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2008 DIGILAW 246 (DEL)

K. L. Diwan v. Mohan Malhotra

2008-02-29

VIPIN SANGHI

body2008
JUDGMENT Vipin Sanghi, J. C.M. No. 3068/2008 .1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. .Caveat No. 47/2008 .2. Since the respondent-caveator has appeared, the caveat stands disposed off C.M.(M) No. 268/2008 3. This petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner against the order dated 13.2.2008 passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (for short `ARCT) Rohini Courts, Delhi in RCA No. 44/2006. By the impugned order the petitioners appeal under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (the Act) against the order dated 3.11.2006 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, (ARC for short), has been dismissed. The learned ARC had dismissed the petitioners objections under Section 25 of the Act to the execution of an eviction order passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act in favour of respondent No. 1, Shri Mohan Malhotra against the judgment debtor, who is respondent No. 2 herein viz. Shri Ravi Diwan. 4. Respondent No. 1, Shri Mohan Malhotra filed the aforesaid eviction petition against respondent No. 2 Shri Ravi Diwan. The property had been let out by the erstwhile owner of the said property Shri Lakshmi Narain Khattar to Shri Hansraj Diwan. Respondent No. 1 purchased the said property in the year 1989 from Shri Lakshmi Narain Khattar with the aforesaid tenant in the property. The original tenant Shri Hansraj Diwan died some time in the year 1995. The admitted position is that respondent No. 2 was residing in the suit premises at the time of, and after the death of Shri Hansraj Diwan. The aforesaid eviction petition was contested by respondent No. 2 The eviction petition came to be allowed and a revision petition under Section 25B was preferred before this Court. During the pendency of the revision petition preferred against the eviction order by the the judgment debtor, possession was taken in execution by the landlord respondent No. 1. However, at the instance of the Judgment Debtor (respondent No. 2 herein) the same was thereafter restored under the orders of this Court and the judgment debtor were put back in possession. Ultimately the said revision petition was dismissed. However, at the instance of the Judgment Debtor (respondent No. 2 herein) the same was thereafter restored under the orders of this Court and the judgment debtor were put back in possession. Ultimately the said revision petition was dismissed. Objections were thereafter, filed by the petitioners on the ground that they were also the legal heirs of Late Shri Hansraj Diwan and had inherited the tenancy rights along with respondent No. 2 Shri Ravi Diwan, and they had an independent title to the suit property. Their case was that the eviction order could not be executed against them since they were not parties to the eviction proceedings. These objections were dismissed by the learned ARC, and by the impugned order the learned ARCT has also rejected the appeal filed by the petitioners. .5. The contention of the petitioners before the Courts below was that there was collusion between the landlord respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, and that respondent No. 2 deliberately did not defend the eviction proceedings effectively .and enabled the passing of an eviction order in favour of respondent No. 1. The petitioners relied on a decision of this Court in Mohd. Idrees and Anr. v. Mst. Nathi (deceased) through LRs 19 (2001) DLT 274 to contend that it was not material that some of the legal heirs of the deceased tenants were not residing in the tenanted premises, and that in any event they were necessary parties to the eviction petition as they too had inherited the tenancy rights alongwith those heirs of the tenant who were in use and occupation of the tenanted premises with the deceased tenant at the time of his death. Reliance was also placed on another decision in the case of Basheshar Nath v. Smt. S. Bikram 1980 (2) RCR 456, a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where a decree of ejectment was passed against the wife of the deceased tenant but the daughter was not made a party. The Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the daughter also inherited the tenancy rights in her own right. 6. On the other hand the submission of the respondent No. 1-landlord was that the objections had been filed merely to delay and defeat the execution of the eviction order. The Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the daughter also inherited the tenancy rights in her own right. 6. On the other hand the submission of the respondent No. 1-landlord was that the objections had been filed merely to delay and defeat the execution of the eviction order. The judgment debtor had contested the eviction petition as he was residing in the tenancy premises, and he contested the said petition. The allegation of collusion between the decree holder and the judgment debtor was also denied. Respondent No. 1 also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Surayya Begum v. Mohd. Usman and Ors. : [1991]2 SCR 517 . In that decision the Supreme Court considered the question whether the heirs of the original tenant who were parties to the eviction proceedings represented the objector also, who had not been impleaded as a party respondent. The suit for eviction had been filed after the death of the original tenant, impleading all the family members except the appellant, who was a daughter of the deceased tenant. A similar objection, as in this case, had been raised to say that the appellant had an independent title to the tenancy rights. 7. The Tribunal extensively discussed the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and applied the test laid down therein to determine whether the judgment debtor acted in a representative capacity in relation to the rights of the objector. After a detailed examination of the said aspect, the Tribunal has returned a finding that the interest of the petitioners was duly represented by the judgment debtor, and consequently the appeal has been dismissed by the impugned order. 8. Before me, the submissions of the petitioner is firstly that the plea that the judgment debtor represented the interests of the petitioner was not a plea taken by the respondent No. 1 landlord in reply to the objections filed by the petitioners. He submits that the said plea could not have been raised before the ARCT or considered by him. The next submission is that even in the case of Surayya Begum (supra), the Honble Supreme Court had remanded back the matter since the objector had not been given sufficient opportunity to lead evidence in support of her allegation that there was collusion between the landlord and the judgment debtor. The next submission is that even in the case of Surayya Begum (supra), the Honble Supreme Court had remanded back the matter since the objector had not been given sufficient opportunity to lead evidence in support of her allegation that there was collusion between the landlord and the judgment debtor. It is argued that in the present case also, the objections had been dismissed without granting sufficient opportunity to the petitioners to lead evidence to establish the collusion between the two respondents. Reference is also made to Section 37 of the Act which states that no order which prejudicially affects any person shall be made by the Controller without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same have been considered by the Controller. It was further argued that the Controller while holding any such inquiry is required to follow the practice and procedure of a court of small causes, including recording of evidence. