Judgment :- This Second Appeal arises out of the Judgment in A.S.No.170/1995 reversing the findings of the trial court in O.S. No.6719/1991 and thereby dismissing the Plaintiff’s suit for permanent injunction. 2. Appellant/Plaintiff has applied for approval of construction plan to the 1st Defendant – Commissioner, Corporation of Madras. Corporation has sanctioned permission for construction of Appellant's premises bearing Door No.60, Choolai High Road, Chennai-7. 3. The case of the Plaintiff is that appropriate planning authority is the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras. While so, the 2nd Defendant has served a notice to the Appellant in the year 1991 dated as 17.12.1987 under Sec.56 of Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 35/1972) (for short 'Act') to demolish the alleged deviated construction. It is the further case of the Plaintiff that when the construction plan was sanctioned by the Corporation of Madras under City Municipal Corporation Act, 2nd Defendant does not have any jurisdiction to issue notice under the Act. Alleging that the Plaintiff was not served with any notice, Plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from in any manner enforcing the notice issued under Sec.56 of the Act. 4. 2nd Defendant-Madras Metropolitan Development Authority (for short MMDA) had opposed the suit contending that in view of express bar provided under Sec.101 of the Act, suit is not maintainable. It was further alleged that no injunction could be granted against the statutory body restraining the statutory body from exercising its statutory functions. Plaintiff has obtained planning permission for the ground floor plus first floor from the 1st Defendant, whereas Plaintiff has constructed II and III floors which are totally unauthorized and therefore, MMDA was justified in issuing the impugned notice. 5. On the above pleadings, relevant issues were framed. Trial court reached the conclusion that there was no proof showing that notice had been sent through messenger. Trial court further held that notice had been sent nearly four years after the construction of the building was completed and on those findings decreed the suit granting permanent injunction as prayed for. 6. Aggrieved, 2nd Defendant-MMDA has preferred appeal in A.S.No.170/1995. Referring to Sec.101 of Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, lower Appellate court held that in view of express bar under the Act, civil suit is not maintainable. 6. Aggrieved, 2nd Defendant-MMDA has preferred appeal in A.S.No.170/1995. Referring to Sec.101 of Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, lower Appellate court held that in view of express bar under the Act, civil suit is not maintainable. The learned Appellate Judge observed that the impugned notice / order is to be challenged only before the competent forum provided under the statute and Plaintiff cannot maintain a civil suit. 7. Challenging the Judgment of the lower Appellate court, Plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal. At the time of admission the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration: 1) Whether section 56 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act could be invoked after the period of three years and the bar enunciated for such power as laid down in 1994(I) L.W. 59? 2) whether the provisions of Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act could be invoked when the sanction was accorded under the provisions of Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and would it amount to usurping jurisdiction as laid down in AIR 1989 SC 830? 8. Ms. P. Kalpa Reddy, the learned counsel for the Appellant contended that only Corporation is the appropriate planning authority who can inspect and can direct the land owner to bring the construction in conformity with the sanctioned plan and the 2nd Defendant – MMDA does not have any jurisdiction to issue notice under the Act. The learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff further contended that no notice has been served upon the Plaintiff and when there was violation of principles of natural justice, civil suit is well maintainable. 9. Reiterating the findings of the lower Appellate court, Mr. C. Kathiravan, the learned counsel for the Respondent-MMDA has submitted that in view of express bar under Sec.101 of the Act, lower Appellate court rightly reversed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. Placing reliance upon 2006 (1) CTC 241 (The Chairman, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Madras-8 v. S. Radhakrishnan and others), the learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that notice issued after 3 years cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Placing reliance upon 2006 (1) CTC 241 (The Chairman, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Madras-8 v. S. Radhakrishnan and others), the learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that notice issued after 3 years cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the Respondent would further submit that as against the issuance of notice as contemplated under the provisions of the Act, Plaintiff ought to have exhausted the remedy provided under the Statute and the lower Appellate court rightly held that the suit is not maintainable. 10. Ex.B1 notice dated 17.12.1987 has been challenged by the Plaintiff in the suit. Ex.B1 notice was issued to the Plaintiff alleging that the construction of ground floor and three floors put up at the premises bearing Door No.60, Choolai High Road, Chennai-7 is in contravention of the planning permission granted. Plaintiff had not produced any material showing that the impugned construction is in accordance with the approved plan. 11. Contention of the Appellant is that 2nd Defendant-MMDA was not justified in issuing notice invoking Sec.56 of the Act three years after the completion of the building. Though, it has been averred that notice was not issued within the stipulated period of three years as contemplated under Sec.56 of the Act, Plaintiff had not produced any document as to when he had obtained approval for the plan and when the construction was completed. Father of the Plaintiff was examined as P.W.1. In his evidence, though P.W.1 has stated that approval was granted for the II floor in 1986, Plaintiff had not produced the approval granted for construction of II floor. In such circumstances the contention that Ex.B1 notice dated 17.12.1987 was issued beyond three years is unacceptable. 