JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri B.C. Rai for the petitioner and Sri Naveen Sinha, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri O.P. Misra and Vinay Saran, Advocates, for the respondents. The pleadings are complete and, therefore, as requested and agreed by the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition has been heard finally at this stage under the Rules of the Court and is being decided herewith. 2. Aggrieved by the recovery proceedings initiated by Industrial Finance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘IFCI’ in short) against the assets of M/s Shiva Paper Mills Ltd. (petitioner No. 1), a company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Delhi and works at village Mau, District Rampur, the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed challenging notices dated 8.1.2008, 19.2.2008 and 1/2.5.2008, Annexures- 7, 8 and 9 respectively, issued under Section 13 (2) and (4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act 2002’), mainly on the ground that no proceedings for recovery can continue by virtue of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1985 Act’), when an appeal under 1985 Act is pending before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (in short ‘AAIFR’). 3. The moot questions need to be answered are whether pendency of appeal under Section 25 of 1985 Act means continuance or pendency of reference under Section 15 of the 1985 Act, and, if that is so, when a creditor representing 3/4th or more in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower takes step for recovery of the amount under Section 13(4) of Act 2002, the reference/appeal would abate or not by virtue of Section 15 (third proviso) of 1985 Act. 4. Brief facts, giving rise to the present dispute, are that the petitioner No. 1 is a company established for the business of manufacture of writing, printing tissue papers. The petitioner No. 2 is the Director of the said company. The petitioner No. 1 obtained certain loan from IFCI and furnished its movable and immovable property as security. 4. Brief facts, giving rise to the present dispute, are that the petitioner No. 1 is a company established for the business of manufacture of writing, printing tissue papers. The petitioner No. 2 is the Director of the said company. The petitioner No. 1 obtained certain loan from IFCI and furnished its movable and immovable property as security. Besides IFCI, the petitioner No. 1 also obtained loan or financial assistance from Industrial Development Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘IDBI’), Bank of Baroda, Canara Bank and Union Bank of India and also furnished corresponding security to those financial institutions. It is said that the Company suffered huge losses and its net worth fully eroded. It made a reference on 13.1.2003 under Section 15 of 1985 Act to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (in short ‘BIFR’). The said reference was registered as case No. 131 of 2003 as communicated by letter dated 12.3.2003 of Registrar, BIFR. After examining the matter, the BIFR vide order dated 8.9.2003 passed under Section 15(1) of 1985 Act, appointed IFCI as operating agency and declared petitioner No. 1 as ‘sick industrial company’ under 1985 Act. Despite deliberations entered with various financial institutions and the petitioner No. 1, the BIFR ultimately could not find out any possibility of revival. Hence, by order dated 14.11.2005, BIFR recorded its opinion for winding up of the company in terms of Section 20(1) of 1985 Act and directed to forward the record to High Court for further action. It also restrained the petitioner-company from disposing of its assets without prior approval of BIFR till an order is passed by High Court in respect to winding up of the company. The petitioner No. 1, aggrieved thereto, preferred an appeal No. 180 of 2005 before AAIFR under Section 25 of 1985 Act. Though an application for stay was also filed before AAIFR, but there is nothing on record to show that any interim order was passed by the appellate authority staying order dated 14.11.2005 of BIFR. The matter, it is said, is pending before the appellate authority. In the meantime, IFCI sent a letter dated 31.1.2006 declaring and calling upon the petitioner No. 1 to pay a sum of Rs. 66,49,75,542/- to IFCI being the outstanding dues as on 15.1.2006, together with further interest thereon at the contractual rate till payment. IFCI, thereafter, declared a total sum of Rs. In the meantime, IFCI sent a letter dated 31.1.2006 declaring and calling upon the petitioner No. 1 to pay a sum of Rs. 66,49,75,542/- to IFCI being the outstanding dues as on 15.1.2006, together with further interest thereon at the contractual rate till payment. IFCI, thereafter, declared a total sum of Rs. 94,84,84,255/- outstanding as on 30.11.2007, the break-up whereof, is as under : Principal - Rs. 18,74,63,223 Interest - Rs. 76,05,05,825 Other debts - Rs. 5,15,207 Total - Rs. 94,84,84,255 5. In purported exercise of power under Section 13 (1) of the Act 2002, IFCI issued a notice dated 8.1.2008 requiring the petitioner No. 1 to pay Rs. 94,84,84,255/- being outstanding dues as on 30.11.2007 along with further interest till payment failing which recourse in terms of Section 13 (4) of the Act 2002 would be taken. It also prohibited petitioner No. 1 from transferring, in any manner, the secured assets without prior written consent of IFCI. Another notice to the same effect was issued by IFCI on 18/19.2.2008. Thereafter, on 2.5.2008 the IFCI served a possession notice upon the petitioner No. 1 stating that they have taken possession of the secured assets on 1.5.2008 and the same shall be put for sale on or after 1.6.2008 in any of the modes mentioned in Rule 8 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘2002 Rules’). Aggrieved by these notices, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the said proceedings initiated by IFCI in this writ petition. 6. Sri B.C. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Section 22 of 1985 Act restrains any creditor etc. from proceeding to recover under any law except with the consent of BIFR or AAIFR as the case may be. Referring to Section 41 and the Schedule of the Act 2002, he pointed out that if a secured creditor takes steps under Section 13 (4) of Act 2002, the reference if is pending before BIFR, only in that case, such a reference shall stand abated but the same has no application to an appeal under Section 25 of 1985 Act pending before AAIFR. He contented that construing all the provisions of both the Acts harmoniously, the inescapable conclusion would be that if an appeal is pending before AAIFR, no recovery proceeding shall lie except with the consent of the appellate authority as provided under Section 22 of 1985 Act and nothing contained in the Act 2002 provides for a situation contrary thereto. He, thus, argued that the respondent No. 1, i.e., IFCI has erred in law by initiating proceedings under Section 13 (4) of Act 2002 and notifying a date for auction of the property without obtaining consent from AAIFR. Placing reliance on the Apex Court’s decision in Union of India and another v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323 and Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, 2001 (8) SCC 61 , he submitted that the Court shall decide law as it is and not what it should be. Since the Act 2002 has made amendment in 1985 Act for providing abatement of the reference if pending before BIFR, there is no reason to read therein the words which would extend its scope to an appeal pending before AAIFR also as that would amount to adding certain words which actually are not there. Referring to the “Statutory Interpretation” by Justice G.P. Singh (9th Edition, 2004), Chapter 3 Page 185, he contended that the proviso must be construed in relation to the subject matter covered by the Section to which it is appended and should not be given an extended meaning and fortify his submission by placing reliance on the Apex Court’s decision in Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimahaiam and others, 2008 (5) SCC 176 . 7. Referring to certain other enactments providing for abatement of certain proceedings, Sri Rai contended that wherever the legislature intended abatement of all proceedings including original as well as appellate, they have used the words ‘all proceedings’ or such words wide enough to include said proceedings. In 1985 Act, the legislature, by third proviso to Section 15 of 1985 Act, however has provided only for reference pending before BIFR and not more than that. He, therefore, submitted that this Court should not accept any interpretation which may enlarge the meaning of reference by extending it to the ‘appellate proceedings’. In 1985 Act, the legislature, by third proviso to Section 15 of 1985 Act, however has provided only for reference pending before BIFR and not more than that. He, therefore, submitted that this Court should not accept any interpretation which may enlarge the meaning of reference by extending it to the ‘appellate proceedings’. He contended that 1985 Act was enacted to secure principles specified in Article 39 of the Constitution so as to give effect to the larger public interest and, therefore, it should be given primacy as held by the Apex Court in Tata Motors Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd. and another, JT 2008(9) SC 227. 8. He has tried to substantiate his argument from different angles and also by citing the authorities of the Apex Court on the interpretation of the statute providing that the Courts should not extend the meaning of the words of statute as that would amount to legislation. 9. Per contra, Sri Naveen Sinha, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents, submitted that the abatement of proceedings as provided vide third proviso to Section 15 of 1985 Act is by operation of law, i.e., ipso facto and would operate as soon as a secured creditor, having interest of not less than 3/4 in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditor, takes steps to recover its secured debts under Section 13 (4) of the Act 2002. Referring to Section 35 of 2002 Act, he said that provisions of Act 2002 shall prevail over any other law which is inconsistent for the time being in force and in view of the non-obstante clause provided therein, Act 2002 shall prevail over 1985 Act. He further contended that a statutory appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. In the present case, when the statute provides for abatement of reference, the same would be applicable to the appellate stage also otherwise it would cause anomalous and contradictory situation, which, as a prudent interpretation, should not be attempted. There is no reason for giving a limited meaning to the words ‘reference’ and ‘BIFR’ under Section 15 of 1985 Act. In the present case, when the statute provides for abatement of reference, the same would be applicable to the appellate stage also otherwise it would cause anomalous and contradictory situation, which, as a prudent interpretation, should not be attempted. There is no reason for giving a limited meaning to the words ‘reference’ and ‘BIFR’ under Section 15 of 1985 Act. He, therefore, submitted that as soon as proceedings are initiated by IFCI under Section 13 (4) of the Act 2002, the appellate proceedings pending before AAIFR under Section 25 of 1985 Act shall stand abated and IFCI is justified in proceeding ahead in accordance with the procedure of 2002 Act. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the Apex Court’s decision in Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and others, JT 2001 (2) SC 639; a Division Bench judgment of Hon’ble Punjab High Court in Triveni Yarns Limited v. Punjab Financial Corporation and others, (2002) 2 PLR 286 ; a Division Bench Judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Ravi Spinning Ltd. and others v. Union of India and another, 2002 (2) Mh LJ 145 and an unreported decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Punjab National Bank and others v. AAIFR and others, decided on 26.5.2008. 10. Besides oral arguments learned counsels for the parties have also filed written submissions. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as the written submissions and various authorities on the subject. 12. In nutshell the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that Section 15, 3rd proviso of 1985 Act provides for abatement of reference pending before BIFR under the said Act if step for recovery is taken by a financial institution under 2002 Act whose interest is not less than 3/4 of the value of the outstanding amount and the said words should be read strictly so as not to extend to the appellate proceedings pending before the AAIFR under 1985 Act. That being so, in view of Section 22 of 1985 Act, recovery proceedings under 2002 Act shall remain suspended till the matter is pending before AAIFR and, IFCI would have no authority to proceed for recovery under 2002 Act without obtaining consent from AAIFR. 