1. Proceedings for acquisition of land measuring 122 kanals 13 Marlas situate at Sharief Abad, District Budgam were initiated by Collector of Power Development Department for construction of Grid Station. Notice under Section 4 for said acquisition had been issued previously by the then Collector under No. 66067 dated April 18, 1989 initially for 264 kanals 16 Marlas of land for Gas Turbine which was later modified to restrict the acquisition to 122 kanals 13 Marlas of land only as aforesaid. Vide his order no. 1403-07 dated February 2, 1995, concerned Collector recommended per kanal rates which was approved by competent authority whereupon per kanal rate of Rs. 55,731/34600 was awarded for the acquired land. Feeling aggrieved and accepting compensation under protest respondent herein appears to have represented before concerned Collector for making a reference under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act to the District Judge for enhancement of compensation which appears to have been done vide reference No. LA-PDD/MHPs/324-40 dated June 3, 1998 received in the District Court on June 9, 1998 whereupon proceedings were conducted which finally culminated into the reference decree passed by learned District Judge wherein compensation in respect of 51 Kanal 5 Marlas of land acquired from the present respondent was enhanced to Rs. 2,00,000 per kanal alongwith Rs. 3,44,437 for fruit bearing trees and Rs. 1,44,000 for sheds amounting in all to Rs. 10738437 over which solatium of Rs. 3221531 was added @ 30% alongwith interest @ 12% per annum from the date of order till realization of the amount. 2. Grounds pleaded to assail the award are that the same has been passed by reference court without impleading the Indenting-Department as a party which should necessarily have been done before commencement of proceedings and that without proper service of notice/summons upon appellants the award was passed ex parte against them which burdens the State exchequer with a huge liability even while there was no cause or ground for enhancement of compensation. 3. 3. Vide interim order dated May 29, 2003 the first appellant, namely, Indenting Department has been held to be competent to institute the appeal which being belated in the point of time was also accompanied by an application for condonation of delay involved in institution of the appeal which appears to have been dismissed in default on March 20, 2002 but proceedings in main appeal continued with both parties appearing in the matter. The question of condoning the delay, however, appears to have resurfaced with respondents application being CMP no. 420/2003 for declaration of instant appeal as time barred and its consequent dismissal on the ground that delay involved in appeal could not be condoned in the instant case. In interim order dated December 22, 2003 covering the main appeal as also aforesaid CMP the Court directed that the CMP would be heard alongwith appeal and revision petition no. 43/2000 connected herewith finally and posted matter for hearing in last week of February, 2004. On May 13, 2004 in terms of interim order of that date, the appeal was "considered" and "admitted" to hearing with a direction to process and schedule it as such. Order admitting the appeal as such by-necessary implication takes into its sway the respondents aforesaid CMP no. 420/2003 invoking the question of limitation also and virtually condones the same by admitting the appeal to hearing notwithstanding dismissal of COD no. 187/2000 in default restoration petition regarding which was pending on the date appeal was admitted to hearing which, therefore, also would stand allowed by necessary implication in terms of that order followed by the implied condonation of delay. Otherwise also, it would be strange to talk about delay in institution of an admitted appeal after its half a decade long pendency for hearing. 4. After admission of the appeal on May 13, 2004 it appears to have been listed on May 11, 2005 when appellants counsel was present but none appeared for respondents which is followed by interim order of February 18, 2005 when respondents counsel Mr. S. T. Hussain pleaded no objection to adjournment of the matter for enabling Advocate General to address arguments provided the same was listed earlier. S. T. Hussain pleaded no objection to adjournment of the matter for enabling Advocate General to address arguments provided the same was listed earlier. On March 9, 2005 appearing counsel have not addressed arguments and the matter stood adjourned hereafter for three consecutive dates on December 3, 2005, May 26, 2006 and September 29, 2006 none appeared on either side to argue the matter, while it was not reached in the list on November 3, 2006 and December 8, 2006. On following date, i. e., February 29, 2007 the Lawyers abstained from work with the result that the matter came to be adjourned many times thereafter but arguments could not be heard either at request of counsel or due to paucity of time. Finally, it was listed for hearing on May 25, 2008 when it was directed to be listed again on May 28, 2008 on which date it was directed to be kept on Board for remaining dates of the week and, accordingly, came up on May 31, 2008, a working Saturday, while again one of the counsel appeared and in view of its eight years long pendency the appeal was reserved for orders on merits. 5. I have gone through records of the case and considered the matter it appears that proceedings on reference which ultimately culminated in the impugned award started way back on June 9, 1998 wherein vide interim order dated August 1, 1998 the appellant Collector (sole respondent before the reference court) was preceded against in ex parte followed by ex parte proceedings against Superintendent Engineer of Indenting Department on August 26, 1998 who had meanwhile been arrayed as a respondent on his own motion with the result that proceedings went ex parte against all appellants who by then were in the array of respondents before the reference court. During course of proceedings learned reference court appears to have examined many witnesses including Patwari and attorney of the respondent. Incidentally, however, none of the witnesses except respondents attorney has deposed anything to suggest a definite market rate of the acquired land or the adjacent one at the relevant time and broadly the rate they have suggested ranges between Rs. 2.00 and Rs. 5.00 lacs. Incidentally, however, none of the witnesses except respondents attorney has deposed anything to suggest a definite market rate of the acquired land or the adjacent