Judgment : 1. This writ petition has been filed to quash the communication by letter bearing No.15365/2002-19, êñ”ôê (ê°õ1) dated 19.3.2003 by the Secretary, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, the second respondent herein and the “Decision of Speaker”, the first respondent herein made on the petition of the petitioner dated 30.1.2003 and to declare the respondents 3 to 6 as being disqualified to be the members of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly as per the provisions of the Tenth Schedule para 2(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 2. The case of the writ petitioner is as under: Late Thiru G.K. Moopanar founded a political party known as Tamil Manila Congress (Moopanar), hereinafter called as T.M.C. (M) and the party was registered and recognised as a State Party by the Election Commission of India. The party was assigned the reserved symbol, namely, bi-cycle under Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) order 1968. 3. In the general election held in the State of Tamil Nadu during May 2001, 23 candidates nominated by T.M.C. (M) with reserved symbol bi-cycle were elected to Tamil Nadu State legislative Assembly. The writ petitioner was elected as the leader of T.M.C. (M) legislative party and was so recognised by the Speaker, the first respondent herein. 4. In the general council meeting of T.M.C. (M) held on 8.7.2001, an unanimous resolution was passed to merge T.M.C. (M) party with Indian National Congress party (hereinafter called as I.N.C.). It was also resolved unanimously to dissolve T.M.C. (M) party with effect from the date of merger. Pursuant to the resolution, in a conference held in Madurai on 14.8. 2002, T.M.C. (M) merged with I.N.C. The petitioner sent a letter dated 26.8.2002 to the first respondent informing about the merger of T.M.C. (M) with I.N.C. and also about the dissolution of T.M.C. (M). By the same letter, the petitioner informed the first respondent that except the respondents 3 to 6 herein and deceased S.S. Mani Nadar , the other 18 M.L.As belonging to T.M.C. (M) may be allotted seats along with members of I.N.C. in the assembly. The first respondent passed an order accepting the merger of T.M.C. (M) with I.N.C. and treating 18 M.L.As. Of T.M.C. (M), as M.L.As. of I.N.C. and later seats were allotted on that basis. The first respondent passed an order accepting the merger of T.M.C. (M) with I.N.C. and treating 18 M.L.As. Of T.M.C. (M), as M.L.As. of I.N.C. and later seats were allotted on that basis. By the very same order, the first respondent permitted the respondents 3 to 6 herein and the deceased S.S. Mani Nadar, who have not accepted the merger to continue to function as T.M.C. (M) in the assembly. The writ petitioner sent a letter dated 11.10.2002 to the first respondent to reverse his decision - are made with regard to respondents 3 to 6 and the deceased S.S. Mani Nadar permitting them to function as T.M.C. (M) M.L.As. No order was passed by the first respondent on this letter dated 11 10 2002 till now. 5. In the meanwhile, the President of T.M.C. (M) made an application to the Election Commission requesting them to delete the name of T.M.C. (M) from the list of political parties registered with the Election Commission. The Election Commission by order at.8.10.2002 accepted the request and deleted T.M.C. (M) as a registered political party. 6. The writ petitioner in January 2003, came to know that the respondents 3 to 6 herein along with others floated a new political party by name Tamil Manila Kamaraj Congress (hereinafter called T.M.K.C.) by applying, and securing registration as a political party with the Election Commission of India. Thereafter, a request was made to the first respondent to recognise them as members of T.M.K.C. in the assembly and the first respondent had also accepted their request and recognised them as members of T.M.K.C. Party. 7. According to the petitioner, as the respondents 3 to 6 have voluntarily given up the membership of their original political party namely, T.M.C. (M) and became members of another political party namely, T.M.K.C., they became disqualified under para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. Therefore, the petitioner sent an application dated 30.1.2003 to the first respondent requesting to pass an order disqualifying the respondents 3 to 6 herein from being the members of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The first respondent by order dated 19.3.2003 rejected the application dated 30.1.2003 and aggrieved by the same, the writ petitioner has filed the above writ petition for the aforesaid relief. 8. The respondents 2 to 6 entered appearance and filed counter affidavit. The first respondent by order dated 19.3.2003 rejected the application dated 30.1.2003 and aggrieved by the same, the writ petitioner has filed the above writ petition for the aforesaid relief. 8. The respondents 2 to 6 entered appearance and filed counter affidavit. By the order of this Court dated 29.3.2004 in W.P.M.P. No. 8896 of 2004, the 7th respondent Union of India and 8th respondent Election Commission of India were impleaded as parties in the writ petition. 9. In his counter affidavit, the second respondent stated that it is not correct to state that the respondents 3 to 6 have voluntarily given up their membership. As per paragraph 4, (1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, those members who have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group and from the time of such merger such other political party or new political party or group as the case shall be deemed to be the political party under subparagraph (1) of paragraph (2) of the Tenth Schedule. Accordingly, the respondents 3 to 6 initially were permitted to function as members of T.M.C. (M) and subsequently as members of T.M.K.C. As per the relevant provision, the disqualification on the ground of defection will not apply in the case of members who have not opted for merger and opted to function as a separate group. It is further stated that the respondents 3 to 6 floated a new party T.M.K.C. after the deletion of T.M.C. (M) and therefore they have not joined T.M.K.C. as alleged by the writ petitioner. The first respondent has given his decision correctly and therefore the writ petition is to be dismissed. 10. An elaborate counter affidavit has been filed by the third respondent which was adopted by the respondents 4 and 5. 11. In his counter affidavit, the third respondent stated that writ petition itself is not maintainable as no infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate. mala fide, violation of principles of natural justice, nor perversity was made as a ground by the writ petitioner to assail the order of the first respondent. 12. On merits, the third respondent stated that though elected on a party ticket and symbol of T.M.C. (M), he chose not to adopt the resolution passed on 8.7.2002 to merge with I.N.C. as I.N.C. had only seven, members at the relevant point of time. 12. On merits, the third respondent stated that though elected on a party ticket and symbol of T.M.C. (M), he chose not to adopt the resolution passed on 8.7.2002 to merge with I.N.C. as I.N.C. had only seven, members at the relevant point of time. Five members including the third respondent have chosen to retain the original identity of T.M.C. (M). The merger took place on 14.8.2002. Election Commission deleted T.M.C. (M)s name from its records by order dated 8.10.2002. Therefore, there is no T.M.C. (M) atleast from 8.10.2002 onwards. Hence, they approached Election Commission of India for registering a political party under Section 29(A) of the Representation of People Act 1951 and submitted an application on 29.11.2002. The new parity started by them functioned from 15.11.2002 and Election Commission accorded recognition to T.M.K.C. on 7.1.2003. After the recognition by the Election Commission, the respondents 3 to 6 started functioning as members of T.M.K.C. and they attended a full session of the assembly held from 23.1.2003 to 31.1.2003. 