HIMA KOHLI, J. : With the consent of the parties, both the matters are disposed of together as the counsels for the parties state that the dispute is common and the parties to the present petition as also to AA No.503/2006 are common. For the sake of convenience, facts of AA No.505/2006 are taken note of. 2. The present petition is filed by the petitioner under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short `the Act’) praying inter alia for appointment of sole Arbitrator in terms of clause 16 of Memorandum of Understanding dated 28th January, 1998. 3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass and require to be dealt with before coming to the arguments of the parties. 4. M/s Sarvamanglam Builders & Developers Ltd, respondent No.8 company is the absolute owner of land measuring 4.386 acres and also the owner of an additional parcel of land measuring 1.344 acres owned by M/s Continental Properties Ltd., a 100% subsidiary of respondent No.8, aggregating 5.730 acres of land situated in the revenue estate of village Sikandrapur Ghoshi, District Gurgaon, Haryana. Respondents No.3 to 7 were shareholders in respondent No.8 company collectively having 22040 shares of the face value of Rs.100/- each in it. It was agreed by respondents No.3 to 7, to raise the authorized share capital of respondent No.8 company to Rs.1 crore. 5. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondents No.3 to 7 approached the petitioner to become a shareholder in respondent No.8 company to the extent of 5% shareholding in the post acquisition paid up capital of respondent No.8 company. The initial purpose of the collaboration of respondents No.3 to 7 with the petitioner was to develop a multi storeyed residential complex on the aforesaid plot of land in the name and style of Speciality Builders Pvt.Ltd., which was subsequently changed and it was decided by the parties to develop a commercial complex and service apartments on the said land. 6. Respondent No.1, M/s Unitech Ltd., a known developer of commercial complex agreed to participate in the development of the aforesaid plot of land along with respondent No.2 and thus it was agreed between the parties that they would make investments for the purpose of development of the said land as a commercial project and share the profits therefrom. Approval, clearance etc. Approval, clearance etc. were agreed to be procured in the name of respondent No.8 company. Accordingly, the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding entitled `Shareholding Agreement’ (hereinafter referred to as `the Agreement`) on 28th January, 1998 wherein respondents No.3 to 8 and the petitioner were collectively referred to as `the RG Group’ and party on the first part’, respondent no.1 as `UT Group’ and party on the second part and respondent No.3 as `PB Group’ and party on the third part. 7. It is recorded in the recitals of the Agreement that the party on the first part had invited the parties on the second part and third part to acquire shareholding in respondent No.8 company and to enhance the shareholding and participate in the development and execution of the project land after obtaining necessary sanctions and approvals from the regulatory authorities. The ratio of the share capital of the first, second and third parties in respondent No.8 company, in the post acquisition paid up capital was fixed as 5% for the petitioner, 35% for the remaining respondents No.3 to 7, thus collectively as 40% for the first party, 40% for the second party and 20% for the third party with the understanding that the parties will have the right to nominate Directors on the Board of Directors of respondent No.8 company in proportion to their respective shareholding, i.e. two Directors would be nominated by the first party, two by the second party and one by the third party. 8. The relevant clauses necessary for deciding the subject matter of the present petition are reproduced hereinbelow: 11. Expenditure & Accounts 11.2 However, the planning, interaction with outside consultants, Architects and sale of available areas after development, will be done by the Second Party and in lieu of these services, the Second Party shall be entitled to fees @ 5% (Five per cent) of the gross sales of the developed areas. 14. TERM OF THIS AGREEMENT: 14.1 THIS AGREEMENT shall continue and be binding upon each of the Parties as long as such Parties shall remain a shareholder in SARVMANGLAM/CONTINENTAL. 14.2 Upon completion of the Project and disposal of all saleable areas, the Board of Directors of the company shall consider the continuance or otherwise of THIS AGREEMENT. In the event, it is decided to terminate THIS AGREEMENT, the Second & the Third Parties will opt out of SARVMANGLAM/CONTINENTAL. 14.2 Upon completion of the Project and disposal of all saleable areas, the Board of Directors of the company shall consider the continuance or otherwise of THIS AGREEMENT. In the event, it is decided to terminate THIS AGREEMENT, the Second & the Third Parties will opt out of SARVMANGLAM/CONTINENTAL. For this, the valuation of shares shall be carried out by a reputed Firm of Chartered Accountants. In the event, R.G.Group (First Party) declines to buy the shares at the aforesaid value, the Second Party and the Third Party respectively in that order shall have the option of buying out the shares of the other two remaining Parties. 