one at the relevant time and broadly the rate they have suggested ranges between Rs. 2.00 and Rs. 5.00 lacs. None of the witnesses except Abdul Rahim Reshi and Ali Mohammad have quoted any personal transaction to substantiate the rates they were alleging nor has any registered sale deed been produced to suggest the sale value of land in the area. The said Abdul Rahim has stated that he purchased a kanal of land in Rs. 2.00 lacs from Shri Iftikhar Hussain Ansari reportedly brother of respondent who had furnished a "Sharie" sale deed attested by the seller of land, the said Iftikhar Hussain Ansari himself as the "Sharie" authority. Another witness, namely, Ali Mohammad, whose statement has been recorded on October 12, 1998 has stated that ten years before he had purchased four kanals of land from Abid Hussain Ansari, the respondent @ Rs. 2.00 lacs per kanal and has furnished the supporting "Sharai" sale deed again attested by the brother of respondent the above said Sh. Iftikhar Hussain Ansari. The statement of Patwari has not added anything to the case except that sales in the area inter se between people of Shia community were attested by their religious heads. The attorney of respondent, namely, Altaf Hussain, has in his detailed, statement stated that the market value of land at the relevant point was Rs. 2.00 lacs and being situated near the city and nearer to hospitals and commercial areas had great potential of future development etc. This aspect has been dealt with by some other witnesses also. 6. With that evidence on record, I would proceed to notice the impugned reference order wherein after giving a resume of the acquisition proceedings and proceedings conducted in the matter learned trial Judge has proceeded to discuss the evidence on record summed up above during which he has curiously avoided reference to the "Sharie" sale deed furnished by witness Gh. Nabi Chintsaz purporting to have been executed in his favour by Sh. Iftikhar Hussain Ansari, the brother of respondent while making reference to one purporting to have been executed by respondent himself and attested by his above said brother. While summarizing. Nabi Chintsaz purporting to have been executed in his favour by Sh. Iftikhar Hussain Ansari, the brother of respondent while making reference to one purporting to have been executed by respondent himself and attested by his above said brother. While summarizing. the evidence the learned trial court has concluded that the approximate market value of the land under reference was Rs. 2.00 lacs per kanal at the relevant point of time and being located near the main city had potential for further development etc. 7. On cumulative consideration of the evidence on record and circumstances attending the case, I feel that impugned reference order suffers on three counts; first, that the ex parte proceedings against Superintendent Engineer of the Indenting Department initiated as aforesaid appear to have been casually ordered on basis of an unauthenticated receipt on back of the summons purporting to have been issued by his receipt clerk. The receipt neither bears neither the office seal nor the name of receiving person. However, there is the report of concerned process server regarding service of summons in support whereof his statement does not appear to have been recorded as is the established practice in all civil courts. In that view, the ex parte proceedings against Superintendent Engineer concerned appears to have been curiously initiated. Secondly, the learned trial court does not appear to have properly appreciated even the ex parte evidence led by respondent- beneficiary in proper perspective nor has it made any effort to secure other "Sharie" sale deeds for record to come to a conclusion regarding the sale price of land in question at the appropriate time. This was particularly required because only two "Sharie" sale deeds were brought on file, one executed by the respondent himself and other by his brother who has attested the both. Being deeply interested in outcome of the reference, these documents attributed to the two gentlemen should have been scrutinized with extra care. Same is the case in respect of other witnesses in so far as ignoring the differences in their statements regarding market price of the land under reference is concerned. Rather a conscious effort on part of learned trial Judge to interwind it into a homogeneous whole percolates from appreciation of evidence. Thirdly, the rate of solatium has unusually been awarded at 30% on the ground of appellants delayed payment of compensation to respondent till 1996. Rather a conscious effort on part of learned trial Judge to interwind it into a homogeneous whole percolates from appreciation of evidence. Thirdly, the rate of solatium has unusually been awarded at 30% on the ground of appellants delayed payment of compensation to respondent till 1996. While saying so learned trial Judge appears to have forgotten that even if that logic was accepted the enhanced rate of solatium could only apply to the compensation paid at originally awarded rate and not the enhanced one which certainly was nowhere in being in 1996. Besides that, no outstanding circumstance to justify this extra statutory increase in the amount of solatium payable in acquisition matters has been put forth which renders this part of the order also bad alongwith rate of interest which has been awarded at 12% per annum instead of the statutory percentage of 6% for first year and 10% thereafter in case of non payment. All these discrepancies in the impugned reference order appear to create gaping holes therein which become frightening by creating a liability of more than Rs. 3.00 crores on the State exchequer which in the ultimate sense has to be borne out by that endangered specie, the common man. 8. Before concluding the order, I feel strongly persuaded to observe that the reference court under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act require to keep in mind that while considering enhancement in compensation for acquired land they are performing an important function having implications at the public exchequer and thereby for public at larged; and thus, they are expected to act strictly within law and its procedures and control the tendency of being a "Hatam Tais" of their times. 9. Accordingly and for all that has been said above, the appeal is allowed and impugned award dated December 22, 1998 of learned District Judge, Budgam passed on the reference is over set. Any amount paid on its basis be recovered from respondent under law. Registry to follow up. No order as to costs.