JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pradeep Kant, J.—It is for the second time, the petitioner being aggrieved by the order of cessation of powers, both administrative and financial as Zila Panchayat Adhyaksha, has approached this Court. Previously, an order was passed on the same charges ceasing the administrative and financial powers vide order dated 14.2.2008, which became the subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 1609 (MB) of 2008 and which order was quashed by this Court on 1.4.2008. The writ petition was thus, allowed. Liberty was, however, given to the State for holding a fresh enquiry, if it so desires. In response to the liberty given by the Court, the present order has been passed. 2. Initially, the petitioner approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 873 (MB) of 2008 with the plea that some enquiry had already been conducted and, therefore, fresh enquiry cannot be conducted under Rule 4(1) of the Rules of 1997 but that writ petition was dismissed on the instructions received by the State counsel that no finding has been passed against or in favour of the petitioner nor any enquiry has been conducted against her. The Court, while dismissing the writ petition, gave liberty to the petitioner to approach this Court, in case any order is passed or action is taken against him. This order was passed on 14.2.2008. 3. Later on, preliminary enquiry was conducted and the administrative and financial powers were ceased, which order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 1609 (MB) of 2008, which was allowed on 1.4.2008, quashing the order dated 14.2.2008. Two Special Leave Petitions were filed against the judgment and order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1609 (MB) of 2008. The first one was dismissed on 15.5.2008. This SLP was filed by one of the members of the Committee, constituted by the State Government, who was a complainant also. 4. The State Government took second opportunity of filing SLP against the order dated 1.4.2008, which SLP was again dismissed on 25.8.2008. Soon thereafter, on 29.8.2008 the impugned order has been passed ceasing the administrative and financial powers of Adhyaksha, namely, that of the petitioner. 5. 4. The State Government took second opportunity of filing SLP against the order dated 1.4.2008, which SLP was again dismissed on 25.8.2008. Soon thereafter, on 29.8.2008 the impugned order has been passed ceasing the administrative and financial powers of Adhyaksha, namely, that of the petitioner. 5. Here it may be pertinent to mention that the first order of cessation of administrative and financial powers dated 14.2.2008 was quashed on two grounds, namely, no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner in the preliminary enquiry to put forward her defence nor was she associated with the enquiry in any manner, and that the charges, as they were framed, could not be said to have been proved nor were such, so as to constitute any misconduct or financial irregularity, making the petitioner liable for removal. 6. The power to remove an Adhyaksha of the Zila Panchayat has been conferred upon the State Government under Section 29 of the Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, which reads as under : "29 (1). If in the opinion of the State Government the Adhyaksha or the Up-Adhyaksha while acting in place of Adhyaksha wilfully omits or refuses to perform his duties or functions under this Act or abuses the powers vested in him or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, [or because physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties] the State Government, after giving the Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity for explanation may by order removed him from office and [such order shall be final and not open to be questioned in a Court of law] : Provided that where in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a committee consisting of three elected members of the Zila Panchayat appointed in this behalf by the State Government. (2) [Omitted by U.P. Act No. 9 of 1994]. (2) [Omitted by U.P. Act No. 9 of 1994]. (3) An Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha, removed from his office under this section, shall not be eligible for elections as Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha for a period of three years from the date of his removal.” 7. The aforesaid provision permits the State Government to order for removal of an Adhyaksha only if he wilfully omits or refuses to perform his duties or functions under the Act or abuses the powers vested in him or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties [or because physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties]. 8. The proviso attached to the said Section mandates an enquiry to be held in this regard, if the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha is prima facie found guilty of committing financial and other irregularities then his administrative and financial powers can also be ceased pending the formal enquiry. 