13. That being so, in view of Section 22 of 1985 Act, recovery proceedings under 2002 Act shall remain suspended till the matter is pending before AAIFR and, IFCI would have no authority to proceed for recovery under 2002 Act without obtaining consent from AAIFR. 13. Sri Sinha, however, has opposed the above contention contending that the 2002 Act on the one hand has overriding effect over any other law and secondly he submits that for the purpose of abatement under Section 15 even the appellate proceedings under 1985 Act are within its ambit and cannot be excluded as that would defeat the very purpose of legislature in making provision for abatement of reference under Section 15. 14. The issue though is very short but has wider ramifications and, therefore, we propose to consider the same in a little comprehensiveness. 15. The two statutes which are up for consideration before us have different fields of operation, purpose and objective. One takes care of health of industries and industrial development in the country while the later one takes care of Financial Industries, public revenue and its recovery in a speedier and expeditious manner without being involved in bottleneckness and handicapness of different nature. The later Act is a latest version for providing modes of speedy recovery of dues of unpaid financial assistance provided by the banks and financial institutions despite of having secured assets against such debt which has caused not only a very staggering increase of non-performing assets of the banks and financial institutions but has also caused serious problem to such institutions for making funds available to other industries for achieving rapid industrial and economic development in the country. Such speedy mode of recovery by making special statutory provision is not only a noble idea depicted by 2002 Act but is an improvement of certain earlier legislations operating in the field whether enacted by the State legislature or Central legislature. 16. If we recapitulate and look into the past, to start with we find “Revenue Recovery Act, 1890” (hereinafter referred to as the “1890 Act”) enacted for providing a speedy method of recovery of arrears of land revenue or a sum recoverable as arrears of land revenue. 16. If we recapitulate and look into the past, to start with we find “Revenue Recovery Act, 1890” (hereinafter referred to as the “1890 Act”) enacted for providing a speedy method of recovery of arrears of land revenue or a sum recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Prior thereto it was only in Madras that such an enactment was made i.e. Madras Revenue Recovery Act (Act No. 2 of 1864) but after the enactment of 1890 Act, several enactments were made by different States. In the post constitutional era, with the enactment of certain special statutes providing for financial assistance to industries etc. the provisions were made therein for speedy recovery of dues of such financial institutions. For example, in the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 special provisions were made for recovery under Sections 29, 31 and 32-G of the Act. In the State of U.P., the U.P. Recovery of Public Dues Recovery Act, 1972 was enacted for speedy recovery of public monies. In respect to the higher public debts i.e. beyond 10 lacs the legislature thought to provide for a different recovery forum and also an adjudicatory body so as to settle disputes which used to delay recovery of such amount and with that intent, “Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993” (hereinafter referred to as the “1993 Act’) was enacted. 17. With the pace of development of economy and in particular considering the lack of level playing field between the banks and financial institutions in the country with other financiers operating at international level, the legislature thought it fit to enact a law with sharper teeth so as to have the power to recover its dues from industrial debtors at least against secured assets, with a greater pace and with the least intervention of outside agency. Consequently the Act, 2002 was enacted which empower the banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sale them or to transfer the same to securitisation company or reconstructions company, as the case may be, so as to reduce its non-performing assets. 18. Consequently the Act, 2002 was enacted which empower the banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sale them or to transfer the same to securitisation company or reconstructions company, as the case may be, so as to reduce its non-performing assets. 18. The essence of 2002 Act was the power conferred upon the securitisation company or reconstructions company to acquire financial assets of any bank or financial institutions, transfer or dispose of excess pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal expeditiously and sale of secured assets of industrial debtors after taking possession thereof without intervention of any third party i.e. enforcement of security interest in favour of a secured creditor without intervention of a Court or tribunal. In order to give full swing to the provisions of 2002 Act, the legislature has not only given overriding effect to Act, 2002 vide Section 35 thereof, but has also made certain amendments in different other statutes for example 1985 Act and 1993 Act (vide Section 41 of the Act, 2002). 19. Section 37 of 2002 Act does not bar application of certain other laws and provides that the provisions of the Act are in addition and not in derogation of (i) Companies Act, 1956, (ii) Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, (iii) Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and (iv) Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 or any other law for the time being in force. It is this provision which is the bone of contention of the petitioner to take recourse to Section 22 of 1985 Act and to contend that since an appeal under Section 25 has not been made to abate vide 3rd proviso to Section 15 of 1985 Act as amended by the Act 2002, therefore, the entire recovery proceedings shall remain suspended vide Section 22 of 1985 Act and the respondent No. 1 has no jurisdiction to proceed with the recovery without the consent of AAIFR. 