1. Claiming to have been appointed as "Watch and Ward Personnel" in respondent-Sericulture Department under order No.4763-64/M.S/90 of 01.02.1990 and suffering stoppage of salary, the petitioner-decree holders herein instituted a suit on 31st July 1990 tried and decreed by Munsiff, Anantnag, on 31.11.1992, ex-parte against respondents, declaring petitioners as validly appointed `watch and ward personnel of respondent-department, annulling whatever orders of termination might have been passed against them and directing their continuance service right since 1st of Feb. 1990 the claimed date of their appointment and declaring them entitled to pay allowance accordingly, along with prohibiting the department from interfering into discharge of their functions and concluded the decree with a direction for compliance thereof within one month from the date of passing it. Naturally thereafter petitioner-decree holders sought execution of decree against respondent-department on 20.10.1994 which was objected to by the local public prosecutor on the ground that decree passed in the matter was a nullity as the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the basic suit because petitioner-decree holders had sought redressal of their reported grievance before the Labour Court also and secured an award there from. One of the objection taken was that since execution petition previously instituted had already been dismissed on 16th Nov. 1993, the later one could not be maintained. The execution was contested on certain factual premises also, main one being that the stations against which petitioner-decree holders were claiming wages for work were not functional at all because of being in occupation of Security forces. The judgment debtor-department however appears to have conceded the status of petitioner-decree holders as casual labourers, having worked with them for some time for which they had already been paid in accordance with law. 2. Vide interim order dt. 8th Nov. 1996 Munsiff Anantnag before whom the proceedings were pending appears to have expressed inability to continue with the proceedings on personal grounds whereupon the same was transferred to local Sub Judge who commenced proceedings there upon on 18.12.1997. The first speaking order on the file appears to have been passed on 19.06.1997 where under learned Sub Judge while recording the statement of counsel for judgment debtors that the department would execute the decree within a couple of days asked decree holders to furnish an account of, what they had already received from respondent-department. Vide order dated 08.03.97 ld. The first speaking order on the file appears to have been passed on 19.06.1997 where under learned Sub Judge while recording the statement of counsel for judgment debtors that the department would execute the decree within a couple of days asked decree holders to furnish an account of, what they had already received from respondent-department. Vide order dated 08.03.97 ld. Sub Judge asked judgment debtors to show cause against attachment of their account and their committal to civil prison for compelling execution of the decree and posted the matter for 29.03.97. On first of April, 1997 however the learned Judge while observing that judgment debtor respondents were delaying execution of the decree ordered attachment of the account head of Commissioner Secretary Industries and that of the concerned departmental office and putting a complete freeze on the account posted the matter for 12.05.97. This order appears to have been challenged through a revision petition, in this court, reportedly dismissed on 26.05.97 with dismissal notified to executing court on 28.05.1997 who posted the matter for 19.06.97 when again the counsel for judgment debtors sought time for complying the decree and had the matter posted for 15.07.97. Meanwhile, the judgment debtors appear to have filed a time barred appeal also against basic decree before District Judge Anantnag who did not find favour with the same and dismissed it as time barred. That done, the matter again landed in the executing court of Sub Judge Anantnag where proceedings recommenced on 30.09.97. On 27.03.98 the learned Executing Court while considering objections of judgment-debtors to execution of decree provided four weeks time for compliance and posted the matter on 27.04.98. On 9.6.98 again the account head of Commissioner Secretary Industries was directed to be attached to the limit of decretal amount which by then had swelled into Rs.2,57,272/- and posted the matter on 20.06.98. On 6.7.98 learned Executing Judge while observing that arrears under the decree till that date had been paid to the decree holders ordered release of the seized account subject to furnishing affidavit for performance of decree in future. On 6.7.98 learned Executing Judge while observing that arrears under the decree till that date had been paid to the decree holders ordered release of the seized account subject to furnishing affidavit for performance of decree in future. Proceedings as such appear to have continued till 19.12.06, when learned Executing Judge while narrating the history of cases and considering its different features including the report of Commissioner whom he had appointed in the matter opined that since the basic decree was only declaratory in nature no direction could be passed for its execution and accordingly dropped the matter. It is this order that is impugned in this revision petition, details whereof would follow. 