9. It thus, can be safely concluded that the State Government cannot exercise the power either of removal or of cessation of administrative and financial power on its own discretion, unless the conditions mentioned in the aforesaid Section exist, which means that even if there is some lapse on the part of the Adhyaksha in performing his duties but if such a lapse does not fall within the misconduct or the omissions mentioned in Section 29(1), referred to above, the State Government will not have any power to remove the Adhyaksha. 10. In the case of R/o Dr. Ram Ashray Yadav, Chairman Bihar Public Service Commission, 2004 (4) SCC 309, while considering the charge of misbehaviour of the Chairman of the Bihar Public Service Commission, found that although most sensitive standard of behaviour is expected of such a constitutional trustee, on facts, their Lordships held that occasional omissions to exhibit exemplary behaviour or conduct expected of the Chairman, although amounted to lapse but did not amount to misbehaviour within the meaning of Article 317 so as to warrant his removal. 11. 11. The controversy in the present writ petition revolves around the question as to whether there is any lapse on the part of the Adhyaksha, and if so, whether the charges, which have been framed, have been prima facie found to be proved on the material on record or they are non-existent charges and lastly whether the Adhyaksha can be removed on the basis of the said charges, even if they are found to be proved. 12. All these issues are to be decided in accordance with Section 29, referred to above. 13. The brief facts, which are necessary for the present controversy are, that the petitioner contested the elections of Zila Panchayat, Gorakhpur and she was elected as Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat on 7.1.2006. The order dated 14.2.2008, which was the subject matter of earlier Writ Petition No. 1409 (MB) of 2008 and the present order dated 29.8.2008 on the same charges have been passed under Section 29 of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), ceasing her administrative and financial powers. 14. Since in the earlier writ petition, the Court took a view that no preliminary enquiry could have been held without associating the petitioner and that such an enquiry was wholly in violation of the provisions of Section 29 of the Act as well as against the principles of natural justice opportunity was given to the State to hold an enquiry afresh, as a result of which, the present impugned order has been passed after giving opportunity to the petitioner with respect to the same charges, inasmuch as she has submitted her reply to the said charges. 15. The only difference between the two orders is that the first order dated 14.2.08 on the same charges was passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioner in the preliminary enquiry, whereas while passing the present order (the second order), the petitioner has been afforded opportunity of replying to the charges. 16. The State’s contention is that this is full opportunity which has been afforded to the petitioner and, therefore, now this Court would not reappreciate or reassess the evidence so as to find as to whether charges have been proved or not, particularly when the State Government felt satisfied with the enquiry report and has passed an order for cessation of administrative and financial powers. 17. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has attacked the order on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner as she was only allowed to submit her reply and that even on the basis of the material on record and the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, no charge can be said to have been proved even prima facie so as to either pass an order of cessation of administrative and financial powers or to take action for removal from the office of Adhyaksha. Further argument is that the charges as they are, even if found proved, shall not constitute for removal of the petitioner. 18. The question that whether opportunity should be given to the Adhyaksha before passing an order of ceasing administrative and financial powers in preliminary enquiry, is no more open to challenge in the present writ petition. 19. The plea of the petitioner, that even on the basis of evidence and material on record before the District Magistrate, neither charges could be said to have been proved nor the charges are such, that even if they stand proved, they can form the basis for removal of Adhyaksha, requires consideration. 20. If the charges do not stand prima facie proved or there has been gross irregularity resulting into prejudice to the petitioner in holding preliminary enquiry or the findings recorded are absolutely perverse, which cannot be reached by a man of ordinary prudence on the basis of record, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Also, if the charges are trivial, or of purely technical nature or they are non-existent, and/or do not constitute any misconduct, or any financial irregularity, the order cannot be sustained under law. 21. Before considering the aforesaid plea, it would be apposite to mention that this Court had considered all the charges, one by one in its judgment and order dated 1.4.08 and has found that none of the charges has been proved nor charges make out any case for gross misconduct or financial irregularity. Since opportunity was given to the State for holding enquiry afresh, therefore, same charges have been reconsidered by the District Magistrate in his enquiry. 