13. It is denied by the third respondent that they joined a new political party. They only floated a new political party as the name of T.M.C. (M) was deleted by the Election Commission by order dated 8.10.2002. 14. According to the third respondent, in para 4 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, it is mentioned beneath the description of sub para 1(b) to the extent that a separate group can function as the original political party, hence he does not suffer from any disqualification. 15. In his counter affidavit, the 6th respondent questioned the locus standi of the writ petitioner as the original party T.M.C. (M) merged with the I.N.C. and the name of T.M.C. (M) itself was deleted by the Election Commission. He also draws support from paragraph (4) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution to contend that disqualification does not arise in the facts of the present case. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 16. A reply affidavit has been filed by the President of T.M.C. (M), before its merger with I.N.C. He is also the President of I.N.C. at the time of filing the reply affidavit in answer to the counter affidavit filed by the 6th respondent. 17. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 16. A reply affidavit has been filed by the President of T.M.C. (M), before its merger with I.N.C. He is also the President of I.N.C. at the time of filing the reply affidavit in answer to the counter affidavit filed by the 6th respondent. 17. It is stated in the above reply affidavit, no settlement was arrived at any time between the two groups as alleged and the registering of a new political party by the respondents 3 to 6 was their own choice and not pursuant to any settlement. 18. Heard Mr. G. Masilamani, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, learned Additional Advocate General for the second respondent, Mr. N. Jothi, learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4. Mr. M. Sathyanarayanan, learned counsel for the 5th respondent and Mr. K. Alagirisamy, learned counsel for the 6th respondent. I have also gone through the documents and judgments referred to by them in support of their submissions. 19. The learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that para 4(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India would not come f the rescue of the respondents 3 to 6 as wrongly stated in the impugned order. He submitted that the order of the first respondent recognising the respondents 3 to 6 as belonging to T.M.K.C. and holding that they would not attract the disqualification would amount to acting against the letter and spirit of Tenth Schedule. According to the learned senior counsel, the respondents 3 to 6 defected to a new party i. e., T.M.K.C. from T.M.C. (M) and it would amount to the respondents 3 to 6 voluntarily giving up their membership of the original party and thereby attracting the disqualification contemplated in para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. Hence, the learned senior counsel prayed for quashing the impugned order and declaring the respondents 3 to 6 as being disqualified to be the members of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions. Hence, the learned senior counsel prayed for quashing the impugned order and declaring the respondents 3 to 6 as being disqualified to be the members of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions. 1) Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilu AIR 1993 SC 412 : (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651 2) Ravi Naik v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1558 : (1994) Supp 2 SCC 641 3) G. Viswanathan v. Speaker AIR 1996 SC 1060 : (1996) 2 SCC 353 4) Dattaraya Maruthi Bawalekar v. Pandurang Dapadu Parte AIR 1998 SC 1994 : (1998) 5 SCC 431 5) Mayavathi v. Markandeya Chand AIR 1998 SC 3348: (1998) 7 SCC 517 20. The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that the impugned order has been correctly passed, that too, on the basis of the exception clause contained in para 4 of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that as per para 4(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule, those members who have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group and from the time of such merger such other new political party shall be deemed to be the political party of the respondents 3 to 6 under sub para (1) of para (2) of the Tenth Schedule. 21. The learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable as no ground of mala fides, violation of constitutional mandate, violation of principles of natural justice and perversity was raised by the petitioner while assailing the impugned order. The learned counsel further added that the scope of this Court in interfering with the order passed by the first respondent is very narrow and unless, the above said four elements are present, this Court cannot interfere with the order of the first respondent. On merits, the learned counsel submitted that the third respondent has got every right to remain in T.M.C. (M) even after merger and only when T.M.C. (M) was deleted as a political party by the Election Commission, the third respondent and others were compelled to float a new party and therefore it cannot be said that they have defected from the parent party to a new party. He also relied on para 4 of the Tenth Schedule and according to him the third respondent and others will not suffer any disqualification in view of para 4 of Tenth Schedule. 22. The learned counsel for the 5th respondent has also very much relied on the para 4 of the Tenth Schedule to submit that there is no merit in the writ petition. 23. The learned senior counsel for 6th respondent submitted that the writ petitioner himself has no locus standi to question the impugned order as he is no longer a member of T.M.C. (M) and in fact T.M.C. (M) itself is not in existence after its name was deleted by the Election Commission. The learned counsel urged that the action of the first respondent is in consonance with the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India and therefore it does not warrant any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations. 25. The only point that arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents 3 to 6 ought to be disqualified as per the Tenth Schedule or not. 26. The Constitution (Fifty second Amendment) Act 1985 amended Act 101, 102, and 191 and added Tenth Schedule after the 9th Schedule to the Constitution. 