JUDGMENT Honble Sunil Ambwani, J.—Heard Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri Sankatha Rai, Senior Counsel appears for the respondent. 2. This defendant’s second appeal arises out of Original Suit No. 420 of 1971 filed by Satya Narain-plaintiff for cancellation of gift deed dated 14.10.1970 executed by Smt. Laxmi Devi-defendant No. 1 in the suit, in favour of Janak Dulari-defendant No. 2, and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the property in dispute to any person other than the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 3 to 6. The suit was decreed by Munsif, Fatehpur on 20.7.1977. The Civil Appeal No. 207 of 1977 was dismissed by 4th Addl. District Judge, Fatehpur on 8.12.1977. 3. The Second Appeal No. 3383 of 1978 came up for hearing on 2.3.2006 and was allowed setting aside the judgments of the Courts below, cancelling the sale deed. On that day no one appears for the respondents. 4. Shri Sri Prakash, the respondent filed a Special Leave to Appeal in the Supreme Court. The Civil Appeal No. 623 of 2008 arising out of SLP (C) No. 13529 of 2006 was allowed on January 21, 2008 with the judgment and order as follows : “Leave granted. In the present case, the second appeal has been disposed of on merits without hearing the appellant. Further, the High Court has refused to restored the matter. There is no error in the order of the High Court refusing to restore the appeal. However, in order to give one more chance to the appellant herein, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court subject to the appellant paying Rs. 50,000/- as cost condition precedent to respondent No. 1 herein. On payment of such cost within four weeks from today, the second appeal No. 3383 of 1978 shall stand restored to the file of the Allahabad High Court. If the amount is not paid within four weeks then the impugned order shall stand without any interference. In the event of appellant paying the cost to respondent No.1 as stated above, we request the High Court to hear the second appeal on merits preferably within three months. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.” 5. In the event of appellant paying the cost to respondent No.1 as stated above, we request the High Court to hear the second appeal on merits preferably within three months. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.” 5. The substantial question of law that arises for determination in this second appeal is whether the partition deed could place any restriction on the right of the widow-Smt. Laxmi Devi, who had perfected her rights under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and became absolute owner of the property, in executing the gift deed dated 14.10.1970; and secondly whether the restriction on transfer as contained in Sections 154, 154-A, 155, 156, 157A, 157AA, 161, 164, 165 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short the Act) would operate as bar on the rights of a female bhumidhar to transfer the land under Section 152 of the Act? 6. The plaintiff brought the action on the allegations that he and defendant Nos. 1 to 6 were members of Joint Hindu Family upto 11.2.1954, when by a deed of family settlement the joint family was dissolved and all ancestral properties were divided in three lots. Laxmi Devi-defendant No. 1, was allotted lot No. 1 along with Gattu Lal and Satya Narain, with the condition that she will not transfer her property to any one other than the parties to the deed or their heirs. Smt. Laxmi Devi was bound by the terms of the family settlement and could not give away the property by gift to Smt. Janak Dulari defendant No. 2, who is daughter-in-law of the brother of plaintiff Satya Narain. Laxmi Devi gifted her entire half share in the properties in favour of Smt. Janak Dulari by registered Gift Deed dated 14.10.1970. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 Laxmi Devi and Janak Dulari filed joint written statement, stating that Laxmi Devi was full and absolute owner of the property on the date of execution of gift deed. The condition imposed in the partition deed dated 11.2.1954 was illegal and void and that the gift deed is valid. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 Laxmi Devi and Janak Dulari filed joint written statement, stating that Laxmi Devi was full and absolute owner of the property on the date of execution of gift deed. The condition imposed in the partition deed dated 11.2.1954 was illegal and void and that the gift deed is valid. In the joint written statement of defendants it was further alleged that Smt. Laxmi Devi had made gift deed on her own free will, which was duly accepted by Janak Dulari-the donee, and that the name of donee was duly mutated by order of Sub Divisional Officer, Bindki in revenue records. 7. The trial Court decreed the suit on a finding that Laxmi Devi did not have absolute interest in the property in dispute. Her right was with restriction that she could transfer the property only to the persons who were parties to the partition deed dated 11.2.1954, and their heirs, and thus the Gift Deed dated 14.10.1970 to a donee, who was not a party to the Partition Deed, was liable to be cancelled. It was further held that suit was not barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of cancellation of Gift Deed dated 14.10.1970. 