3. Grounds pleaded to assail this order are that having already been partially executed the decree could not be held to be unexecutable, particularly while all objections taken by respondent judgment debtors had already been rejected at different points of time, as a result whereof the impugned order was bad as resulting in defeating a valid decree on trivial considerations. During course of submissions while petitioners counsel has reiterated and further elucidated the grounds projected in memo of petition the respondents counsel who in view of proceedings cataloged hereinabove stood on a somewhat slippery ground tried to defend the impugned order on certain pre-decretal circumstances suggesting that in peculiar circumstances reportedly prevailing at that time, particularly that official machinery was dis-functional due to public disorder and respondent judgment debtors could not defend themselves or project their case properly at any point of time till the decree was partially executed through coercive process. 4. I have heard learned counsel and considered the matter. Perusal of impugned order reveals that Ld. Executing judge while dropping execution proceedings has opined that the decree under execution was purely declaratory in nature which could not become per se executable particularly because in their plaint also the decree-holders had prayed for declaratory relief only. At the same time however he has not said anything about preceding orders passed in the matter during all the years execution was pending which automatically loose all their force in view of his order under challenge and the situation is that if the impugned order survives all proceedings/ orders held/passed in the matter become a nullity. At the same time however he has not said anything about preceding orders passed in the matter during all the years execution was pending which automatically loose all their force in view of his order under challenge and the situation is that if the impugned order survives all proceedings/ orders held/passed in the matter become a nullity. On the other hand if it collapses then what would be left to be done by executing court is to pass a consequential order in view of earlier proceedings. This reflects a somehow un-usual scenario in which the matter perhaps requires to be considered in its entirety rather than focusing on the pin ultimate stage at which the current litigation has taken birth. 5. Perusal of the plaint originally instituted by decree holders before the trial court reveals that while pleading their initial employment by respondent-department as casual labourers and second respondents order No.4763 of 1990 dated 1.2.90 appointing them as "watch and ward personnel" Seed Station (A) Achabal/Seed Station Achabal, they complained that despite having worked as such they were denied their wages and prayed for, "declaration that they were officially appointed as Watch and Ward Personnel" under aforesaid order along with annulment of any dismissal order passed against any of them as illegal and in-operative and a direction for their continuation without break with release all benefits acquiring to them as such, and injunction against respondents to have them restrained from interfering into discharge of their duties. In their written statement filed through certain official respondents while admitting engagement of petitioners-plaintiffs as casual labourers the respondents pleaded that they were not entitled to any regular engagement nor had the appointment order been issued in their favour and that the department never intended to dis-engage them. After trial, the suit as already said was decree in following terms:- "In view of the aforesaid application/observation I, hold, decree and declare in ex-parte in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants that the plaintiffs are Watch and Ward personnel of the department of defendants at Seed Station A&B, Achabal, vide order No. 4763-64/MS/90 dated 1.2.1990 respectively. Secondly I, hold, decree and declare in ex-parte in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, that if any order of termination of services of the plaintiffs exists anywhere, shall be null and void, unjust and in effective against the plaintiffs. Secondly I, hold, decree and declare in ex-parte in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, that if any order of termination of services of the plaintiffs exists anywhere, shall be null and void, unjust and in effective against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are declared in continuous service since 1.2.90 as watch and ward personnel. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to the arrear pay and allowances since 1.2.90, except the pay and allowances which they have received for the first five months since 1.2.90.Thirdly, a decree of permanent injunction is also passed in exparte in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants to the effect, that the defendants are perpetually restrained to interfere in to the due discharge of duties of the plaintiffs, as watch and ward personnel, contrary to the provided rules. The decree shall be satisfied within a period of one month from today. There is no order as to costs. The plaintiffs shall bear their own costs" Thus, no holds barred the trial judge (Sh. M.I. Qureshi) virtually acted as an employment exchange a forbidding authority and a civil and labour court declaring petitioner decree holders to be in government service since a previous date around two years prior to date of basic decree, with a direction for payment of their wages prohibiting their discontinuation. Not stopping there, the ld. Judge also declared "any order of termination of services of plaintiffs existing anywhere as null vide in-just and in effective" virtually sealing the possibility of any them. For its unique features and serious fiscal implications embedded therein the respondent-department should have lost no time in challenging the decree, but as is