27. The following paragraphs in the Tenth schedule are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue that arose in the writ petition. Para (1)(b) defines the term “legislature party” as under: “( b) “legislature party”, in relation to a member of a house belonging to my political party in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 or paragraph 4, means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the time being belonging to that political party in accordance with the said provisions.” Para(1)(c) defines the term “Original political party” as under: “(c) “Original political party”, in relation to a member of a House means the Political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph (2)” 28. Para 2 deals with disqualification of a member of Parliament or assembly as the case may be belonging to any political party and it is useful to refer to para (2) which reads as under: “2. Para 2 deals with disqualification of a member of Parliament or assembly as the case may be belonging to any political party and it is useful to refer to para (2) which reads as under: “2. Disqualification on ground of defection- (1) Subject to the provisions of (para 4 and 5) a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House.- (a) if hehas voluntarily given his membership of such political party; or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-para,- (a) an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member: (b) a nominated member of a House shall,- (i) whether he is a member of any political party on the date of his nomination a such member, be deemed to belong to such political party; (ii) in any other case, he deemed to belong to the political party of which he becomes, or as the case may he, first becomes, a member before the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with the requirements of Article 99 or as the case may be, Article 188. (2) An elected member of a House who has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after such election. (3) A nominated member of a House shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with the requirements of Article 99 or, as the case may be, Article 188. (3) A nominated member of a House shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with the requirements of Article 99 or, as the case may be, Article 188. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this para, a person who, on the commencement of the Constitution (Fifty second Amendment) Act, 1985, is a member of a House (whether elected or nominated as such) shall,- (i) Where he was a member of a political party immediately before such commencement, be deemed, for the purposes of sub-para (1) of this para, to have been elected as a member of such House as a candidate set up by such political party; (ii) in any other case, be deemed to be an elected member of the House who has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party for the purposes of sub-para (2) of this para, or as the case may be, be deemed to be a nominated member of the House for the purposes of sub-para (3) of this paragraph.” Para4 is an exception to para 2 which: “ 4. Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of merger-( 1) A member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-para (1) of para 2 where his original political party merges with another Political party and he claims that he and any other members of his original political party,- (a) have become members of such other political party or, as the case may be, of a new political party formed by such merger; or (b) have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group, and from the time of such merger, such other political party or new political party or group, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-para (1) of para 2 and to be his original political party for the purposes of this sub-para. (2) For the purposes of sub-para (1) of this para, the merger of the original political party of a member of a House shall be deemed to have taken place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger.” 29. If any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, the question shall be referred to for the decision of the Chairman or the Speaker as the case may be and his decision is final under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule. Para 7 deals with bar of jurisdiction of Court in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member of a house under this schedule. 30. Before proceeding further, let me consider the judgments relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. 31. In Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilu (supra) the Constitutional validity of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act 1985 was challenged before a Five Judges bench of the Supreme Court. The majority view held as under: “These provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme. A person who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. The provisions of para 2(1) (a) proceed on the premise that political propriety and morality demand that if such a person, after the election, changes his affiliation and leaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then he should give up his Membership of the legislature and go back before the electorate. The same yardstick is applied to a person who is elected as an independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after the election.” Accordingly we hold: “that the para 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is valid. Its provisions do not suffer from the vice of subverting democratic rights of elected Members of Parliament and the Legislatures of the States. It does not violate their freedom of speech, freedom of vote and conscience as contended. Its provisions do not suffer from the vice of subverting democratic rights of elected Members of Parliament and the Legislatures of the States. It does not violate their freedom of speech, freedom of vote and conscience as contended. The provisions of para 2 do not violate any rights or freedom under Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution. The provisions are salutary and are intended to strengthen the fabric of Indian Parliamentary democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections. The contention that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, even with the exclusion of para 7, violate the basic structure of the Constitution in that they affect the democratic rights of elected Members and, therefore, (sic) of the principles of Parliamentary democracy is unsound and is rejected.” “That having regard to the background and evolution of the principles underlying the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, the provisions of para 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in terms and in effect bring about a change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and. therefore, the amendment would require to he ratified in accordance with the proviso to sub-Article (2) of Article 368 of the Constitution of India.” “That there is nothing in the said proviso to Article 368(2) which detracts from the severability of provision on account of the inclusion of which the Bill containing the Amendment requires ratification from the rest of the provisions of such Bill which do not attract and require such ratification. Having regard to the mandatory language of Article 368(2) that “thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended” the operation of the proviso should not be extended to constitutional amendments in a Bill which can stand by themselves without such ratification. That, accordingly, the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, to the extent of its provisions which are