Judgment : The Appeal is filed challenging the order of the Inspector General of Registration, the first respondent, rejecting the Appeal on the ground of limitation. The document in question relates to a sale dated 212. 2001. On 3. 2004 a notice was issued pursuant to the reference under Section 47-A of the Stamps and on 3. 2004, Objections were given. According to the appellant no order was passed. On an Application filed under the Right to Information Act a reply was given by the Revenue District Officer (Stamps), Chennai dated 211. 2007 enclosing the order dated 13. 2004 passed by the 2nd respondent, the Deputy Collector of Stamps. On receipt of the same, on 12. 2007, an Appeal was filed to the first respondent which was rejected on 12. 2008 stating that there is a delay and therefore the Appeal is not maintainable. 2. The respondents were put on notice and appeared through Mr. S. Muthian, Government Advocate. On verification and instruction, he submitted that the impugned order rejecting the Appeal was passed because of the delay in filing the Appeal against the second respondent’s order. It is not disputed that the communication of the order of the Deputy Collector Stamps was not made in the manner specified under the Rules. 3. A batch of cases were filed challenging the similar order passed by the first respondent and this Court by orders dated 17. 2008 in C.M.A.Nos.776, 777, 994 1304, 1312, 1345, 1701, 1816, 1817 and 2008 allowed the Appeals holding that the Appeals are not barred by limitation since the impugned orders were not communicated and consequently there is an error apparent in proceedings as per the Rules. The relevant portion of the earlier order of the Court is as follows: “11. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the Division Bench judgment Indira Devi v. Inspector General of Registration, No.120, Santhome High Road, Chennai-28 and 28 Others, (2005) 1 CTC 733 , wherein in paragraph Nos.5 and 6, it has been held as follows: “5. The relevant portion of the earlier order of the Court is as follows: “11. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the Division Bench judgment Indira Devi v. Inspector General of Registration, No.120, Santhome High Road, Chennai-28 and 28 Others, (2005) 1 CTC 733 , wherein in paragraph Nos.5 and 6, it has been held as follows: “5. There is no dispute that as per Rule 9(5)(a) of the said Rules, an Appeal under subsection (10) of Section 47-A shall be preferred within two months from the date of final order passed under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 47-A. Though the relevant Rule says that an Appeal has to be preferred within two months from the date of final order passed, in the absence of specific exclusion regarding Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner drawing our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (Principal seat) dated 33. 2004 made in C.M.A.(NPD) Nos.896 and 897 of 2004 would submit that the Appeal filed by the appellant before the first respondent is well within time. In the said decision, the Division Bench had occasion to consider the similar claim under the very same provision i.e. Rule 9(5)(a) of the Rules referred to above. After referring to a judgment of the Supreme Court dealt within a similar circumstances, the Division Bench has concluded thus: We therefore, hold that the date of the order under Section 47-A for the purpose of deciding the limitation for filing Appeals should be construed to mean the date of the service of the order. Hence, the date of order under Rule 9 of the said Rules shall be construed to mean the date of service of the order for the purpose of determining the time limit to prefer the Appeals. 6. Inasmuch as there is a specific provision enabling the aggrieved person to file an Appeal to the Appellate Authority, the first respondent herein viz., the Inspector General of Registration, as rightly observed by the Division Bench, unless the copy of the order is furnished/served on the aggrieved person, it would not be possible for him to file the Appeal. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench”. On this premises, all the Appeals are canvassed. 12. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench”. On this premises, all the Appeals are canvassed. 12. Heard Thiru R. Muthian, learned Government Advocate (C.S.) for the respondents, who on verification and instructions from officials of the department who is present in Court stated that the communication were sent to the parties concerned by ordinary post. They are not able to place on record the acknowledgment to show that it has been duly served on the parties. The appellants on their turn have sought for, made representation and in some cases applied for a copy of the order and the Appeals are filed thereafter. The Appeals, it is contended by them are in time and there is no delay. If the date of receipt of the order as contended by the appellants is taken as date of service. Respondents do not dispute the contention. 13. Since the order of the Collector (Stamps) has not been communicated as provided under Rule 15, the first respondent ought not to have, rejected the Appeals on the ground that the Appeals were not filed in time. The legal position stands clarified by the Division Bench decision’s cited supra. 14. The respondents are also not disputing the dates on which the orders were received by the appellants as stated by the individuals/appellants in all these Appeals. If the date of receipt as stated by the appellant is reckoned as the date of communication, the appellants claim that they have filed their Appeals within the time has to be accepted and right so they are entitled to be heard on merits. The counsel for respondent stated that the impugned orders can be set aside and remitted back to the authority for consideration on merits. 15. In such view of the matter the impugned order in all the cases passed by the first respondent Appellate Authority, namely, the Inspector General of Registration are set aside and the matters are remanded back to the first respondent for consideration of the Appeals on merits. The Appeals as far as possible shall be heard and disposed of within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order”. 4. The Appeal in the case is filed after receipt of the order of the second respondent by making an Application under the Right to Information Act. The Appeals as far as possible shall be heard and disposed of within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order”. 4. The Appeal in the case is filed after receipt of the order of the second respondent by making an Application under the Right to Information Act. It was not communicated earlier in the manner specified under the Rules. The respondents are not able to show any such communication. Therefore, the reasoning of this Court, in the earlier decision referred to present case. The Government Advocate does not dispute this fact. If the date of receipt, as stated by the appellant is reckoned as the date of communication, the appellant’s claim, that he has filed the Appeal within the time has to be accepted. The rejection of Appeal is bad and the appellant is entitled to be heard on merits. As there is no delay and the question of limitation does not arise. 5. In view of the earlier order passed in the batch of writ petitions, which squarely applies to the facts of the present case, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the first respondent to decide the appeal on merits. The appeal is allowed as above. No costs. Consequently the connected M.P.No.3 of 2008 is closed.