JUDGMENT: Heard the learned counsel on record. 2. This Court on 22.6.1998 made the following order: "Admit in view of the substantial questions of law raised in ground Nos.1 to 7 of Memorandum of Grounds Appeal. Notice". 3. On a careful perusal of the grounds, on the strength of which the Second Appeal had been admitted, this Court is of the opinion that all these grounds would relate to only factual controversies. However, Sri M.Radhakrishna, learned counsel representing the appellant would maintain that in the light of the facts and circumstances, the following substantial questions of law would arise for consideration in this Second Appeal: 1. Whether the judgment of the appellate Court can be sustained without recording the specific finding relating to the factum of possession especially in a suit of this nature, the suit being a suit for perpetual injunction simplicitor? 2. Whether the decree can be made in favour of the 2nd plaintiff since there was no cause of action at all in favour of the 2nd plaintiff as on the date of the institution of the suit? Incidentally the counsel also pointed out to the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by both the Court of first instance and also the appellate Court. The counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 4. On the contrary the learned counsel representing respondents 1 and 2 would maintain that it is no doubt true that initially from the lawful owner, by virtue of an agreement of sale, the purchase was made and subsequent thereto a registered sale deed was executed in favour of the 2nd plaintiff, who is none other than the wife of the first plaintiff. The counsel also would maintain that she was brought on record and the said order in a way had attained finality since the same had not been challenged. The counsel also would maintain that she was brought on record and the said order in a way had attained finality since the same had not been challenged. Further the learned counsel would maintain that it is not as though the suit was based on the strength of an agreement of sale as against the executant, but the suit was originally based on an agreement of sale as against certain non-parties i.e., the strangers, whatever may be the defence of these strangers in the written statement, and the counsel also would maintain that even in the light of the nature of the defence taken, since the original owner is not in serious controversy being one Nanduri Laxmipathi Rao, and also in view of the fact that subsequent thereto the sale deed was executed in the name of the wife, the 2nd plaintiff, in pursuance of the prior agreement in the name of the first plaintiff, the husband, by driving the parties to yet another litigation on the ground of subsequent cause of action may lead the parties in a way to multiplicity of proceedings especially in the light of the clear findings which had been recorded especially on the aspect of the possession by the appellate Court, the Second Appeal to be dismissed. 5. Heard both the learned counsel and perused the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and also the findings recorded by the appellate Court. 6. The parties hereinafter would be referred to as shown in OS No.609 of 1980 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Tanuku. The suit was instituted originally by the first plaintiff for perpetual injunction and the 2nd plaintiff was added as per the orders in IA No.1256 of 1983, dated 19.10.1983. It is needless to say that the said order made in IA No.1256 of 1983 had attained finality since the same had not been challenged. The suit was instituted with the following averments: "The plaint schedule property belongs to late Sri Nanduri Laxmipathi Rao, the brother-in-law of the 1st defendant. He died leaving behind his daughters Kusuma Kumari and Seetha Hanumayamma, the pre-deceased daughter's son Achanta Anjaneya Prasad and the second wife late Ramatulasi. Late Ramatulasi bequeathed her undivided share in the plaint schedule and other land to her deceased sister Chaganti Parvathi Devi. He died leaving behind his daughters Kusuma Kumari and Seetha Hanumayamma, the pre-deceased daughter's son Achanta Anjaneya Prasad and the second wife late Ramatulasi. Late Ramatulasi bequeathed her undivided share in the plaint schedule and other land to her deceased sister Chaganti Parvathi Devi. The plaint schedule house site thus had been in possession and enjoyment of the above people till 25.6.1980. The first plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase the plaint schedule house site and the agricultural land from the above people on 25.6.1980 for Rs.800/-. The possession of vacant site was delivered to the first plaintiff on 25.6.1980 and ever since he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same in his own right. He got erected a fence on all sides and has been using the said site for grazing purposes. On 24.9.1980 the 2nd defendant began to demolish the fence. He even threatened to kill the first plaintiff if he interfered. A police report was given on 25.9.1980 by the first plaintiff. The 2nd plaintiff obtained a sale deed for the suit schedule property on 25.2.1982 from the real owners of the property and got it registered on the same date. Hence she is entitled to pursue the suit as it was instituted for her benefit. On 29.9.1980 the defendants got a registered notice issued claiming that the 1st defendant purchased the site from late Lamipathi Rao. It is also alleged that the 2nd defendant was a tenant. The 2nd defendant was set up by the 1st defendant who tried to purchase the property in competition with the first plaintiff, but failed. The defendants have no manner of right to the property. The 1st defendant is trying to occupy the property illegally through the 2nd defendant. They want to trespass into the land which is in possession of the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff apprehends that the defendants may dispossess him. Hence the suit". 