16. ARBITRATION Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or interpretation thereof shall be referred and be finally resolved by Arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration Laws as applicable from time to time. “ 9. Counsel for the petitioner contended that more than eight years have expired since the execution of the Agreement and though the petitioner approached the respondents time and again, it has been kept in the dark about the progress made in connection with the project on the land, no notice for Annual General Meeting was sent to the petitioner, nor a statement of account was forwarded to it. As a result, the petitioner issued letters dated 11th October, 2005, 5th December, 2005 and 5th April, 2006, and called upon the Managing Director of respondent No.1 to distribute share of profits of the petitioner in the said project which, as per the petitioner would amount to Rs.6.705 crores, in addition to the returns on the investments and the interest on profit which had accrued on a year to year basis since commencement of the project along with share of profit in the maintenance of the buildings in the project. 10. 10. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the failure on the part of the respondents to reply to the earlier letters issued by the petitioner, the petitioner issued a legal notice dated 29th June, 2006 to respondents No.1 and 2 calling upon them to pay a sum of Rs.4.125 crores to the petitioner on account of the petitioners share in the project and Rs.1.08 crores as a share of the petitioner in the increase of FAR in tower D of the project developed by respondent No.8 along with interest @ 18% p.a. The petitioner also claimed entitlement to proportionate share of profit in the project amounting to Rs.1.50 crores along with interest @ 18% p.a. The respondents were informed that in case of default on their part, the petitioner shall invoke the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement and take further necessary steps pursuant thereto. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the respondents No.1 & 2 failed to reply to the aforesaid notice, it was compelled to file the present petition on 4th December, 2006 invoking the arbitration clause 16 governing the parties, for appointment of a sole Arbitrator. 11. Notice was issued on the aforesaid petition on 6th December, 2006 whereafter the respondents entered appearance. Respondents No.1 & 2 have filed their respective replies contesting the petition. Though respondents No.3 to 8 did not file a reply on the record, it was stated by their counsel that their stand was the same as that of respondents No.1 & 2. In other words, respondents No.3 to 8 are also contesting the present petition filed by the petitioner for appointment of a sole Arbitrator. 12. While the existence of an arbitration clause was not disputed by any of the respondents, the present petition was opposed by them on various counts. It was submitted by the counsels for the respondents that the present petition is beyond the scope of arbitration and the Agreement. 12. While the existence of an arbitration clause was not disputed by any of the respondents, the present petition was opposed by them on various counts. It was submitted by the counsels for the respondents that the present petition is beyond the scope of arbitration and the Agreement. Counsel for the respondent no.1 contended that the petitioner being only 5% shareholder in the respondent No.8 company and no dispute having been raised by any of the remaining shareholders who collectively form a part of the RG Group, party on the first part, the present petition is not maintainable and at best, the disputes raised by the petitioner emanate from interse differences amongst the constituents of the RG Group, party on the first part and not against respondents No.1 & 2 and thus no dispute or differences can be permitted to be raised by the petitioner within the scope of the arbitration clause as the grievance of the petitioner with respect to non-distribution of profits cannot be a subject matter of a dispute raised for adjudication by invoking clause 16 of the Agreement. In support of his submissions, counsel for the respondent no.1 relied on clause 11.2 and clause 16 of the Agreement. 13. In rebuttal, counsel for the petitioner denied that the petition is beyond the scope of arbitration as contained in the Agreement by relying upon the provision of Section 2 of the Act. It was stated that the petitioner was not under any obligation to seek prior consent from the other constituents of the RG Group, party on the first part, for invoking the arbitration clause as there was no such stipulation contained in the Agreement. It was denied that the disputes raised by the petitioner were beyond the scope of the arbitration clause or they were claims personal in nature against the remaining constituents of the RG Group who, as per respondents No.1 & 2 on their part had not raised any dispute under the Agreement. Reference was made by the counsels for both sides to the following judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the context of Section 11(6) of the Act: (i)SBP & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another (2005) 8 SCC 618 (ii) Shree Ram Mills Ltd. Vs. Utility Premises (P) Ltd. (2007) 4 SCC 599 14. Reference was made by the counsels for both sides to the following judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the context of Section 11(6) of the Act: (i)SBP & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another (2005) 8 SCC 618 (ii) Shree Ram Mills Ltd. Vs. Utility Premises (P) Ltd. (2007) 4 SCC 599 14. Taking the first objection raised by the respondents as to the maintainability of the present petition on the ground that the petitioner being only one constituent from amongst seven constituents who collectively form a part of the “party of the first part” as described in the Agreement dated 28th January, 1998 is disentitled from invoking the arbitration clause, it is necessary to examine the Agreement. It is pertinent to note that the Agreement starts by describing all the three parties by referring to them individually. Thus the RG Group which has been collectively described as the `party of the first part’ comprises of seven persons from item No.1 (a) to 1(g), the name of the petitioner finding place at item No.1(f). However, although all the aforesaid constituents are collectively described as the `RG Group’ and as Directors/Shareholders