20. Though both the sides have argued the matter from different angles but in our view first of all it would be necessary to consider the meaning of ‘reference’ under Section 15 of 1985 Act and its effect and scope so as to consider whether it would be extendable to an appeal pending before AAIFR under Section 25 of the Act or not. If we come to the conclusion that the word “reference” would include appeal, Section 15, IIIrd proviso would come into operation to abate the same and thereafter it may not be necessary to consider other aspects of the matter but if we find that an appeal is distinct to reference then only occasion would arise to consider rest of the aspects. For the said purpose we propose to have a glance over the various provisions of 1985 Act. 21. The word “reference” is not defined in the 1985 Act. The Act contemplates establishment of BIFR vide Section 4 and constitution of an appellate authority vide Section 5 thereof. Chapter III deals with the references, inquiries and schemes and Section 15 is titled as “Reference to Board” i.e. BIFR. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 provides, where an industrial company has become sick industrial company i.e. an industrial company having been a company registered for not less than 5 years at the end of any financial year has accumulated losses equal to or exceeded its entire net worth, the Board of Directors of such company shall, within 60 days from the date of finalization of duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year, at the end of which the company has become a sick industrial company, shall make a reference to BIFR for determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company. 22. Since the principal issue revolves around Section 15 of 1985 Act, it would be useful to reproduce the same as under : “15. 22. Since the principal issue revolves around Section 15 of 1985 Act, it would be useful to reproduce the same as under : “15. Reference to Board.—(1) When an industrial company has become a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors of the company, shall, within sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year as at the end of which the company has become a sick industrial company, make a reference to the Board for determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company : Provided that if the Board of Directors had sufficient reasons even before such finalisation to form the opinion that the company had become a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors shall, within sixty days after it has formed such opinion, make a reference to the Board for the determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company : Provided further that no reference shall be made to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction after the commencement of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, where financial assets have been acquired by any securitisation company or reconstruction company under sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of that Act : Provided also that on or after the commencement of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, where a reference is pending before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, such reference shall abate if the secured creditors representing not less than three-fourth in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditors have taken any measures to recover their secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of that Act. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the Central Government or the Reserve Bank or a State Government or a public financial institution or a State level institution or a scheduled bank may, if it has sufficient reasons to believe that any industrial company has become, for the purposes of this Act, a sick industrial company, make a reference in respect of such company to the Board for determination of the measures which may be adopted with respect to such company : Provided that a reference shall not be made under this sub-section in respect of any industrial company by— (a) the Government of any State unless all or any of the industrial undertakings belonging to such company are situated in such State. (b) a public financial institution or a State level institution or a scheduled bank unless it has, by reason of any financial assistance or obligation rendered by it, or undertaken by it, with respect to such company, an interest in such company.” 23. A bare reading of Section 15(1) shows that as soon as an industrial company become a sick industrial company, an intimation shall be given by the Board of Directors of such company to BIFR for determination of the measures which shall be adopted in respect to the such company. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 empowers even the Central Government, Reserve Bank, State Government, a Public Financial Institution, a State Level Institution or a Scheduled Bank to make a similar reference to BIFR if it has sufficient reason to believe that an industrial company has become a sick industrial company for the purpose of 1985 Act. The intent is clear. An industrial company when it becomes sick, the measures which should be adopted by it for its rehabilitation or otherwise, as the case may be, should be determined by the BIFR. An obligation cast on the Board of Directors of such company to intimate BIFR. A discretionary power is given of similar nature, to various other authorities who may also have interest in the welfare of such company. 24. The term “reference” has been used in Section 15 to denote intimation, information and to put BIFR into action for determining measures to be adopted with respect to a company which has become a sick industrial company. 24. The term “reference” has been used in Section 15 to denote intimation, information and to put BIFR into action for determining measures to be adopted with respect to a company which has become a sick industrial company. The term “reference”, therefore, by itself, in the context of the Act, has no technical or juridical meaning except of a stage whereupon the authority under the Act, i.e., BIFR shall get jurisdiction to proceed on. 25. If a company has become a sick industrial company, the obligation to send information is there on the Board of Directors of the company. The BIFR is also under an obligation to proceed further by making such inquiry, as the case may be, as it may deem fit for the purpose of determining measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company. 