7. The 1st defendant filed written statement, which was adopted by the 2nd defendant. The material allegations had been denied and a specific stand had been taken that the suit is not maintainable. It was also pleaded as hereunder: "The plaintiff did not show the plaint schedule property correctly with correct measurements and boundaries. It is true that it is originally belonged to late Laxmipathi Rao, the brother-in-law of the 1st defendant. The material allegations had been denied and a specific stand had been taken that the suit is not maintainable. It was also pleaded as hereunder: "The plaintiff did not show the plaint schedule property correctly with correct measurements and boundaries. It is true that it is originally belonged to late Laxmipathi Rao, the brother-in-law of the 1st defendant. It is also true that he died leaving behind him his two daughters Kusuma Kumari, Seetha Hanumayamma and the pre-deceased daughter's son Achanta Anjaneya Prasad and second wife late Rama Tulasi. It is false to allege that late Rama Tulasi bequeathed her undivided share in the plaint schedule property and the other land to her sister Chaganti Parvathi Devi. Late Rama Tulasi did not execute any Will. It must be a rank forgery. She has no capacity to execute a Will. It is equally false to contend that the plaint schedule property was in possession and enjoyment of the persons referred to above till 25.6.1980. It was never in possession and enjoyment of his daughters or widow or any heirs of late Laxmipathi Rao at any time within a period of twenty years. It was in the possession and enjoyment of the 1st defendant till the date of suit and thereafter. It is false to contend that the plaintiff entered into an agreement of purchase. The agreement was brought into existence collusively to defeat the rights of the 1st defendant. No attempt to purchase was made by this defendant. The 1st defendant purchased the schedule property from late Lamipathi Rao about 20 years back for a full sale consideration of Rs.200/- and he was put in possession of the same at the time of the oral agreement of sale an he continued to be in possession of the plaint schedule property all these years in his own right, title and interest. A regular sale deed could not be taken by this defendant due to subsisting relationship that existed between this defendant and Laxmipathi Rao. The 1st defendant has leased out the suit site to the 2nd defendant who is in continuous possession as tenant all these years i.e., for more than two decades. The 2nd defendant is paying rent regularly and he is putting the schedule property to use by raising vegetables, plantains etc. The 1st defendant has leased out the suit site to the 2nd defendant who is in continuous possession as tenant all these years i.e., for more than two decades. The 2nd defendant is paying rent regularly and he is putting the schedule property to use by raising vegetables, plantains etc. There is also one coconut tree and the usufruct of it is also enjoyed by the 2nd defendant as tenant. Thus the 1st defendant enjoyed the plaint schedule site openly, publicly and to the knowledge of all these persons concerned and thereby he perfected his title by adverse possession by enjoying the same for more than the statutory period. The title and interest in the plaint schedule property though originally belongs to Laxmipathi Rao was destroyed and therefore his wife and children cannot lay their claim to any portion of the same. During the middle of the month of April, 1980 Salapaka Kusuma Kumari and Smt. Vadravu Sita Rama Hanumayamma, daughters of late Laxmipathi Rao came to Manchili and requested this defendant to pay something to them in addition to the amount already paid to late Laxmipathi Rao and they will execute a regular sale deed along with other sale deeds to be executed for the agricultural lands. The 1st defendant graciously agreed to give an additional sum of Rs.400/- though not legally obliged to do so and made a a part payment of Rs.50/- to the said daughters and Chaganti Sree Rama Murthy, the father of the 2nd wife of Laxmipathi Rao. Thus all the three persons received the said sum in pursuance of the understanding arrived at between the first defendant and the said three persons. The 1st defendant got issued a registered notice dated 7.7.1980 separately to the daughters Kusuma Kumari and Hanumayamma. They gave replies on 13.7.1980 and 11.8.1980 respectively with false and frivolous allegations. They set up a sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff falsely. The defendant gave a telegram and registered notice to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Attili. After receipt of it, he gave up all attempts to disturb the possession of the defendants. The plaintiff cannot purchase the property. He has no status to purchase. The agreement of sale dated 25.6.1980 was not executed by any of the heirs or legal representatives of late Laxmipathi Rao. After receipt of it, he gave up all attempts to disturb the possession of the defendants. The plaintiff cannot purchase the property. He has no status to purchase. The agreement of sale dated 25.6.1980 was not executed by any of the heirs or legal representatives of late Laxmipathi Rao. Sri Chaganti Sree Rama Murthy has no legal right to execute any such agreement on behalf of some named persons. He is not the power of attorney holder of the daughters and grand child. He cannot arrogate the powers