8. In Civil Appeal, it was argued before the appellate Court that Smt. Laxmi Devi had matured her rights under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and that in any case U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which is a special law, is applicable to her rights in respect of the property which was agricultural land. 9. The appellate Court held that family settlement restricted the rights of Smt. Laxmi Devi, and that even after enforcement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the position will not alter as her rights of succession were regulated by U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The appellate Court relied upon judgment in Cheddu Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 All 664, in which it was held that the benefit of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, is not applicable in respect of agricultural holdings. The appellate Court relied upon judgment in Cheddu Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 All 664, in which it was held that the benefit of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, is not applicable in respect of agricultural holdings. The appellate Court distinguished the judgment in Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath, 1964 RD 80, a Full Bench of this Court, on the ground that where a female inherits a Bhumidhari holdings from a male Bhumidhar, the transfer will remain valid and effective only for her life or until she remarries. Though the appellate Court did not dispute the principle of law deciding in Ramji Dixit’s case, it found that question involved in the present case is not the right of Smt. Laxmi Devi to transfer, but the condition put in the family settlement, which was binding on her. 10. The appellate Court also held that even if Janaki Dulari could be included as one of the heirs, and could have been inherited the property from Satya Narain, she is not an immediate heir and could not have taken a share in the life time of her husband. The appeal was consequently dismissed. 11. Shri G.L. Tripathi has relied upon judgment of V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi, 1977 (3) SCC 99 ; Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath and others, AIR 1968 SC 1058 and Jagan Singh v. Dhanwati and another, 2005 All CJ 125 and submits that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 gave Smt. Laxmi Devi absolute right to ownership and transfer of property. Section 14 (1) and the explanation thereto are couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of female heir so as to advance the object of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and to grant socio-economic rights sought to be achieved by the long needed legislation. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of proviso to Section 14 (1). It must be construed in a manner so as not to dilute the affect of sub-section (1) of Section 14, and to become inconsistent with it. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to the instruments decrees, awards, gifts etc. by which rights are acquired in favour of female, for the first time. In such cases the restricted right in favour of female is legally, permissible. Section 14 (1) will not operate in that sphere. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to the instruments decrees, awards, gifts etc. by which rights are acquired in favour of female, for the first time. In such cases the restricted right in favour of female is legally, permissible. Section 14 (1) will not operate in that sphere. Where however, the instrument merely declares recognition of pre-existing rights, and such as claim of partition or share to which the female is even otherwise entitled, which is a pre-existing right, the sub-section will have no application, and in such case the limited interest of the female heir would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one and that the restriction placed, if any, under the document will have to be ignored. 12. In Ramji Dixit’s case, the Supreme Court considered the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, so far interest of female Zamindar is concerned, it was held by the Court as follows : “4………..But there is, in our judgment, no discernible relation between the nature of the estate of a female holder, and the restriction placed upon the power of testamentary disposition or the special rules of devolution of the holding of a female bhumidhar on death, abandonment or surrender, or forfeiture resulting from marriage or re-marriage. From the various provisions made in the Act it is impossible to evolve any consistent or logical pattern, indicating that the legislature intended by imposing the special rules of devolution of the interest of a female bhumidhar on death, marriage, abandonment or surrender, to make her tenure in the holding a mere life-estate. 12. There is nothing in the Act which indicates that when a female who inherits the rights of a bhumidhar, under Section 171 or Section 172 or Section 172A, any residuary interest remains vested in any other person. Under the Act she is the owner of the property; the entire estate is vested in her. It is a fundamental rule of our jurisprudence that an estate does not remain in abeyance. If it was intended by the Legislature that the interest inherited by a female mentioned in Section 171 was to be a life interest, there would be some indication that the reversionary or residuary interest remains vested in another person designated for that purpose. But a search in that behalf in the Act is fruitless. 13. If it was intended by the Legislature that the interest inherited by a female mentioned in Section 171 was to be a life interest, there would be some indication that the reversionary or residuary interest remains vested in another person designated for that purpose. But a search in that behalf in the Act is fruitless. 