26. As soon as, such a reference is made, immediately thereafter there are certain consequences and follow up action at various level which may arise or occur. In brief we may note down the same as under : (a) The BIFR may make such inquiry as it may deem fit to find out whether the industrial company has become a sick industrial company. (b) For the purpose of such inquiry the BIFR may appoint an operating agency and also one or more persons to be Special Director or Special Directors of the company to safeguard the financial and other interest of the company or in public interest. (c) Where it is established that a company is a sick industrial company, the BIFR shall decide considering all the relevant facts and circumstances, whether it is practicable to the company to make up its net worth, exceeding accumulated losses, within a reasonable time. (d) Where BIFR finds that it is practicable for the company to make up its net worth, exceeding accumulated losses, within a reasonable time, by an order and subject to such restrictions or conditions, as the case may be, specify in the order, it would require the company to do so. (e) If the BIFR finds otherwise, it would direct any operating agency to prepare a scheme having referred to such guidelines as may be specified in orders for such measures in relations to such company. (e) If the BIFR finds otherwise, it would direct any operating agency to prepare a scheme having referred to such guidelines as may be specified in orders for such measures in relations to such company. (f) The kind of scheme referred to in Section 17(3) shall be prepared by the operating agency considering various measures as provided in Section 18(1) and (2). If such a scheme for rehabilitation of a company is ultimately found practicable, and, sanctioned by BIFR, it shall be enforced. During the period the scheme operates the BIFR is always in power to make modification or to direct for a fresh scheme. Section 18 sub-section (12) clearly provides and empower BIFR for periodical monitoring of the implementation of a sanctioned scheme. (g) If the scheme requires financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees etc. from the Central Government, State Government, a Scheduled Bank or other bank etc., the scheme shall be circulated and provided to all such concerned and if accepted and consented to, the same would also be implemented subject to continuous monitoring by BIFR. Where the scheme is not accepted and failed to be implemented, the BIFR is always empowered to take such other measures including winding up of sick industrial companies. (h) Under Section 20 where the BIFR finds that neither the company can make up its net worth exceeding accumulated losses within a reasonable time and is also not likely to become viable in future and find it expedient that the company should be wound up, the BIFR shall record its opinion for winding up and communicate to the concerned. 27. During the entire process, after the information is given to BIFR under Section 15(1), which has been termed as “reference” therein, and as soon as the said reference is received, it is deemed to be registered and the inquiry under Section 16(1) is deemed to have commenced. For the subsequent stages there is no mention of the word ‘reference’ but various steps to be taken by the authorities under 1985 Act which are consequences of certain acts and omissions, and substantially connected with the term “reference” are only provided. 28. For the subsequent stages there is no mention of the word ‘reference’ but various steps to be taken by the authorities under 1985 Act which are consequences of certain acts and omissions, and substantially connected with the term “reference” are only provided. 28. At this stage, it would also be necessary to refer Rule 19 of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction Regulations, 1987 (in short ‘1987 Regulations’) which provides that a reference shall be made under Section 15(1) in the prescribed form and on receipt thereof at the office of BIFR, the Secretary or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall make an endorsement about the date on which it has filed or received in the office of the Board and shall stand registered if on scrutiny it is in order. Where the reference is incomplete or does not contain relevant information and the informant failed to supply the same despite communication by BIFR, the Secretary or Registrar are authorised to decline the reference and in that case Rule 19(7) shall be applied. 29. The various orders passed by BIFR if causes a grievance to any person, he has a right of appeal under Section 25 before the appellate authority. 30. From a conjoint reading of various provisions of 1985 Act and Rules and Regulations framed thereunder, we find that the relevance of the word “reference” is only to the effect that if a company has become sick industrial company the information in the prescribed manner shall be given by the Board of Directors of such company to BIFR or may be given by other authorities, as stated above, namely, Central Government, State Government, a Scheduled Bank or other bank etc. After receiving said intimation in the prescribed manner it shall be given a serial number and it then stands registered. The word “reference”, therefore, as such has not only been used as a title for a bundle of certain specified proceedings or steps but in the context of 1985 Act it is a stage whereafter the authority under the Act namely, BIFR assume jurisdiction to take care of determining the measures to be adopted for a company which has become a sick industrial company which are in its interest. Such measures may include steps for its revival, failing which, opinion for winding up. 31. Such measures may include steps for its revival, failing which, opinion for winding up. 31. If BIFR passes any order which causes grievance to any person, he has a right of appeal. This appeal filed at any stage, whatsoever, or against any order whatsoever of BIFR, is nothing but like various steps provided in the Act necessary for determining measures for a sick industrial company and constitute an additional procedural step. When an inquiry is made, when the scheme is approved and is implemented etc., the reference does not come to an end. Even during the course of implementation of a scheme, BIFR continue to hold its authority over such company. When the matter is pending in appeal, the authority of the BIFR does not come to an end at that stage also though the BIFR’s order of course is subject to the order passed by AAIFR but the fact remains that during the entire period when the proceedings are before the BIFR or AAIFR in