of attorney holder. He has no legal status to execute the sale agreement and he cannot convey any title or conclude any binding contract in favour of the plaintiff. The alleged agreement of sale dated 25.6.1980 was antedated and brought into existence without any intention to sell and in collusion with the 1st plaintiff. The 2nd wife of Laxmipathi Rao died intestate and issueless. Sri Chaganti Sree Rama Murthy might have forged a Will said to have been executed by the 2nd wife of Laxmipathi Rao. The entire agreement is void ab initio. The plaintiff cannot derive any right or title through the said agreement. The plaintiff did not explain the manner of enjoyment and possession prior to the alleged agreement in his favour. The 1st defendant is having a site on the southern boundary of the plaint schedule. The thatched shed is in his said site. It was under the occupation of the tenant. There is a foundation constructed by this defendant covering the plaint schedule as well as his own site. He erected a thutikada live fench long time back. It also covers the remaining portion of the northern boundary of the plaint schedule. There is no cause of action to the suit and the alleged cause of action is false. The relief is not properly valued and the court fee paid is incorrect. It is therefore prayed that the suit may be dismissed with costs. The 2nd plaintiff is not a necessary and proper party to the suit. The alleged document executed by the vendors of the plaintiff is not true, valid and binding on the defendants. The 1st defendant perfected his right by adverse possession. The description of the property in the sale deed and the agreement of sale is not correct. The document obtained by the 2nd plaintiff is nominal, collusive and fraudulent". 8. The alleged document executed by the vendors of the plaintiff is not true, valid and binding on the defendants. The 1st defendant perfected his right by adverse possession. The description of the property in the sale deed and the agreement of sale is not correct. The document obtained by the 2nd plaintiff is nominal, collusive and fraudulent". 8. On the strength of the above pleadings, the following issues were settled: 1. Whether the plaintiff or the defendants have been in possession of the plaint schedule property by the date of filing of this suit? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction prayed for? 3. Whether the valuation made and the court fee paid are not correct? 4. To what relief? Further, the following additional issues also had been settled: 1. Whether the 2nd plaintiff is not a necessary and proper party to the suit? 2. Whether the defendants perfected their rights in the plaint schedule property by adverse possession by means of long and continuous possession? 9. While answering additional issue No.1, the Court of first instance came to the conclusion that the 2nd plaintiff is the wife of the first plaintiff and she filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was also held that the 2nd plaintiff is a proper and necessary party inasmuch as she is the wife and also the purchaser of the property and accordingly recorded the findings. The Court of first instance also recorded further findings and came to the conclusion that the 1st defendant was able to prove prima facie his adverse possession over the statutory period and plaintiffs were unable to prove their possession as pleaded in the plaint and accordingly negatived the relief. The Court of first instance had appreciated the evidence of DWs.1 to 3 and also Exs.A1 to A8 and Exs.B1 to B3. The matter was carried by way of appeal AS No.21 of 1987 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Tanuku and the appellate Court at paragraph 9 framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the defendants perfected their right and title in the suit schedule property by adverse possession? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction against the defendants? Whether the defendants perfected their right and title in the suit schedule property by adverse possession? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction against the defendants? The appellate Court commenced the discussion from paragraphs 10 to 20 and recorded a specific finding that the plaintiffs had been in possession of the property as on the date of the suit and ultimately reversed the decree and judgment of the Court of first instance granting the relief of perpetual injunction. Aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal had been preferred. The appellate Court at paragraph 19 observed as hereunder: "The endorsement with regard to possession of Ex.A1 is dated 21.9.1980. The defendants contention is that it is interpolation. As early as on 13.7.198- it is mentioned that an agreement of sale was executed in favour of the plaintiff in Ex.B7. It is also clearly mentioned about the execution of Ex.A1 and delivery of property. There is no necessity to the plaintiffs to interpolate the document. It is argued by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff himself admitted as PW.1 that they stopped living in the plaint schedule since 5 or 6 months after the agreement and therefore, the plaintiffs who are not in possession of the property cannot claim injunction. The agreement was executed on 25.6.1980. Even if the admission of PW.1 is taken into account, they stopped living in the plaint schedule 6 months thereafter i.e., from the end of December, 1980, they stopped living, but the suit was filed on 9.10.1980 itself. As such the plaintiffs were in possession of the plaint schedule property by the date of the suit. DW.1 admitted in his evidence that PW.1 is living in the disputed since less than one year. It