13. On a careful review of the provisions of the Act, we are unable to hold that it was intended by the Legislature to enact by implication that the holding inherited by a female heir belonging to one of the classes of female heirs in Section 171 is not (sic) held as a life-estate.” 13. This Court has followed the legal principle in Jagan Singh v. Dhanwati and another, 2005 All CJ 125, in which it was held by this Court that right of a female bhumidhar cannot be restricted by a contract or a will. A life estate is not contemplated in bhumidhari rights. 14. In the present case, there is no dispute that Smt. Laxmi Devi had a pre-existent right, which matured into full ownership under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, on the strength of Ramji Dixit’s case, it is also held that even if the property is agricultural holding to which, the special law namely U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 is applicable, there could be no restriction on her rights to transfer the land, by a gift deed. 15. The revolutionary change brought under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 clearly brought within its sweep, any restriction which may have been placed by any instruction, deed, decree or award between the family members by which the pre-existing right of the widow was excluded. The object of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was to provide the restricted right of a widow or woman succeeding to the estate in a family, to mature in full rights of ownership which could be transferred by her. 16. Shri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that family settlement dated 11.2.1954 was registered on 17.2.1954. 16. Shri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that family settlement dated 11.2.1954 was registered on 17.2.1954. It was a tripartite deed between Gattu Lal son of Beni Prasad, Satya Narain son of Chiranji Lal @ Chidiya Lal and Smt. Laxmi Devi as first party; Shri Chiranji Lal @ Chidiya Lal son of Beni Prasad, Shri Jai Narain son of Chiranji Lal @ Chidia Lal as second party and Shri Ram Narain son of Chiranji Lal @ Chidia Lal as third party. This family settlement restricted the rights of Smt. Laxmi Devi with a statement; “she will have no right to transfer the property to any other person, except the parties or their successors.” It is stated that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force w.e.f. 17.6.1956. Smt. Laxmi Devi executed a gift deed on 14.10.1970, which was registered on 2.12.1970, in favour of Smt. Janak Dulari wife of Shri Om Prakash, the brother of Shri Sri Prakash, the plaintiff-respondent. Shri Om Prakash was alive, when the gift deed was executed. He died on 1.3.1982. 17. Shri Sri Prakash-plaintiff-respondent has challenged the gift deed executed by her grand aunt-late Smt. Laxmi Devi, who died in the year 1973, in favour of his brother’s wife Smt. Janak Dulari. The gift deed was executed in respect of half share in two agriculture plots total area 12 bigha 19 biswa and 5 biswansis and half share in House No. 45 situated in Mahajani Gali, Bindki, Distt. Fatehpur, and half share in house situate in the market of Bindki, Distt. Fatehpur. It is contended by Shri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents that under the family partition Laxmi Devi was one of the three members of the first party having 1/3rd share in the property in Schedule-1. She did not have any right to execute gift deed in respect of half share of property mentioned in Schedule-1. She could transfer only 1/3rd share in the property in Schedule-1. She did not have any right to execute gift deed in respect of half share of property mentioned in Schedule-1. She could transfer only 1/3rd share in the property in Schedule-1. He further submits that Gattu Lal died in the year 1955 and Shri Chiranji Lal also died in 1957 and that at the time of execution of the Gift Deed dated 14.10.1970 registered on 2.12.1970 Shri Ram Narain, Shri Satya Narain and Shri Jai Narain, sons of other brother of Gattu Lal namely Chiranji Lal were alive, and thus the gift deed could, according to the terms of the parties, be executed either in favour of the parties or their successors. Smt. Janak Dulari was daughter-in-law of Shri Satya Narain and was not a person in whose favour the gift deed could be executed. 18. During the pendency of the suit Smt. Janak Dulari, the donee executed a sale deed dated 7.10.1971 in favour of Smt. Maya Trivedi, wife of Shri Amar Nath Trivedi-respondent No. 6 in respect of half share of the double storey house in Mohalla Bazar, Town Bindki, Distt. Fatehpur. She also executed another sale deed dated 3.12.1971 in favour of Smt. Vidya Devi wife of Durga Datta in respect of half share in Plot No.111 and Plot No.123 of 6 bigha 9 biswa and 12 ½ biswansis. 19. A perusal of the judgments of the trial Court and the first appellate Court would show that the suit was contested mainly on the issues whether late Smt. Laxmi Devi got only life interest in the property in dispute and that the gift deed is liable to be cancelled on that ground. The first five issues concentrated on this question of law. Issue Nos. 6 and 7 framed on 8.1.1976 related to the questions as to whether defendant No. 7-Smt. Vidya Devi is bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and whether the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. On 12.8.1976 issue No. 8 was framed namely whether compromise/family settlement dated 11.2.1954 is legal and valid. It was held by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court that Smt. Laxmi Devi was absolute owner of the property but that a condition was imposed that she could transfer her property only in favour of parties of the