appeal, the intimation i.e. the reference registered under the Act continues and BIFR do not seize to have any authority over the company even if it has held that revival of company is not viable and has recorded its opinion for its winding up. 32. In our view, thus, during the period when an appeal is pending before AAIFR, it cannot be said that the reference is not continuing to be registered under Section 15 of 1985 Act inasmuch as, if the registration of reference itself has come to an end it would mean as if no reference is pending under 1985 Act and it would result in the end of appellate proceeding as well. The appellate proceeding in 1985 Act, in our view, presupposes that the reference before BIFR continue to register and BIFR continues to have jurisdiction over the company in one or the other way. This is fortified from the fact that under Section 22(a) the BIFR has power to issue direction to a company not to dispose of its assets except with its consent and such order would continue during the period of consideration of scheme under Section 18 and also during the period, it has recorded its opinion for winding up but till the commencement of winding up proceedings before the concerned High Courts. 33. 33. In the case in hand we find that the BIFR has held that revival of the company is not viable and thus recorded its opinion for winding up. It is not the case of the parties that the winding up proceedings have initiated or commenced before the High Court. On the contrary, against the opinion of BIFR that revival of company is not viable and it should be wound up the company, the petitioner felt aggrieved and filed appeal under Section 25 which is pending. 34. At this stage learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once an opinion of BIFR for winding up is given it would result as if the winding up proceeding is deemed to be pending before the High Court and the provisions of the Companies Act in respect to winding up would be attracted which would include Section 529-A thereof which takes care for apportionment of the outstanding dues of the workers with priority and at par with the secured creditor’s dues. He contended that if we take any other view that would exclude the priority of worker’s dues contemplated under Section 529-A of the Companies Act and would be against the interest of the workmen. It is contended that an interpretation which is in the interest of the workers, instead of the creditors, should be preferred otherwise the workers would be without any remedy in respect to recovery of their dues. 35. The argument though attracting but has no substance at all. In our view, this issue stands concluded by the Apex Court’s decision in NGEF Ltd. v. Chandra Developers (P) Ltd. and another, 2005(8) SCC 219 . The question up for consideration in that case was up to what stage BIFR shall have jurisdiction under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1985 where a company has been opined to be wound up. The Apex Court held that both the Company Court as well as BIFR cannot be held to exercise concurrent jurisdiction as any such construction would create chaos and confusion. In para 41 of the judgment, the Court held : “A company declared to be sick in terms of the provisions of SICA, continues to be sick unless it is directed to be wound up. In para 41 of the judgment, the Court held : “A company declared to be sick in terms of the provisions of SICA, continues to be sick unless it is directed to be wound up. Till the company remains a sick company, having regard to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 20, BIFR alone shall have jurisdiction as regards sale of its assets till an order of winding up is passed by a Company Court.” (emphasis added) 36. How the matter shall proceed further, has also been dealt with by the Court in para 43 of the judgment where it said : “The High Court indisputably on receipt of such recommendation of BIFR would initiate a proceeding for winding up in terms of Section 433 of the Companies Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 536 ipso facto does not confer any jurisdiction upon the Company Court to direct sale of the assets of the sick company. It has to exercise its power thereunder subject to the provisions of the special statute governing the field. Despite the fact that the procedures laid down under the Companies Act would be applicable therefor but they must be read with sub-section (4) of Section 20 of SICA which contains a non obstante clause and in terms thereof, BIFR is authorised to sell the assets of the sick industrial company in such a manner as it may deem fit. By reason of the said provision, BIFR is also empowered to forward the sale proceeds to the High Court for orders for distribution in accordance with Section 529-A and other provisions of the Companies Act which in no uncertain terms would mean that the distribution of the sale proceeds would be for the purpose of meeting the claims of the creditors in the manner laid down therein. The intention of Parliament in enacting the said provision becomes clear as in terms of Section 22-A of SICA, BIFR is empowered to issue any direction in the interest of the sick industrial company or its creditors or shareholders and direct the sick industrial company not to dispose of its assets except with its assent. Section 32, as noticed hereinbefore, again contains a non obstante clause. Section 32, as noticed hereinbefore, again contains a non obstante clause. The scheme suggests that BIFR retains control over the assets of the Company and in terms of the aforementioned provisions may either prevent any sale or permit any sale of the assets of the sick industrial company. Such a power in BIFR remains till a winding-up order is passed by the High Court and a stage arrives for the High Court for issuing orders for distribution of the sale proceeds.” 37. Again in para 50 of the judgment the Court has reiterated the above view and held : “BIFR is that authority proprio vigore which continues to remain as custodian of the assets of the Company till a winding-up order is passed by the High Court.” 