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2008 DIGILAW 258 (ORI)

Prasanna Kumar Das v. Republic of India

2008-03-28

S.C.PARIJA

body2008
ORDER :- The petitioner, who is a practising advocate of Bhubaneswar Bar has filed this revision application under Section 401, Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 13-10-2006 passed by the learned Special C.J.M. (CBI), Bhubaneswar, rejecting the petition filed under Sections 227 and 228, Cr.P.C. and directing framing of charge against the petitioner under Section 120-B read with Section 420, I.P.C. 2. The case of the prosecution, is that, accused No. 1-Manoj Kumar Ray set up a business to deal in Two-wheelers in the month of January, 1997 under the name and style M/s. Usha Auto mobiles. He opened a current account in Bank of India, SSI Branch, Bhubaneswar on 17-2-98. A couple of months thereafter he applied to the Bank for a Cash Credit Limit up to Rs. 8 lacs. The Bank while enquiring into his solvency and eligibility relied on the Valuation Report submitted by accused No. 3-Tara Prasad Dhal, an Architect and Proprietor of M/s. Design Group, Saheed Nagar, Bhubaneswar in respect of the landed property offered by the loanee as collateral security belonging to one of the guarantors i.e., Rahas Bihari Beura. A limit up to Rs. 8 lacs was sanctioned on 18-4-98 and the amount was released even despite non-compliance by the guarantor of submitting his title deeds in respect of the properties hypothecated to the Bank as collateral security. As the transaction of the loanee was satisfactory as per the observation of the Bank, accused No. 1 applied for an enhancement of the credit limit to Rs. 35 lacs on 10-5-2000 with a request to replace another guarantor namely, Pradeep Chandra Mohanty whose properties he valued at Rs. 60 lacs and enclosed xerox copies of title deeds with his application. 3. This time the Bank insisted on verification of the title deeds submitted by accused No. 1 by accused No. 2 (petitioner), its empanelled lawyer as to the marketability of the title and so also a report on the valuation of the said properties located at Mouza-Badapokhari P.S. Tangi, Dist-Cuttack, Plot No. 151, Khata No. 352, measuring an area of Ac. 12.00 dec. from accused No. 3-Tara Prasad Dhal, an Architect and Valuer in the panel. In consideration of the verification report submitted by accused No. 2 and the valuation submitted by accused No. 3; the Bank in its discretion was pleased to sanction Rs. 29 lacs in according enhancement to the credit limit. 12.00 dec. from accused No. 3-Tara Prasad Dhal, an Architect and Valuer in the panel. In consideration of the verification report submitted by accused No. 2 and the valuation submitted by accused No. 3; the Bank in its discretion was pleased to sanction Rs. 29 lacs in according enhancement to the credit limit. Ultimately when it was found that the conduct of the account was not satisfactory the Bank followed up with the borrower by issuing a letter to him on 3-12-2001 with copy to the guarantor i.e., Pradeep Chandra Mohanty. When Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty replied back stating that he is in no way connected with the loan of M/s. Usha Automobile, further verification was made and it was found that the title deeds submitted as collateral security are forged and fabricated and someone else has impersonated Pradeep Chandhra Mohanty and executed the guarantee documents in his name. The succeeding Manager reported the matter to C.B.I, which was investigated into. Upon investigation it came to light that accused No. 2 Sri Prasanna Kumar Dash, an Advocate in the Bank's panel in conspiracy with accused No. 1-Manoj Kumar Ray submitted false Search Report on 9-5-2000 with regard to the mortgaged property by falsely mentioning that the title deed was clear, marketable, free from encumbrances and can be mortgaged equitably and further that Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty is the owner in possession of the schedule property after correction of the land records by Revenue Authority of Tangi, Cuttack, in favour of Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty vide Mutation Case No. 796/98. On the basis of this false report the Bank of India, SSI Branch enhanced the Cash Credit Limit of accused No. 1. 4. In course of investigation, it was established that the aforesaid plot was standing in the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei and was never transferred/corrected in the name of Pradeep Chandra Mohanty. The said land was sold to one Smt. Rekha Ray, w/o Manas Sankar Ray of Saheed Nagar, Bhubaneswar on 16-11-2001 and the ownership was changed accordingly to the name of Smt. Rekha Ray as per orders of the Mutation Officer in Mutation Case No. 2508/ 01 on 13-6-02. During investigation Sri Tulasi Das Pattanaik, Revenue Inspector, Gurudagaon Revenue Circle under Tangi-Choudwar Tahasil was examined as P.W. 14. During investigation Sri Tulasi Das Pattanaik, Revenue Inspector, Gurudagaon Revenue Circle under Tangi-Choudwar Tahasil was examined as P.W. 14. He stated with reference to Tenance Ledger No. 3, Page-158 of Mouza-Bada Pokhari that Plot No. 151 of Khata No. 347/234 area Ac. 12.00 dec. stood in the name of Smt. Chandramani Del vide Mutation Case No. 636/95 and never transferred to the name of any other person up to the year 2002. The said land was transferred to the name of Smt. Rekha Ray on 13-6-2002 vide Mutation Case No. 2508/01. Sri Bijaya Kumar Rath, Tahasildar, Tangi-Choudwar examined as P.W. 1 also confirmed this fact that the original recorded tenant of this land was Smt. Chandramani Dei vide Mutation Case No. 636/95 and subsequently the said landed property in Khata Nos. 347/235 and 347/234 were transferred in the name of Smt. Rekha Ray vide Mutation Case No. 2508/01 on 13-6-02 after purchase of this land by Smt. Rekha Ray on 16-11-2000 for Rs. 10 lacs. According to the R.I. the land revenue for this land was also paid in