amenable to the legal sovereign of the amending process of the Union Parliament cannot be overborne by the proviso which cannot operate in that area. That, accordingly, the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, to the extent of its provisions which are amenable to the legal sovereign of the amending process of the Union Parliament cannot be overborne by the proviso which cannot operate in that area. There is no justification for the view that even the rest of the provisions of the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, excluding para 7 of the Tenth Schedule become constitutionally infirm by reason alone of the fact that one of its severable provisions which attracted and required ratification under the proviso to Article 368(2) was not so ratified. That para 7 of the Tenth Schedule contains a provision which is independent of and stands apart from, the main provisions of the Tenth Schedule which are intended to provide a remedy for the evil of unprincipled and unethical political defections and, therefore, is a severable part. The remaining provisions of the Tenth Schedule can and do stand independently of para 7 and are complete in themselves workable and are not truncated by the excision of para 7.” 39. The fiction in para 6(2), indeed, places it in the first clause of Article 122 of 212, as the case may be. The words “proceedings in Parliament” or “proceedings in the legislature of a State” in para 6(2) have their corresponding expression in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) respectively. This attracts an immunity from mere irregularities of procedures. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention to invoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct of resolution of disputes as to the disqualification of members deeming provision implies that the proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the House; but only before the Speaker s a specially designated authority. The decision under para 6(1) is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject to the approval by the House. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Article 122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Article 122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. In the light of the decisions referred to above and the nature of function, that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under para 6, the scope of judicial review under Articles 136 and 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under para 6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, noncompliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. In view of the limited scope of judicial, review that is available on account of the finality clause in para 6 and also having regard to the constitutional amendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i. e. Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia time action would not be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception will, however, have to be made in respect of cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such disqualification or suspension is likely to have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequences. That the Tenth Schedule does mot, in providing for an additional grant for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such dispute vested in the Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power. That para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speaker/Chairman is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in para 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, noncompliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity are concerned. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in para 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, noncompliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity are concerned. That the deeming provision in para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in , (1965) 1 SCR 413: ( AIR 1965 SC 745 ) to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words, “be deemed to he proceedings in Parliament” or “proceedings in the Legislature of a State” confines the scope of the fiction accordingly. The Speakers/ Chairman while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review. However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having regard to the constitutional amendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no guia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave, immediate and irreversible repurcussions and consequences.” 32. In Ravi Naik v. Union of India (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under: “11. This appeal has been filed by Bandekar and Chopdekar who were elected to the Goa Legislative Assembly under the ticket of MSP. The have been disqualified from membership of the Assembly under order of the Speaker dated 13.12.1992 on the ground of defection under para 2(1)(a) and 2(1) (b) of the Tenth Schedule. From the judgment of the High Court it appears that disqualification on the ground of para 2(1)(b) was not pressed on behalf of the contesting respondent and disqualification was sought on the around of para 2(1)(a) only. The said para provides for disqualification of a member of a House belonging to a political party if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party”. The words “voluntarily given up his membership” are not synonymous with “resignation from the membership of that party. The said para provides for disqualification of a member of a House belonging to a political party if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party”. The words “voluntarily given up his membership” are not synonymous with “resignation from the membership of that party. Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs. 18. Thesubmission of Shri Sen is that the petitions that were filed by Khalap before the Speaker did not fulfil the requirements of clause (a) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 6 in as much as the said petition did not contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner (Khalap) was relying and further that the provisions of clause (b) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 6 were also not complied with in as much as the petitions were not accompanied by copies of the documentary evidence on which the petitioner was relying and the names and addresses of the persons and the list of such information as furnished by each such person. It was also submitted that the petitions were also not verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of pleadings and thus there was noncompliance of sub-rule (6) of Rule 6 also and that in view of the said infirmities the petitions were liable to be dismissed in view of sub-rule (2) of Rule 7. We are unable to accept the said contention of Shri Sen. The Disqualification Rules have been framed to. regulate the procedure that is to be followed by the Speaker for exercising the power conferred on him under sub-para (1) para 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The Disqualification rules are, therefore, procedural in nature and any violation of the same would amount to an irregularity in procedure which is immune from judicial scrutiny in view of sub-para (2) of para 6 as construed by this Court in Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilucase. The Disqualification rules are, therefore, procedural