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on Mohd. Idrees (supra) and Nanu Mal (deceased) v. Bhagwat Pershad @ Bhagwat Sarup and Anr. : 54(1994) DLT 249 (DB), Woolways, Shop-cum-Office, Chandigarh and Ors. v. Central Bank of India, Chandigarh and Smt. Vidyawanti v. Tokan Dass 1974 RLR 23. 9. On the other hand the submission of learned Counsel for the respondent-caveator is that in the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to examine the order passed by the Tribunal on its merits. In support of this submission he relied on Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaeim and Ors.: [1984]1 SCR 211 . He further submits that in Mohd. Idrees (supra) the fact situation was entirely different, inasmuch as, the eviction petition had been dismissed on account of the non-joinder of a necessary party. In that case, in response to the eviction petition, in his defence the tenant had specifically raised the issue about the non-joinder of another heir of the deceased tenant. The landlord had taken the stand that since the other son of the deceased tenant was not residing in the suit premises at the time of death of the tenant he was not a necessary party. The landlord had taken the stand that since the other son of the deceased tenant was not residing in the suit premises at the time of death of the tenant he was not a necessary party. This submission of the landlord had been rejected by the Controller and was also rejected by this Court. However, in the facts of the present case, neither respondent No. 2 had not raised any such plea, nor the petitioners had jumped into the on going eviction proceedings on their own while the same were pending. They have sprung up only after the eviction order had attained finality merely to obstruct the execution proceedings. Therefore, it is contended that the said decision would have no application in the facts of the present case. It is also argued that the real issue in the present case is whether the interest of the petitioners/objectors was duly represented by the judgment debtor or not, and that this aspect is squarely dealt with in Surayya Begum (supra). Counsel for the respondent also relied on Order I Rule 13 CPC. 10. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties, I am of the view that there is no merit in this petition and the impugned order does not call for interference. .11. In response to the objections filed by the petitioners, the stand taken by the respondent-landlord was that the objections had been filed at the instance of, in collusion with and in league with the judgment debtor. It was also pleaded that during the pendency of the eviction petition and the revision petition before this Court, it was never alleged that the judgment debtor and the objectors have a .strained relationship or that they were not on speaking terms. In fact the objectors used to visit the suit premises. In paragraph 4 of the preliminary objections, respondent No. 1 had stated that the judgment debtor had contested the eviction petition "strongly/hotly" by engaging the best possible competent lawyers in rent cases, namely, S/Sh. Subash Oberoi, Advocate, J.K. Seth, Senior Advocate and R.S.Endlaw, Advocate to defend the eviction petition till the High Court. The Judgment Debtor had even got the possession of the suit premises restored from the decree holder to himself after the successful after execution of decree dated 29.1.2005, with orders of this Court. Subash Oberoi, Advocate, J.K. Seth, Senior Advocate and R.S.Endlaw, Advocate to defend the eviction petition till the High Court. The Judgment Debtor had even got the possession of the suit premises restored from the decree holder to himself after the successful after execution of decree dated 29.1.2005, with orders of this Court. Even at that stage the petitioners did not stake any claim to the tenancy rights in the suit premises. It was also pleaded that it was mala fide and dishonest on the part of the objectors to allege that the decree dated 29.1.2005 is a collusive one between the decree holder and the judgment debtor. It was further alleged that the objectors were well aware of the pendency of litigation amongst the judgment debtor and the decree holder regarding the property in question and that they actually assisted the judgment debtor in defending the eviction petition at every stage of the proceedings, but never came forward to claim tenancy rights in the suit premises. Respondent No. 1 further took the stand that the objectors never asserted any right as tenants and in fact after the demise of the original tenant it was only respondent No. 2 who had remained in possession of the suit premises. 12. The sum and substance of these assertions was, firstly, that the petitioners had no independent title or right as tenants since they were not in occupation of the suit premises and were residing elsewhere before and after the death of the original tenant, and secondly that there was collusion between the respondent No. 2 and the petitioners who had been set up by respondent No. 2 to delay and defeat the execution of the eviction order. The allegations also were that, in fact, the petitioners were well aware of the pendency of the eviction proceedings but that they deliberately chose not to stake any claim as tenants in the suit premises. Most importantly, it was contended that the eviction proceedings were hotly contested by engaging well-known and competent counsels by respondent No. 2, the implication being that the interest of the petitioners had been duly represented in the eviction proceedings. Most importantly, it was contended that the eviction proceedings were hotly contested by engaging well-known and competent counsels by respondent No. 2, the implication being that the interest of the petitioners had been duly represented in the eviction proceedings. In my view these averments clearly bring out that the contention of the Respondent No. 1 was that firstly, the petitioners had no interest or independent title as tenants in the suit premises, and in any event, their interest had been duly represented in the eviction proceedings. 