ORDER 1.. This Transfer C.M.P., has been filed by the respondents 2 to 4 in C.M.A. 38 of 2008 on the file of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai praying for a direction to transfer the said proceedings to any other Court of competent jurisdiction after withdrawal of the same from the file of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 2. The factual details as necessary for the disposal of the transfer petition are as under: A suit in O.S. No. 7061 of 2007 has been preferred by the first respondent before the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai against the petitioners as well as the Bishop of Kanniyakumari Dioceses Council praying for a decree of declaration that the resolution passed in the meeting of the Kanniyakumari Dioceses Council CSI at its meeting held on 3.3.2007 removing the first respondent from the position of Correspondent of Technical Education as illegal and null and void and for other consequential reliefs. In the said suit, the revision petitioners have entered appearance and contested the matter. Along with the suit, the first respondent also filed an application in I.A. No. 18284 of 2007 praying for an order of interlocutory injunction to restrain the petitioners from interfering with his administration and duties as correspondent of Technical Education Board at Kanniyakumari Diocesan Council. The said application was opposed by the revision petitioners by filing counter and ultimately the learned trial judge was pleaded to dismiss the application as per order dated 14.2.2008. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent has filed an appeal before the City Civil Court, Chennai and the matter was taken on file in C.M.A. 38 of 2008 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. In the said appeal, notice was issued to the revision petitioners and the appeal was posted on 12.6.2000 for hearing. On appearance of the revision petitioner, the matter was advanced to 9.6.2008 and the counsel for the first respondent being the appellant in the civil miscellaneous petition advanced his arguments on the said date of hearing. In the said appeal, notice was issued to the revision petitioners and the appeal was posted on 12.6.2000 for hearing. On appearance of the revision petitioner, the matter was advanced to 9.6.2008 and the counsel for the first respondent being the appellant in the civil miscellaneous petition advanced his arguments on the said date of hearing. It was further contended in the transfer petition that after the arguments were over on the side of the first respondent, the learned IV Additional Judge posed a question to the counsel for the petitioner as to what would be his answer to the part of the arguments advanced on the side of the first respondent, and to this, learned counsel answered that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the very suit as no cause of action had arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of City Civil Court, Chennai. Immediately, the learned trial judge opined that since the Synod Constitution has been invoked, the City Civil Court, Chennai has got jurisdiction to try the case. When this fact was intimated to the fourth petitioner by his counsel, on the next day, the deponent has made enquiries and having ascertained the name of the Presiding Officer, the deponent was convinced that, the said Presiding Officer is enmically indisposed of against him, the reason being that he was practicing in the Courts of Nagercoil and other Courts at Kanniyakumari and the Presiding Officer also was practicing in the very same Court and he has appeared against the deponent in a number of cases as an advocate and there were heated exchange of words between them and as such their relationship strained in the course of time. It was further contended that in the matrimonial dispute between the Presiding Officer and his wife, he advised the Hon’ble Presiding Officer to rejoin with his first wife instead of going for a divorce and this also contributed for the strained relationship between them and as such the deponent was convinced that he will not get justice from the Presiding Officer and consequently, the transfer petition has been preferred. 4. The prayer in the transfer petition was opposed by the first respondent by filing counter. 4. The prayer in the transfer petition was opposed by the first respondent by filing counter. It is the contention of the first respondent that along with the appeal in C.M.A. 38 of 2008, he has also filed application in C.M.P. 725 of 2008 seeking an order of status quo as on 14.2.2008 and restoration of the post of Correspondent, Technical Education Board as he had the benefit of an order of status quo during the pendency of the proceedings in I.A. 18284 of 2007 in O.S. No. 7061 of 2007. The appeal was originally posted on 24.1.2008 and on that date, the counsel for the fourth petitioner being the deponent in the transfer petition filed vakalath and counter and undertook: to file vakalath on behalf of the first respondent in the appeal. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to 28.4.2008 and on the said date of hearing, the respondents 1 to 4 entered appearance and took time for counter. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to be posted on 29.4.2008 for filing counter. The matter was later adjourned to 2.6.2008 for enquiry. When the matter came up on 2.6.2008, the application for interim order in C.M.P. No. 725 of 2008 was taken. The learned Judge observed that, he would hear the main appeal itself instead of the interlocutory application and accordingly the application was posted along with the appeal. Since the case was adjourned by a longer date, the first respondent filed an application on 3.6.2008 for advancing the hearing to an early date and accordingly,- the same was allowed with the consent of the petitioners and the matter was advanced to 9.6.2008. As scheduled, the counsel for the first respondent commenced his arguments on 9.6.2008 and the case was adjourned to 10.6.2008 for further hearing. On 12.6.2008, counsel for the first respondent completed his arguments and the counsel for the petitioners were duly present on all those dates of hearing. After conclusion of the arguments on the side of the first respondent, the matter was adjourned to 16.6.2008 for the arguments on the side of the petitioners. On 16.6.2008, the petitioners sought adjournment and accordingly it who posted to 17.6.2008 and on that date, the petitioners filed a memo informing the Court, of the stay granted by the High Court in the transfer petition filed by them. 5. On 16.6.2008, the petitioners sought adjournment and accordingly it who posted to 17.6.2008 and on that date, the petitioners filed a memo informing the Court, of the stay granted by the High Court in the transfer petition filed by them. 5. The first respondent further contended in the counter that the learned trial judge was not inclined to grant interim order in favour of the first respondent during the pendency of the appeal and that was the reason why the matter was adjourned for the purpose of taking up the very appeal itself. It was further indicated in the counter that only after hearing the arguments advanced on the side of the first respondent and the merits of his case as projected in the arguments that the petitioners have come up with the present application to see that the matter is dragged for some more time till the expiry of the period of the first respondent to be in office. 6. The third respondent, Bishop of Kanniyakumari Diocese also filed a counter, wherein, it was indicated that there is no basis for the apprehension raised by the petitioners inasmuch as according to the Bishop, the proceeding was conducted by the Presiding Officer in a fair and responsible manner. 7. In the above factual background, I have heard Thiru. C. Ravichandran, learned counsel for the petitioner, Thiru. N. Rajan, learned counsel for the first respondent and Thiru. A.R. Nixon, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3. 8. The only point which arise for consideration in the present transfer petition is as to whether the petitioners have made out a case for withdrawal of the proceedings in C.M.A. No. 38 of 2008 from the file of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 9. The suit in O.S. No. 7061 of 2008 has been preferred by the first respondent against the revision petitioners and others and the dispute is between the petitioners 1 to 3 being the defendants 2 to 4 as well as the first respondent being the plaintiff. The declaration sought for in the suit also pertains to the resolution passed by the second petitioner as well as the consequential acts in pursuance of the said resolution removing the first respondent from the poet of correspondent. The declaration sought for in the suit also pertains to the resolution passed by the second petitioner as well as the consequential acts in pursuance of the said resolution removing the first respondent from the poet of correspondent. The fourth petitioner being the Secretary is only acting on the basis of the authority given by the petitioners 1 to 3 and as such there is no lis between the fourth petitioner and the first respondent. 10. In the affidavit filed in support of the transfer petition, it is the case of the fourth petitioner that both himself and the Presiding Officer were practicing before the Courts at Nagercoil and Kanniyakumari and he had appeared in a large number of cases against the Presiding Officer and there were heated exchange of words between them during such practice and as such their relationship got strained. Another reason alleged in support of the bias of the Presiding Officer pertains to the approach made by the wife of the Presiding Officer for counseling before the fourth petitioner and his advise given to the learned Presiding Officer to avoid a possible divorce and to rejoin with his first wife. These are the two reasons which weighed with the fourth petitioner to entertain an apprehension that he will not get justice from the Presiding Officer. When the deponent was informed by his counsel from Chennai that the learned Presiding Officer made a comment that the suit is maintainable as the first respondent has invoked Synod Constitution, he realised that the Presiding Officer still had the animosity against him. Therefore, in such circumstances, the fourth petitioner has moved the present transfer petition with the association of petitioners 1 to 3. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioners are not making any kind of allegations against the Presiding Officer and it is only the apprehension of the fourth petitioner that made them to file the application for transfer. 