JUDGMENT By the Court.—This special appeal has been filed against an order of the learned Single Judge by which the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. It appears that an advertisement was issued for engagement of Siksha Mitra in respect of village Onawal of district Chandauli. In pursuance of the said advertisement the petitioner appellant Seema Kumari and respondent No. 6 Sunita Devi and other candidates applied. The quality point marks of the appellant were higher than those of the respondent No. 6 but the name of respondent No. 6 was proposed for engagement on the basis that the petitioner was not eligible as she was not a resident of the village Onawal. The petitioner filed objections before the committee constituted for the purpose against the proposal of the name of the 6th respondent and the said objections found favour with the committee and the name of the petitioner was thereafter proposed and the petitioner was appointed. Respondent No. 6 Sunita Devi challenged the appointment in writ petition No. 52711 of 2006 which was disposed of with a direction to the District Magistrate to decide her representation. In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 21.9.06 the District Magistrate has decided the dispute. He has given a finding that the petitioner Seema Kumari was married in a village of another district Ghazipur and not being a resident of the village Onawal was not eligible. This order was challenged by the petitioner appellant in the writ petition which has given rise to this special appeal. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the finding recorded by the District Magistrate that the petitioner is not a resident of village Onawal is a finding of fact and hence the petition was dismissed. 2. We have heard Sri Yogesh Agarwal counsel for the appellant and Sri Yatindra counsel for respondent No. 6. 3. Sri Yogesh Agarwal has made three submissions. The first submission is that there is no requirement under the Government Orders that the candidate should belong to the same village where the Institution is situated and secondly that even if there is such a requirement the same would be invalid in view of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India which prohibit any discrimination on the ground of residence. The third submission is that the appellant is a resident of village Onawal and the view taken by the District Magistrate and the learned Single Judge that the appellant is a resident of another village is erroneous and that relevant materials like kutumb register and affidavit of the appellant have been ignored. 4. We shall first examine the contention of the appellant relating to the prescribed qualifications. A copy of the G.O. dated 1.7.2000 which provides for the engagement of Shiksha Mitra has been annexed as Annexure 2 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application with the special appeal. The relevant portion relating to the qualification of the residence of the candidate in the same village is contained in para 3 of the G.O. The said portion is being quoted below : “Gramin Shiksha Samiti Dwara Us Gram Panchayat Mein Jiski Pradeshik Seema Main Vidyala Avasthit Hai, Nirdharit Ahartadhari Abhayarthiyon Ke Hi Avedan-Patra amantrit Karege. Vishesh Paristhithi Mein Yadi Kisi Gaon Main Ahr Abyarthi Uplabdh Na Ho to sambandhit Nyay Panchayat mein se Ahr abyarthi chinhankit kiye Ja Sakengein” 5. Sri Yogesh Agarwal submitted that all that the rule requires is that the Institution for which applications are invited should be situated in the same village Panchayat. We are afraid the interpretation put forward by the counsel for the petitioner does not appear to us to be correct. The latter portion of this rule makes the position quite clear inasmuch as it provides that in case an eligible candidate of the same village is not available a candidate from the same Nyaya Panchayat may be identified. In our view the proper interpretation of this part would be that it is only in the event of an eligible candidate of the same village being not available that recourse can be had to selecting a person from another village in the same Panchayat. Moreover it is not disputed that in the advertisement inviting applications the condition that the candidate should be the resident of the same village was specifically mentioned. The petitioner applied in pursuance of that advertisement and her case in fact is that she belongs to the same village. The first contention of the appellant’s counsel in our opinion therefore does not have any merit. 6. The petitioner applied in pursuance of that advertisement and her case in fact is that she belongs to the same village. The first contention of the appellant’s counsel in our opinion therefore does not have any merit. 