compromise/family settlement/partition deed and their successors. It was held by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court that Smt. Laxmi Devi was absolute owner of the property but that a condition was imposed that she could transfer her property only in favour of parties of the compromise/family settlement/partition deed and their successors. It was held that Smt. Laxmi Devi did not have a right to execute the gift deed in favour of Smt. Janak Dulari and that a suit was maintainable even without relief of declaration.The trial Court recorded findings on issue No. 5 that defendant Smt. Janak Dulari is the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff but that defendant could not have conspired against Shri Ram Narain and Shri Jai Narain and that thereafter Smt. Janak Dulari had made transfers in favour of Smt. Vidya Devi and Smt. Maya Trivedi during the pendency of the suit, and that these transfers have no effect on the suit on the basis of the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that defendant Nos. 7 and 8 are not bonafide purchasers for valuable considerations. The suit was not held to be barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as defendant Nos. 7 and 8 were not in possession and that the suit was liable to be decreed. In this second appeal Ground No. 1, namely that the right of Smt. Janak Dulari to execute the gift deed and the interpretation of the deed of the 1954 (Ex.1) as family settlement and whether it was really a deed of partition was framed as substantial question of law on 9.7.1979. On 27.9.2002 this Court allowed an application dated 16.10.2002 to add 8 more grounds as substantial questions of law. 20. The Court permitted the following questions also to be added as substantial questions of law : “(i) Whether the Court below erred in law in interpreting Exibit ‘1’ on which plaintiff’s suit was based as family settlement though correctly interpreted it was clearly a deed of partition? (ii) Whether in the circumstances of the case the mere inclusion of the name of the plaintiff in the partition deed as the co-sharer of Qura No.1 created any title in his favour on the basis in which he could file this suit out of which this appeal has arisen? (iii) Whether the gift deed dated 14.10.1970 was void in law? (iii) Whether the gift deed dated 14.10.1970 was void in law? (iv) Has the plaintiff any right to claim the injunction in the suit or to get the gift deed dated 14.10.1970 cancelled? (v) Whether it was legally permissible to create a restriction on the transfer of Bhumidhari rights when the right of transfer conferred by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (No.1 of 1951) is wholly unrestricted? (vi) Whether condition imposed by Clause 4 of the deed of partition was void, invalid and unenforceable in law in view of Sections 10 and 11 of Transfer of Property Act? (vii) Whether restriction in Clause 4 of the deed of partition even if valid and enforceable was in the eye of law a mere personal covenant, the breach of which could only make Lakshmi Devi liable for damages? (viii) Whether the suit is not maintainable being barred by the provisions of Sections 336 and 331 of the U.P. Act No.1 of 1951?” 21. I do not find that these newly added grounds are substantial questions of law, which actually arise for consideration in this second appeal. The substantial question of law must arise from the pleading and issues framed and decided by the trial Court and the grounds raised in the appellate Court. New questions need not be considered in second appeal, nor these questions were considered by me earlier and are required to be considered for the purposes of decision of this second appeal. The substantial question of law namely whether any restriction could be put by partition deed on the rights of Smt. Laxmi Devi, who had perfected her right under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and whether provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 place any bar on the right of female bhumidhar to transfer the land under Section 152 of the Act, are the only questions, which are required to be considered and which arise from the pleading and the judgments of the Courts below. 22. The Court by its order dated 18.2.2008 allowed the respondent to deposit Rs.50,000/- with the Registrar General of the Court. 23. Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant-Smt. Vidya Devi has confined his argument to the questions raised by him earlier. 22. The Court by its order dated 18.2.2008 allowed the respondent to deposit Rs.50,000/- with the Registrar General of the Court. 23. Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant-Smt. Vidya Devi has confined his argument to the questions raised by him earlier. Shri Sankatha Rai on the other hand would further submit that the family settlement dated 11.2.1954 places a bar upon Smt. Laxmi Devi to transfer the property in her share only to the parties or successors of the parties and to no other person. At the time of execution of the gift deed Gattu Lal and Chiranji Lal, the other two persons as party of the first part in the deed of family settlement had died but that Ram Narain, Satya Narain and Jai Narain, all sons of Chiranji Lal were alive and therefore according to condition No. 4 of the family settlement Smt. Laxmi Devi could have alienated the property of her share only in favour of Shri Ram Narain, Shri Satya Narain and Shri Jai Narain. A compromise by the parties by way of family settlement was binding on all the parties and that a party, who had taken benefit under the transaction was not entitled to turn around and say that the transaction was of a kind which the other party could not enter into and is therefore invalid. Shri Janak Dulari could not be treated as member of the family. 