22. Since opportunity was given to the State for holding enquiry afresh, therefore, same charges have been reconsidered by the District Magistrate in his enquiry. 22. The petitioner’s case is that the impugned enquiry and the order passed, is a result of political manoeuvring as the complainant Sri Umesh Chandra Yadav belongs to Congress (I) party and Smt. Manju Singh belongs to Bahujan Samaj Party, a member of Zila Panchayat, who has also been appointed as a member in the Committee constituted by the State Government. 23. It appears that Sri Umesh Chandra Yadav made a complaint on 12.3.2007 but probably nothing could be detected against the petitioner on the said complaint. Sri Yadav again made a complaint on 23.7.2007. Another complaint was made by Sri K.N. Kharwar on 8.8.2007, who was posted as Upper Mukhya Adhikari, Zila Panchayat, Gorakhpur and lastly another complaint was made through Smt. Manju Singh, who was member of Zila Panchayat, on 11.9.2007. 24. The complaints substantially contained the same charges on which the preliminary enquiry had been conducted but for the charge No. 6, regarding which no complaint was made. 25. There are six charges in all, and before proceeding with the plea of the petitioner that the same very charges were considered by this Court in earlier writ petition and the Court found that the charges were not proved even, prima facie, nor was there any material to establish them, and that they were not sufficient either to initiate a formal enquiry or to remove the Adhyaksha, therefore, the subsequent exercise done by the District Magistrate under the directives of the State Government is per se illegal and based on no fresh material, which vitiates the impugned order, it would be apt to mention that but for the charge No. 1 which was found to be proved in the absence of original documents being produced before enquiry officer in the earlier enquiry, rest four charges which are substantially one and the same, have been found to be proved with no additional material being brought on record. 26. In the earlier Writ Petition No. 1609 (MB) of 2008, while dealing with the charges and the basis on which they were found to be proved, this Court came to the conclusion that there was no charge of financial irregularity said to have been committed by the petitioner. 26. In the earlier Writ Petition No. 1609 (MB) of 2008, while dealing with the charges and the basis on which they were found to be proved, this Court came to the conclusion that there was no charge of financial irregularity said to have been committed by the petitioner. The Court, therefore, observed as under : "The District Magistrate found the charge No. 1 proved because original documents were not supplied. In respect of charge No. 3, he found the situation suspicious and rest of the charges have been dealt with in like manner, showing no financial irregularity committed by the petitioner. On the facts aforesaid, we are satisfied that preliminary enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with rules nor the charges can be said to have been, prima facie, proved and, therefore, there was no admissible material before the State Government to be satisfied that a case is made out for holding a formal enquiry and consequently, no formal enquiry can be conducted on the basis of such a preliminary enquiry report nor the order passed by the State Government can be sustained.” 27. Liberty to hold an enquiry afresh is given by the Court normally when the Court finds either any procedural defect in holding the enquiry or it is found that there was no material on which the enquiry can be upheld, to afford an opportunity for establishing the charge, may be prima facie, if there remains any material which has been inadvertently left out or could not be produced at that time. Liberty to hold enquiry again and again cannot be given for the purpose of obtaining a desired report by the State Government nor liberty so given can be taken to mean giving such an opportunity. 28. In the instant case, the Division Bench of this Court in the earlier writ petition found that the charge No. 1 was not proved for want of documents and noticed the conduct of Sri K.N. Kharwar, who remained Upper Mukhya Adhikari continuously for 14-15 years and when he was transferred, he filed a writ petition, in which interim order of stay was passed in his favour and which was dismissed on appearance being put in by the present Adhyaksha by filing counter affidavit and that charge No. 1 was the verbatim reflection of the complaint made by Sri Kharwar himself. 29. 29. It is the specific case of the petitioner, that the Kharwar’s complaint was a mala fide complaint because the petitioner was instrumental in seeing him out of Gorakhpur by effectively opposing the writ petition. 