is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that DW.2 himself admitted in the chief examination itself that a thatched shed was constructed 6 or 7 years back and cattle of PW.1 used to be tethered. Basing on the certified copy of the deposition of DW.2 he put forth the argument, but in fact in the original deposition it is noted as DW.1, but not PW.1. However in the cross-examination DW.2 admitted that PW.1 is living in the disputed site since six months. DW.3 admitted that DW.1 is living in the shed constructed in the suit schedule with his wife and children. However in the cross-examination DW.2 admitted that PW.1 is living in the disputed site since six months. DW.3 admitted that DW.1 is living in the shed constructed in the suit schedule with his wife and children. It is argued by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffs have failed to prove prima facie title by the date of the suit and the execution of Ex.A4 cannot be taken into account. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1965 A.P. 98 (Pangoti Manga Rao vs. Chinnadi Venkateswara Rao, for the proposition that the Courts are not precluded from the cognizance of facts that occur since the laying of the action and granting relief to the parties on the basis of the altered situation, under exceptional circumstances after filing of the suit cannot be contested. In this case the legal heirs of late Laxmipathi Rao, who authorized Chaganti Sree Rama Murthy to execute an agreement of sale in Ex.A1 have executed the sale deed pending suit. In fact the defendant cannot question this transaction between the plaintiffs and their vendors. The principle laid down in the above said decision quite aptly apply to the facts of the case". 10. The counsel for appellants had placed strong reliance on the decision reported in CH.RUKMA REDDY vs. K.DHARMA REDDY, 2005(3) ALD 15 wherein it was observed at paragraph 8 as hereunder: "One important aspect of the matter is that the Appellate Court did not choose to set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court nor did it record any finding that respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) were in possession of the property. Further, it did not realize the limited relevance of ownership and prima importance of possession in suits for permanent injunction. In the judgment of the appellate Court, the following sentence, viz. : 'in order to grant equitable relief, the ownership and possession are important', runs contrary to the settled principle of law. Further, the appellate Court granted permanent injunction in favour of respondents 1 and 2, on the ground that the appellant did not sustain any loss. This hardly constitutes any basis for grant of permanent injunction. Any further discussion on the matter is likely to have impact on the merits of the matter". Further, the appellate Court granted permanent injunction in favour of respondents 1 and 2, on the ground that the appellant did not sustain any loss. This hardly constitutes any basis for grant of permanent injunction. Any further discussion on the matter is likely to have impact on the merits of the matter". The counsel also relied on the decision reported in K.ABDUL RAHCEM vs. HAJEERAPPA2, wherein it was observed at paragraph 16 as hereunder: "In a suit for mere injunction, it is no doubt true that possession is to be established by the plaintiff and possession must be of such a nature, which can be protected by a Court, a lawful possession or a juridical possession. Lawful possession may be of varied forms, necessarily in all the cases the plaintiff need not be the owner of the property. There may be other cases where the possession may be lawful and the exhaustive illustrations cannot be enumerated in this regard. At any rate, the view expressed by the appellate Court that a suit for mere injunction is not maintainable without praying for the relief of declaration of title cannot be accepted in the light of the views expressed in Sannasi Ambalagarau v. Venkatapathy Chetty, 2. C.420 (DB) (Mad), Muslim Wakf Board, Bhopal v. Municipal Board Bhopal, AIR 1960 MP 249 , A.L.V.R. Ct. Veerappa Chettiar v. Arunachalam Chetti, AIR 1936 Mad. 200, Muthayyan Swaminatha Sastrial v. S.Narayanaswami Sastrial, AIR 1936 Mad, 936, Potturi Saraswati v. Vallbhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 1985(1) ALT 1 , Smt.Indimatiben Chimanlal Desai v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Bom. 423 , Mulji Umershi Shah v. Paradisia Builders Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, AIR 1998 Bom. 87 and Megavarnam Chettiar v. Krishnan Chettiar, AIR 1934 Mad. 600 . However, in Balamoni Kistanna v. V. Narayana Reddy, 1982 (2) ALT 408 , it was held that where plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property a suit for mandatory injunction without a prayer for declaration of title or for recovery of possession is not maintainable. This question need not detain this Court any longer, in the light of the decision of the Apex Court referred to in Rame Gowda (died) by Lrs. case (supra). This question need not detain this Court any longer, in the light of the decision of the Apex Court referred to in Rame Gowda (died) by Lrs. case (supra). In the light of the specific denial relating to the title and in the light of the finding recorded by the appellate Court in relation to Ex.A1, in view of the fact that there should be an enforceable obligation in the light of Section 38 of the Act, too, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, it would be appropriate for the appellants to pray for declaration to title too. At this juncture, the principles that can be enumerated in this regard are specified hereunder:- (1) A suit