38. In this case also it cannot be said that a winding up order has been passed by the High Court and the matter is pending for winding up before the High Court, therefore, the question of interpreting the provisions of the statutes in the light of Section 529-A of the Companies Act does not arise at all since it cannot be said that the proceedings under the Companies Act have seen the light of the day. 39. We can consider this aspect from one more angle. Under 1985 Act the appellate authority has power coextensive to BIFR inasmuch as it may confirm, modify or set aside the order or remand the matter to BIFR for fresh consideration. If in a given case where the steps have been taken to recover secured debt under Section 13(4) of 2002 Act and if it is held that the appeal before AAIFR shall not abate, in that case, if the appellate authority remands the matter to BIFR, it would immediately attract third proviso to Section 15(1) of 1985 Act and the proceedings shall stand abated and cannot proceed. That being so, there is no gain in saying that though the appeal would remain pending under Section 27 of 1985 Act but the appellate power would stand curtailed to the extent of disabling it from remanding the matter to BIFR otherwise it would stand abated. Neither we have any reason to read the provisions of 1985 Act in such a piecemeal manner nor is there any rationale for reading the provisions of 1985 Act in such a manner. Neither we have any reason to read the provisions of 1985 Act in such a piecemeal manner nor is there any rationale for reading the provisions of 1985 Act in such a manner. It is well established that all the provisions of the statute must be read harmoniously so as to best serve the objective and purpose with which the statute has been enacted by the legislature. 40. As we have already observed, 1985 Act was enacted in public interest to make special provisions with a view to secure the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies, owning industrial undertakings, and a speedy determination by a body of experts of the preventive ameliorative, remedial and other measures which would need to be taken with respect to such companies and expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Similarly, 2002 Act on the contrary, has been enacted to regulate the securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest of Banks and financial institutions in a speedier manner without intervention of the Court or Tribunal. It is with this objective that under Section 13(1) of 2002 Act enforcement of security interest in favour of secured creditor has been permitted to be made notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or Section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and without intervention of the Court or Tribunal but only in accordance with the provisions of 2002 Act. The enforcement of security interest etc. under 2002 Act is by the secured creditors in respect to secured debt. If what the learned counsel for the petitioners has argued is accepted and the provisions of Section 22 of 1985 Act is permitted to operate even against security debt against which secured creditors have decided to enforce the same in accordance with 2002 Act, the purpose and objective of 2002 Act would stand defeated and it cannot operate at all. At this stage, we find it useful to refer Section 35 of 2002 Act also which gives overriding effect to 2002 Act over any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. At this stage, we find it useful to refer Section 35 of 2002 Act also which gives overriding effect to 2002 Act over any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. It is no doubt true that 1985 Act has been held to be a special Act but 2002 Act is also a special Act and, therefore, where the provisions of two special Acts cannot stand together, the latter shall override the earlier one. Recently, in Tata Motors Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court in para 19 observed that “the provisions of a special Act will override the provisions of a general Act. A later of it will override an earlier Act.” 41. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that a statute cannot be read in a manner so as to add or subtract something therefrom. He also submitted that casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court. Referring to Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and ETIO, (2007) 5 SCC 447 , he placed reliance on paras 92 and 93 of the judgment which read as under : “Omission of words in a particular statute may play an important role. The intention of the legislature must be, as is well known, gathered from the words used in the statute at the first instance and only when such a rule would give rise to anomalous situation, may the Court take recourse to purposive construction. It is also a well settled principle of law that casus omissus cannot be supplied. “If the legislature has used different words, or has omitted certain words, in our opinion, the same cannot be read as containing the words “unless a different intention appears”. It may be that the provisions of the 2003 Act are demonstrably different from the 1962 Act but we must assume that the legislature did so deliberately. The intention of the legislature by making a distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2003 Act, in our opinion, is obvious. The fact that the significant words “unless a different intention appears” or the Act does not contain a provision inconsistent therewith were known to the legislature.” 42. The intention of the legislature by making a distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2003 Act, in our opinion, is obvious. The fact that the significant words “unless a different intention appears” or the Act does not contain a provision inconsistent therewith were known to the legislature.” 42. Similarly, in Nelson Motis v. Union of India and another, (1992) 4 SCC 711 , para 8 of the judgment was relied where the Apex Court held : “The language of sub-rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. As was observed in innumerable cases in India and in England, the expression used in the statute alone declares the intent of the legislature. In the words used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the act speaks for itself. Reference was also made in the reported judgment to Maxwell stating : “The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words.” 43. He also cited Government Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar and another, (1992) 4 SCC 719 , where in para 4 of the judgment it was held : “It is settled law that if the intention of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, then Courts cannot ignore clear wording and held to the contrary. As the Act categorically provides that a roadroller is a motor vehicle, we fail to understand how the High Court, even after noticing the definition, could have held that roadroller was not a motor vehicle.” 