the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei up to the year 2000-01 and never in the name of Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty. But as per the report of accused No. 2-Sri Prasanna Kumar Dash, the empanelled Advocate, the land was included in Hal Khata No. 347/234 after being mutated in the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei vide Mutation Case No. 636/95. Later there was a family settlement between the mother-Smt. Chandramani Dei and son-Pradeep Chandra Mohanty by virtue of which the entire area of Ac. 12.00 dec. of the schedule property was allotted to the exclusive share and ownership of her son, Pradeep Chandra Mohanty vide registered deed No. 1292, dated 17-10-96. Further in pursuance to the absolute allotment of the schedule property in favour of Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty, the Tahasildar, Tangi-Choudwar corrected the land record in respect of the schedule property in the name of Pradeep Chandra Mohanty vide Mutation Case No. 796/98. In this view of the matter Sri Dash (accused No. 2) reported that Pradeep Chandra Mohanty is now the absolute owner-in-possession of the schedule property and has been continuing in khas possession thereof free from hindrances and is paying land revenue to the Government regularly. In this view of the matter Sri Dash (accused No. 2) reported that Pradeep Chandra Mohanty is now the absolute owner-in-possession of the schedule property and has been continuing in khas possession thereof free from hindrances and is paying land revenue to the Government regularly. However, during investigation it was ascertained from the Revenue Authorities of the local Tahasil such as the concerned R.I. and the Tahasildar that before mutation of the schedule property in the name of Smt. Rekha Ray by virtue of her purchase vide Mutation Case No. 2508/01, dated 13-6-02, the same has never been transferred to any other person. As per the Tenance Ledger maintained in the local Tahasil, the recorded tenant up to 13-6-02 was Smt. Chandramani Dei. The land rent of the said plot as per the version of Sri Das Pattnaik, Revenue Inspector, was paid from the financial year 1995-96 to 2001-02 in the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei, the owner of the land. In the following year i.e. 2002-03 the land revenue of the schedule land was paid in the name of Smt. Rekha Ray. Though the land revenue was paid by Pradeep Chandra Mohanty in the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei for the year 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 as ascertained from the relevant rent receipts, land revenue for the years 1998-99, 1999-00 and 2000-01 have been paid by Smt. Chandramani Dei herself vide rent receipt Nos. 504004/ 7-12-98 and No. 500670/11-7-00. 5. The mutation case number mentioned in the Advocate's report by virtue of which the land records were corrected from the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei to the name of Sri. Pradeep Chandra Mohanty as reported by accused No. 2 is false according to the statement of Tahasildar. Sri Bijaya Kumar Rath. According to him, it is actually Mutation Case No. 636/98 in the R.O.R. available in the office of the Tahasildar, Tangi-Choudwar by virtue of which a new Khata bearing No. 347/234 i.e. the schedule property was created in the name of Smt. Chandramani Dei, the original recorded tenant up to the year 2002. In the Valuation Report submitted by accused No. 3-Tara Prasad Dhal, the empanelled Valuer on 29-4-2000 Sri Dhal has also specified Smt. Chandramani Dei to be the original recorded tenant and actual owner of the schedule property. In the Valuation Report submitted by accused No. 3-Tara Prasad Dhal, the empanelled Valuer on 29-4-2000 Sri Dhal has also specified Smt. Chandramani Dei to be the original recorded tenant and actual owner of the schedule property. Evidently therefore the report submitted by accused No. 2-Prasanna Kumar Das, empanelled Advocate that Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty was the absolute owner in-possession of the schedule property on 9-5-2000 vide Mutation Case No. 796/98 on the basis of a registered Family Settlement Deed and he was paying land revenue for the schedule property prima facie appears to be completely false. Accordingly his opinion in the report dated 9-5-2000 furnished to the Bank that Pradeep Chandra Mohanty has acquired and possessed good marketable title in respect of the schedule property free from encumbrances and that the schedule property can be legally and validly mortgaged equitably by deposit of title documents in original by Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty is also not correct. 6. The petition filed by the present petitioner for discharge under Sections 227 and 228, Cr.P.C. was considered by the Magistrate, keeping in view the above facts and proceeded to reject the petitioner's application with the following order :- "Therefore, the documents on record, the report of the Advocate and the Valuer, statement of the Revenue Authorities of the local Tahasil on ownership and forgery of title documents adequately establish a prima facie case against accused No. 2-Sri Prasanna Kumar Dash under Sec. 120-B read with Section 420, IPC. The materials aboard are grossly inadequate to make out a prima facie case against him under Section 120-B r/w. 419/468/471, IPC as the conspiracy entered into by him with the borrower do not relate to the commission of cheating by impersonation and forgery. In the result put on 21-11-06 for framing charge against accused No. 2, under Section 120-B read with Section 420, IPC." 7. It is the order of the Special C.J.M. (CBI), Bhubaneswar dated 13-10-2006, which is under challenge in this revision application under Section 401, Cr.P.C. The main plea is that the petitioner as an Advocate of the Bank having furnished the report/opinion basing on the xerox copies of document supplied by the Bank relating to the schedule properties, the same is not a