13. When third party objections are filed before the Controller to the execution of an eviction order, it is for the executing court to examine whether the third party objector has an independent title to such premises. Even if he concludes that the objector has an independent title as claimed by him, that does not automatically nullify the eviction decree qua the third party. The enquiry then gets focussed on the question whether the interest of such an objector, who sets up an independent title has been duly represented by the judgment debtors or not. That is exactly what has been done by the learned ARCT in this case. 14. Admittedly, neither respondent No. 2 nor the petitioners brought it to the notice of the Rent Controller or the respondent-landlord that the petitioners had an independent title to the suit premises as tenants. The respondent-landlord, when he filed the eviction petition was justified in proceeding against respondent No. 2 alone, since he had seen the original tenant and respondent No. 2 in use and occupation of the suit premises during the lifetime of the original tenant, and upon his demise it was only respondent No. 2 who remained in occupation at the premises and dealt with the respondent-landlord as a tenant. The landlord could not be expected to go on a wild goose chase looking for all possible legal heirs of the deceased tenant. Such an approach would put an unjustifiable burden on the landlord and also encourage frivolous objections to the execution of a decree obtained by the landlord after a great amount of toil and expense, not to mention the time expended by him in courts. In this case the facts are glaring. Such an approach would put an unjustifiable burden on the landlord and also encourage frivolous objections to the execution of a decree obtained by the landlord after a great amount of toil and expense, not to mention the time expended by him in courts. In this case the facts are glaring. Assuming that the petitioners were kept in the dark by Respondent No. 2 of the filing of the eviction petition and the passing of the eviction order by the learned ARC, they certainly would have learnt of it when the eviction decree was executed and possession of the tenancy premises taken over by Respondent No. 1. At least at that stage the petitioners would have swung into action had they been possessed of any existing rights, title or interest in the tenancy premises. However, even at that stage the petitioners were nowhere to be seen or heard of. It was only Respondent No. 2 who asserted his rights as a tenant and got back possession under orders of this Court during the pendency of this revision petition in this Court. This clearly shows the falsity of the claim set up by the petitioners. 15. Even if it were to be accepted that the petitioners had an independent title on account of being the legal heirs of the deceased tenant, they did not stake any such claim at any earlier stage and sat on the fence till after the eviction order had been passed, and the revision petition dismissed by this Court. Only when it became imminent that the executing Court would proceed to execute the eviction order, they jumped into the fray. The timing of their entry into the scene is also crucial. It was only six days after the dismissal of the revision petition by this Court that they made their appearance. This conduct of the petitioners only demonstrates collusion between them and Respondent No. 2, who are his own relations. .16. Nothing was brought on record by the petitioners in their objections to show that the relationship between the petitioners and Respondent No. 2 was strained or that they were not on talking terms. It is not the petitioners case that they have taken any action - civil or criminal, till date, against respondent No. 2 for his alleged collusion with respondent No. 1. It is not the petitioners case that they have taken any action - civil or criminal, till date, against respondent No. 2 for his alleged collusion with respondent No. 1. Now, the Executing Court, while dealing with the third party objections to the eviction decree, undoubtedly has to consider the objections and cannot ignore the same and proceed to execute the decree. However, that does not mean that in all cases the executing court is necessarily required to record evidence as in a trial of an original civil suit. It was not even prima facie established by the petitioners that they had ever exercised any rights as tenants after the demise of the original tenants. In fact, their claim to have an .independent title to tenancy premises itself appears to be illfounded since it is well settled that an heir of the deceased tenant, who is not in use and occupation of the tenanted premises and who does not exercise the rights and fulfills the obligations of a tenant by payment of rent is deemed to have impliedly surrendered his tenancy rights that he may have inherited. Reference may be made in this behalf to a decision of this Court in Sushil Kumar v. Bhagwanti Devi and Anr. 1989 (2) RCJ 629 and another decision of this Court in Dal Chand v. Raj Rani and Anr. CM(M) No. 169/2008 decided on 05.02.2008. 17. The issue in Mohd. Idnis (supra) was whether the judgment debtor had represented the interest of the objector, son of the deceased tenant. That was a case where the defendant in the eviction petition had disclosed the fact that the deceased tenant had another son who had also inherited the tenancy rights. Despite that disclosure the landlord had failed to implead the said son as a party defendant in the eviction petition on the ground that the said son was not residing in the tenanted premises. This Court held that it is immaterial whether or not the heir of the deceased tenant was in use and occupation of the tenanted premises and that he would, in any event be a legetee in respect of the tenancy rights and was a necessary party to the eviction proceedings. This Court held that it is immaterial whether or not the heir of the deceased tenant was in use and occupation of the tenanted premises and that he would, in any event be a legetee in respect of the tenancy rights and was a necessary party to the eviction proceedings. As aforesaid, in the present case, neither respondent No. 2 nor the petitioners ever disclosed to the respondent -landlord the fact that the petitioners had an interest in the tenancy rights of the suit premises. Neither of the petitioners ever exercised any rights or discharged any obligations as a tenant. I therefore reject the submission of the petitioners based on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Idnis (supra). 18. I now proceed to consider the submission of the parties based on Surayya Begum (supra). Surayya Begum (supra) was a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in two civil appeals. Civil Appeal No. 2056/91 was preferred by Surayya Begum and Civil Appeal No. 2057/901 was preferred by Renu Sharma and Anr. They were disposed of by a common judgment since they involved common questions of law. Surayya Begum claimed herself to be one of the nine legal representatives of the original tenant, one Khalil Raza. The respondent-landlord denied the fact that she was a daughter of the deceased tenant. The eviction proceedings were pursued by the landlord with success against the other legal representatives of the deceased-tenant who were respondent Nos. 2 to 9, being the other sons, daughters and wife of the deceased tenant. The contention of the appellant Surayya Begum was that since she was not impleaded as a party to the eviction proceedings instituted by the respondent, her right in the tenancy, which was an independent right cannot be put to end by permitting the decree obtained by the respondent-landlord to be executed against respondent Nos. 2 to 9. She also alleged collusion between respondents 2 to 9 and the decree holder. A similar plea was taken by the landlord to state that the objector had been set up by respondents 2 to 9 to defeat the decree against them which had been contested for a decade upto the stage of Supreme Court. 