for permanent injunction without prayer for declaration of title is maintainable. (2) When title is specifically denied and cloud cast on the title to be cleared, it would be safe to pray for the relief of declaration too in such a suit. (3) In a suit for permanent injunction, the question of title may be incidentally gone into. All these aspects may have to be decided in the light of the Section 38 of the Act, read with Section 2(a) of the aforesaid Act". The counsel also relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in R.G.JANTHAKAL vs. BHARAT PARIKH CO., 1981 Kant LJ 365, wherein it was observed at paragraph 10 as hereunder: "It is well settled principle of law now that injunction can be issued only on proof of actual interference or threat of interference and not in the absence of it. In any event the trial Court from the pleadings could have but failed to frame an issue on this particular question as to threat and interference by the defendant though it was quite clearly pleaded in the plaint as is evidenced by reading paragraph 8 of the plaint. The lower appellate Court ought to have framed an issue itself and considered the evidence on record and if satisfied could have come to the conclusion one way or the other and then decided the question. The lower appellate Court ought to have framed an issue itself and considered the evidence on record and if satisfied could have come to the conclusion one way or the other and then decided the question. This not having been done, the order of the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside and it is so set aside and the matter is remitted back to the lower appellate Court with a direction that it shall if necessary frame an additional issue as to whether the plaintiff proves interference by the defendant of its right to carry on mining operations in plaint B schedule area peacefully or whether there is threat by the defendant to such carrying on of the operations of the plaintiff. It is for the lower appellate Court if the evidence on record is not sufficient to decide, whether it should record additional evidence after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence and decide the case on merits insofar as it pertains to the prayer for injunction in the plaint. The lower appellate Court may in accordance with the directions given above dispose of the appeal within three months from the date of receipt of the records from this Court. In all other respects the judgment of the trial Court stands. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs". 11. There cannot be any quarrel relating to the propositions, which had been laid down, in the decisions specified supra. The factum of possession predominantly is a finding of fact. It is no doubt true that the Court of first instance recorded a particular finding and the appellate Court had reversed the same. The original owner is not in dispute or controversy. The appellate Court also had taken the nature of the defence taken by the contesting defendants into consideration. It is no doubt true that certain subsequent events had been taken into consideration and the decree of perpetual injunction had been granted. In normal course of events, this Court would have driven the 2nd plaintiff giving liberty to the 2nd plaintiff to institute a fresh suit, but in the light of the facts and circumstances especially to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, this Court is not inclined to do so for the reasons recorded infra. 12. In normal course of events, this Court would have driven the 2nd plaintiff giving liberty to the 2nd plaintiff to institute a fresh suit, but in the light of the facts and circumstances especially to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, this Court is not inclined to do so for the reasons recorded infra. 12. It is not in serious controversy that the first plaintiff got an agreement of sale from the lawful owner and it is also not in serious controversy that the 2nd plaintiff is no other than the wife of the first plaintiff and she got a regular sale deed during the pendency of the litigation and she also came on record as 2nd plaintiff, and the said order impleading her as 2nd plaintiff had attained finality since the same had not been challenged. Merely on the ground that it is a subsequent cause of action, to drive such a party to yet another litigation would be further making the litigation more complicated and paving the way to multiplicity of proceedings. It is needless to say that the civil Courts are always at liberty to mould the facts depending upon the reliefs and circumstances in a given case. 13. In the light of the categorical findings recorded by the appellate Court in the elaborate judgment commencing from paragraphs 10 to 20 on appreciation of the whole evidence available on record, evidence of PWs.1, 2, DWs.1 to 3, Exs.A1 to A8 and Exs.B1 to B3, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that as far as the finding relating to the factum of possession is concerned, there is no legal infirmity, and as far as the other serious objection taken relating to the 2nd plaintiff not having any cause of action on the date of the institution of the suit in the light of the close relationship between the first plaintiff and second plaintiff though both cannot be treated as one entity in Indian Law and also taking the events and circumstances of the case into consideration, this Court is not inclined to disturb the factual findings recorded by the appellate Court and the said findings are hereby confirmed. 14. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. In view of the peculiarity of the case, the parties to the litigation to bear their respective costs.