in respondent No.8 company and M/s Continental Properties (P) Ltd., it is not as if the constituents of the party of the first part decided to form an association of persons and designated one from amongst them as authorized to deal for and on behalf of all the constituents, with the remaining parties to the Agreement, namely, party of the second and the third part respectively. This is not only borne out by a perusal of the Agreement, but also by glancing at the last page of the Agreement where signatures of the parties are affixed. In the column of the “party of the first part”, all the seven constituents of the RG Group are independent signatories. It is also pertinent to note that respondent No.8 company of which all the rest of the six constituents are stated to be the Directors/Shareholders etc., is represented in its own right, through its Director, Mr.Ramnik Agarwal, duly authorized by the Board of Directors to sign and execute the Agreement on its behalf. 15. It is also pertinent to note that respondent No.8 company of which all the rest of the six constituents are stated to be the Directors/Shareholders etc., is represented in its own right, through its Director, Mr.Ramnik Agarwal, duly authorized by the Board of Directors to sign and execute the Agreement on its behalf. 15. The arbitration clause No. 16 contained in the aforesaid Agreement also does not expressly state as to which of the parties could invoke the said clause, i.e., whether the arbitration clause could be invoked only by any one of three parties, i.e. by the RG Group or the UT Group or the PB Group or by any one of the signatories to the Agreement. Rather, a perusal of the arbitration clause No.16 in the Agreement shows that there is no reference to any party at all. Instead, reference is made therein only to “any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with the Agreement or interpretation thereof”. 16. Taking into consideration the definition of `party’ under Section 2(1)(h) of the Act which has been defined as “party to an arbitration agreement”, in the absence of any covenant to the contrary in the Agreement, the term cannot be given a restrictive meaning. It therefore cannot be stated that the petitioner herein is not a `party’ to the Agreement merely because it is one of the seven constituents of the “party of the first part” for the reason that the petitioner is a signatory to the Agreement in question in its own right and the said right has not been made dependent on the remaining constituents of the “party of the first part” being ad idem with the petitioner, for the purposes of invoking the arbitration clause. Merely because the remaining six constituents, namely, respondents No.3 to 8 have not invoked the arbitration clause or have not raised a dispute, cannot be a ground to foreclose the right of the petitioner to invoke the arbitration clause and file the present petition for appointment of an arbitrator. 17. Merely because the remaining six constituents, namely, respondents No.3 to 8 have not invoked the arbitration clause or have not raised a dispute, cannot be a ground to foreclose the right of the petitioner to invoke the arbitration clause and file the present petition for appointment of an arbitrator. 17. Thus, the objection taken on behalf of the respondents that the present petition instituted by the petitioner herein is not maintainable and that the petitioner does not have locus standi to file the petition for appointment of an Arbitrator, or that the consent of the remaining six constituents of the “party of the first part” was mandatorily required for the petitioner to invoke the arbitration clause, is untenable and liable to be turned down. The petitioner being a party to the Agreement which contains the arbitration clause and a signatory to the aforesaid Agreement in its own right, is well entitled to invoke the arbitration clause by filing the present petition, without requiring any prior consent from the remaining six constituents, namely, respondents No. 3 to 8. 18. Neither the Agreement, nor the Statute has placed any such embargo on the petitioner barring it from invoking the arbitration clause, without the prior consent from respondents No.3 to 8. Such a narrow interpretation to the term “party”, has not been given in the Agreement and if permitted to be given, shall fly in the face of the definition “party” as provided for under the Act. Provision of Section 2 (1) (h) of the Act does not place any such fetters on a party as sought to be imposed by the respondents herein. Rather, a reading of the arbitration clause shows that the intention of the parties was to word the clause very loosely, by not referring to any party who may be entitled to invoke arbitration, thus making it very wide and all encompassing in nature. It is therefore held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the arbitration clause in the Agreement. 19. The second objection taken by the respondents is that the disputes raised in the petition are beyond the scope of arbitration and that as the petitioner is a shareholder of respondent No.8 company, it is only entitled to dividends when declared by the company. 19. The second objection taken by the respondents is that the disputes raised in the petition are beyond the scope of arbitration and that as the petitioner is a shareholder of respondent No.8 company, it is only entitled to dividends when declared by the company. Thus it was contended that there is no “dispute” or “difference” that can be raised by the petitioner within the scope of the arbitration clause. Counsel for the respondent No.1 urged that while exercising its powers under Section 11 (6) of the Act, it is for this Court to decide whether conditions for exercise of the said powers under the aforesaid provision exist or not. He also contended that the disputes raised by the petitioner related internally to the “party of the first part” or, the “RG Group” and not all the parties, and that resolution thereof could be sought by the petitioner under the Companies Act. 20. In the aforesaid context, it is relevant to advert to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Engineering Ltd.