JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sabhajeet Yadav, J.—By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 20.11.2006 passed by Additional Commissioner (Administration) Trade Tax, Lucknow contained in Annexure-1 of the writ petition, whereby while working as Senior Clerk in the office of Assistant Commissioner (Administration) Trade Tax, Etah the petitioner was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary inquiry against him. 2. The aforesaid order of suspension was initially challenged on various grounds including that the allegations levelled against the petitioner are vague and it is based on non-application of mind but by filing supplementary affidavit in the writ petition the petitioner has stated that in respect of the same charges the petitioner was given adverse entry by Assistant Commissioner (Administration) Trade Tax, Etah, whereby his integrity was also held doubtful for the period from 12.8.2005 to 31.3.2006. A copy of the aforesaid adverse entry communicated to the petitioner enclosed as Annexure SA-1 to supplementary affidavit. On communication of the said adverse entry the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Joint Commissioner, Executive Trade Tax, Aligarh Region, Aligarh on 18.11.2006 and same is still pending before the competent authority. Meanwhile the order of suspension of the petitioner has been passed by respondent No. 3 on the same cause of action grounded on same facts. 3. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of State Government wherein the averments made in various paragraphs of the writ petition have been refuted and disputed. The pertinent averments contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 13 and 14 of the counter affidavit sworn by Sri A.K. Yadav, Trade Tax Officer, Etah are extracted as under : "7. That the contents of para 6 of the writ petition are wrong and are denied. It is denied that the petitioner has unblemished service record. In fact, adverse entries were given to him in the year 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1983­84 which was consequently expunged after considering his representation. However, the petitioner was given adverse entries in the year 1985-86, 1994-95. In the year 1980 also, strict warning was given to him, which was recorded in his service record. For the year 2005-06, adverse entry was recorded in his service record and his integrity was also found to be doubtful. 8. That the contents of para 7 of the writ petition are absolutely false and are denied. In the year 1980 also, strict warning was given to him, which was recorded in his service record. For the year 2005-06, adverse entry was recorded in his service record and his integrity was also found to be doubtful. 8. That the contents of para 7 of the writ petition are absolutely false and are denied. It is denied that the petitioner performed his duties with integrity and professionalism. In fact, his integrity was doubted and same was recorded in the annual entry for the year 2005­06. 10. That the contents of para 9 of the writ petition are false and are denied. However, in reply it may be stated that in the preliminary enquiry, number of irregularities and manipulations done by the petitioner were found, which resulted in loss of revenue to the State. The misconduct of the petitioner included forging of signature of Higher Authorities in Import Declaration Form (Form-31), removal of original copies from the records and also forging the signatures of record keeper. For ready reference, the copy of preliminary enquiry conducted by the Assistant Commissioner (Works), Trade Tax, Aligarh is being filed herewith as Annexure CA-1 of this affidavit. 13. That the contents of para 14 of the writ petition are absolutely wrong and are denied. However, in reply it may be stated that there is no arbitrariness or illegality in the suspension order and the suspension order was passed to avoid further loss of revenue to the Government. It is further stated that the charge-sheet is being prepared against the petitioner and same shall be given to him soon and the departmental enquiry will proceed in accordance with law. 14. That the contents of para 15 of the writ petition are misconceived legal plea and shall be effectively replied at the time of hearing of the case. However, in reply it may be stated that there is no violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the order of suspension was passed after looking into gravity of charges and financial loss caused to the department." 4. Heard Sri Ajay Bhanot, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 5. In fact, the order of suspension was passed after looking into gravity of charges and financial loss caused to the department." 4. Heard Sri Ajay Bhanot, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 5. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner in nutshell is that once the petitioner has been given an adverse entry in his annual confidential report for the year 2005-06 on the basis of appraisal of works and conduct almost on the same charge as contained in the impugned order of suspension, it is not permissible under law to proceed with disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner on the same charges grounded on same facts or same cause of action, as it would amount to double punishment or double jeopardy on the same cause of action grounded on almost on same set of facts. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of Calcutta High Court rendered between Purnendu Narayan Chakraborty and the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of High Court decided on 15th June, 1989 and another decision of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Lt. Governor, Delhi and others v. H.C. Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342 . 6. Governor, Delhi and others v. H.C. Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342 . 6. For appreciation of question in controversy involved in the case, it would be appropriate to extract the adverse entry given in annual confidential report of the petitioner for the year 2005-06 as under : izfo"V o"kZ 2005&2006 vof/k&12-8-2005 ls 31-3-2006 rd deZpkjh dk uke&Jh jeu dqekj lDlsuk in&ofj"B fyfid o"kZ 05&06 ds izkjEHk esa Jh jeu lDlsuk ds ikl Mh0lh0vkj0 iVy jgkA esjs }kjk ekg flrEcj 2005 esa Mh0lh0vkj0 dk voyksdu fd;k] ml le; ek= ebZ 2005 rd ds pkyku Mh0lh0vkj0 ij vafdr ik;s x;s ks"k twu] tqykbZ] vxLr 2005 ds pkyku Mh0lh0vkj ij vafdr ugha Fks vkSj u gh lEcfU/kr [kkrkokyksa dks izkIr djk;sA ekuuh; TokbaV dfeuj ¼dk;Zikyd½ O;kikj dj vyhx<+ lEHkkx vyhx<+ }kjk fnukad 24-2-2006 dks dk;kZy; fujh{k.k fd;k x;kA ik;k x;k fd fcYVh i`"Bkadu dk;Z esa vk;kr ?kks"k.kk i=ksa ij vf/kdkjh dh eqgj yxkdj Jh jeu lDlsuk }kjk vf/kdkjh ds gLrk{kj fd;s x;sA Tok0 dfe0 ¼dk;Zikyd½ O;k0 dj vyhx<+ ds funsZk ekeys dh xgu tkap dh x;h rFkk dk;kZy; ds i= la0 1223 fnukad 10-3-2006 ls rF;ksa dk lgh ik;s tkus ij Jh lDlsuk ds fo:} fjiksVZ izsf"kr dh xbZA fofHkUu lEHkkxksa ls izkIr fcyks dks lEcfU/kr [kkrkikyksa dks izkIr ugha djk;s x;sA fcyksa dh izkfIr dj [kkrkokyksa ds QthZ gLrk{kj fd;s x;s tks [kkrkokyksa }kjk Lo;a ds gLrk{kj Lohdkj ugha fd;s x;sA fnukad 27-12-2005 dks 07 eghus ds vkikr ?kks"k.kk i=ksa dks Jh lDlsuk us Lo;a i`"Bkafdr djds O;kikfj;ksa dks ns fn;sA mDr lHkh eky vkxjk esa jsd ls vk;k FkkA vr% mDr vkikr ?kks"k.kk i= jsyos ldsUnz vkxjk ls ikl gksus pkfg;s FksA mDr lHkh eky lpy ny vkxjk }kjk idM+k x;k rFkk tekur tek djokbZ xbZA Jh lDlsuk us rc mDr vkikr ?kks"k.kk i=ksa dks foYVh i`"Bkar jft0 ij ugha p<+k;k vkSj u gh QkeksZ dh ewy izfr;k¡ dk;kZy; esa tek dh xbZA dk;kZy; vflLVsaV dfeuj O;kikj dj ,VkA izfo"V o"kZ 2005&2006 vof/k&12-8-2005 ls 31-3-2006 rd deZpkjh dk uke&Jh jeu dqekj lDlsuk in&ofj"B fyfid Jh lDlsuk }kjk vius dk;Z geskk ykijokgh cjrh xbZ gSA mudks vf/kfu;e ds fo:} dk;Z djus esa tjk Hkh fgpd ugha gSA dk;kZy; esa Hkh le;c} ugha jgsA Jh lDlsuk dk vU; ds izfr O;ogkj larks"ktud ugha jgkA Js.kh [kjkc mijksDr mfYyf[kr dkj.kksa ls Jh jeu dqekj lDlsuk dh lR;fu"Bk lafnX/k gSA g0@vLi"V eqgj ¼ lqjsk pUnz½ vflLVsUV dfeuj ¼izkk0½ 7. Now it is necessary to quote relevant portion of the order of suspension dated 20th November, 2006 passed by Additional Commissioner (Administration), Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow as under : i= la[;k&LFkk&4&¼d½&iks0,Q0&80&jeu dqekj lDlsuk@96&97@4364@O;kikj dj dk;kZy; dfeuj O;kikj dj mRrj iznsk ¼LFkkiuk vjkt vuqHkkx½ y[kuÅ % fnukad 20 uEoEcj] 2006 vknsk Jh jeu dqekj lDlsuk] ofj"B fyfid] dk;kZy; vflLVsUV dfeuj ¼lpy ny½ O;kikj dj] ,Vk }kjk o"kZ 2005&06 esa e.My dk;kZy; ,Vk esa viuh rSukrh vof/k esa fcYVh i`"Bkadu ,oa ladfyr fcyksa ds forj.k iVy ij dk;Zjr jgrs gq, loZJh VkVk dsfedy fy0 QfVZykbtj fMohtu] bUnz/kke ccjkyk] cnk;wW ds ekeysa esa :0 19]17]500 loZJh dqekj ,.M cznlZ ch0ds0vks0 Åwaojxjai ,Vj rFkk vU; bZaV HkV~Bksa@dks;yk ds izdj.k esa :0 18]58]667 dh jktLo dks {kfr igqapkus vk;kr ?kks"k.kk i=ksa dh ewy izfr;ka muds }kjk xk;c djus dk rF; izdkk esa vk;k ,oa lgk;rk dsUnzksa o lpy ny bdkbZ ls izkIr fcyksa dk forj.k djus esa lacaf/kr iath ij [kkrkikyksa ds QthZ gLrk{kj muds }kjk fd;s x;sA lR;kiu gsrq izkIr fcyksa dks xk;c fd;k x;kA bl izdkj dks;yk ds vk;kr ?kks"k.kk i=ksa ij Jh lDlsuk }kjk vf/kdkjh ds gLrk{kj djds mudk i`"Bkadu fd;k x;kA vk;kr ?kks"k.kk i=ksa dh fcYVh i`"Bkadu iath ij u c<+kdj u"V dj nh x;hA bl izdkj Jh jeu dqekj lDlsuk] o o0fy0 m0iz0 ljdkjh deZpkjh vkpj.k fu;ekoyh ds fu;e&3 esa fufgr izkfo/kku ds vuqlkj izR;sd lkjoku le; ij ije lR;fu"Bk ls jktdh; dk;Z ,oa vius nkf;Ro dk fuoZgu u djus ,oa jktLo dk vfgr@{kfr djkus ds izFke n`"V;k nks"kh ik;s x;s gSa] ftlds fy;s muds fo:) foHkkxh; vuqkklukRed dk;Zokgh izLrkfor gS] vr% ,rn }kjk rkRdkfyd izHkko ls Jh jeu dqekj lDlsuk] o0fy0 dks fuyafcy fd;k tkrk gSA g0@vLi"V ¼vt; dqekj mik/;k;½ ,Mhkuy dfeuj ¼izkklu½ O;kikj dj mRrj iznsk] y[kuÅA 8. From mere reading of annual confidential report of the petitioner for year 2005-06 and allegations contained in the impugned order of suspension of the petitioner, it is clear that the petitioner was earlier awarded an adverse entry by the competent departmental authority on the basis of some charges mentioned therein and subsequently with some more and additional charges or allegations he has been placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary inquiry, therefore, question for consideration before this Court is that as to whether the petitioner could be placed under suspension on those charges grounded on the same set of facts or cause of action in respect of which he was earlier awarded an adverse entry in his annual confidential report for the year 2005-06 or not? In this connection, it is necessary to point out that the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the proposed disciplinary action against the petitioner is barred by principle of double jeopardy embodied under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India which postulates that “no person shall be prosecuted and punished for same offence more than once”. 