12. The learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff mainly contended that under Sec.243 of Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act (for shot Corporation Act), the Commissioner has got power to inspect the construction to find out any violations. Under Sec.244 of Corporation Act, the Commissioner can direct the land owner to bring the construction in conformity with the sanctioned plan. Failing which under Sec.244-A of Corporation Act, Commissioner can either levy penalty on square feet basis for half yearly levy or under Sec.254 of Corporation Act directing the land owner to bring the construction in conformity with the sanctioned plan. 13. Failing which under Sec.244-A of Corporation Act, Commissioner can either levy penalty on square feet basis for half yearly levy or under Sec.254 of Corporation Act directing the land owner to bring the construction in conformity with the sanctioned plan. 13. On behalf of the Appellant, it has been pointed out that as per the above provisions of the Corporation Act, only Corporation is the competent authority to take action in case of deviation from the approved plan and 2nd Defendant-MMDA has no such authority for issuing notice for demolition. The contention that 2nd Defendant-MMDA has no authority to issue notice does not merit acceptance. When there is any unauthorized construction, under Sec.56 of the Act, 2nd Defendant-MMDA is empowered to require removal of unauthorized construction. It is relevant to note that Corporation had also taken action in 1987. In his evidence P.W.1 has stated that for deviation from the approved plan, fine was levied and the same was paid by the Plaintiff. There is no force in the contention that 2nd Defendant-MMDA has over stepped its jurisdiction. 14. Main ground of challenge of notice is non-service of notice upon the Plaintiff. The learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the 2nd Defendant-MMDA did not produce any evidence to prove serving of notice in the year 1987. Plaintiff has alleged that notice was served by a special messenger in the year 1991 and the notice was ante-dated. This contention does not merit acceptance. By perusal of Ex.B1, it is seen that notice EC2/10097/87 dated 17.12.1987 was served upon the Plaintiff by a special messenger. Ex.B2 is the acknowledgement by one S. Jayanthi who signed on behalf of the Plaintiff for having received the notice on 21.12.1987. There is no reason for doubting Exs.B1 and B2. 15. The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that in any event, the impugned notice was allegedly issued in 1991 is beyond the period of 3 years and the lower Appellate court failed to note that 3 years bar of limitation is attracted for serving any notice after the period of 3 years of development. 15. The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that in any event, the impugned notice was allegedly issued in 1991 is beyond the period of 3 years and the lower Appellate court failed to note that 3 years bar of limitation is attracted for serving any notice after the period of 3 years of development. Placing reliance upon 2006 (1) CTC 241 (The Chairman, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Madras-8 v. S.Radhakrishnan and others), the learned counsel for the Respondent-MMDA would submit that mere lapse of time viz., 3 years from the date of completion of unauthorized construction would not stand legalized. In the said decision, First Bench of this court considered the question whether appropriate authority's power to issue notice is to be exercised within 3 years from the date of completion of unauthorized construction. Division Bench of this Court held that 'planning authority' is within its right to issue notice against unauthorized construction even after the expiry of 3 years and take appropriate steps for demolition of unauthorized development. Applying the ratio of the above decision, there is no merit in the contention that the notice is barred by limitation. 16. The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that only Commissioner of Corporation has got power to inspect the construction to find out any violations under Sec.244 of the Act. It was argued that only Commissioner can direct the land owner to bring the construction in conformity with the sanctioned plan and MMDA cannot assume such power issuing notice for demolition. This contention does not merit acceptance. Under Sec.9-C of the Act, MMDA may, by order authorize to any local authority or other party to exercise any of its power vested in it by or under the Act. Exercise of power by the Commissioner, Corporation would not in any way take away the powers of MMDA to issue notice for demolition of unauthorized construction. 17. Second Appeal is to be dismissed on the short ground of non-maintainability of the suit in view of express bar provided under Sec.101 of the Act. There is an express bar provided under Sec.101 of the Act for filing a civil suit. 17. Second Appeal is to be dismissed on the short ground of non-maintainability of the suit in view of express bar provided under Sec.101 of the Act. There is an express bar provided under Sec.101 of the Act for filing a civil suit. Sec.101 of the Act stipulates that any decision or order of Tribunal or the Government or the planning authority or other authority or of any officer under the Act shall be subject to any appeal or revision or review provided under the Act be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. When the Act specifically excludes jurisdiction of Civil court, civil suit is not maintainable. 18. Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 is a self contained enactment which provides for appeal, revision, review of any order passed by the Planning authority or of any officer under the Act. Sec.56 of the Act also provides that any person aggrieved by notice may within the period specified in the notice apply for permission under Sec.49 for retention of the land. The Act also provides for statutory remedy. Without exhausting the remedies available under the statute, civil suit is not maintainable. 19. Normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a civil suit. 20. In AIR 2000 SC 2220 : (2000) 3 SCC 689 (State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by L.Rs. and others), the Hon'ble Supreme Court enumerated the following principles in examining the question of maintainability of the suit: (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication; and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. 21. Where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the court and the scheme of the Act provides for adequate and sufficient remedies, without exhausting the remedies available under the statute, civil suit is not maintainable. 21. Where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the court and the scheme of the Act provides for adequate and sufficient remedies, without exhausting the remedies available under the statute, civil suit is not maintainable. The grievance of the Plaintiff as to violation of principles of natural justice is unfounded. 22. Upon appreciation of evidence and materials on record, lower Appellate court was justified in reversing the conclusion of the trial court. The Judgment of the lower Appellate court does not suffer from any perversity warranting interference. 23. In the result, the Judgment of the lower Appellate court in A.S. No. 170/1995 dated 27.01.1997 on the file of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai (arising out of the Decree and Judgment dated 24.12.1993 in O.S. No.6719/1991 on the file of XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai) is confirmed and this Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.