30. The charge No. 1 can be read into three parts. The first part says that on 27.6.2007, 88 tenders under the scheme of State Finance Commission were made and out of 86 works, for 54 works, financial, technical and administrative approval was given by the petitioner on 16.5.2007 on the basis of the report of Engineer, Upper Mukhya Adhikari and comments of the Clerk of the construction department, in the absence of estimation of work being signed by the Engineer and Upper Mukhya Adhikari. 31. The petitioner has brought on record, the document of such estimation as Annexure-23 to the writ petition, which corroborates the plea that Engineer and Upper Mukhya Adhikari have placed their signatures on 15.5.2007 and thereafter on 16.5.2007 the petitioner has given her approval as Adhyaksha. This document shows that work of all the 86 tenders were duly estimated by the concerned offices. 32. The letters dated 15.2.2008 and 16.2.2008 written by the then Upper Mukhya Adhikari and Executive Engineer of Zila Panchayat clearly show that estimates were containing the signatures of the officers and were present in respective files. The State Government also gave approval to these tenders on 15.10.2007. 33. The second part of the charge that 29 tender works were approved without having any estimation also stands belied by the aforesaid document which takes care of all the 86 tenders. The very fact that the estimates were duly signed by the Upper Mukhya Adhikari and Engineer, was also confirmed by the Upper Mukhya Adhikari, Jagdish Prasad Tripathi in his letter on 15.2.2008 addressed to the petitioner confirming that approval for 86 tenders aforesaid was asked for only on the completion of all the formalities by the concerned officials/officers and after his signature and, therefore, if any document is produced, which does not contain his signature, it may be treated as a forged document. 34. In respect of the third part of the charge, which relates to the work, which valued more than Rs. 34. In respect of the third part of the charge, which relates to the work, which valued more than Rs. 10 lakhs and was allegedly given without permission/sanction of the State Government also has been found to be proved, on ignoring and misreading the documentary evidence which was before the enquiry officer and which has not been taken into account at all. 35. The report/estimate prepared, a true copy of which has been brought on record as aforesaid Annexure-23, clearly says that it bears the signature of all concerned authorities including the Engineer and Upper Mukhya Adhikari, therefore, there does not remain any doubt that proper estimation was made which was in the respective files and a report to that effect was prepared which was duly considered and approved by the Adhyaksha, on being submitted under the signatures of all concerned officers/officials in respect of more than Rs. 10 lacs. 36. The requirement of having technical sanction of the State Government in the tenders valuing more than Rs. 10 lacs is not being disputed by the petitioner but he says that the contract was given only after the technical sanction was granted by the State Government and that it is absolutely false and concocted story against the petitioner. In support of the aforesaid plea, attention has been drawn to the technical sanction granted by the Deputy Director on 25.5.2007 and thereafter by the State Government on 31.12.2007. 37. The matter was placed before the petitioner for the aforesaid work which valued more than Rs. 10 lacs i.e. Rs. 15 lacs, giving the estimation done and the requirement of the construction work, namely, construction of Pulia, laying down of Kharanja etc. 38. The report said that since the valuation of the work is of more than Rs. 10 lacs, therefore, financial/administrative sanction may be granted for taking technical sanction for the same which is to be obtained from the State Government. This report was signed by the Administrative Officer, Engineer of Zila Panchayat and certain other officers/officials, on which the petitioner made an endorsement that in view of the report of the Engineer/Upper Mukhya Adhikari, the approval is granted under her signature on 21.5.2007. After getting approval from the petitioner as Adhyaksha, the matter was forwarded to the Deputy Director, Zila Panchayat, Monitoring Cell vide letter dated 23.5.2007 seeking technical sanction. After getting approval from the petitioner as Adhyaksha, the matter was forwarded to the Deputy Director, Zila Panchayat, Monitoring Cell vide letter dated 23.5.2007 seeking technical sanction. The Deputy Director granted the sanction after considering that the work was of more than Rs. 15 lacs as is evident from the summary of project annexed as Annexure-23 to the writ petition and thereafter on 31.12.2007 the State Government also granted the technical sanction with respect to the same work. 39. The charge has been found to be proved only on the ground that State Government granted the technical sanction on 31.12.2007 but the petitioner gave his approval much before that and contract was given on the tenders invited and accepted before 31.12.2007. 