9. From plain reading of Article 20(2) of the Constitution it is clear that a person cannot be prosecuted and punished for same offence more than once. The roots of the principle, which this article enacts are to be found in well established rule of English Law which finds expression in the maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari”—a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence. The expressions “prosecuted and punished” are to be taken conjunctively and not disjunctively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. There must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of same offence. In order to attract operation of provisions of Article 20 (2) both the factors must co-exist. The expression ‘punishment’ in this clause means a judicial penalty awarded by criminal court as distinguished from a statutory authority and would not include other penalties, such as disciplinary action in the case of public servants as held in S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375 ; Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 and Rama v. Superintendent of Police, AIR 1967 Mysore 220. But it would be useful to discuss its contents and import in brief hereinafter. 10. While discussing the conditions of the application of doctrine Dr. But it would be useful to discuss its contents and import in brief hereinafter. 10. While discussing the conditions of the application of doctrine Dr. (Justice) Durga Das Basu in his Book ‘Constitution of India (Shorter) Eleventh Edition (at page 169-170) after analysing several decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Assistant Collector v. Malwani, AIR 1970 SC 962 ; Maqbool v. State of Bombay, (1953) SCR 730; Baijnath v. State of Bhopal, AIR 1957 SC 494 ; Safi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1966 SC 69 ; Kalawati v. State of H.P., 1953 SCR 546 ; State of M.P. v. Veereshwar, AIR 1957 SC 592 ; Ebrahim v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 933 ; State of Maharashtra v. Shriram, 1980 Cr. L.J. 13 (Bom); Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375 ; Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 , has pointed out certain conditions for application of doctrine of double jeopardy viz; "(a) There must have been previous proceeding before a court of law or a judicial Tribunal of competent jurisdiction. (b) Person must have been prosecuted in the previous proceeding. (c) The offence which is subject matter of second proceeding must be the same as that of the first proceeding from which he was prosecuted and punished. (d) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where he is for the second time sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence. 11. But Article 20 (2) has no application where the subsequent proceeding is mere continuance of the first proceeding e.g. in case of an appeal against acquittal or against conviction. Nor does it bar a retrial on appeal, with a direction to re-frame the charge provided the retrial is confined to the same offence for which he had been tried at original trial. In other words a second punishment for the same offence does not attract the operation of clause unless second punishment is awarded in fresh proceeding. Thus to provide that a person who would be convicted of an offence shall not only be punished under the law but also be removed from the country, does not offend against the guarantee offered by the present clause. Thus to provide that a person who would be convicted of an offence shall not only be punished under the law but also be removed from the country, does not offend against the guarantee offered by the present clause. For the same reason clause does not prohibit a provision for two penalties for the same offence in the same proceeding without involving a double prosecution and conviction or conviction of one charge after acquittal of another at the same trial and the bar provided under this clause does not apply unless all the aforesaid conditions are satisfied. 12. From the aforesaid discussion, there appears hardly any scope for application of doctrine of double jeopardy in the service law jurisprudence, particularly in disciplinary matters of Government employees. In this connection it would be noted that where the criminal prosecution and disciplinary proceeding are grounded on same set of facts and even if the criminal prosecution is ended in acquittal, unless the acquittal is based on merit, the jurisdiction of authority empowered to hold the disciplinary inquiry against the employee cannot be held to be barred under law for simple reason that object and purpose of both the proceedings are quite distinct and different altogether. The dominant purpose of a criminal proceeding is to achieve the protection of public while that in disciplinary proceeding is purity and efficiency of public service. Obviously, therefore, the field of operation of two proceedings are quite different and independent. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and rules governing the enquiry or trial are also conceptually different. The aforesaid view has been taken by this Court in Kailash Chandra II v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 ALJ 1343 and Gopal Chandra Sinha v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 (4) ESC 2899, after analysing the various decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 1416 ; Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1434 ; Nelson Motis v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981 ; State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, AIR 1997 SC 13 ; State of Karnataka and another v. T.Venkataramnappa, JT 1996 (9) SC 734 and Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, AIR 2003 SC 1796 . 13. 13. At this juncture it is to be noted that the disciplinary inquiry of the Government employee is governed by the rules known as ‘Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999’ (hereinafter referred to as Rules,1999). Rule 3 of which deals with various penalties to be imposed upon the Government servants for good and sufficient reason as under : “3. Penalties.—The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon the Government Servants : (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments for a specified period; (iii) Stoppage at an efficiency bar; (iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders; (v) Fine in case of persons holding Group ‘D’ posts : provided that the amount of such fine shall in no case exceed twenty five per cent of the month’s pay in which the fine is imposed. Major Penalties : (i) Withholding of increments with cumulative effect; (ii) Reduction to a lower post or grade or time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale; (iii) Removal from the service which does not disqualify from future employment; (iv) Dismissal from the service which disqualifies from future employment. Explanation.—The following shall not amount to penalty within the meaning of this rule, namely : (i) Withholding of increment of a Government servant for failure to pass a departmental examination or for failure to fulfil any other condition in accordance with the rules or orders governing the service; (ii) Stoppage at the efficiency bar in the time scale of pay on account of ones not being found fit to cross the efficiency bar; (iii) Reversion of a person appointed on probation to the service during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation. (iv) Termination of the service of a person appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of the service or the rules and orders governing such probation." 14. Rule 4 deals with suspension of a Government employee against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding. (iv) Termination of the service of a person appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of the service or the rules and orders governing such probation." 14. Rule 4 deals with suspension of a Government employee against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding. The relevant provision of Rule 4 (1) of said Rules is extracted as under : “(1) A Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority: Provided that suspension should not be resorted to unless the allegations against the Government servant are so serious that in the event of their being established may ordinarily warrant major penalty : Provided further that concerned head of the Department empowered by the Governor by an order in this behalf may place a Government servant or class of Government servants belonging to Group A and ‘B’ posts under suspension under this rule : Provided also that in the case of any Government servant or class of Government servants belonging to Group ‘C’ and ‘D’ posts, the appointing authority may delegate its power under this rule to the next lower authority." 15. Rules 7, 8 and 9 of the said Rules deal with the procedure for imposing major penalties and Rule 10 deals with procedure for imposing minor penalties. Rule 11 provides appeal against the penalties and Rule 12 deals with the power of Appellate Authority. Rules 13 and 14 provide provisions for revision and review respectively and Rule 15 provides that no order under Rules 12, 13 and 14 imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed imposition or enhancement, as the case may be. Rule 17 deals with recession and saving clause whereby the earlier existing Rules dealing with the matter has been rescinded and any inquiry, appeal, revision or review pending under those earlier existing rules were to be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of these new rules. 16. Rule 17 deals with recession and saving clause whereby the earlier existing Rules dealing with the matter has been rescinded and any inquiry, appeal, revision or review pending under those earlier existing rules were to be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of these new rules. 