6. It is next contended that Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India prohibits ineligibility or discrimination on the ground of residence in the matter of public employment. Sri Yogesh Agarwal submitted that the engagement as Shiksha Mitra however it may be described is in fact a public employment and therefore the restriction that the candidate should belong to the same village is an illegal restriction. He submitted firstly that the appointment of shiksha mitra is made by the State and the work is also taken by the State and salary is also paid out of State funds and therefore there exists a relationship of master and servant between the State and the shiksha mitra and hence the engagement of shiksha mitra would be a public employment. In such a case it is only the Parliament which under Article 16(3) can make a law allowing such restriction. In support of the contention learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the meaning of the words ‘employ’ and ‘employment’ in Webster’s Dictionary, which are quoted below : “employ -(em ploi v.t. 1. to use the services of (a person or persons),;have or keep in one’s service; This factory employs thousands of men. 2. to keep busy or at work; engage the attentions of: He employs himself by reading after work. 3. to make use of (an instrument, means etc.):use: apply to employ a hammer to drive a nail. 4. to occupy or devote (time, energies etc.): I employ my spare time in reading. I employ all my effort in writing well. 5. Employment : service: to be in someone’s employ. (late M.E.employe < MF emploie(r)<< I. Implicare to infold (LL: to engage): see IMPLICATE— em-ploy ‘a- bi’l-ity, n.— em-ploy’a-ble adj.- Syn.1 engage, hire: retain: occupy, use. employment-(em ploi ment) n. 1. the act or an instance of employing. 2. state of being employed ; employ; service; to begin or terminate employment. 3. an occupation by which a person earns a living; work; business. 4. an activity or the like that occupies a person’s time; she found meeting a comforting employment for her ideal hours. (EMPLOY + -MENT)— Syn. 3. the act or an instance of employing. 2. state of being employed ; employ; service; to begin or terminate employment. 3. an occupation by which a person earns a living; work; business. 4. an activity or the like that occupies a person’s time; she found meeting a comforting employment for her ideal hours. (EMPLOY + -MENT)— Syn. 3. vocation, calling; job, trade, profession.” 7. Counsel for the appellant also placed reliance upon the decision of the apex Court in AIR 1957 SC 444 , Harish Chandra Bajpai and another v. Triloki Singh and another. In that case the question was whether the appellant had contravened the provisions of Section 123(7) of the Representation of Peoples Act by employing for the purposes of election more persons than permissible under Schedule VI. Para 30 of the judgment has been relied upon. The apex Court relying upon its previous decision in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurastra, AIR 1957 SC 264 , held that the real test for deciding whether the contract was one of employment was to find out whether the agreement was for personal labour of the person engaged and that if that was so, the contract was one of employment, whether the work was time work or piece work, or whether the employee did the whole of the work himself or whether he obtained the assistance of other persons also for the work. 8. In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Govt. Orders. It appears that after Govt. Order dated 1.7.2000, a subsequent Govt. Order dated 1.7.2001, copy of which has been annexed alongwith the supplementary affidavit filed by the appellant in the special appeal as Annexure 2 was issued. The subject of the said Govt. Order itself indicates that the scheme has been launched for universalization of primary education and for participation of educated youth in Shiksha Mitra Yojna. The first para of the Govt. Order indicates that the scheme was primarily meant for imparting education in the same village. It appears from the Govt. Order that shiksha mitra is a community service and the object is to give incentive to young men and women of the village to participate in community-service. It is also clearly provided in the said para that the shiksha mitra scheme is not an employment oriented scheme. It appears from the Govt. Order that shiksha mitra is a community service and the object is to give incentive to young men and women of the village to participate in community-service. It is also clearly provided in the said para that the shiksha mitra scheme is not an employment oriented scheme. Para 6 of the Govt. Order dated 1.7.01 provides for honorarium of Rs. 2,250/- p.m. to the shiksha mitra (since raised to Rs. 3,250/- p.m. as stated by the counsel for the respondent). Para 6 also provides that the payment is to be made out of gram shiksha nidhi for which specific grant is to be provided by the State Government. A proforma of the prescribed form, which a candidate is required to fill up is given at the foot of the Govt. Order. The said form indicates that the candidates are required to be willing to accept all the terms and conditions of the Govt. Order. The said form also requires an undertaking on behalf of the candidate that they would participate in the community service. In the Form 2 (Prarup do) the candidate is required to give his consent that the candidate would not consider himself to be an employee of the Govt./Parishad and would work as a social worker and would not take any salary. Both the Govt. Orders of 2000 and 2001 provide that there will be 50% reservation in favour of women. It is also provided therein that the reservation for engagement as shiksha mitra would be made according to the classification of village under Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947. It is thus clear that the reservation provided for public employment under U.P. Act No. 4 of the 1994 Act would not be applicable. Thus provisions under the Government Orders clearly indicate that the scheme is not for public employment. 