40. From the documents on record, which have not been considered by the enquiry officer at all and which form part of the record, it is clear that the petitioner Adhyaksha did not grant any approval/sanction of the said work (i) on her own; and (ii) technical sanction was granted by the Deputy Director on 25.5.2007 and if in the meantime tenders were invited and were finalised but as per the case of the petitioner no work order was issued till the technical sanction was granted by the State Government on 31.12.2007 and the work was finally approved in January 2008, it cannot be said that the petitioner in any way acted against the norms or the rules. 41. It may be taken note of, that once the technical sanction has been granted by Deputy Director and later on, by the State Government also, with respect to the same tenders and contracts, it cannot be said that conduct of the petitioner in any way was abuse of her powers or it resulted into any financial loss or it was any financial irregularity, so as to remove the petitioner from the office. Once the technical sanction has been granted by the Deputy Director and thereafter by the State Government itself, the charge cannot be said to be proved, moreso when the enquiry officer has not taken notice of these facts and has conveniently ignored them. 42. In the counter affidavit filed by the State, the aforesaid facts are not disputed but a plea has been taken that since the State Government granted technical sanction on 31.12.2007, therefore, all actions taken before it, were against the rules. 42. In the counter affidavit filed by the State, the aforesaid facts are not disputed but a plea has been taken that since the State Government granted technical sanction on 31.12.2007, therefore, all actions taken before it, were against the rules. This hardly justifies the stand of the State. 43. In the case of Lakhan Lal v. State of U.P. and others, (1994) 12 LCD, reiterating the observations made in Surendra Prakash Goel v. State of U.P. and others, HVD (Alld.) 1992(1), it has been held that if the President has committed some technical irregularity but he has not been benefitted from the same financially or otherwise, Government should not remove him from the office and instead a warning under Proviso to sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Act is sufficient. 44. Before summing up the said charge, it is also necessary to mention that this charge was the repeat charge of the complaint of Sri K.N. Kharwar and it was not supported by any affidavit of Sri Kharwar as required under Rule 3 of Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Removal of Pramukhs, Up-Pramukhs, Adhyakshas and Up-Adhyakshas) Inquiry Rules, 1997. 45. Thus the aforesaid charge No. 1 could not be proved, but the District Magistrate has found it proved by ignoring the material evidence before him. In fact it is a non-existent charge and does not make out any case for removal of the petitioner from the post of Adhyaksha in terms of Section 29 of the Act. 46. So far the charge No. 2 is concerned, the Court considered that since the writ petition of Sri Kharwar was dismissed and there was no Upper Mukhya Adhikari and Smt. Sandhya Tiwari, Chief Development Officer/Chief Officer, Zila Panchayat was supposed to be given charge but Sri Kharwar was relieved on 20.2.2007 i.e. 14 days after the dismissal of the writ petition and in the meantime, since no officer was looking after the work, therefore, charge was given to one Vinod Kumar Singh, Vittiya Paramarshdata, to look after the work. There was no allegation that Sri Vinod Kumar Singh has incurred any financial liability on the Panchayat and discharged any such function. There was no allegation that Sri Vinod Kumar Singh has incurred any financial liability on the Panchayat and discharged any such function. However, in the present enquiry it has been stated that on examination of record, it has come to the light that Sri Vinod Kumar Singh had not only performed routine work of Upper Mukhya Adhikari but also made recommendations for acceptance of tenders valuing Rs. 4 Crores. 47. The aforesaid allegation regarding making recommendations of work valuing Rs. 4 Crores was not the subject matter of the charge-sheet or the enquiry. The petitioner was not afforded any opportunity in that regard. Even if Sri Vinod Kumar Singh had made recommendations for acceptance of any tender, the petitioner having not approved any one of them, no financial liability or irregularity or for that matter any illegality or irregularity can be attributed to the petitioner. The petitioner neither authorised Sri Vinod Kumar Singh to make any such recommendations nor asked to make any such recommendations. Since the charge was limited to the question as to why officiating charge of Upper Mukhya Adhikari was given to Vittiya Paramarshdata and not to the Chief Development Officer/Chief Officer, Zila Panchayat for which sufficient explanation was given, which was considered by the High Court in its earlier judgment also, we do not find that this charge also can be said to be proved on the same very material, simply by adding one ground, which on the face of it, does not relate to any of the work and conduct of the petitioner. There is no charge or allegation that the petitioner had allowed him to deal with any financial matters and rather specifically, the power to act as drawing and disbursing officer was not given to him. 48. The petitioner has also relied upon the government order dated 20.9.1985 read with government order dated 11.5.1992 saying that in case of short-term vacancy created on the post of Upper Mukhya Adhikari, officiating charge may be given to the senior most officer. 