2 to 9. She also alleged collusion between respondents 2 to 9 and the decree holder. A similar plea was taken by the landlord to state that the objector had been set up by respondents 2 to 9 to defeat the decree against them which had been contested for a decade upto the stage of Supreme Court. The executing Court heard the parties and held that in view of the controversy on fact arising in the case, the appellants objection could be decided finally only after the parties are allowed to lead evidence. The executing Court fixed trial dates to try the disputed issues. The respondent-landlord challenged that order before this Court. This Court accepted the submission of the respondent -landlord holding that the appellant was bound by the decree and her objections had been filed with the sole object of delaying the execution. The appellants application under Section 47 read with Section 151 C.P.C and Section 25 of the Act were accordingly dismissed. That decision was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court. 19. Now I may narrate the facts in the appeal of Renu Sharma. The tenant in possession of the shop under dispute died in 1982 leaving behind his widow, three sons and four daughters as his heirs and representatives. Thereafter the respondent-landlord commenced an eviction proceeding in 1985 and obtained an eviction order. In the eviction proceedings, the landlord had impleaded only the wife and the sons of the deceased tenant. Two out of the four daughters were married and the remaining two daughters, appellants before the Supreme Court, were staying in the house but were not joined as parties. Despite contest by the mother and brothers of the appellants, an eviction order was passed in execution. The appellants, being the unmarried daughters of the deceased tenant, filed objections contending that they had an independent title in the tenancy rights and the decree obtained against the other members of the family would not bind them. The Supreme Court in its decision observed: 8. ...The main dispute between the parties, as it appears from their respective stands in the courts below, is whether the heirs of the original tenants who were parties to the proceeding, represented the objector-heirs also. The Supreme Court in its decision observed: 8. ...The main dispute between the parties, as it appears from their respective stands in the courts below, is whether the heirs of the original tenants who were parties to the proceeding, represented the objector-heirs also. According to the decree holder in Miss Renu Sharmas case their interest was adequately represented by their mother and brothers and they are as much bound by the decree as the named judgment debtors. In Surayya Begums case respondent 1 has denied the appellants claim of being one of the daughters of Khalil Raza, and has been contending that the full estate of Khalil Raza which devolved upon his heirs on his death was completely represented by the respondents 2 to 9. In other words, even if the appellant is held to be a daughter of Khalil Raza the further question as to whether her interest was represented by the other members of the family will have to be answered. 9. The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A Karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Explanation VI. - Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. - Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. This, of course, is subject to the essential condition that the interest of a person concerned has really been represented by the others; in other words, his interest has been looked after in a bona fide manner. If there be any clash of interests between the person concerned and his assumed representative or if the latter due to collusion or for any other reason, malafide neglects to defend the case, he can not be considered to be a representative. The issue, when it becomes relevant, has, therefore, to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty; but in other cases the issue may have to be decided with reference to relevant evidence to be led by the parties. Surraya Begums case is of this class while Renu Sharmas appeal belongs to the first category. 20. The Supreme Court observed that while in Surayya Begums (supra) case, disputed questions of fact were involved including the challenge to the parentage of the appellant by the respondent-landlord, and her allegations of collusion between the landlord and respondent Nos. 2 to 9, in Renu Sharmas case, the situation was very different, inasmuch as, the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal had given adequate opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence in support of their cases, which had not been availed of. In Surayya Begums case the Supreme Court held that on account of the disputed questions being raised, the executing court had granted the opportunity to the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective cases and in these circumstances the High Court should not have closed the matter finally, without waiting for the recording of evidence. Consequently the order of the High Court in Suraiya Begum was set aside and the matter remanded back to the executing Court for decision in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court, after permitting the parties to lead evidence. Consequently the order of the High Court in Suraiya Begum was set aside and the matter remanded back to the executing Court for decision in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court, after permitting the parties to lead evidence. However, no such opportunity was considered necessary, and therefore not granted by the Supreme Court in Renu Sharmas case. In Renu Sharmas case, the Supreme Court considered the circumstances, including the fact that the rent was paid to the landlord by the appellants mother and brothers and never by them, and that they are young girls in the family who are being looked after by the elders. Accordingly Renu Sharmas appeal was dismissed with costs. 21. From the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that whether or not the objector should be permitted to lead evidence in support of such like objections has to be determined on the facts of each case. It is for the executing Court to determine whether disputed questions of fact arose and a trial is called for. If on the facts as they appear before the Rent Controller, he is of the opinion that the allegations made by the objector are serious which require a deeper scrutiny and are not a mere device to delay and defeat the execution of the eviction decree, prompted by the judgment debtors themselves, he may decide to hold a trial, otherwise not. It would be for the executing court to examine the facts as pleaded and the documents placed before it to determine whether or not a full fledged trial is called for in a given case. There cannot be a hard and fast rule or a straight jacket formula prescribed in this regard. There are two competing concerns that the court, when confronted with objections under Section 25 of the Act, is faced with. On the one hand there is a concern for the landlord, who has obtained an eviction decree after some amount of expense, toil and running around in the courts which has attained finality. The concern of the court is to see that its eviction decree is executed without any delay so that the landlord may enjoy the fruits of his decree. The concern of the court is to see that its eviction decree is executed without any delay so that the landlord may enjoy the fruits of his decree. This concern would be even greater where the decree is passed on any of the grounds for which a summary proceedure is prescribed under the Act and the tenant is not entitled, as of right to defend the eviction proceedings, due to the urgent nature of these grounds. On the other hand, the concern of the executing court is also to see that a person who is not bound by the decree should not be made to suffer eviction from the premises, since no one can be condemned unheard. 