12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that there is no supporting affidavit from the petitioners 1 to 3 pertaining to their prayer for transfer and the entire action is the spade work of the fourth petitioner to further his interest and that the Church as well as the Bishop does not have any objection in continuing with the proceedings before the Court. It was further contended that the matter cannot be transferred at the instance of the fourth petitioner, who is only an Officer working under the petitioners 1 to 3 and as such, the transfer petition has to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the Bishop of Kanniyakumari Diocese also contended that there is no basis in the apprehension raised by the petitioners and on the grounds as projected in the case no case could be transferred and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the application. 14. The only apprehension raised by the petitioners pertain to the strained relationship between the deponent being the fourth petitioner in the transfer petition and the Presiding Officer as both were practicing before the very same Courts at Nagercoil and Kanniyakumari at one point of time. The grievance of the fourth petitioner is that as the Presiding Officer appeared against him in number or cases and there were heated exchange or words between them during the course of such hearing, their relationship got strained and to add fuel to fire, deponent also interfered in the matrimonial matter between the Presiding Officer and his first wife. All this made the Presiding Officer to develop a sort of enmity against the fourth petitioner. 15. The question is whether heated exchange of words between two counsel appearing on behalf of two contesting parties in a particular matter had the effect of developing enmity between the counsel. The counsel appearing for a party is an Officer of the Court. The petitioner appeared for his client only to prosecute the case of the party and the counsel appeared for the other side was interested only to defend the interest of his client within the frame work of law. At times on a particular point there might be arguments between the counsel inside the Court room and the moment the proceeding is over, the counsel leaves the Court as friends. It is also quite common for senior members of the bar to advise junior members both in the practice of profession as well as in their family matters and on account of such advise, it cannot be said that the junior members of the bar would become enmically indisposed of against such senior members. It is also quite common for senior members of the bar to advise junior members both in the practice of profession as well as in their family matters and on account of such advise, it cannot be said that the junior members of the bar would become enmically indisposed of against such senior members. In case transfer petitions are entertained in the manner and on the basis as alleged in the present transfer petition, it will not be possible for any of the Presiding Officers to conduct matters wherein he had to deal with lawyers who had earlier appeared against him while he was practicing the profession of law. 16. The reason for conducting an enquiry by the fourth petitioner to ascertain the name of the Presiding Officer is found to be the question posed by the Presiding Officer to his counsel in respect of the arguments on the side of the first respondent and the observation of the Presiding Officer that the Court at Chennai got jurisdiction in view of the Provisions of Synod Constitution. 17. It is found from the plaint in O.S. No. 7061 of 2007 that the. Church of South India at Royapettah, Chennai has been impleaded as the first defendant in the suit. In the cause of action paragraph, it was specifically pleaded by the first respondent that the office of the Church of South India is within the jurisdiction of Courts at Chennai and as such the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 18. The Presiding Officer of IV Additional City Civil Court appears to be a participating Judge which is evident from the averments in the transfer petition. It cannot be said that the Presiding Officer is not expected to put questions during the course of hearing. In order to appreciate the real controversy involved in the matter and for effective adjudication of the lis, it is permissible for the Court to put questions to the counsel and at times, it is not uncommon for the Court to put questions to the counsel on the other side after hearing the arguments on the side of the petitioner or plaintiff and such questions are made only for the purpose of enabling the respondent to offer their remarks and those questions cannot be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. It is possible for the other side to substantiate their case by way of materials and to show that there are no basis in the contention of the petitioner in respect of which questions were put by the learned Judge. Merely because the Presiding Officer has asked certain questions to the parties, it cannot be said that he is biased and that he is enmically indisposed of against a party to the proceedings. 19. Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act gives power to the Judge to put questions to the parties irrespective of as to whether it is relevant or irrelevant. It is useful to extract the said provision for better appreciation: “165. Judge’s power to put questions or order production- The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved: Provided also that this Section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under Sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the questions were asked or the documents were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under Section 148 or 149; nor shall be dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.” 20. In State of Rajasthan v. Ani Alias Hanif and Others AIR 1997 SC 1023 : (1997) 6 SCC 162 , the Apex Court considered the scope and ambit of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act and observed thus: “11. We are unable to appreciate the above criticism. In State of Rajasthan v. Ani Alias Hanif and Others AIR 1997 SC 1023 : (1997) 6 SCC 162 , the Apex Court considered the scope and ambit of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act and observed thus: “11. We are unable to appreciate the above criticism. Section 163 of the Evidence Act confers vast and unrestricted powers on the trial Court to put “any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant” in order to discover relevant facts. The said Section was framed by lavishly studding it with the word “any” which could only have been inspired by the legislative intent to confer unbridled power on the trial Court to use the power whenever he deems it necessary to elicit truth. Even if any such question crosses into irrelevancy the same would not transgress beyond the contours of powers of the Court. This is clear from the words “relevant or irrelevant” in Section 165. Neither of the parties has any right to raise objection to any such question. 12. Reticence may be good in many circumstances, but a Judge remaining mute during trial is not an ideal situation. A taciturn Judge may be the model caricatured in public mind. But there is nothing wrong in his becoming active or dynamic during trial so that, criminal justice being the end could be achieved. Criminal trial should not turn out to be a bout or combat between two rival sides with the Judge performing the role only of a spectator or even an umpire to pronounce finally who won the race. A Judge is expected to actively participate in the trial, elicit necessary materials from witnesses in the appropriate context which he feels necessary for reaching the correct conclusion. There is nothing which inhibits his power to put questions to the witnesses, either during chief examination or cross-examination or even during re-examination to elicit truth. The corollary of it is that if a Judge felt that a witness has committed an error or a slip it is the duty of the Judge to ascertain whether it was so, for, to err is human and the chances of erring may accelerate under stress of nervousness during cross-examination.” 21. The corollary of it is that if a Judge felt that a witness has committed an error or a slip it is the duty of the Judge to ascertain whether it was so, for, to err is human and the chances of erring may accelerate under stress of nervousness during cross-examination.” 21. In the matter of : ‘K’ a Judicial Officer, AIR 2001 SC 972 : (2001) 3 SCC 54 , the Apex Court underlined the requirement of Judicial Officers to be bold and fearless and observed thus: “7. A Judge entrusted with the task of administering justice should be bold and feel fearless while acting judicially and giving expression to his views and constructing his judgment or order. It should be no deterrent to formation and expression of an honest opinion and acting thereon so long as it is within four-corners of law that any action taken by a subordinate judicial officer is open to scrutiny in judicial review before a superior forum with which its opinion may not meet approval and the superior Court may upset his action or opinion. The availability of such fearlessness is essential for the maintenance of judicial independence. However, sobriety, cool, calm and poise should be reflected in every action and expression of a Judge.” 22. It is trite that appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and when there is a power conferred upon the Judge to put any kind of questions to a party or to a witness whether relevant or irrelevant, it cannot be said that the Presiding Officer conducted the matter in such a manner which amounts to bias warranting an order of transfer from its file. 23. A conjoint reading of the grounds raised in the affidavit filed in support of the transfer petition shows that the apprehension raised by the petitioner is not enough to order transfer of the proceeding. Mere apprehension is not sufficient. There should be reasonable basis for such apprehension or as otherwise it would be possible for unscrupulous litigants to come up with a string of such apprehension with ulterior motives to get the matter transferred from the file of a particular Court either with an intention to choose the forum or with an intention to drag on the very proceedings. Nobody should be permitted to make slanderous, wild and false allegations against Judicial Officers which would malign the entire judicial system. Nobody should be permitted to make slanderous, wild and false allegations against Judicial Officers which would malign the entire judicial system. Confidence in the judicial system is of paramount importance. Any attempt to shake the confidence of the public in the justice delivery system would have serious consequence. Judiciary