in nature and any violation of the same would amount to an irregularity in procedure which is immune from judicial scrutiny in view of sub-para (2) of para 6 as construed by this Court in Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilucase. Moreover, the field of judicial review in respect of the orders passed by the Speaker under sub-para (1) of para 6 as construed by this Court in Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilucase is confined to breaches of the constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity. We are unable to uphold the contention of Shri Sen that the violation of the Disqualification Rules amounts to violation of constitutional mandates. By doing so, we would be elevating the rules to the status of the provisions of the Constitution which is impermissible. Since the Disqualification Rules have been framed by the Speaker in exercise of the power conferred under para 8 of the Tenth Schedule they have a status subordinate to the Constitution and cannot be equated with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as constitutional mandates and any violation of the Disqualification Rules does not afford a ground for judicial review of the order of the Speaker in view of the finality clause contained in sub-para (1) of para 6 of the Tenth Schedule as construed by this Court in Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilucase. 20. Principles of natural justice have an important place in modern Administrative Law. They have been defined to mean “fair play in action”. (See: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, BHAGWATI, J.) As laid down by this Court.” They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country hut is shared in common by all men” ( Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel ). An order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, is procedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. That is the reason why inspite of the finality imparted to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen by para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule such a decision is subject to judicial review on the ground of noncompliance with rules of natural justice. That is the reason why inspite of the finality imparted to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen by para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule such a decision is subject to judicial review on the ground of noncompliance with rules of natural justice. But while applying the principles of natural justice, it must be borne in mind that “they are not immutable but flexible” and they are not cast in a rigid mould and they cannot be put in a legal strait-jacket. Whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” 33. In G. Viswanathan v. Speaker (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under: “7. The crucial point raised in these appeals‘ centres round the interpretation to be placed on para 2 (1)(a) read with the explanation thereto of the Tenth Schedule. Does a member of a House, belonging to a political party, become disqualified as having voluntarily given up his membership of such political party on his joining another political party after his expulsion from the former. 7A. The legislative background enacting the law affords a key for an understanding of the relevant provisions. What impelled the Parliament to insert the Tenth Schedule can be seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which ultimately resulted in the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, quoted in the decision, Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilu, (1992) Supp.2 SCC 651(668): 1992 AIR SCW 3497(3512). It is to the following effect. “The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. It is not combated, it is lively to undermine the very foundations of our democracy and the principles which sustain it. With this object, an assurance was given in the Address by the President to Parliament an anti-defection Bill. This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance” When the constitutionality of the above provisions was challenged, this Court, after referring to para 2, 3 and 4 of the Tenth schedule of the Constitution stated in Kihote Hollenhan v. Zachilu ( supra) as under: “These provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidate at the, election on the basis of such programme. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidate at the, election on the basis of such programme. A person who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. The provisions of para 2(1)(a) proceed on the premise that political propriety and morality demand that if such a person, after election, changes his affiliation and elaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then he should give up his membership of the legislature and go back before the electorate. The same yardstick is applied to a person who is elected as an independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after the election. 8. The scope of the legal fiction enacted in the explanation (a) to para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule assumes importance in this context. By the decision of this Court it is fairly well settled that a deeming provision is an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed. The Legislature is competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not even exist. It means that the Courts must assume that such a State of affairs exist as real, and should imagine as real the consequences and incidents which inevitably flow therefrom, and give effect to the same. 10. It appears that since the explanation to para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule provides that an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member, such person so set up as a candidate and elected as a member shall continue to belong to that party. Even if such a member is thrown out or expelled from the party, for the purposes of the Tenth Schedule he will not cease to be a member of the political party that had set him up as a candidate for the election. He will continue to belong to that political party even if he is treated as ‘unattached‘. The further question is when does a person ‘voluntarily give up‘ his membership of such political party, as provided in para 2(1)(a). He will continue to belong to that political party even if he is treated as ‘unattached‘. The further question is when does a person ‘voluntarily give up‘ his membership of such political party, as provided in para 2(1)(a). The act of voluntarily giving up the membership of the political party may be either express or implied. When a person, who has been thrown out or expelled from the party which set him as a candidate and got elected, joins another (new) party, it will certainly amount to his voluntarily giving up the membership of the political party which had set him as a candidate for election as such member. 