16. Besides aforesaid rules there is yet another set of rules which governs the communication of adverse entry and disposal of representation against the adverse entry in annual confidential reports of Government servants known as ‘Uttar Pradesh Government Servants (Disposal of Representation against Adverse Annual Confidential Reports and Allied Matters) Rules, 1995’ (hereinafter referred to as Rules,1995). Rule 4 of which deals with communication of adverse report and procedure for disposal of representation as under : "4. Communication of adverse report and procedure for disposal of representation.—(1) Where a report in respect of a Government Servant is adverse or critical, wholly or in part, hereinafter referred to as adverse report, the whole of the report shall be communicated in writing to the Government Servant concerned by the accepting authority or by an officer not below the rank of reporting authority nominated in this behalf by the accepting authority, within a period of 45 days from the date of recording the report and a certificate to this effect shall be recorded in the report. (2) A Government Servant may, within a period of 45 days from the date of communication of adverse report under sub-rule (1), represent in writing directly and also through proper channel to the authority one rank above the accepting authority, hereinafter referred to as the competent authority, and if there is no competent authority, to the accepting authority itself, against the adverse report so communicated : Provided that if the competent authority or the accepting authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the Government Servant concerned had sufficient cause for not submitting the representation within the said period, he may allow a further period of 45 days for submission of such representation. (3) The competent authority or accepting authority as the case may be, shall, within a period not exceeding one week from the date of receipt of the representation under sub-rule (2), transmit the representation to the appropriate authority, who has recorded the adverse report, for his comments, who shall, within a period not exceeding 45 days from the date of receipt of the representation furnish his comments to the competent authority or the accepting authority as the case may be : Provided that no such comments shall be required if the appropriate authority has ceased to be in, or has retired from, the service or is under suspension before sending his comments. (4) The competent authority or the accepting authority, as the case may be, shall, within a period of 120 days from the date of expiry of 45 days specified in sub-rule (3), consider the representation along with the comments of the appropriate authority, and if no comments have been received without waiting for the comments, and pass speaking orders— (a) rejecting the representation; or (b) expunging the adverse report wholly or partly as he considers proper. (5) Where the competent authority due to any administrative reasons, is unable to dispose of the representation within the period specified in sub-rule (4), he shall report in this regard to his higher authority, who shall pass such orders as he considers proper for ensuring disposal of the representation within the specified period. (6) An order passed under sub-rule (4) shall be communicated in writing to the Government Servant concerned. (7) Where an order expunging the adverse report is passed under sub-rule (4), the competent authority or the accepting authority as the case may be shall omit the report so expunged. (8) The order passed under sub-rule (4) shall be final.........." 17. From a close analysis of Rules 1999 and 1995 it is clear that both the rules are meant for different purposes. It is no doubt true that both the sets of rules apply to the State Government servants but they operate independently in different field. Rule 1999 deals with detail procedure for disciplinary action against Government employees whereas Rules 1995 deals with a time-frame-schedule for communication of adverse entry and also disposal of representation against adverse entries recorded in character roll or annual confidential reports of the Government employees. 18. Rule 1999 deals with detail procedure for disciplinary action against Government employees whereas Rules 1995 deals with a time-frame-schedule for communication of adverse entry and also disposal of representation against adverse entries recorded in character roll or annual confidential reports of the Government employees. 