22. While addressing these concerns, the executing court would therefore examine whether any objection raised calls for a trial. If the objections raised on the face of it appear to be frivolous and vague, the executing court is not obliged to go to trial. After all, the purpose of a trial is to enable the parties to lead evidence to prove their respective cases. However, if the case set up by one or the other party is so vague and frivolous, and so completely devoid of particulars, that the holding of a trial would be a futile exercise, the court can dispense with the requirement of holding a trial. If a trial is directed to be held in every case where a third party files objections under Section 25 of the Act, it could lead to failure of justice, since an unscrupulous tenant would file, and encourage others to file, one objection after another and insist that a trial be held on each occasion even when it is clear that there is no merit or substance in the objections and which eventually would get rejected. 23. In the present case, both the learned Additional Rent Controller and the learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal have consistently come to the conclusion that the objections filed by the petitioners were merely a devise to delay the execution of the eviction order. The learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal has examined in depth the issue whether the judgment debtor i.e. respondent No. 2 adequately represented the interest of the petitioners in the eviction proceedings. Findings recorded by the learned trial court in the order rejecting the objections read as follows: 7. The learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal has examined in depth the issue whether the judgment debtor i.e. respondent No. 2 adequately represented the interest of the petitioners in the eviction proceedings. Findings recorded by the learned trial court in the order rejecting the objections read as follows: 7. Having considered the aforesaid submissions, I am of the view that factum of objector No. 5 living in the suit property as pleaded by objectors themselves cannot be accepted as correct particularly in view of the fact that it cannot be believed that she was not aware of the having handed over possession by the DH and restoration thereof to JD in terms of order of Honble High Court as stated above. Moreover, had it been so, there is no reason as to why objectors also remained silent upto 28.8.06. Learned Counsel for DH has drawn my attention to Para 17 of order passed by Honble High Court in the said revision petition wherein it has been clearly observed that counsel for petitioner (JD herein) had stated that he is not willing to handover the possession of the tenanted premises on granting of some time but would like to avail further legal remedy. It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for DH that present objections have been filed after dismissal of the said revision petition are nothing but another means to delay execution of the proceedings and to defeat rights of the DH. 8. Perusal of record of trial of this case shows that the JD had pleaded from the beginning that he is living in tenanted premises alongwith his wife and children and never stated anything about objector No. 5 residing in the same. Moreover, JD never raised any plea regarding petition being bad for non-joinder of present objectors. Ld. Counsel for objectors has argued that since JD was in collusion with DH there was no reason for him to mention about the presence of objectors in the suit property or to implead present objectors in the eviction proceedings. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case I am not inclined to agree with the said submissions made on behalf of objectors. I may at this stage refer to the fact that perusal of record shows that JD had been vehemently opposing the eviction petition at all stages. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case I am not inclined to agree with the said submissions made on behalf of objectors. I may at this stage refer to the fact that perusal of record shows that JD had been vehemently opposing the eviction petition at all stages. As per order of Honbleble High Court possession of the premises was even restored to JD once as already discussed herein above. In these circumstances it cannot be stated that the JD was in collusion with the DH as contented by the present objectors. Rather the JD opposed the case of DH right from the beginning and contested it tooth and nail and there is no reason for believing that he connived with the DH. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case in toto, I am in agreement with the submissions made on behalf of the DH. 9. Accordingly, I am of the view that present objectors cannot be accepted since there is no ground for believing that objectors were not having knowledge of the pendency of eviction petition which the JD had been contested since 04/9/01 i.e date of filing of application for leave to defend. With these observations objections are hereby dismissed. 24. The learned ARCT, on a reading of Suraiya Begum culled out a few tests to be applied in a case where an objector sets up an independent title qua the tenanted premises, apart from the title of the judgment debtor. The said principles as stated by the learned ARCT read as follows: 17. i) interest of a person concerned has really been represented by the others: in other words, his interest has been looked after in a bona fide manner; ii) if there is any clash of interest between the persons concerned and his assumed representative or if the latter due to collusion or for any other reason, malafide neglects to defend the case, he cannot be considered to be a representative. iii) The issue, when it becomes relevant, has, therefore, to be answered with a reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt, one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty. iii) The issue, when it becomes relevant, has, therefore, to be answered with a reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt, one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty. But in other cases, the issue may have to be decided with reference to relevant evidence to be led by the parties. 25. In my view the learned ARCT has rightly appreciated the principles and tests and proceeded to apply the same in the facts of the present case. Analysis of the learned ARCT while applying the aforesaid principles/tests is exhaustive and read as follows: 18. Now, it is to be seen if the interest of the appellants/objectors were really represented by the Judgment Debtor, Ravi Diwan while defending the eviction petition, filed by the petitioner, Mohan Malhotra. The eviction petition was filed under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act, on the ground of bona fide requirement. The essential condition to seek eviction in such cases, are as follows: i) the petitioner is the owner and landlord; ii) the premises has been let out for residential purposes; iii) the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him. iv) the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. 