9. Counsel for the respondent No. 6 relied upon two decisions each of a learned Single Judge of this Court Devendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and others in writ petition No. 37904 of 2004 and that in writ petition No. 5644 of 2004, Smt. Vimla Singh v. State of U.P. and others. It has been held by the learned Single Judge in these cases that the scheme of engagement as a shiksha mitra is not a scheme of public employment. It has been held by the learned Single Judge in these cases that the scheme of engagement as a shiksha mitra is not a scheme of public employment. We approve of the view taken by the learned Single Judge in this case. In our opinion therefore the engagement of shiksha mitra is not a public employment and hence the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India are not attracted. The decision of the apex Court in Harish Chand Bajpai’s case did not relate to non salaried voluntary social service and is distinguishable. 10. We may now consider the last submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was in fact a resident of the same village Onawal. It is not disputed that the appellant is married in village Hathaura of Vikas Khand, village Saidpur, Ghazipur to one Santosh Kumar. The District Magistrate has found that in the voter list as well as in the kutumb register the name of the appellant has been shown as being resident of village Hathaura. There was thus ample material on the basis of which a finding was recorded by the District Magistrate that the petitioner is not a resident of Onawal but is a resident of the village in which she was married. Sri Yogesh Agarwal challenged the finding on the ground that there is a cutting in the kutumb register and submitted that an affidavit filed by the appellant denying any gauna had taken place and that she was residing in Onawal has been ignored by the District Magistrate. Counsel for the appellant concedes that at the time when the appellant applied her age was 22 years. It is difficult therefore to believe that the gauna of the petitioner would not have taken place. However the fact that the petitioner has married Santosh of another village is not disputed. As to whether the marriage had taken place before her application as a shiksha mitra is a matter within the special knowledge of the appellant. The appellant has not filed any material to indicate the date of her marriage. However the fact that the petitioner has married Santosh of another village is not disputed. As to whether the marriage had taken place before her application as a shiksha mitra is a matter within the special knowledge of the appellant. The appellant has not filed any material to indicate the date of her marriage. Sri Yatindra counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the affidavit of the appellant dated 19.4.06 Annexure 16 to the affidavit filed by the appellant in support of the stay application in the special appeal which contains an admission of the fact that the petitioner’s name has been entered in the kutumb register in village Hathaura. 11. As regards the contention of the appellant’s counsel that the affidavit of the appellant has not been considered it is enough to say that in the face of the documentary evidence in the form of kutumb register and the undisputed fact that the petitioner is married in another village the self serving affidavit of the petitioner can be given little credence. Sri Yogesh Agarwal also submitted that the kutumb register is not a reliable document inasmuch as the entry of the name of the village Hathaura has been scored out. It can safely be said in this case that there was enough material before the District Magistrate for recording a finding that the petitioner is married in another village and in such a situation there can be a presumption of fact that she lives in the village of her marriage. The District Magistrate and the learned Single Judge have believed that case. It is not for us in special appeal to take a different view of the matter when the findings recorded by the District Magistrate and the learned Single Judge are supported by ample material. Sri Yogesh Agarwal has also drawn our attention to the subsequent Govt. Order dated 25.1.08 which provides that in case of female shiksha mitra her services will not be terminated unless she herself resigns. This Govt. Order is of no relevance to the case in hand. Firstly the Govt. Order has been issued long after the selection in the present case. Secondly it appears that this Govt. Order is intended to apply to cases where the marriage takes place after the candidate is engaged as a shiksha mitra. In view of the aforesaid findings there is no merit in this appeal. Firstly the Govt. Order has been issued long after the selection in the present case. Secondly it appears that this Govt. Order is intended to apply to cases where the marriage takes place after the candidate is engaged as a shiksha mitra. In view of the aforesaid findings there is no merit in this appeal. Dismissed. ————