49. 48. The petitioner has also relied upon the government order dated 20.9.1985 read with government order dated 11.5.1992 saying that in case of short-term vacancy created on the post of Upper Mukhya Adhikari, officiating charge may be given to the senior most officer. 49. Even if the charge was given by the petitioner to Sri Vinod Kumar Singh, who was the senior most officer and not to Smt. Sandhya Tiwari, it would not constitute any irregularity as the government order dated 25.5.1995, which is said to have been violated, only prohibits that if any other officer is authorised to exercise the drawing and disbursing power, then Adhyaksha would be liable for action under Section 29 of the Act. 50. It is the specific case of the petitioner and also as evident from the record, that Sri Vinod Kumar Singh was given the charge under compelling situation when Sri K.N. Kharwar whose writ petition was dismissed but was not relieved by the State Government and was not coming to the office but for one or two occasions, therefore, he was given the charge for discharging the routine daily work with no drawing and disbursing powers that too only for a very few days. Smt. Sandhya Tiwari was given the charge on 20.2.2007. This charge again cannot constitute any financial irregularity or any irregularity, so as to remove him from office. 51. Charge No. 3 also does not reflect any financial irregularity but only a suspicion has been raised as to why specimen signatures of Sri Jagdish Tripathi, Upper Mukhya Adhikari, were sent late i.e. on 24.2.2007, though he had taken charge on 21.2.2007 and it further says that the date of taking over charge was ante dated. If it was a case of ante dating the charge certificate, then apparently the reason for sending his signatures on 24.2.2007 is obvious, namely, when according to the District Magistrate, the charge was actually taken by him on 24.2.2007 and if ante dating was done, there could have been no occasion for the Adhyaksha to send his signatures on 21st February, 2007. However, this charge has not been, prima facie, proved nor any financial irregularity is said to have been committed, because of the alleged discrepancy. 52. However, this charge has not been, prima facie, proved nor any financial irregularity is said to have been committed, because of the alleged discrepancy. 52. So far the charge No. 4 is concerned, it relates to the cancellation of three tenders on 25.4.2007, without assigning any reason and also without forfeiting security amounts of the tenders. On 3.8.2006, the tenders were invited but after nine months on 12.2.2007 the officers of Zila Panchayat in a collusive manner asked the petitioner to grant tender to Sri Gulab Singh, the third tenderer without showing that the tender has been offered first to the second tenderer and, therefore, the petitioner asked the officers to produce the relevant rules and the petitioner smelling foul play cancelled the tender of five works on 20.4.2007 by detailed and reasoned order, and also because the tenders were 15% to 50% below the quoted rate. 53. There is also a report of 2.12.2006, where the member of Zila Panchayat represented that if the tender is granted on half the quoted rate then the quality of work cannot be maintained and quality of works cannot be compromised in view of the government order dated 14.3.2007. Fresh tenders were, therefore, published on 12.12.2007 and finalised on 4.1.2008. 54. So far the forfeiture of security money is concerned, the petitioner submitted that the said charge is baseless as Rule 24 sub-clause (3) of Construction Rule, 1994 provide that the security is to be forfeited only when the tenderer refuses to perform the work after grant of tender. In the present case, the tenders were never accepted and the entire tender process was cancelled for valid reasons, therefore, the question of forfeiting the security amount did not arise. 55. The learned counsel for the State could not answer that when either of the tenders were not accepted then under which provision of the rules security money could have been forfeited. It is obvious that security money can be forfeited in a matter of contract, only when the tenderer/contractor violates the terms of the contract and renders himself liable for such forfeiture. In a case where contract has not been given at all and tenders were cancelled by the department, there would be no occasion or authority to forfeit the security of the tenderers, who are only prospective bidders, rather forfeiting security in such a case, would have been against the rules. 56. In a case where contract has not been given at all and tenders were cancelled by the department, there would be no occasion or authority to forfeit the security of the tenderers, who are only prospective bidders, rather forfeiting security in such a case, would have been against the rules. 