19. The record speaks that the eviction petition was filed in May, 2001. The judgment Debtor filed the application to seek permission to defend the petition. The necessary permission was granted by the court of learned Addl. Rent Controller on 4.2.2002. Thereafter, the written statement was filed to oppose the eviction petition. The judgment debtor took the plea that the petitioner, Shri Mohan Malhotra was not the owner of the property and that there was no bona fide requirement of the house by the petitioner or any other family members dependent upon him. Otherwise, the petitioner had alternative residential accommodation. On completion of the pleadings, the petitioner examined two witnesses, including himself. The judgment debtor examined four witnesses, including himself. Thereafter, the petitioner wanted to lead evidence in rebuttal. He moved an application. The judgment debtor opposed the application. However, it was allowed by the court of learned Addl.Rent Controller. The Judgment Debtor challenged that order in appeal. On completion of the pleadings, the petitioner examined two witnesses, including himself. The judgment debtor examined four witnesses, including himself. Thereafter, the petitioner wanted to lead evidence in rebuttal. He moved an application. The judgment debtor opposed the application. However, it was allowed by the court of learned Addl.Rent Controller. The Judgment Debtor challenged that order in appeal. The Rent Control Tribunal vide order dated, 3.11.2004 in MCA No. 485/2004, allowed the appeal. Thereafter, the Addl.Rent Controller heard the arguments and allowed the eviction petition vide order dated 29.1.2005. 20.The Judgment Debtor (representative of the objectors), did not accept the eviction order. He filed revision petition before the Honble High Court to challenge the eviction order. In that revision petition also, the ownership of the petitioner and his bona fide requirement of the suit premises, were disputed. Before the dismissal of the revision petition No. 77/2005 dated 21.8.2006, the Honble Court inquired from the learned Counsel for the revisionist/Judgment Debtor, if the tenant could vacate the premises after getting sometime. However, the offer was declined and it was stated on behalf of the tenant that "he would like to avail all further legal remedies." It may also be pointed out that during the pendency of the revision petition before the Honble High Court, the Decree Holder had taken over the possession of the premises in execution proceedings as it was stated that there was no stay against the dispossession of the Judgment Debtor. The Judgment Debtor filed application with the request for restoration of the possession. The Honble High Court intervened and the possession was restored to the Judgment Debtor on 10.10.2005. 21. Thus, the Judgment Debtor (Ravi Diwan) contested the eviction petition by all means for about six years. He took all necessary defence to defeat the relief of eviction, as claimed by the petitioner. In the given circumstances, it cannot be said that the Judgment Debtor did not defend the eviction petition bona fide and consequently, did not really represent the objectors, or their interest was not looked after in a bonafide manner. If the Judgment Debtor had any malafide in contesting the eviction petition, then he would have given enough room to the Decree Holder to get the eviction order much earlier. 22. It is also to be seen if there was any clash of interest between the Judgment Debtor and assumed representative i.e, the appellants/objectors. If the Judgment Debtor had any malafide in contesting the eviction petition, then he would have given enough room to the Decree Holder to get the eviction order much earlier. 22. It is also to be seen if there was any clash of interest between the Judgment Debtor and assumed representative i.e, the appellants/objectors. As per objections, Shri Hans Raj Diwan, predecessor in interest of the objectors and Judgment Debtor, expired on 14.5.1995. The objectors with their families are living in separate residential accommodation due to paucity of accommodation in the suit property. They have been living separately for considerable period. It is stated that the appellant/objector No. 5, Mrs. Promilla Sachdev was married, but shifted back to the suit property in the year, 1982-83, owing to temperamental differences with her husband. She has been continuously living in the suit property. The petitioner/Decree Holder has denied that appellant No. 5 is living in the suit property. In any case, it is mater of record that the appellants Nos. 1 to 4 have been living in separate houses due to paucity of accommodation and it is only the Judgment Debtor, who along with his family has been residing in the suit property. On account of the eviction order, the Judgment Debtor is the most sufferer. Though, the appellants/objectors and the Judgment Debtor are tenants in common, yet the interest of the appellants is not in clash with the interest of the Judgment Debtor. So far appellant No. 5 is concerned, it has been observed by the court of learned Addl.Rent Controller that she did not resist her dispossession when the Decree Holder got executed the eviction order. She even did not apply for repossession of the premises. It was only the Judgment Debtor who claimed repossession and his request was conceded by the Honble Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant No. 5 was not in Delhi in those day. However, such plea has not been taken in the objections, filed under Section 25 of the Act. All these circumstances show that there could not have been any malafide on the part of the Judgment Debtor in defending the eviction petition and to overlook the interest of the appellants. Hence, it cannot be said that the Judgment Debtor was not a true representative of the appellants/ objectors. 23. All these circumstances show that there could not have been any malafide on the part of the Judgment Debtor in defending the eviction petition and to overlook the interest of the appellants. Hence, it cannot be said that the Judgment Debtor was not a true representative of the appellants/ objectors. 23. It has also been submitted by the appellants that they would have contested the eviction petition more seriously, particularly the ownership of the petitioner and relationship of landlord and tenant. The property was let out by late Shri Laxmi Narain Khattar to late Shri Hans Raj Diwan. The appellants have been contributing their share of rent and have been paying the same to the legal representatives of late Shri Laxmi Narain Khattar. The court of learned Addl.Rent Controller as well as the Honble High Court examined the issue and have categorically held that the petitioner is the owner of the property. He has right to claim the eviction for bona fide requirement. In view of such findings, I find no merit in the contention that the appellants would have contested the eviction petition so vigorously that it would have been rejected. 