Search Report as stated in the charge-sheet. The said opinion of the petitioner was given on the basis of documents supplied by the Bank on a bona fide presumption that they are xerox copies of genuine documents and that the petitioner had specifically mentioned in his report that the schedule properties can be legally and validly mortgaged by deposit of title documents in original with the Bank by Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty. 8. According to Sri Kalyan Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner, physical verification of the documents was not the job assigned to the petitioner as an advocate, whose duty was simply to opine basing on documents supplied to him. Accordingly, it was submitted that any prudent lawyer would have given the same opinion basing on those documents, unless personal search is made in the office of the Sub-Registrar and Tahasildar. Hence, the petitioner as an advocate of the Bank having given his honest legal opinion on the basis of documents supplied by the Bank, he cannot be held responsible nor any adverse inference can be drawn from such opinion. 9. Sri Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that these factors have not been taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate while disposing of the petitioner's application under Sections 227 and 228, Cr.P.C. and further the learned Magistrate having held that the materials aboard are grossly inadequate to make a prima facie case against the petitioner under Section 120-B read with Sections 419/ 468/471, IPC as the conspiracy entered into with the borrower do not relate to the commission of cheating by impersonation and forgery erred in concluding that charges can be framed against the petitioner under Section 120-B read with Section 420, IPC. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for quashing of the impugned order of the Magistrate dated 13-10-2006 in exercise of revisional power under Section 401, Cr.P.C., as the allegations made against the petitioner do not prima facie establish the offence of Section 120-B read with Section 420, I.P.C. 10. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for quashing of the impugned order of the Magistrate dated 13-10-2006 in exercise of revisional power under Section 401, Cr.P.C., as the allegations made against the petitioner do not prima facie establish the offence of Section 120-B read with Section 420, I.P.C. 10. The petitioner in this regard, relies on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hiralal Jain v. Delhi Administration, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2598 : (1973 Cri LJ 47) as well as the two decisions of this Court in the case of Biman Bihari Patnaik v. State of Orissa, reported in (2004) 27 OCR 146 : (2004 Cri LJ (NOC) 307) and in the case of Sri Bhupendra Kumar Basu v. State of Orissa, reported in (2004) 27 OCR 149, in support of his contention that the petitioner as an advocate having given a bona fide and honest legal opinion, he cannot be proceeded against under Section 120-B read with Section 420. I.P.C. The petitioner also relies on a decision of this Court in the case of Saroj Kumar Sahoo v. State of Orissa and another, reported in 94 (2002) CLT 65 : (2003 Cri LJ 1872), in support of his aforesaid contention and accordingly prays that the impugned order of the learned Magistrate directing framing of charge against the petitioner under Section 120-B read with Section 420, IPC is improper and illegal and therefore the same is liable to be quashed. 11. Sri. S. K. Padhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the C.B.I. has referred to the relevant portion of the legal opinion given by the petitioner to the Bank which reads as under : "I have examined all relevant documents and concerned Revenue record for considerable periods and satisfied that Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty is the absolute owner of the schedule property, free from all sorts of encumbrances. The title documents referred to above, are good and perfect evidence of title in favour of Sri Pradeep Chandra Mohanty. The schedule properties can be equitably mortgaged in favour of the Bank by deposit of all original documents, referred above." 12. With reference to the above opinion, Sri Padhi submits that admittedly the petitioner (accused No. 2) having not examined or verified the relevant revenue records, the said report is completely false and the same has been given only to benefit the loanee (accused No. 1). With reference to the above opinion, Sri Padhi submits that admittedly the petitioner (accused No. 2) having not examined or verified the relevant revenue records, the said report is completely false and the same has been given only to benefit the loanee (accused No. 1). In this regard, Sri Padhi submits that the offence under Sec. 120-B, IPC is an independent offence and while it is true that the gist of the offence is the agreement between two or more offenders, but particular facts of the conspiracy need not even be shown in the charge. Some general evidence pertaining to the conspiracy would be sufficient to form part of the charge of conspiracy in the charge-sheet. As a matter of fact some connecting link or connecting factor somewhere would be good enough for framing of charge since framing of charge and to establish the charge of conspiracy cannot possibly be placed on a par. To establish the charge of conspiracy, what is required is cogent evidence of meeting of two minds in the matter of commission of an offence, in the absence of which, the charge cannot be sustained. 13. At the stage of framing of charge, the trial Court is required to consider whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. Section 227 of the Code provides for the eventuality when the accused shall be discharged. If not discharged, the charge against the accused is required to be framed under Section 228. These two sections read as under : "227. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. 228. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. 228. Framing of charge- (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which- (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked, he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried." 14. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in AIR 2005 SC 359 , after referring to various decisions of the Apex Court, have come to hold that at the stage of framing of charge it is not obligatory for the Judge to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. At that stage, the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion, at the initial stage of framing of charge, is sufficient to frame the charge and in that event it is not open to say that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. 15. The revisional power of High Court under Section 401, Cr.P.C. though very wide and purely discretionary, the same is to be fairly exercised according to the exigencies of each case. 15. The revisional power of High Court under Section 401, Cr.P.C. though very wide and purely discretionary, the same is to be fairly exercised according to the exigencies of each case. It is well settled that it is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The Revisional Court would not interfere merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record, unless it is shown to be perverse, or without evidence or not tenable in law. The order of the lower Court cannot be interfered with simply because another view is possible. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of The Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, reported in AIR 1993 SC 892 : (1993 Cri LJ 600), the object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 is to confer power upon superior criminal Courts - a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdictionin order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted, on the one hand, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. The controlling power of the High Court is discretionary and it must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said facts and circumstances which vary greatly from case to case. 17. In the case of State of M.P. v. S. B. Johari and others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 665 : (2000 Cri LJ 944), the Supreme Court held as follows (Para 4) : "In our view, it is apparent that the entire approach of the High Court is illegal and erroneous. From the reasons recorded by the High Court, it appears that instead of considering the prima facie case, the High Court has appreciated and weighed the materials on record for coming to the conclusion that charge against the respondents could not have been framed. It is settled law that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is settled law that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed." The parameters of the revisional power though somewhat restricted, is more akin to the inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., which envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The rule of inherent power has its source in the maxim "Quando lex aliquid alique, concedit conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest", which means that when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which the thing itself cannot exist. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exists. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted into. 18. In the case of R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239), the Supreme Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings - (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 19. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527). A note of caution was, however added, that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and others, reported in AIR 2004 SC 517 : (2004 Cri LJ 598), while referring to earlier decision of the Apex Court came to hold that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole, if it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then, the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis of quashing the proceeding. 21. These aspects were highlighted in State of Karnataka v. M. Devenddrappa and another, reported in AIR 2002 SC 671 : (2002 Cri LJ 998), wherein it was held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when charge is framed, at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on record but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. 22. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on record but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. 22. With regard to the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as noted above, I am of the view that the same has no application to the facts of present case, in view of the factual background detailed above. So far as the decision of this Court in the case of Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2003 Cri LJ 1872) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the inherent power of the Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. to quash a criminal proceeding at the initial stage, the same has already been overturned by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and another v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, reported in (2006) 33 OCR (SC) 233. 23. In view of the factual position of the case highlighted above and considering the same in the background of the legal principles enumerated above, no illegality or impropriety can be said to have been committed by the learned Special C. J. M. (CBI), Bhubaneswar, in passing the impugned order dated 13-10-2006 in SPE No. 9 of 2003, so as to warrant any interference by this Court either in exercise of its revisional power under Section 401, Cr. P. C. or even in exercise of inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. The Cri. Rev. is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.