Judgment DEBIPRASAD SENGUPTA, J. The subject matter of challenge in the present appeal is the judgment and order dated 10.3.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge in W. P. No. 612 of 2002. In the writ petition the validity of an award of 7th Industrial Tribunal was under challenge. Initially the dispute which was referred to in the Tribunal was as follows: “Whether the termination of service of Shri G. C. Guha is justified. To what relief, if any, he is entitled to?” From the award of the Tribunal dated 18th April, 1996 it appears that the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that this was a simple case of resignation and not at all a retrenchment. Such award dated 18th April, 1996 was challenged in a writ proceeding being C. O. No. 19267 (W) of 1996, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 30.10.2000. The learned Judge was of the view that Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enquire into the question as to whether this was a case of resignation or not and all that the Tribunal was required to consider was whether the termination was legal, valid and whether the employee was entitled to any relief, if it is held to be illegal. The award was accordingly set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for answering the dispute strictly in terms of the reference. After the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal, the same was adjudicated and an award was passed on 8.10.2001 in favour of the employee/workman thereby holding that termination of service of workman amounts to retrenchment and since it was done without following the mandatory provision of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the termination was unjustified. It was further decided that since there was no question of reinstatement of the workman as he had already crossed the age of superannuation, he was entitled to his back wages from the date of retrenchment to the date when he would have normally retired from service. Such award dated 8.10.2001 was challenged by the Company in a writ proceeding before this Court. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 10th March, 2003 in W. P. No. 612 (W) of 2002 dismissed the writ application and hence this appeal. Such award dated 8.10.2001 was challenged by the Company in a writ proceeding before this Court. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 10th March, 2003 in W. P. No. 612 (W) of 2002 dismissed the writ application and hence this appeal. It may be mentioned here that an application was filed in the Tribunal after this matter was remanded back to the Tribunal to frame a preliminary issue as to whether the Reference was maintainable in law or not. Such application was rejected by the Tribunal on 30.5.2001 and challenging such order a writ petition was moved before this Court being W. P. No. 1301 of 2001. Writ application was disposed of by order dated 24.7.2001 and the impugned order was set aside with the following observation. “Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The Tribunal shall also go into the question as to whether the Reference is bad is an incidental issue within the scope and ambit of the order dated October 20, 2000 passed in C. O. No. 19267 (W) of 1996. However, while deciding the issues and questions, the Tribunal shall bear in its mind the scope and ambit of the decision to be given in the Reference within the meaning of the ultimate order passed in C.O.No. 19267 (W) of 1996 on October 30, 2000.” From the award dated 8.10.2001, it appears that the learned Judge, 7th Industrial Tribunal held that the termination of service of the workman amounts to retrenchment and such termination was declared unjustified as the same was done in non-compliance of the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is the contention of the learned Advocate of the appellant that the service of the workman was never terminated by the Company and it was a simple case of resignation. No order of termination was ever issued by the Company terminating service of the workman. The learned Advocate refers to the letter of resignation dated 1st June, 1990 which is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure “P-3”. The learned Advocate also refers to Annexure “P-4” and “P-5” which are reminders to the Company with a request to accept the resignation and to release all the dues to the workman which he was legally entitled to. The learned Advocate also refers to Annexure “P-4” and “P-5” which are reminders to the Company with a request to accept the resignation and to release all the dues to the workman which he was legally entitled to. Annexure “P-6” is a receipt granted by the respondent / workman after receiving his dues amounting to Rs.9,845.25 in full and final settlement. It is submitted by the learned Advocate of the appellant / company that the documents referred to above are sufficient to indicate that this was not a case of termination and retrenchment and this was a simple case of resignation. The learned Advocate has questioned the validity of the Reference and submits that the issue was not properly framed for proper adjudication by the Tribunal. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent / workman submits that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a dispute only in terms of reference made to it by an appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it cannot go beyond this reference. In support of his contention the learned Advocate relies upon the following judgments: (a) AIR 1967 SC 469 (Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd Vs. Workman & Others) (b) 1979 Lab. I.C. 827 (Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat Vs The Perfect Pottery Company Limited & Another). (c) 1999 (1) CHN 711 (Raibahadur B.M.H. Trust & Another Vs Presiding Officer & Others). We have gone through the judgments referred to above. The principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Court is settled principle of law. The ratio of all the judgments supports the contention of the learned Advocate of the respondent / workman that the Industrial Tribunal cannot travel beyond the ambit and scope of the issues referred to it for adjudication. The learned