usual with official working the concerned officers appear to have come out of their self imposed hibernation at their own convenience only after the time for filing an appeal had elapsed which automatically shut the doors of redressal on them. Perusal of the interim orders of trial court file reveal that State government as defendant No.1 has been proceeded against in ex-parte on 29th May 1991 with an observation that service upon them was complete by issuance of notice through registered post, even while there is nothing on file like a postal receipt to suggest that registered notice was ever sent to the first defendant. Nor is there any supporting statement in that behalf, with the result that original suit continued against local officer of Sericulture Department who as revealed by circumstances of the case appear to have been pretending a contest rather than contesting the suit effectively, which to say the least suggests a passive connivance on their part with petitioner decree holders. The ld. trial Judge who should have attempted a proper trial of the suit also appears to have been swayed, perhaps by his zeal to conclude the proceedings so much so that while talking about initiation of ex-parte proceedings against defendant-respondents at page eight of his judgment, he appears to have mis stated the circumstances by observing that "after aforesaid written statement was filed all the defendants absented themselves from the court hearing of the matter, therefore, ex-parte proceedings were initiated against all the defendants which are in operation till now", while as a matter of fact, the State Government i.e. first respondent had never participated in the proceedings at all and there was no question of their having absented particularly as already said because nothing exists on record to suggest that they were ever properly served. 6. In totality of circumstances the multi shaded proceedings conducted in the matter appear to have some unique feature of their own. 6. In totality of circumstances the multi shaded proceedings conducted in the matter appear to have some unique feature of their own. First, that an extremely serious matter with equally serious fiscal implications appears to have suffered quite a casual trial punctuated with certain visible irregularities of procedure; secondly, that the State government, the only defendant charged with shouldering the burden of whatever adverse might follow does not appear to have been provided enough opportunity of defending their side; thirdly, that the local officers who have participated in the proceedings have not been able to demonstrate the requisite sense of responsibility towards the matter and have quite loosely conducted themselves to the detriment of their department and finally that the learned trial judge appears to have handed down an unusual judgment though serious in nature as having the features of acknowledging petitioner decree holders as Government servants without actually having been so appointed by the competent authority, ordering their wages as such while treating them in continuation of service and restraining the department under which they are declared to be in service from taking any action to discontinue their services, and above all declaring "order of termination existing anywhere as illegal null and void" without any such order having been specifically mentioned pleaded or challenged before him. Obviously when there was no formal appointment there could have been no question of termination. This final decree awarded as such, to say the least appears to be simply preposterous and all judicial officers working at various levels of district judiciary would be well advised to control their misplaced zeal for doing the unusual and strictly confine themselves within contours of law and procedure to avoid being misunderstood. 7. In that back drop arises the question of assessing the impugned order of Executing court holding the decree under execution to be only declaratory in nature and not executable which in terms does not appear to be strictly supported by contents of the decree which besides declaratory part awards an injunctive relief also with a positive direction for payment of wages to the petitioner decree holders. While assessing this question the circumstantial background of the matter as summarized above cant be lost sight of. While assessing this question the circumstantial background of the matter as summarized above cant be lost sight of. Accordingly, I feel that not only the execution proceedings but main proceedings contended during trial of the suit which culminated in the decree under reference also require reconsideration which I intend to undertake in exercise of the revisional power of this court those have been involved. Since that can result in oversetting the basic decree also I feel that before passing the ultimate order the parties deserve a detailed hearing in view of the contents hereof. 8. Before parting with the matter I may be noticed that in all this litigation has completed 17 year by now and requires to be concluded with dispatch. Accordingly it is directed to be listed again on 30th of June, 2008 for hearing Meanwhile the Ld. counsel for petitioner decree holders has stated that only (19) out of (27) plaintiffs in the main suit are pressing the matter now, while as remaining are either adjusted elsewhere or have given up. He may furnish a list of these persons to counsel for other side who would report instructions as to how for the respondent-department can go in accommodating their claim of engagement on basis of official records. Instructions may be reported when the matter comes up next. Copies of this order be circulated among judicial officers. List as directed.