(supra) wherein while discussing the functioning and duties of a Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him under Section 11(6) of the Act, the Court observed as below: “ 9 …While exercising the power or performing the duty under Section 11(6) of the Act, the Chief Justice has to consider whether the conditions laid down by the section for the exercise of that power or the performance of that duty exist. Therefore, unaided by authorities and going by general principles, it appears to us that while functioning under Section 11(6) of the Act, a Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him, is bound to decide whether he has jurisdiction, whether there is an arbitration agreement, whether the applicant before him is a party, whether the conditions for exercise of the power have been fulfilled, and if an arbitrator is to be appointed, who is the fit person, in terms of the provision. Section 11(7) makes his decision on the matters entrusted to him, final. Xxx 11. Section 11(7) makes his decision on the matters entrusted to him, final. Xxx 11. The appointment of an arbitrator against the opposition of one of the parties on the ground that the Chief Justice had no jurisdiction or on the ground that there was no arbitration agreement, or on the ground that there was no dispute subsisting which was capable of being arbitrated upon or that the conditions for exercise of power under Section 11(6) of the Act do not exist or that the qualification contemplated for the arbitrator by the parties cannot be ignored and has to be borne in mind, are all adjudications which affect the rights of parties. It cannot be said that when the Chief Justice decides that he has jurisdiction to proceed with the matter, that there is an arbitration agreement and that one of the parties to it has failed to act according to the procedure agreed upon, he is not adjudicating on the rights of the party who is raising these objections. The duty to decide the preliminary facts enabling the exercise of jurisdiction or power, gets all the more emphasized, when sub-Section (7) designates the order under sub-sections (4), (5) or (6) a “decision” and makes the decision of the Chief Justice final on the matters referred to in that sub-Section. Thus, going by the general principles of law and the scheme of Section 11, it is difficult to call the order of the Chief Justice merely an administrative order and to say that the opposite side need not even be heard before the Chief Justice exercises his power of appointing an arbitrator. Even otherwise, when a statute confers a power or imposes a duty on the highest judicial authority in the State or in the country, that authority, unless shown otherwise, has to act judicially and has necessarily to consider whether his power has been rightly invoked or the conditions for the performance of his duty are shown to exist. Xxx 17…Where a Chief Justice designates not a Judge, but another person or an institution to nominate an Arbitral Tribunal, that can be done only after questions as to jurisdiction, existence of the agreement and the like, are decided first by him or his nominee Judge and what is to be left to be done is only to nominate the members for constituting the Arbitral Tribunal. Looking at the scheme of the Act as a whole and the object with which it was enacted, replacing the Arbitration Act of 1940, it seems to be proper to view the conferment of power on the Chief Justice as the conferment of a judicial power to decide on the existence of the conditions justifying the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal… 18. ... Therefore, the power was conferred on the highest judicial authority in the country and in the State in their capacities as Chief Justices. They have been conferred the power or the right to pass an order contemplated by Section 11 of the Act. We have already seen that it is not possible to envisage that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice as persona designata. Therefore, the fact that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice, and not on the court presided over by him is not sufficient to hold that the power thus conferred is merely an administrative power and is not a judicial power. Xxx 25…While constituting an Arbitral Tribunal, on the scheme of the Act, the Chief Justice has to consider whether he as the Chief Justice has jurisdiction in relation to the contract, whether there was an arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the Act and whether the person before him with the request, is a party to the arbitration agreement. On coming to a conclusion on these aspects, he has to enquire whether the conditions for exercise of his power under Section 11(6) of the Act exist in the case and only on being satisfied in that behalf, he could appoint an arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal on the basis of the request. …Similarly, when the party raises an objection that the conditions for exercise of the power under Section 11(6) of the Act are not fulfilled and the Chief Justice comes to the conclusion that they have been fulfilled, it is difficult to say that he was not adjudicating on a dispute between the parties and was merely passing an administrative order. It is also not correct to say that by the mere constitution of an arbitral tribunal the rights of parties are not affected. It is also not correct to say that by the mere constitution of an arbitral tribunal the rights of parties are not affected. Dragging a party to an arbitration when there existed no arbitration agreement or when there existed no arbitrable dispute, can certainly affect the right of that party and even on monetary terms, impose