Advocate of the respondent / workman submits that the respondent was appointed as a senior stenographer in January, 1971 by M/s Sinclair Freight & Chartering Consultants Pvt. Limited and thereafter the same was amalgamated with M/s. Sinclairs Hotel & Transportation Limited. As a result of such amalgamation services of all the employees stood transferred to M/s. Sinclairs Hotel & Transportation Limited. As a result of such amalgamation services of all the employees stood transferred to M/s. Sinclairs Hotel & Transportation Limited. There was a condition regarding termination of service which was as follows: “3 months notice from either side or payment of salary in lieu thereof will be sufficient to terminate the employment.” The learned Advocate submits that the trouble started after such amalgamation when the new management was bent upon getting rid of the old employees. The respondent thereafter was asked to quit on the assurance of getting compensatory benefits. So by letter dated 1.6.90 he tendered his resignation subject to certain conditions. Thereafter in spite of repeated correspondence when the Company refused to make payment of such compensatory benefits, the respondent sought for intervention of the Labour Department, Government of West Bengal and thus the reference was made to the Tribunal. It is the contention of the learned Advocate of the respondent / workman that when an employee tenders his resignation, it becomes effective on the expiry of 3 months from the date of resignation. An employer cannot have the power to accept resignation with immediate effect. It is submitted by the learned Advocate that the respondent submitted his resignation on 1.6.90 and expressed his desire to resign from service with effect from 1.9.90, i.e. by giving 3 months’ notice in terms of the condition regarding termination. But the Company terminated his service before expiry of the said period of 3 months. The learned Advocate refers to the letter being Memo No. AJK/ABT/90 dated 22nd June, 1990 issued by the Chief Executive of the Company thereby terminating the service of the respondent with immediate effect, which is not permissible under the law. In support of the contention, the learned Advocate relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1989 (1) LLJ 368 (S.C.) – (Punjab National Bank Vs Shri P.K. Mittal). From a reading of the said judgment it appears that an Officer of a Nationalized Bank sent a letter on 21st January, 1986 purporting to retire from service with effect from 30th June, 1986 i.e. after the expiry of 3 months notice. Bank sent a letter on 7th February, 1986 stating that such resignation was accepted by waiving the condition of notice and that he was being relieved with effect from 7th February, 1986. This action was challenged by filing a writ petition. Bank sent a letter on 7th February, 1986 stating that such resignation was accepted by waiving the condition of notice and that he was being relieved with effect from 7th February, 1986. This action was challenged by filing a writ petition. The High Court held that the Officers’ resignation would be effective only on 30th June, 1986 and that there was no jurisdiction to terminate the service of the Officer and that the Officer had a right to withdraw the resignation before 30th June, 1986. Challenging such decision of the High Court an appeal was preferred by the Bank. While dismissing the appeal it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that acceptance of resignation before expiry of the notice period amounts to termination and that such notice period cannot be waived by the bank. It was further held that before the resignation becomes effective the employee can withdraw his resignation. In that case the resignation stands withdrawn and the employee continues to be in service. No specific provision is necessary for permitting the employee to withdraw the resignation and on general principle the employee can withdraw his resignation. Relying upon the judgment referred to above, it is submitted by the learned Advocate of the appellant that termination of service of the workman in the present case amounts to retrenchment and since it was done in total non-compliance with the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the termination was unjustified. We have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. We have also perused the judgments referred to above as also the documents placed before us. We find sufficient merit in the submission made by the learned Advocate of the respondent/workman. It is now well settled that the Tribunal cannot go beyond the terms of reference and can exercise its jurisdiction with the limited area in terms of reference. In the present case the Tribunal has adjudicated the reference made by the appropriate Government on the basis of materials placed before it. The respondent/workman tendered his resignation on 1.6.90 and expressed his desire to resign with effect from 1.9.1990 i.e. on the expiry of the notice period of 3 months as stipulated in the condition regarding termination. So the resignation submitted by the respondent could have been accepted and made effective on or from 1.9.1990 and not from 25.6.1990. The respondent/workman tendered his resignation on 1.6.90 and expressed his desire to resign with effect from 1.9.1990 i.e. on the expiry of the notice period of 3 months as stipulated in the condition regarding termination. So the resignation submitted by the respondent could have been accepted and made effective on or from 1.9.1990 and not from 25.6.1990. Since the service of the respondent/workman was terminated with effect from 25.6.1990, i.e. before expiry of the notice period of 3 months, such termination must be held to be illegal. In view of the discussions made above, we are of the view that it was rightly held by the Tribunal that termination of service in the present case amounts to retrenchment and the same was done in total non-compliance with the provision of Section 25-F of the Act and as such was invalid and unjustified. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed as we do not find anything wrong with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There will be no order as to costs.