being the last resort to redress the grievances of the public, great responsibility is cast on the Courts to do justice and in an impartial manner. In case parties are allowed to get the matters transferred on account of such flimsy reasons, flood gate would be opened. The Subordinate Judiciary is the pillar of the very judicial system and it should be the endeavour of everybody, to strengthen and safeguard this pillar rather than to weaken its base. 24. While deciding an application for transfer of proceedings, the paramount consideration would be the ends of justice. In case, if it is demonstrated that the trial in the judicial forum would result in denial of justice to a party to the proceeding, the same is a valid ground to order transfer of proceedings. There cannot be any straight jacket formula in such cases and each case depends on the peculiar facts of such case. But for transfer of a proceeding on the basis of loss of confidence in the Presiding Officer or on the ground of bias, mere apprehension is not sufficient. There should be factual foundation or reasonable basis for such apprehension. It is true that the apprehension has to be looked into from the angle of the petitioner in the transfer petition. Even then, there should be materials to form the basis for such apprehension and the proceedings cannot be transferred for mere asking and in a routine manner. 25. In Gurcharan Dass Chadha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 1418 , the Apex Court considered the question of apprehension as a basis for transfer of proceedings and observed thus: “The law with regard to transfer of case is well settled. A case is transferred if there is a reasonable apprehension on the part of a party to a case that justice will not be done. A petitioner is not required to demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. He is entitled to a transfer if he shows circumstances from which it can be inferred that he entertains an apprehension and that it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. A petitioner is not required to demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. He is entitled to a transfer if he shows circumstances from which it can be inferred that he entertains an apprehension and that it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. It is one of the principles of the administration of justice that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to be done. However, a mere allegation that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case does not suffice. The Court has further to see whether the apprehension is reasonable or not. To judge of the reasonableness of the apprehension the state of the mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must not only be entertained, but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension.” 26. While considering the question of bias in a proceeding before Court Martial, the Apex Court referred to the observation of Frankfurther, J. in the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak and other English cases and observed thus: 7. “As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party. The proper approach for the Judge is not to look at his own mind and ask himself, however, honestly, “am I biased?” but to look at the mind of the party before him. Lord Esher in Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750 at p.758 said: “The question is not, whether in fact he was or was not biased. Lord Esher in Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750 at p.758 said: “The question is not, whether in fact he was or was not biased. The Court cannot inquire into that.......in the administration of justice, whether by a recognised legal Court or by persons who, although not a legal public Court, are acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires that, in order that there should be no doubt about the purity of the administration any person who is to take part in it should not be In ouch a position that he might be suspected of being biased.” In Metropolitan Properties C.(F.G.C) Ltd. v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 at p 599 Lord Denning M.R. observed: “.…… in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the Court, does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the Tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be nevertheless if right minded persons would think that in the circumstance, there was a real likelihood of blame on his part, then he should not sit......”. Frankfurther, In Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak, (1951) 343 US 451 at p. 466 said: “The judicial process demands that a judge move within the framework of relevant legal rules and the Court covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole Judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are interested. But it is also true that reason cannot control the sub-conscious influence of feelings of which it is unaware. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are interested. But it is also true that reason cannot control the sub-conscious influence of feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for believing that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are operating, Judges rescue themselves. They do not sit in judgment.” 27. In Ms. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another v. Miss. Rani Jethmalani AIR 1979 SC 468 : (1979) 4 SCC 167 , the Apex Court considered the issue of transfer of criminal proceedings and speaking for the Bench Mr. Justice. V.R. Krishna Iyer observed thus: “2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the Court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more compelling from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner’s grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any Court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle, the Court may weigh the circumstances.” 28. In an identical situation, the Apex Court considered the transfer petition filed by a former minister in the State of Kerala praying for withdrawal of proceedings from a particular Bench and to transfer the same from the High Court of Kerala to any other High Court on the ground that the learned Judge had effectively worked against him as an advocate before Justice K. Sukumaran Commission of Inquiry and therefore the petitioner bona fide apprehended that the learned Judge would be prejudiced against him in spite of passage of time and his elevation as a Judge. However, the Apex Court in R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala AIR 2000 SC 2778 : (2000) 7 SCC 129 rejected his prayer for transfer by holding that there is no remotest chances or justification for entertaining apprehension that petitioner would not get justice if the appeal is decided by the Bench to whom it is assigned and observed thus: “…. we would further state that in this country there is complete separation of the judiciary from the executive and Judges are not influenced in any manner either by the propaganda or adverse publicity. Cases are decided on the basis of the evidence available on record and the law applicable. Granting such application and transferring the appeal from the High Court of Kerala to the High Court of Karnataka would result in casting unjustified aspersion on the Court having jurisdiction to decide the appeal on the assumption that its judicial verdict is consciously or subconsciously affected by the popular frenzy, official wrath or adverse publicity, which is not the position qua the judicial administration in this country. We would also mention that at the time of hearing the learned counsel has not raised this contention. 10. Further, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that one of the Judges of the Bench was appointed and has worked as an advocate to assist Justice K. Sukumaran Commission to inquire into malpractices in the execution of the rectification work in the hydroelectric project called Edamalayar Project and, therefore, the petitioner is not likely to get justice if the appeal is decided by the said Bench, deserves to be rejected. It is true that one of the principles of the administration of justice is that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to have been done. However, a mere allegation that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case is not sufficient. Before transferring the case, the Court has to find out whether the apprehension appears to be reasonable. To judge the reasonableness of the apprehension, the state of mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must appear to the Court to be reasonable, genuine and justifiable. Before transferring the case, the Court has to find out whether the apprehension appears to be reasonable. To judge the reasonableness of the apprehension, the state of mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must appear to the Court to be reasonable, genuine and justifiable. In the present-day scenario, if these types of applications are entertained, the entire judicial atmosphere would be polluted with such frivolous petitions for various reasons.” 29. The learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Kulwinder Kaur alias Kulwinder v. Kandi Friends Education Trust and Others (2008) 3 SCC 659 : (2008) 3 MLJ 511 contended that reasonable apprehension in mind of the litigant is a valid ground for transfer. There is no quarrel with the legal proposition as found in the judgment of the Apex Court cited supra. But the issue in the present case is as to whether the apprehension raised by the petitioner in sufficient to order transfer of the case from the file of the learned Appellate Judge. The apprehension raised by the petitioner has no factual basis as is found from the affidavit filed by the fourth petitioner. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.K. Ghosh I.A.S. and Another v. J.G. Rajput AIR 1996 SC 513 for his contention that in case of bias, it is appropriate that the learned Judge should rescue himself from Bench in a particular matter. The said judgment has absolutely no application with the present case inasmuch as in P.K. Ghosh I.A.S. and Another v. J.G. Rajput (supra) the admitted factual position was that the very Judge who heard the Contempt Petition along with a senior Judge was the counsel for the contempt petitioner in the Original Proceeding, the non-compliance of the order of which has given rise to the petition for contempt. It was in such circumstances, the Apex Court observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge should have rescued himself from hearing contempt petition particularly when a specific objection to this effect was taken by the appellants that the learned Judge had earlier appeared for the petitioner in the contempt petition and against the contemnor in the very same proceeding and it was only in respect of the said order that the act of contempt has been alleged. The facts of the said case is entirely different from the present case and the said judgment has no application in the factual situation except for the legal proposition enunciated by the Apex Court. 31. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Sangeetha S. Chugh v. Ram Narayan V. and Others AIR 1995 Kar. 112 where it was held thus: “As regards the second point, in the course of the trial of any case, when the matter is being heard the Presiding Officer might express some opinions so as to elicit further information from the contestant. It does not mean that he would have made up his mind with respect to the decision to be taken in the case. When discussions are held and arguments are heard, a Presiding Officer is entitled to disclose his mind so that the respective counsels can follow the trend of the Court and offer an appropriate explanation or reply. Such discussion only helps to clear the disputed questions in the case. It is too much to say that if any statements are made, it means that the Presiding Officer has made up his mind with respect to the decision in the case. If this be the position, no case can be heard by any Court. It cannot be expected that the Judges should be silent without expressing any opinion. A sphinx like attitude is not expected from the Presiding Officer especially when he is trying a matrimonial case or litigation between very near relation. There should be an effective discussion, an effective attempt to conciliate and an effective attempt, to clarify the misunderstanding so that the dispute can be settled or a just and proper declaration can be drawn by the Presiding Officer. There should be an effective discussion, an effective attempt to conciliate and an effective attempt, to clarify the misunderstanding so that the dispute can be settled or a just and proper declaration can be drawn by the Presiding Officer. If in that process, the Presiding Officer makes any comments on merits of the case, it cannot be misunderstood as an expression of the decision.” 32. Thiru. A.R. Nixon, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 by placing reliance on the judgment by this Court in G. Lakshmi Ammal v. Elumalai Chettiar and Others AIR 1981 Mad. 24 and in Ratanlal v. Suresh Kumar AIR 1987 Madhya Pradesh 178 contended that mere apprehension is not sufficient to pass an order of withdrawal of came from the file of a particular Court. 33. In G. Lakshmi Ammal v. Elumalai Chettiar and Others (supra), a learned Judge of this Court observed that any expression of opinion by a learned Judge would by itself is not sufficient to warrant transfer of a subsequent proceeding. 34. In Ratanlal v. Suresh Kumar (supra) a learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court considered the issue of transfer on the ground of observation made by the Presiding Officer and held thus: “12. Transfer can only be ordered when the party has reasonable apprehension that justice will be denied to him. The mere fact that the party has suspicion in this regard would no, constitute a valid ground for transfer. The fact that the Judge has taken a particular view in other case is no ground for transfer because by arguments it may be persuaded to change his view. A judicial order passed by a Judge cannot legitimately be made the foundation for a transfer application. The proper remedy against it is by way of an appeal or revision.” 35. It is true that Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the High Court or the District Court to entertain an application for transfer. The said provision does not prescribe any ground for ordering transfer. All that is necessary is that the Court should act judicially to meet the ends of justice. 36. The Apex Court in Jitendra Singh v. Bhanu Kumari and Others (2008) 5 MLJ 373 : 2008 (6) Scale 594 considered the issue relating to general power of transfer and withdrawal as provided under Section 24 of C.P.C and held thus: “9. All that is necessary is that the Court should act judicially to meet the ends of justice. 36. The Apex Court in Jitendra Singh v. Bhanu Kumari and Others (2008) 5 MLJ 373 : 2008 (6) Scale 594 considered the issue relating to general power of transfer and withdrawal as provided under Section 24 of C.P.C and held thus: “9. ….. The purpose of Section 24 C.P.C is merely to confer on the Court a discretionary power. A Court acting under Section 24 C.P.C may or may not in its judicial discretion transfer a particular case. Section 24 does not prescribe any ground for ordering the transfer of a case. In certain cases it may be ordered suo motu and it may be done for administrative reasons. But when an application for transfer is made by a party, the Court is required to issue notice to the other side and hear the party before directing transfer. To put it differently, the Court must act judicially in ordering a transfer on the application of a party......” 37. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out a case for transfer of the proceedings from the file of the learned IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai and as such the transfer petition is liable to be dismissed. 38. Accordingly, the Transfer C.M.P., is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Petition dismissed.