56. The refusal on the part of the petitioner to grant tender to the third or fourth tenderer in the facts and circumstances of the case can also not be taken to be a misconduct on her part and this cannot be a ground for removal in any case. The fifth charge is that the government order dated 11.5.1992 did not permit the petitioner to get the Tehbazari auction held by the officiating engineer. The aforesaid charge says that the petitioner as Adhyaksha approved the leave of Upper Mukhya Adhikari and got the auction of Tehbazari done. 57. So far the grant of leave is concerned, the petitioner has categorically stated that he was not the authority competent to grant the leave and the leave was to be granted by the Mukhya Adhikari and, therefore, if the leave was granted, the petitioner cannot be held guilty for that. 58. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner gave the work of auction of Tehbazari to a responsible officer and if Sri Vinod Kumar Singh did not sign the auction form and money was deposited by Engineer, the petitioner cannot be held guilty for that. The petitioner reiterated in his reply that the Engineer was allowed to conduct the auction as per the government orders dated 20.9.1985 and 11.5.1995 but the enquiry officer did not consider the reply and mentioned that both the government orders are very old. Again in the absence of Upper Mukhya Adhikari, for carrying out the auction of Tehbazari, if the senior officer was appointed alongwith Engineer to conduct the auction, and there being no allegation that auction was not properly conducted or the amount received during the auction was not deposited or that Theka was not given or could not be given in pursuance of the auction, this will not again constitute a valid ground for removal of Adhyaksha from her office. 59. The sixth charge says that the petitioner did not produce the documents of relieving and joining/taking over charge by the officers of Central Transferable Cadre. 60. 59. The sixth charge says that the petitioner did not produce the documents of relieving and joining/taking over charge by the officers of Central Transferable Cadre. 60. This charge though has been enquired into and is found to be partially proved but was not a matter of complaint in either of the complaints. Thus, it was not a complaint in accordance with Rule 3 of the Rules of 1997 and it not being supported by any affidavit, no enquiry could have been conducted on the said charge. The charge has been proved purely on surmises and conjectures. It does not make out any case for removal of the Adhyaksha. 61. The Court while assessing the charges would not enter into in detailed scrutiny or reassessment of the evidence or the material nor would substitute its own finding as against the finding of the enquiry officer and the satisfaction of the State Government but it will have to be seen as to whether there is any material on the basis of which subjective opinion can be formed by the State Government on objective consideration and whether in reaching to a conclusion, the enquiry officer has taken into account all the material and has not ignored or left out of consideration, such evidence or documents, which if had been taken into account, possibly would have changed the mind of the enquiry officer and consequently that of the State Government. 62. The charges which we have discussed, amply prove that despite the finding given by this Court in earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner simply because liberty was given to the State to hold a fresh enquiry, the same charges have been found to be proved but, in substance, with no proof and by ignoring the relevant admissible material, which was available with the enquiry officer. All the charges were not supported by any material evidence and formal enquiry on the basis of such report was held, only with a view to oust the petitioner, though there is no material against her for such an action. 63. All the charges were not supported by any material evidence and formal enquiry on the basis of such report was held, only with a view to oust the petitioner, though there is no material against her for such an action. 63. The sequence of events and the manner in which the enquiry has been initiated earlier on the complaint of Sri Umesh Chandra Yadav, belonging to a political party then again on the complaint of Sri K.N. Kharwar, who was Upper Mukhya Adhikari, against whom allegations of personal annoyance and mala fide have been made, coupled with the fact that though his complaint was not supported by an affidavit and was not in accordance with the Rules of 1997 but was entertained and that despite the fact that the charges which have been dealt with separately, do not make out any case against the petitioner, show that the impugned order has been passed for ceasing her administrative and financial powers and for proceeding with the formal enquiry on non-existent charges. The order, therefore, is liable to be set aside, which is hereby quashed. 64. The petitioner shall be allowed to discharge his functions, financial and administrative both, henceforth. 65. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. ————