24. It has also been pleaded that to the belief of appellants, the Judgment Debtor agreed to take a sum of Rs. 5 lac from the petitioner to vacate the house. On the basis of such plea, the appellants have tried to establish that there is mala fide on the part of the Judgment Debtor to defeat the interest of the appellants/objectors. The plea is absolutely without any merit. It is so because the Judgment Debtor vigorously contested the eviction petition for about six years. The Decree Holder got the eviction order from the court of learned Addl. Rent Controller and then, it was confirmed by the Honble High Court. The Judgment Debtor declined to take sometime to vacate the house, as offered by the Honble High Court and stated that he would like to take legal remedies. In such circumstances, it is not believable that the Decree Holder would make a payment of Rs. 5 lac to get the house vacated. The conduct of the Judgment Debtor also shows that he was not after money, but took every possible means to resist the eviction order. 25. In such circumstances, it is not believable that the Decree Holder would make a payment of Rs. 5 lac to get the house vacated. The conduct of the Judgment Debtor also shows that he was not after money, but took every possible means to resist the eviction order. 25. The aforesaid facts of the case make the position absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt that the Judgment Debtor bona fide looked after the interest of the appellants/objectors. There was no malafide on his part and that, the Judgment Debtor did not collude to neglect to defend the eviction petition. He genuinely contested the eviction petition and, therefore, he acted as genuine representative of the appellants/objectors, though they were not named as respondents in the eviction petition. Under the circumstances, the court of learned Addl. Rent Controller has rightly held there was no need to allow the parties to lead evidence to decide the objections. It has rightly been held that the objections have got no merit and were filed just after 6-7 days of the dismissal of the revision petition by the Honble High Court, just to deny the fruit of the eviction order to the Decree Holder. .26. I find no merit in the submission of the petitioners that in the facts of this case, the learned ARC and the learned ARCT erred in not permitting the petitioners to lead evidence by conducting a trial on the so-called disputed issues. In my view if the submission of the petitioners were to be accepted that in every case where third party objections are preferred, a full fledged trial should takes place before the objections are decided one way or the other, it would be very easy for any unscrupulous tenant to set up a third party objector raising a claim of an independent title and delaying and defeating the execution of a validly obtained eviction decree. It is well known that often tenants have the tendency to cling on to the tenanted premises, one way or the other despite the existence of a valid eviction decree and in the process to initiate successive proceedings either in their own name or in the name of third parties. It is well known that often tenants have the tendency to cling on to the tenanted premises, one way or the other despite the existence of a valid eviction decree and in the process to initiate successive proceedings either in their own name or in the name of third parties. The Honble Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar AIR 2004 SC 904 has held that such objections should be dealt with by the executing court firmly and such efforts should be stamped out. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment observed as follows: .Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment-debtor to deny the decree-holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing laws delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system. .27. I am also referred to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in AIR 1997 Kar 149 Vigneshwar v. Gangabai Kom Narayan Bhat Prasad and Ors., wherein the Karnataka High Court held as follows: .Having decided the aforesaid point of law, I need to observe that there is another aspect of this case namely the fact that the manner in which execution proceedings are protracted, prolonged, complicated and the type of tactics that are used in order to see to it that decrees are not realized, make it necessary for this Court to very clearly emphasise the fact that the trial Court should be very slow in entertaining any challenge to the execution of decrees. All frivolous objections must be forthwith the beaten down and the decrees executed forthwith because they are orders of a competent Court which have become final. In, cases where all sorts of mischievous and dishonest tactics are resorted to in order to delay or default the execution, the executing Courts must be absolutely firm and ruthless in stopping such unhealthy practices. This is absolutely essential because otherwise the rule of law would not only be set at naught but it would virtually nullify and neutralise the orders of competent Courts. 28. The fallacy in this submission of the petitioner becomes even more glaring in cases to which the summary procedure prescribed in Section 25B of the Act applies. This is absolutely essential because otherwise the rule of law would not only be set at naught but it would virtually nullify and neutralise the orders of competent Courts. 28. The fallacy in this submission of the petitioner becomes even more glaring in cases to which the summary procedure prescribed in Section 25B of the Act applies. In such cases, while the eviction proceedings are governed by a summary procedure, if the submission of the petitioner were to be accepted, a full fledged trial should be held whenever third party objections are filed to an eviction decree. Such an interpretation would completely militate against the object and purpose of the Act and is, therefore, rejected. 29. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the decision of this Court in Smt. Vidya Wanti (supra) is of no avail. A Division Bench of this Court while deciding the said case, by relying on Section 19(1)(b) of the Hindu Successions Act proceeded on the basis that the heirs of the deceased tenant inherited the tenancy rights as co-tenants i.e. as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. It was held that they had unity of possession but not unity of title. However, the said decision does not appear to be good law any longer in view of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Harish Tandon v. ADM : [1995]1 SCR 56 and H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul : [1989]2 SCR 769 . In Harish Tandon (Supra), the Supreme Court held that after the death of original tenant, his heirs do not become tenants-in-common. After the death of the original tenant, his heirs will be deemed to be holding the premises as joint tenants and for any breach committed by any of such joint tenants, all the heirs of the original tenants have to suffer. The incidence of the tenancy is same as that enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs and there is no division of the premises or all the rent payable thereafter and the heirs succeeds to the tenancy as a joint tenants. In H.C. Pandey (supra), once again the Supreme Court held that after the death of the original tenant his heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants and not as tenants-in-common. This is, however, subject to any provision to contrary either negativing or limiting the succession. In H.C. Pandey (supra), once again the Supreme Court held that after the death of the original tenant his heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants and not as tenants-in-common. This is, however, subject to any provision to contrary either negativing or limiting the succession. Even in Suraiya Begum (supra), Supreme Court, in relation to Section 19 of the Hindu Successions Act, observed that when it directs that the heirs of the Hindu dying intestate shall take his property as tenants-in-common, this devolution of rights on the heirs is inter-se amongst them, and does not affect their relationship with a stranger having a superior or distinctive right therein. The relationship between the stranger and the heirs of the deceased tenants is not the subject matter of the section. 