on him a serious liability for meeting the expenses of the arbitration, even if it be preliminary expenses and his objection is upheld by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the position that no adjudication is involved in the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal. Xxx 38… Therefore, a decision on jurisdiction and on the existence of the arbitration agreement and of the person making the request being a party to that agreement and the subsistence of an arbitrable dispute require to be decided and the decision on these aspects is a prelude to the Chief Justice considering whether the requirements of sub-Section (4), sub-Section (5) or sub-Section (6) of Section 11 are satisfied when approached with the request for appointment of an arbitrator. It is difficult to understand the finality to referred to in Section 11(7) as excluding the decision on his competence and the locus standi of the party who seeks to invoke his jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. Viewed from that angle, the decision on all these aspects rendered by the Chief Justice would attain finality and it is obvious that the decision on these aspects could be taken only after notice to the parties and after hearing them. 39. It is necessary to define what exactly the Chief Justice, approached with an application under Section 11 of the Act, is to decide at that stage. Obviously, he has to decide his own jurisdiction in the sense, whether the party making the motion has approached the right High Court. He has to decide whether there is an arbitration agreement, as defined in the Act and whether the person who has made the request before him, is a party to such an agreement. It is necessary to indicate that he can also decide the question whether the claim was a dead one; or a long barred claim that was sought to be resurrected and whether the parties have concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations or by receiving the final payment without objection. It is necessary to indicate that he can also decide the question whether the claim was a dead one; or a long barred claim that was sought to be resurrected and whether the parties have concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations or by receiving the final payment without objection. It may not be possible at that stage, to decide whether a live claim made, is one which comes within the purview of the arbitration clause. It will be appropriate to leave that question to be decided by the arbitral tribunal on taking evidence, along with the merits of the claims involved in the arbitration … Xxx 47 ….(iv) The Chief Justice or the designated judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. These will be, his own jurisdiction, to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief Justice or the judge designated would be entitled to seek the opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator qualified in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act if the need arises but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of the Chief Justice or the judge designate.” (emphasis added) 21. In a subsequent judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Ram Mills Ltd.(supra), while discussing the aforesaid case of Patel Engineering (supra), particularly para 39 thereof, the Supreme Court observed as below: “.. Even at the cost of repetition we must state that it is only for the purpose of finding out whether the arbitral procedure has to be started that the Chief Justice has to record satisfaction that there remains a live issue in between the parties. The same thing is about the limitation which is always a mixed questions of law and facts. The Chief Justice only has to record his satisfaction that prima facie the issue has not become dead by the lapse of time permitted by law to agitate those issues covered by the agreement. The same thing is about the limitation which is always a mixed questions of law and facts. The Chief Justice only has to record his satisfaction that prima facie the issue has not become dead by the lapse of time permitted by law to agitate those issues covered by the agreement. It is for this reason that it was pointed out in the above para that it would be appropriate sometimes to leave the question regarding the live claim to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. All that he has to do is to record his satisfaction that the parties have not closed their rights and the matter has not been barred by limitation. Thus, where the Chief Justice comes to a finding that there exists a live issue, then naturally this finding would include a finding that the respective claims of the parties have not become barred by limitation.” (emphasis added) 22. Applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court to the present case, the argument of the respondents that the claim of the petitioner is only against respondent No.8 company and that no dispute or difference arises which requires to be adjudicated by invocation of the arbitration clause governing the parties, requires to be examined. 23. The petitioner has made a claim in the present petition for entitlement to a sum of Rs.6.705 crores with interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of completion of the project. It has sought distribution of the share of the profit of the petitioner in the project as also return on the investment and the interest on the profit which has accrued from year to year since the start of the project along with share of profit in the maintenance of the building in the project. 