11. We are of the view that labelling of a member as ‘unattached‘ finds no place nor has any recognition in the Tenth Schedule. It appears to us that the classification of the members in the Tenth Schedule proceeds only on tie manner of their entry into the House. (1) one who has been elected on his being set up by a political party as a candidate for election as such member; (2) one who has been elected as a member otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party usually referred to as an ‘independent‘ candidate in an election; and (3) one who has been nominated. The categories mentioned are exhaustive. In our view, it is impermissible to invent a new category or clause other than the one envisaged or provided in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. If a person belonging to a political party that had set him up as a candidate, gets elected to the House and thereafter joins another political party for whatever reasons either because of his expulsion from the party or otherwise, he voluntarily gives up his membership of the political party and incurs the disqualification. Being treated as ‘unattached‘ is a matter of mere convenience outside the Tenth Schedule and does not alter the fact to be assumed under the explanation to para 2(1). Such an arrangement and labelling has no legal bearing so far as the Tenth Schedule is concerned. If the contention urged on behalf of the appellant is accepted it will defeat the very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule came to be introduced and would fail to suppress the mischief, namely, breach of faith of the electorate. Such an arrangement and labelling has no legal bearing so far as the Tenth Schedule is concerned. If the contention urged on behalf of the appellant is accepted it will defeat the very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule came to be introduced and would fail to suppress the mischief, namely, breach of faith of the electorate. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the deeming fiction must be given full effect for otherwise the expelled member would escape the rigour of the law which was intended to curb the evil of defections which was intended to curb the evil of defections which had polluted our democratic polity. 12. Mr. Shanthi Bhushan laid stress on para 1(b) of the Tenth Schedule and condoned that the Legislative party in relation to a member of a House belonging to any political party means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the time being belonging to that political party and so understood, the appellants who were thrown out or expelled from the part, did not belong to that political party nor will they be bound by any whip given by that party, and so, they are unattached members who did not belong to any political party and in such a situation the deeming provision in sub-para (a) of the explanation to para 2(1) will not apply. We are afraid it is nothing but begging the guest ion. Para 1(b) cannot be read in isolation. It should be read along with paras 2, 3 and 4. Para 1 (b) in referringto the Legislative Party in relation to a member of a House belonging to any political party, refers to the provisions of para 2, 3 and 4, as the case may be, to mean the group consisting of all members of that House for the time being belonging to that political party in accordance with the said provisions, namely, para 2, 3 and 4, as the case may be. Para 2(1) read with the explanation clearly points out that an elected member shall continue to belong to that political party by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. This is so notwithstanding that he was thrown oat or expelled, from that party. Para 2(1) read with the explanation clearly points out that an elected member shall continue to belong to that political party by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. This is so notwithstanding that he was thrown oat or expelled, from that party. That is a matter between the member and his party and has nothing to do so far as deeming clause in the Tenth Schedule is concerned. The action of a political party quaits member has no significance and cannot impinge on the fiction of law under the Tenth Schedule. We reject the plea solely based on Clause 1(b) of the Tenth Schedule. 13. Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India , 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 : (1994 AIR SCW 1214). In the said decision para 2(1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was construed and it is observed at page 649 (of (Supp) SCC): (AT P. 1224 of ATR SCW) thus: “The said paragraph provides for disqualification of a member of a House belonging to a political party “if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party “if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party. “The words “voluntarily given up his membership” are not synonymous with “resignation” and have a wider connotation. A person may voluntarily give up his membership of a political party even though he has not tendered his resignation from the membership of that party. Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs.” If he of his own volition joins another political party, as the appellants did in the present case, he must be taken to have acquired the membership of another political party by belonging the political party to which be belonged or must be deemed to have belonged under the explanation to para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule, Of course. Courts would insist on evidence which is positive, reliable and unequivocal,” 34. Courts would insist on evidence which is positive, reliable and unequivocal,” 34. In Dattatraya Marthui Bawalekar v. Pandurang Dupadu Parte Dattatraya Marthui Bawalekar v. Pandurang Dupadu Parte Dattatraya Marthui Bawalekar v. Pandurang Dupadu Parte ( supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under: “5. Shri Harish N. Salve and V.A. Bohde, learned senior advocates for the contesting respondents pleaded that the allegations made in the affidavit filed in the High Court made it clear that if appellants form an Aghadi. The disqualification of Section 3(2) would attract when elected councillors join any political party after such elections. The requisite conditions to attract the provision of the Act are (i) the councillors had been elected otherwise than as a candidate set up by a political party. Aghadi or Front; (ii) Such councillor joins any political party, Aghadi or Front after such elections. The disqualification attaches if an elected councillor joins any political party after fresh election. The expression such election has reference to the process in which he was a candidate of a political party. If these conditions are satisfied then the elected councillor would stand disqualified. Section 3 (2) deals with independents since candidates referred to are when a councillor has been elected otherwise than as candidate of a political party. The legislation imposes a condition that a person elected as an independent should continue as such without subjecting himself to any party affiliation and permitting independents to form a party after election would completely negate the policy of the law. The contention on behalf of the appellants is that such an interpretation would put the independents at greater disadvantage than the members of the political party, is misconceived inasmuch as splits or mergers would not arise in case of independent councillors. The spirit of enactment is that a member of a political party cannot join another or form a political front without incurring disqualification as provided under Section 3 unless he is expelled from his party. By the same token. Section 3(2) mandates that a person elected as an independent retains his status as such. 6. The spirit of enactment is that a member of a political party cannot join another or form a political front without