JUDGMENT 1. HEARD the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 2. A short question is involved in this matter as to whether once the Special leave Petition is dismissed challenging the judgment and order passed by the division Bench of High Court exercising appellate jurisdiction in a writ application, whether a review application could be maintainable seeking review of the judgment and order of the Division Bench after dismissal of the Special Leave petition as well as the review petition thereof, by the Supreme Court of India, with a prayer of condonation of delay by filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Factual matrix of this review application as filed with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is to this effect: The present applicant moved a writ application being W. P. No. 385 of 1998 assailing the order terminating the service during probationary period. The writ petitioner therein suffered the order of termination passed by the High Court administration while he was on probation in the lower Judicial Service in the post of Munsif, now renamed as Judge, Junior Division. This application was dismissed by reasoned order on 12th August, 1999. Against this dismissal of writ application, an appeal was laid registered as A. P. O. No. 131 of 2000, which also stood dismissed by a reasoned decision dated 26th August, 2003 by the Division bench of Calcutta High Court. Assailing the judgment and order passed by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid appeal, a Special Leave Petition was moved, which was registered as Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 2437 of 2004 and this special Leave Petition stood dismissed by the order dated 8th April, 2004. Against the order of dismissal of Special Leave Petition, a review application was moved before the Apex Court, which also stood dismissed by the order dated 24th august, 2004. Thereafter the writ petitioner filed representation to the President of India and ultimately filed this review application with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 727 days. 3. Thereafter the writ petitioner filed representation to the President of India and ultimately filed this review application with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 727 days. 3. IN the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the ground has been taken that after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition and also the review application as moved in the Apex Court, the petitioner approached different forums and thereafter as his representation was not considered, the review application was filed, which caused delay. 4. IT is now a settled legal position in view of the judgment of the Apex court that once a Special Leave Petition is dismissed even by any non-speaking order, no review application is maintainable in the High Court, as the same would be nothing but affront to the order of the Supreme Court and is attracted by the doctrine of "judicial propriety". In an identical case Abbai Maligai partnership Firm and Anr. Vs. K. Santhakumaran and Ors., reported in (1998) 7 SCC 386 , a Division Bench of three Judges', decided that issue. It is true that the jurisdiction under Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of india is a discretionary jurisdiction. If leave is granted, appeal is required to be heard. Once, the appeal is heard on merit, doctrine of merger has its applicability and also principle of res judicata also will be applicable. But a question was considered, if the application under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is dismissed by a reasoned order whether same would be attracted by merger doctrine or not? This question has been answered negatively in the case Kunhayammed and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Anr., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 , a Division Bench judgment of three Judges', but the Court held that in the event of a speaking order, the same could be considered as an order under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and as such, it has a binding effect in between the parties, which will debar the parties to file any review application in High Court. In the case of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by non-speaking order whether review application is maintainable in High Court, two situations were considered by Apex Court to answer it. In the case of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by non-speaking order whether review application is maintainable in High Court, two situations were considered by Apex Court to answer it. During pendency of review application, if special Leave Petition is dismissed, review application would be maintainable but court would not pass any order to review it after dismissal of Special Leave petition as the same would be nothing but affront to the decision of the Apex court following the judicial propriety principle. The review application after dismissal of Special Leave Petition is not entertainable at all as per views expressed in the case Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Anr. (supra), which is now holding the field. 5. SIMILAR view expressed in the case K. Rajamouli vs. AVKN Swamy, reported in (2001) 5 SCC 37 holding that review application after dismissal of the special Leave Petition would be nothing but an abuse of process of Court and also an affront to the order passed by Supreme Court. In the case Greenview Tea and Industry vs. Collector Golaghat, Assam and Anr., reported in (2004) 4 SCC 122 the Apex Court reiterated the view as expressed in K. Rajamouli (supra ). In the case Satrucharla Vijaya Ramaraju vs. Nimmaka Joya Raju and Ors., reported in (2006) 1 SCC 212 the Apex Court held that after dismissal of Special Leave petition, its order is binding on the parties following the judicial discipline principle. In the case State of Maharashtra and Anr. Vs. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, reported in 1996 AIR SCW 1493 the Apex Court held that after dismissal of the special Leave Petition even if the same was without any speaking order and the same did not attract the res judicata principle but the Tribunal was wrong to exercise the power of review, which is attracted by doctrine of judicial discipline. 