30. The decision of this Court in Nanu Mal (deceased)(supra), is also of no avail and has no bearing on the present case. That was a case where this Court held that the Civil suit file by the plaintiff/appellant was barred under Section 50 of the Act, since it was held that Kishan Gopal, the brother of the two defendants in the suit was the tenant in the suit premises and he was survived by his legal heirs. While dealing with the aspect of non joinder of a necessary party, and submission of the plaintiff/ appellant that the proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 CPC to the effect "provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of necessary party" came into effect only on 1.2.1977 and therefore, non-joinder of necessary party in a suit filed prior to the said amendment would not defeat the suit by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, this Court proceeded on the footing that it was not the case of the plaintiff that the defendants and legal heirs of Kishan Gopal were joint tenants. As aforesaid, the Honble Supreme Court has already held that heirs of a tenant inherit the tenancy rights as joint tenants. This decision, for the aforesaid reasons as well, has no bearing in the facts of the present case. 31. The petitioner has also relied on Woolways, Shop-cum-Office, Chandigarh and Ors. v. Central Bank of India, Chandigarh and Ors. In this case, the objections filed under Section 47 of the CPC to the execution petition filed by the judgment debtor had been dismissed in limini by the executing court. 31. The petitioner has also relied on Woolways, Shop-cum-Office, Chandigarh and Ors. v. Central Bank of India, Chandigarh and Ors. In this case, the objections filed under Section 47 of the CPC to the execution petition filed by the judgment debtor had been dismissed in limini by the executing court. In revision proceedings the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the objections under Section 47 of the CPC should not have been disposed of summarily. The Executing Court is not enjoined by the Statute to frame issues and dispose of the same in the same manner as a suit. Nevertheless, the Executing Court is under obligation to decide the dispute in a judicial manner. It was held that if the parties want to lead evidence the court ought to grant an opportunity. After making the aforesaid observations, the court examined the substance of the objection raised by the judgment debtor. It noticed that the Judgment Debtors had come with the positive plea that they had paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- out of the decreetal amount, but the bank did not realise the pledged goods of the proportionate value. The judgment debtors had pleaded that the amount was deposited in the bank. In these circumstances, the court held that an opportunity should have been afforded to prove the assertion made in the objection petition and that the Executing Court should not have dismissed the objection petition without going into the merits. This judgment is relied on to submit that the petitioners ought to have been given an opportunity by the learned ARC to lead evidence to prove the allegations of collusion between the two Respondents which allegedly lead to the passing of the eviction order. In my view, this decision cited by the petitioner is also of no avail. Firstly, the decision in Suraiya Begum (supra) is a direct decision dealing with Section 25 of the Act, a reading whereof indicates the principles that are applicable while dealing with the objections of third parties, who claimed to be holding independent title to the suit premises, other than the title of the judgment debtor tenant. Firstly, the decision in Suraiya Begum (supra) is a direct decision dealing with Section 25 of the Act, a reading whereof indicates the principles that are applicable while dealing with the objections of third parties, who claimed to be holding independent title to the suit premises, other than the title of the judgment debtor tenant. Secondly, even in this case one finds that the court while holding that the objections of the judgment debtor should not have been dismissed in limini, appreciated the content of the objection before reaching the conclusion that an opportunity should be afforded to the judgment debtor to prove the assertion made in the objection petition. Therefore, without expressly stating the same principal as is to be found in Suraiya Begum (supra), in fact, the court adopted the same yard stick in reaching its conclusion. 32. I am also with agreement with the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that while dealing with the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction even if it is confronted with a mere wrong decision without anything more. The Supervisory jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions withing the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It is not for this Court to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the Tribunal is purportedly based or to correct errors of law in the decision. 33. From the facts of this case, it is clear to me that the objections filed by the petitioners were nothing more than a device adopted by the petitioner to delay and defeat the eviction decree which had attain finality. 34. In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India : AIR 2005 SC 3353 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded on the unsuccessful party. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs. In large number of cases, such an order is passed despite Section 35(2) of the Code. Such a practice also encourages filing of frivolous suits. It also leads to taking up of frivolous defences. Further wherever costs are awarded, ordinarily the same are not realistic and are nominal. When Section 35(2) provides for cost to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party except in those cases where the Court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons thereof. The costs have to be actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost besides the payment of the court fee, lawyers fee, typing and other cost in relation to the litigation. It is for the High Courts to examine these aspects and wherever necessary make requisite rules, regulations or practice direction so as to provide appropriate guidelines for the subordinate courts to follow. 35. In the present case, the revision petition filed by the judgment debtor was dismissed on 21st August 2006 where after a period of about a year and half has gone by and the petitioners have successfully avoided the execution of the eviction decree. Moreover, the Respondent landlord has been subjected to litigation costs before the learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal and also before this Court. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, I, therefore, dismiss this petition with costs quantified at Rs. 1 lac. Petition dismissed.