24. The plea of the respondents that the disputes, if any, raised by the petitioner are directed against respondent No.8 company alone and not against any of the other respondents, particularly not against respondents No.1 & 2, is not sustainable for the reason that the parties of the second part and the third part have shareholdings in respondent No.8 company to the extent of 40% & 20% respectively, while the seven constituents of the RG Group who form a part of the party of the first part have a collective shareholding in the respondent No.8 company to the extent of 40%. Clause 6.2 of the Agreement stipulates that none of the parties shall part with their respective shareholding without the unanimous consent of the other parties. It is also recorded that the shareholding of the seven constituents of the first party in the respondents No.4 and 5 companies and that of the petitioner company shall not be altered or changed without the mutual consent of all the parties to the Agreement. Similarly clause 14.1 of the Agreement stipulates that the said Agreement shall continue and be binding upon each of the parties as long as such parties shall remain a shareholder in respondent No.8 company or M/s Continental Pvt.Ltd. Thus, it cannot be said that the arbitration clause cannot be invoked by the petitioner as the disputes raised by it are against respondent No.8 company and none else. The arbitration clause in the Agreement clearly states that any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with the Agreement or interpretation thereof, shall be referred to and resolved by arbitration. In these circumstances, it will be for the arbitral Tribunal to decide on merits as to whether the disputes raised by the petitioner against the respondents No.1 and 2 are maintainable or not. 25. Now with regard to the objection of the respondents that there is no live issue between the parties for being referred to arbitration, it has been clearly laid down in the case of Shree Ram Mills Ltd. (supra) that the Court has only to record its satisfaction that prima facie the issue has not become dead by lapse of time or that the party has not slept over its rights beyond the time permitted by law to agitate the issues covered by the agreement or whether the matter has not become barred by limitation. 26. There is no grievance raised by the respondents that the issues raised by the petitioner have become barred by limitation. It is also not the case of the respondents that the parties have recorded their accord and satisfaction regarding financial claims and there is no question of there remaining any lingering issue between the parties. 26. There is no grievance raised by the respondents that the issues raised by the petitioner have become barred by limitation. It is also not the case of the respondents that the parties have recorded their accord and satisfaction regarding financial claims and there is no question of there remaining any lingering issue between the parties. The plea of the respondents that the claims made by the petitioner against respondents No.1 and 2 are not sustainable for the reason that the petitioner is not entitled to claim or has been unable to indicate a right to distribution of profits in the respondent No.8 company and as the petitioner has not raised any grievance with regard to non-payment of dividend, underselling of units by respondent No.1 or fraud on the part of respondent No.1 qua the petitioner, thus the petitioner has failed to raise any `dispute’ or `difference’ within the scope of the arbitration clause, is not acceptable and liable to be turned down. By raising such objections, the respondents are confusing the term “maintainability” of the claims of the petitioner with “sustainability” thereof. This Court while exercising its powers under Section 11(6) of the Act is only required to satisfy itself that prima facie there exist live claims between the parties to be decided by the arbitral Tribunal and that the parties are at issues on certain matters. It is, however, not for this Court to decide the sustainability of the claims raised by the petitioner in the present proceedings. 27. Having considered the disputes raised by the petitioner, this Court is prima facie of the opinion that they are not time barred. Nor is there any accord and satisfaction between the parties regarding their mutual rights and obligations, subject matter of the Agreement. Thus certain live issues can be stated to exist for adjudication by the arbitral Tribunal. 27. Having considered the disputes raised by the petitioner, this Court is prima facie of the opinion that they are not time barred. Nor is there any accord and satisfaction between the parties regarding their mutual rights and obligations, subject matter of the Agreement. Thus certain live issues can be stated to exist for adjudication by the arbitral Tribunal. Having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, and the respondents having failed to appoint an Arbitrator within 30 days from the date a notice was received by them from the petitioner invoking the arbitration clause governing the parties or even subsequently, but prior to institution of the present petition, in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Datar Switchgears Ltd. Versus Tata Finance Ltd. & Anr., reported in IV (2000) CLT 191 (SC)=VII (2000) SLT 543=JT 2000 (Suppl.2) SC 226 and in Punj Lloyed Ltd. Versus Petronet MHB Ltd., reported in (2006) 2SCC 682 and the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Delkon (India) Pvt. Ltd. Versus G.M. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., reported in 120 (2005) DLT 542 (DB), it is left to this Court to do the needful. 28. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, both the petitions are allowed. Mr.Justice Y.K. Sabharwal (Retd. CJI) is appointed as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate all the disputes arising between the parties. The parties shall equally share the fee of the Arbitrator. The parties shall appear before the Arbitrator on 18.3.2008, at 4.30p.m. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the learned Arbitrator forthwith. The parties are also directed to intimate the learned Arbitrator about the order. 29. The petitions are disposed of.