6. FURTHERMORE, from the ground as taken in the Section 5 application, namely, filing of representation and waiting thereof, in our view, cannot be a ground to condone the delay besides the legal question about maintainability of such after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, however, has argued by referring the judgments passed in the case A.R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1581 and Lily Thomas and Ors. Vs. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, however, has argued by referring the judgments passed in the case A.R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1581 and Lily Thomas and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 , that the scope of Article 235 of the Constitution of India since was not properly considered and applied by the Division Bench of High court while passing the judgment, so review application for ends of justice is maintainable, even after dismissal of Special Leave Petition. 7. HAVING regard to the grounds as taken in the memo appeal while assailing the judgment of learned Single Judge passed in the writ application it appears that exhaustive ground was taken on that score of Article 235 of constitution of India and the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court while dismissing the appeal being no. A. P. O. 131 of 2000 considered those points. Furthermore, from the Special Leave Petition it appears that those grounds were re-echoed and the Apex Court dismissed the same. In the review application against the order passed in Special Leave Petition, the point was re-agitated before the Apex Court and same stood dismissed. 8. THE case of A. R. Antulay (supra) was an issue of jurisdiction of the criminal Court to decide the matter, which was not addressed earlier while directing the Bombay High Court to complete the criminal proceeding and as such, as the matter was going to the root about jurisdiction, the Apex Court applied the principle of ex debito justitiae to remove the mistake as crept in. In the present factual matrix of the case, here is no such question of empowering somebody having no jurisdiction and/or direction to create a jurisdiction, thereby as such, the A. R. Antulay (supra) has no applicability. The case Lily Thomas (supra) as relied upon by the learned Senior advocate Mr. Bose, also has no applicability. In the said case the Apex Court relied as many as 12 cases on issue of exercise of the power of review and also referred as many as 5 cases of Apex Court, save and except, 2 cases of Privy council. In the said case in paragraph 52 and 56, the Apex Court observed to this effect: "52. In the said case the Apex Court relied as many as 12 cases on issue of exercise of the power of review and also referred as many as 5 cases of Apex Court, save and except, 2 cases of Privy council. In the said case in paragraph 52 and 56, the Apex Court observed to this effect: "52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka held: (SCC pp. 619-20, para 19) "19. Review literally and even judicially means reexamination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and to rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: '. . . . . nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. . . . The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies. ' basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: 'it is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard. ' Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualize the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualize the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to the sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice." 9. THE mare fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength. 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practiced. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any statute, can take a different views notwithstanding the earlier judgment." 10. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any statute, can take a different views notwithstanding the earlier judgment." 10. ON a bare reading of the views expressed by the Apex Court in the said case it appears that the Apex Court did not deviate from the legal principle and the law that in the review application there is no scope of rehearing of the matter de novo and further that review is maintainable only on the settled legal proposition of the law as was discussed therein in the said paragraphs. In the instant case there is no such factual matrix in terms of the decisions as considered, relied and referred to in the Lily Thomas (supra ). It appears that before the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, wherein the present applicant suffered to judgment, the point touching Article 235 of the Constitution of India so far as its scope about the administrative control over an appointee in the lower Judicial Service was dealt with and discussed by holding that the appointment rules under which the appointee was appointed was applicable to the government employee and as soon as appointment was completed, the appointee came within the jurisdiction of High Court Administration for determination of probationary period, confirmation in service and posting etc. Furthermore, in the Special Leave Petition the same point was reagitated and it stood dismissed and similarly the review application as filed seeking review of the order passed in the Special Leave Petition also stood dismissed. Hence, it is not a case that the point was not at all considered in the angle of the judgment passed in the case Girdhari Lal Gupta vs. D. H. Mehta and Anr., reported in 1971 (3) SCC 189 , wherein the Apex Court held that review is permissible when material statutory provision was not brought to the notice of the Court when the judgment was delivered. Having regard to the aforesaid findings, we are of the view that this review application is not maintainable on the grounds (1) it is attracted by the principle of "judicial propriety" in terms of the views expressed by the Apex Court passed in the case Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Anr. Having regard to the aforesaid findings, we are of the view that this review application is not maintainable on the grounds (1) it is attracted by the principle of "judicial propriety" in terms of the views expressed by the Apex Court passed in the case Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Anr. (supra); (2) no sufficient reason has been assigned in the application under Section 5 of the limitation Act, to condone the delay. 11. CONSIDERING those, this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stand dismissed and as a consequence, it will be deemed that review application also stand dismissed.