24. It is further contended by Shri Sankatha Rai that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would not applicable to agricultural land. Section 152 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 created special rights under the Act. The principles of Hindu Law and Mohammedan Law were not applicable to bhumidhari rights and thus it cannot be said that late Shri Laxmi Devi had perfected her rights and that inspite of the family settlement in which she restricted her rights, she could have transferred the land to any other person except the parties or their successors. 25. The submission made by Shri Sankatha Rai does not change the substance of the argument, which were raised in the trial Court and the appellate Court that late Smt. Laxmi Devi did not have right to execute the gift deed dated 14.10.1970 in favour of Smt. Janak Dulari. 25. The submission made by Shri Sankatha Rai does not change the substance of the argument, which were raised in the trial Court and the appellate Court that late Smt. Laxmi Devi did not have right to execute the gift deed dated 14.10.1970 in favour of Smt. Janak Dulari. She had pre-existing right in the property, which was acknowledged by the family settlement dated 11.2.1954. By virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 she perfected her rights and that there was no restriction on her to execute the gift deed in favour of Smt. Janak Dulari on 14.10.1970. 26. In Ram Charan v. Girja Nandini, AIR 1966 SC 432 ; Shiv Ram v. Ram Ratan and others, 1969 ALJ 83; and Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1976 (2) ALR 173 (SC) cited by Shri Sankatha Rai it was held that family settlement or arrangement between the members of a family descending from common ancestors or a near relation to sink their differences and disputes and to resolve their conflicting claims to buy peace of mind and to bring about complete harmony and good will are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced, if honestly made. The object is to protect the family from long drawn litigation and perpetual strifes and to bring unity and solidarity in the family. The settlement, however, should be bonafide to resolve family dispute and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family. It should be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion and undue influence. The parties must have some antecedent title, claim or interest or even a possible claim in the property. Even if name of the parties has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner then the antecedent title must be assumed and family arrangement will be upheld. In this case, I find that in para 3 of the family partition it was clearly stated that parties will be full owner of their shares with only restriction placed upon Smt. Laxmi Devi that she could transfer the property only to the parties or the successors to the documents. 27. In this case, I find that in para 3 of the family partition it was clearly stated that parties will be full owner of their shares with only restriction placed upon Smt. Laxmi Devi that she could transfer the property only to the parties or the successors to the documents. 27. Section 152 of the UPZA & LR Act gives rights to the bhumidhars to transfer the land subject to certain restrictions. Any agreement in contravention to the right to transfer is not valid. Late Smt. Laxmi Devi was not conferred any new right, which could be confined to her life time. The family settlement recognised her rights to succeed to the property. Any restriction, therefore, creating life interest in her favour, came to an end with enactment of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, which had the effect, in its scope and ambit to clear any cloud, which may have been imposed on a female Hindu to be the full owner of the property. As pointed out earlier late Smt. Laxmi Devi was not given any right by the deed of family settlement. The document simply recognised these pre-existing rights in her favour with a condition put in the year 1954 that she could sell her rights only to parties to the documents or their successors. This restriction on transfer without any consideration was also one of the restriction, which was sought to be removed by Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act with effect from the date of its enforcement on 17.6.1956. Section 14 (1) and explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether it acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. This limitation was not restricted only to limitation placed by law operating prior to commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 but also covered a family settlement or a deed of partition, which acknowledged these restricted rights. Any fetters placed on the pre-existing rights of a hindu female were removed by Section 14 (1) and explanation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Any fetters placed on the pre-existing rights of a hindu female were removed by Section 14 (1) and explanation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, (1977) 3 SCC 99 the Supreme Court said in para 62 as follows : “We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus : (1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring of recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights. (2) Section 14 (1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation. (3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14 (1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14 (1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14 (1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14 (1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female’s limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14 (1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14 (1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of express terms like “property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition”, “or in lieu of maintenance” “or arrears of maintenance” etc. in the Explanation to Section 14 (1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section (2). (6) The words “possessed by” used by the Legislature in Section 14 (1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14 (1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title. (7) That the words “restricted estate” used in Section 14 (2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14 (1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.” 28. The Supreme Court also held in Bishwanath Pandey v. Badami Kaur and others, AIR 1980 SC 1329 , as under : “This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 3.2.1969 dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant in limine. The undisputed facts of the case are that Smt. Badami Kaur was a widow of the last proprietor of the lands in dispute and she was recorded as such. The case was decided before the Consolidation authorities mainly on the basis of a statement alleged to have been given by Smt. Badami Kaur some time in the year 1931 as a result of which she was mutated as a widow of her husband. It was pleaded by the reversioners that the mutation was only by way of consolation without any rights in the properties which were to go to her collaterals; namely the respondents. This statement was made at a time when neither the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was passed nor the Hindu Succession Act came into force. At the time when the matter was decided by the Deputy Director of Consolidation both the Acts had been passed which conferred absolute proprietary rights on Smt. Badami Kaur who is still alive. Once Smt. Badami Kaur became an absolute owner of the property, the respondents’ interest as collaterals ceased to exist and they had therefore no locus standi to challenge the status of Smt. Badami Kaur. The Deputy Director of Consolidation therefore proceeded on a totally erroneous view of law in holding that Smt. Badami Kaur had merely a life interest and the property should go to the respondents who were the collaterals. During the pendency of this appeal, it appears that Smt. Badami Kaur has executed a deed of gift in favour of the appellant. The Deputy Director of Consolidation therefore proceeded on a totally erroneous view of law in holding that Smt. Badami Kaur had merely a life interest and the property should go to the respondents who were the collaterals. During the pendency of this appeal, it appears that Smt. Badami Kaur has executed a deed of gift in favour of the appellant. It is however not necessary to go into the validity or otherwise of the gift in view of the fact that Smt. Badami Kaur is still alive and is the absolute proprietor of the land in question. She has a right to admit anybody as co-tenant. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court and of Deputy Director, Consolidation dated 25-7-1968 are set aside and that she is directed to be recorded as the absolute owner and Bhumidar of the land in dispute.” 29. The restriction placed in family settlement for sale only to a party to the document or successors without any consideration thereof was clearly a limitation placed upon the pre-existing right of late Laxmi Devi. The enforcement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 removed the restriction and that her possession with a pre-existing and recognised right of ownership entitled her to transfer the property to Smt. Janak Dulari. 30. Smt. Janak Dulari is wife of Shri Om Prakash son of respondent No. 1. Shri Om Prakash died on 1.3.1982. Smt. Janak Dulari was thus a family member and later became the successor to the interest of Shri Om Prakash, the son of Shri Satya Narain, the plaintiff. Shri Sri Prakash succeeded to him as the other son along with Shri Om Prakash on the death of Shri Satya Narain on 25.12.1977. Smt. Janak Dulari as such inherited the interest of Shri Om Prakash on his death on 1.3.1982. 31. On the aforesaid discussions and the principles of law laid down by Supreme Court and followed by this Court, I find that the appellate Court committed manifest error of law in holding that the partition deed signed by Smt. Laxmi Devi, a child widow restricted her rights, which she had inherited from her husband and that she had absolute right of ownership and transfer of the properties. The restrictions placed on her by partition deed dated 11.2.1954 on her pre-existing rights were removed and that her rights were matured by Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further no restriction was placed by U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 on her to transfer the agricultural holdings. Both the substantial questions of law are returned in favour of the defendant-appellants. 32. The second appeal is consequently allowed. The judgment and decree of IVth Additional District Judge, Fatehpur dated 8.12.1977 in Civil Appeal No. 207 of 1977 and judgment and decree dated 30.7.1977 passed by Munsif, Fatehpur in Original Suit No. 420 of 1971, Satnarain v. Laxmi Devi and others, cancelling the sale deed is set aside, and the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed with cost throughout. ————