18. It is to be noted that the annual confidential reports are made on the basis of appraisal of work and conduct of the Government employees. If the work and conduct of the Government servants are found unsatisfactory, the authorities empowered to have superintendence upon the work and conduct of the employees are authorized under relevant Government orders issued in this regard to record adverse entries in their annual confidential reports. While appraisal of work and conduct of a Government Servant it is quite possible for superior officer to take note of such work and conduct of Government employee which may also be misconduct and liable to be dealt with separately and independently under Rule 1999 but because of that reason alone the superior officer authorized to record entry in annual confidential report of the Government servant cannot stay his hand awaiting initiation of disciplinary action against such Government servants and stall the preparation of annual confidential report of such Government servants. In my opinion, there is no legal embargo in recording such adverse entry in annual confidential report of Government servants on the basis of same set of facts which may also constitute misconduct. 19. However, if any entry in annual confidential report of Government employee is recorded by competent authority is adverse or critical in nature, the same shall be communicated to the Government servant thereupon who shall be entitled to make representation against such adverse entry under Rules 1995 and his representation shall be decided by the competent authority whose decision shall be final. It is no doubt true that if any adverse entry is recorded in annual confidential report of the Government employee, the same shall have penal consequences and service career of the Government employees would be adversely affected thereby unless it is expunged by the competent authority on representation of such Government employees but in my considered opinion, that alone cannot debar the Disciplinary authority from taking disciplinary action under 1999 Rules, on same set of facts which are subject matter of adverse entry. 20. 20. It is also significant to note that the adverse entry recorded in character-roll and/or annual confidential report of Government servant including withholding of integrity certificate or holding integrity of a Government servant doubtful or not certifying integrity are neither defined or described as punishment under Rules 1999 nor needs any disciplinary inquiry under said rules before any such adverse entry is recorded in character roll or annual confidential report, rather such adverse entry is recorded while appraisal of work and conduct of the Government servant without holding any disciplinary inquiry against such Government servant but if certain facts constituting misconduct are taken into account while appraisal of work and conduct of the Government employee and an adverse entry is recorded in his annual confidential report, he would be entitled to challenge the same before the competent authority or accepting authority by making representation under Rule 1995. Despite thereof even if adverse entry attained finality after disposal of representation of such Government employee, even then it cannot debar the Disciplinary Authority from initiating disciplinary action under 1999 Rules and if such action is taken by the Disciplinary Authority, in my considered opinion, the same cannot be held to be barred by the principle of double jeopardy. 21. Now coming to the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, in this connection, I may refer the case of Purnendu Narain Chakraborty (supra) decided by Calcutta High Court. It appears that in the aforesaid case, adverse entries were made in confidential Roll of employee prior to employee being allowed to cross-efficiency bar. It was held that such adverse entry cannot be taken into account for subsequent promotion, as the basis of adverse entries, knocked down by subsequent events namely allowing the employee to cross efficiency bar. By importing the application of principle of double jeopardy the Court has further held that employee cannot be denied benefit of higher scales as also promotion for same complaint. But, in my opinion, the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. 22. In Lt. Governor Delhi and others v. H.C. Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342 , head constable Narinder Singh was appointed as a constable in Delhi Police on 22.12.1982. He was given out-of-turn promotion under Rule 19 (ii) of Delhi Police Promotion and Confirmation Rules, 1980 for outstanding devotion to duty. 22. In Lt. Governor Delhi and others v. H.C. Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342 , head constable Narinder Singh was appointed as a constable in Delhi Police on 22.12.1982. He was given out-of-turn promotion under Rule 19 (ii) of Delhi Police Promotion and Confirmation Rules, 1980 for outstanding devotion to duty. Subsequently in the year 1990 disciplinary action was initiated against him for dereliction of duty which culminated in imposition of penalty of reduction of pay by one stage without cumulative effect. Appeal against the said order was dismissed. Thereafter Appointing Authority issued a second show cause notice on 8.1.1992 proposing to remove his name from promotion list to which he was brought under the above rules. Aggrieved by the proposed action the respondent filed an application before Central Administrative Tribunal seeking quashing of show cause notice. The Tribunal allowed the petition and held that show cause notice would amount to double punishment based on same cause of action and accordingly, quashed the show cause notice. Delhi Administration went in appeal before Apex Court. 