incurring disqualification as provided under Section 3 unless he is expelled from his party. By the same token. Section 3(2) mandates that a person elected as an independent retains his status as such. 6. Section 3(2) to which we have adverted to earlier with reference to a councillor or a member who has been elected otherwise than as a candidate set up by a political party or Aghadi or front such a candidate or such councillor or member shall be disqualified for being a councillor if he joins any political party or Aghadi or front after such election. The Section specifically provide that an independent candidate not set up by a political party or front incurs disqualification on his joining any political party after such election. This Court in Kihato Hollohan v. Zachillu Kihato Hollohan v. Zachillu Kihato Hollohan v. Zachillu , 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651(688): (1992 AIR SCW 3497at p.3530-3531), while dealing with the effect of provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution noticed that the same yardstick has to he applied to a person who is elected as an independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after the election as is done with reference to a person who has been elected on a political plank. Therefore, no distinction could be made between a person who is elected as an independent and such distinction has not been made by the Act in question. On the other hand, it is made clear a councillor or a member has been elected not set up by a political party or front joins such political party subsequently would incur disqualification.” 35. In Mayavathi v. Markandeya Chand (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under: “ 14. The scope of judicial scrutiny on matters pertaining to the decision of a Speaker passed under para 6 of the Xth Schedule has been elaborately considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, (1992) Supp 2 SCC 651 : 1992 AIR SCW 3497. The scope of judicial scrutiny on matters pertaining to the decision of a Speaker passed under para 6 of the Xth Schedule has been elaborately considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, (1992) Supp 2 SCC 651 : 1992 AIR SCW 3497. One of the grounds urged before the Constitution Bench in support of the plea that Xth Schedule is liable to be struck down as violative of basic features of the Constitution was that: “the investiture of the determinative and adjudicative jurisdiction in the Speaker would, by itself, vitiate the provision on the ground of reasonable likelihood of bias and lack of impartiality and therefore denies the imperative of an independent adjudicatory machinery. The Speaker is elected and holds office on the support of the majority party and is not required to resign his membership of the political party after his election to the office of the Speaker. 17. Para6 of the Xth Schedule renders the decision of the Speaker final. The Constitution Bench considered its validity in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (supra). In the majority judgment it was held that the finality clause in para 6 does not completely exclude the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Ultimately, the Constitution Bench upheld the validity of the Xth Schedule subject to the aforesaid rider. However, the Bench further held that the scope of judicial scrutiny is limited to ascertain whether the decision of the Speaker is vitiated by jurisdictional errors viz., “infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.” 29. The said extreme proposition may lead to the situation that, no matter, however illegal the order may be, it cannot be touched if its author is the Speaker. I am unable to concede such an immunity to any constitutional functionary to be above law or to have unfettered jurisdiction to pass unreasonableorders with immunity. The test cannot be whether it is possible for the Speaker to record such a conclusion, because the very fact that the Speaker passed an order itself is the instance to show that it is possible. The test cannot be whether it is possible for the Speaker to record such a conclusion, because the very fact that the Speaker passed an order itself is the instance to show that it is possible. The test is whether the conclusion or the finding made by the Speaker is so unreasonable or -so unconscionable that no Tribunal have arrived at it on the given materials.” 36. In the light of the above facts and judgments of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, now let me consider the issue that has arisen in this case. The undisputed facts are as under: 1) The respondents 3 to 6 were elected as members of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly belonging to T.M.C. (M) party in the General Election held in May 2001. 2) T.M.C. (M) merged with I.N.C. in Madurai on 14.8.2002. 3) Out of 23 M.L.As belonging to T.M.C. (M) 18 accepted the merger and joined I.N.C. 4) The respondents 3 to 6 and late Thiru S.S. Mani Nadar did not accept the merger and continued to function T.M.C. (M) in the assembly. 5) The first respondent permitted the above said 5 M.L.As to function as T.M.C. (M) M.L.As. 6) The then President of T.M.C. (M), requested the Election Commission of India to delete the name of T.M.C. (M) from the list of political parties. 7) The Election Commission by an order dated 8.10.2002 deleted the T.M.C. (M) as a registered political party. 8) The respondents 3 to 6 floated a new political party, namely, T.M.K.C. and obtained registration from the Election Commission. 9) The petitioner-made an application dated 30.1.2003 to the first respondent requesting him to disqualify the respondents 3 to 6 as per Clause 2(1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule. 10) By the impugned proceedings dated 19.3.2003, the first respondent rejected the petitioners application by holding that as per paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, the respondents 3 to 6 shall not be disqualified under sub para (1) of para 2. 37. It is an admitted fact that the respondents 3 to 6 had not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group along with another member. Therefore, para (4) (2) (b) of the Tenth Schedule will hold the field and disqualification under para 2(1) will not apply to members who did not accept the merger. 37. It is an admitted fact that the respondents 3 to 6 had not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group along with another member. Therefore, para (4) (2) (b) of the Tenth Schedule will hold the field and disqualification under para 2(1) will not apply to members who did not accept the merger. So far there is no difficulty and the Tenth Schedule recognises the right of a member who does not accept the merger and opts to function as a separate group, 38. But the contention of the writ petitioner is that after floating a new party, the respondents 3 to 6 became members of that new party and thereby they voluntarily gave up their identity as a separate group and in such circumstances, para 2(1) (a) will apply and therefore they are liable to be disqualified for being members of the assembly. 39. I am unable to accept this contention of the writ petitioner. 40. Original political party is defined in relation to a member of a House in para l(c ) of the Tenth Schedule and it means the political party to which the member for the purpose of sub-para (1) of paragraph (2). 