44. Nasiruddin and others v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 , para 37 was referred where it was held, when a statute contains a provision which is somewhat ambiguous , it is the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret the same appropriately. In a given case the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. In a given case the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. The intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. 45. The next judgment is Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2001) 4 SCC 534 , where it was held that the golden rule is that words of statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning and the Court should not place a construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses. 46. Lastly, Delhi Financial Corporation and another v. Rajiv Anand and others, (2004) 11 SCC 625 , was cited where in para 17 the Court held that while interpreting a provision, one cannot proceed on the assumption that the legislature cannot make a mistake. If there is a defect or omission in the words used by the legislature the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result. The Court is not authorised to alter a word or provide a casus omissus. 47. The aforesaid judgments lay down well known principles of interpretation and there cannot be any quarrel with the propositions set out therein. However, the aforesaid principles observed by the Apex Court in the judgments referred to above cannot be read in isolation since principles of interpretation involves various shades and nuances. It cannot be said that in every case it is one and the same manner of interpretation which would apply universally. 48. In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. (supra) the Apex Court clearly observed that if by reading a statute literally from the words used therein an anomalous situation is likely to create, the Court may take recourse to purposive construction. It cannot be said that in every case it is one and the same manner of interpretation which would apply universally. 48. In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. (supra) the Apex Court clearly observed that if by reading a statute literally from the words used therein an anomalous situation is likely to create, the Court may take recourse to purposive construction. In Nasiruddin and others (supra), the Apex Court quoted from para 25 of its earlier judgment in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 , observing that the words of the statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. These principles are well settled and have been repeated by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. 49. In the case in hand, neither we have added any word nor supplied casus omissus nor we have done any violence to the language of the statute by observing that Section 15(1) proviso while providing abatement of a reference when steps for recovery of secured debts under Section 13(4) of 2002 Act are taken, would apply to a case where an appeal before AAIFR is pending to make the scheme of the statute reasonably workable and practicable. 50. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on a Division Bench decision in Noble Aqua Pvt. Ltd. and others v. State Bank of India and others (Writ Petition No. 4815(C) of 2007), decided on 21.2.2008 by Hon’ble Orissa High Court, Cuttack, where the Court has interpreted third proviso to Section 15(1) of 2002 Act holding that it is applicable only to a case where reference was pending. There the company was declared sick by BIFR on 14.11.2006 and, thus the Court held that the proceedings were not at the stage of reference but culminated in an order declaring the company sick, hence, there is no question of abatement of the proceedings under 1985 Act. We have gone through the entire judgment and with great respect we do not find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the above case. We have gone through the entire judgment and with great respect we do not find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the above case. First of all a reading of the judgment shows that Hon’ble Orissa High Court has proceeded on the assumption that 1985 Act is a Special Act with overriding effect but has omitted to refer or consider Section 35 of 2002 Act which also gives overriding effect to 2002 Act over any other law in case of inconsistency. Further it has restricted the word ‘reference’ to a stage when information is given by the company and it is registered at BIFR. The Hon’ble Court has not considered the fact that the second proviso completely bar any reference under 1985 Act once financial assets have been acquired by any securitisation company or reconstruction company. Similarly, the third proviso, by operation of law, provide for abatement of reference pending before BIFR where the secured creditor had taken any measure to recover secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13. The purpose and objective of 2002 Act would stand defeated, particularly, when it also has overriding effect over any other inconsistent law, if the restricted interpretation as put in by Hon’ble Orissa High Court is followed. We are, therefore, not inclined to agree with the view taken therein. 51. On behalf of the respondents it has been argued that an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings and, therefore, it was not necessary to mention for abatement before the AAIFR and it was suffice for the legislature to provide for abatement of a pending reference before BIFR since it would include necessarily, in law, the appellate proceedings also. For the said purpose, reliance was placed on Punjab National Bank (supra) Ravi Spinning Mill Ltd. (supra) and Triveni Yarns Ltd. (supra). It is no doubt true that an appeal is continuation of original proceedings and this proposition in law cannot be disputed. Though we are in agreement with the ultimate view taken in the aforesaid three judgments that even appellate proceedings pending before the AAIFR shall abate by virtue of Section 15(1), third proviso of 1985 Act where the measures for recovery of secured debts are taken under Section 13(4) of 2002 Act but we have given our own reasons also for coming to this conclusion. 52. 52. In the result, we find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed without there being any order to costs. Interim order, if any, is vacated —————