23. In para 4 of the aforesaid decision Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “4. Reading of the show-cause notice suggests as if it is in continuation of the departmental proceedings. Lack of devotion to duty is mentioned as the reason for the proposed action which was the subject-matter of the earlier proceedings as well. The second proposed action based on the same cause of action proposing to deny promotion or reversion is contemplated under the impugned show-cause notice. Second penalty based on the same cause of action would amount to double jeopardy. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in law in annulling such an action. We are not expressing any opinion on the ambit or scope of any rule.” 24. From mere reading of the observations made hereinbefore it is clear that in above noted case Hon’ble Apex Court has applied the principle of double jeopardy on account of fact that show cause notice proposing to deny promotion or reversion was based on same cause of action on which earlier penalty of reduction of pay by one stage without cumulative effect was imposed upon the employee concern, therefore, second proposed action was found to be double penalty on the same cause of action. But the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from the facts of the aforesaid case. 25. But the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from the facts of the aforesaid case. 25. It is well settled, as held in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003 SC 511 (Pr. 59), that a decision is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well settled that a little difference in the facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. Therefore, in view of such legal position it is to be examined that in given facts and circumstances of the case as to whether, the aforesaid case lends any support to the case of petitioner or not. 26. In this case the petitioner was given an adverse entry in his annual confidential report 2005-2006, on the basis of appraisal of his work and conduct by the competent authority but subsequently on the basis of aforesaid allegation which were subject matter of adverse entry and with some more additional charges/allegation he was suspended in contemplation of disciplinary inquiry against him. It is no doubt true that if the disciplinary inquiry contemplated against the petitioner is permitted to be proceeded with, the same can be culminated in major punishments but as held herein before since both the actions are quite distinct and altogether differently known in the service law jurisprudence, therefore, in my considered opinion, such disciplinary action cannot be held to be barred by principles of double jeopardy, for simple reason that earlier action was not based on any disciplinary inquiry held against the petitioner instead thereof it was based on merely appraisal of work and conduct of petitioner for the year 2005-06. 27. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner could neither place any authority wherein it is laid down that while recording entries in annual confidential report of government servant, if certain work and conduct of government servant was found not satisfactory or objectionable even touching to his/her integrity and also constitute misconduct against him, for which an adverse entry is recorded in his annual confidential report, the same cannot be made basis for disciplinary action or such subsequent disciplinary action is barred by doctrine of double jeopardy. In case the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted in that event of the matter various mischiefs are bound to happen and an employee would escape from disciplinary action, if on the basis of appraisal of his work and conduct he is given an adverse entry in character roll or annual confidential report in a particular year in respect of which he was subsequently found to have committed misconduct warranting disciplinary inquiry against him. Therefore, in my opinion, such approach would neither be conducive for maintenance of efficiency, purity and discipline in the public service and administration nor can be held to be barred by principle of double jeopardy. In such situation, principle of double jeopardy is not attracted. 28. In view of aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order of suspension passed against the petitioner in contemplation of disciplinary inquiry against him on the basis of some allegations which were also subject matter of the adverse entry recorded in his annual confidential reports of year 2005-2006 cannot be faulted with. The respondents are well within the authority under law to proceed with contemplated/pending disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner and during pendency of such disciplinary inquiry the petitioner may also remain under suspension. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any illegality in the order of suspension and proposed disciplinary action against the petitioner. 29. For the aforestated reasons, the writ petition is misconceived and without any merit hence liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed. ————