41. A members of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House, as per sub-para (1) para 2, if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which be belongs, without obtaining prior permission from that political party and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party within 15 days from the date of such voting or abstention. For the purpose of para 2 an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. 42. But this disqualification on the ground of defection as contemplated in para 2(1) of Tenth Schedule is subject to the provisions of para 4 and 5. 43. Para4 of the Tenth Schedule deals with two instances of exception to sub-para (1) of para 2. 42. But this disqualification on the ground of defection as contemplated in para 2(1) of Tenth Schedule is subject to the provisions of para 4 and 5. 43. Para4 of the Tenth Schedule deals with two instances of exception to sub-para (1) of para 2. They are (1) A member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub para (1) of para 2 where his original political party merges with another political party and he claims that he and other members of his political party have become members of such other political party or as the case may be, of a new political party formed by such merger and (2) A member of a House shall not be disqualified where his original political party merges with another political party and he claims that be and other members of his original party have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group. 44. After the merger, the other political party or new political party shall be deemed to be the political party to which he belongs for the purpose of sub para (1) of para 2 and to be his original political party for the purpose of sub para 1 of para 4 respectively, if the member accepts the merger and if he opts to function as separate group, such group shall be deemed to be the political party to which be belongs for the purpose of sub para (1) of para 2 and to be his original political party for the purpose of sub para (1) of para 4 respectively. 45. In the present case, out of the 23 members of the House, 18 accepted the merger and accordingly, for them, I.N.C. is the political party and original political party for the purpose of sub para (1) of para 2 and sub para (1) of para 4 respectively. For the remaining 5 who opt”d to be out of merger, their group, in whatever name, that group was called is the political party and original political party for the purpose of sub para (1) of para 2 and sub para (1) of para 4 respectively. 46. For the remaining 5 who opt”d to be out of merger, their group, in whatever name, that group was called is the political party and original political party for the purpose of sub para (1) of para 2 and sub para (1) of para 4 respectively. 46. Now, this group of the respondents 3 to 6 was initially recognised in the name of the merged party itself (i.e.) T.M.C. (M) and later on when the name of T.M.C.(M) was delted from the records of the Election Commission, floated a new party, (i. e.) T.M.K.C. and requested the first respondent to recognise them as members of T.M.K.C. in the assembly. The first respondent accepted their request and recognised them as members of T.M.K.C. 47. Now, the separate group consisting of the respondents 3 to 6 identified themselves as members of T.M.K.C, formed by themselves along with others. By doing so, whether they are liable to be disqualified as per sub para (1) of para 2 as contended by the writ petitioner. 48. I am of the considered view that they do not come within the ambit and scope of sub para (1) of para 2, which itself is subject to para 4 and 5. 49. All the members, (i. e.) the respondents 3 to 6 after functioning as a separate group opted to become the members of T.M.K.C, formed by themselves along with others. In such circumstances, it is once again a case of merger as contemplated in para 4 and therefore sub para (1) and para 2 will not get attracted in their joining the new political party. Therefore, as rightly contended by the respondents 1 to 6, para 4 alone will apply in this case of 5 members of T.M.C. (M) who have not accepted the, merger of T.M.C. (M) with I.N.C, who initially opted to be a separate group calling themselves as members of T.M.C. (M) and later on floated the new political party called T.M.K.C 50. Strong reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in G. Viswanathan v. Speaker (supra) to contend that the respondents 3 to 6 continue to belong to T.M.C. (M) even if they are treated as a separate group and when they voluntarily gave up their status as a separate group and joined T.M.K.C., they should be disqualified as being members as per sub para (l) of para 2. 51. First of all, the facts in G. Viswanathan v. Speaker (supra) are totally different and the Supreme Court did not deal with a case of merger as contemplated in para 4 of Tenth Schedule. In that case before the Supreme Court, two members belonging to A.I.A.D.M.K. Party were expelled from their party and the Speaker declared them as unattached members. When they joined another party namely M.D.M.K., it was decided by the Speaker that they incurred disqualification under para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule and they ceased to be members of the Assembly. When the decision of the Speaker was challenged in a writ petition, this Court dismissed the same. The Supreme Court also in the above decision confirmed the order of this Court. 52. Thus, the facts of the present case and the facts before the Supreme Court are entirely different. Apart from that the deeming provision given in explanation (a) in sub para (1) of para 2 is different from the deeming provision contemplated in para 4(1) (b). In such circumstances, the findings and observations of the Supreme Court given in the above judgment could not be straight away imported to the facts of the present case, which is a case of merger- as per para 4 of the Tenth Schedule. 53. The grievance of the writ petitioner is that the respondents 3 to 6 incurred disqualification as per para 2(1) which was not accepted by the first respondent. Therefore, the writ petition, questioning the decision of the first respondent cannot be throw away on the ground of maintainability. However, I find that the order of the first respondent does not disclose that he has not followed the mandate of the Constitution or he has violated the principles of natural Justice or the order is tainted with mala fide or it is perverse and hence I find no merits to interfere with the same. 54. However, I find that the order of the first respondent does not disclose that he has not followed the mandate of the Constitution or he has violated the principles of natural Justice or the order is tainted with mala fide or it is perverse and hence I find no merits to interfere with the same. 54. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Before parting with, it is to be recorded that this writ petition was argued in April 2006 and the arguments were completed only when the next elections to Tamil Nadu Assembly were about to be held and on the verge of the expiry of the term of office of the respondents 3 to 6 and thus forcing this Court to deliver a judgment which would be of academic interest only. Atleast in future, such matters of public interest are to be included in the cause list well in advance to avoid last minute arguments to save the writ petition from being dismissed as infructuous.