Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has stated that he had joined the police service as a Grade-II constable in Ramanathapuram District, in the year 1982. The petitioner was served with a charge memo in P.R.No.20/93, under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, issued by the second respondent. The charges were vague and they were without the material particulars necessary for the petitioner to defend himself. In the oral enquiry, the prosecution had failed to prove the charges and therefore, the enquiry officer had rightly concluded that there was no evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner. However, the second respondent had held that the charge against the petitioner stood proved, based on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3, even though there were serious discrepancies in their evidence. Not convinced with the explanation of the petitioner to the dissenting note, the second respondent had passed the impugned order of punishment, by his proceedings, dated 28. 1994, by reducing the scale of the petitioner by one stage, without cumulative effect, for one year from the date of the said order. 2. The petitioner has stated that he had filed an appeal, against the order of punishment imposed on him, to the first respondent. The first respondent had rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner by his order, dated 5. 1995, without considering the points raised by the petitioner and without giving any valid reason for passing such an order. In such circumstances, the petitioner had filed an original application, in O.A.No.7842 of 1995, before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, which has been transferred to this Court and renumbered as W.P.No.27198 of 2006. 3. A reply affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents denying the allegations made by the petitioner. It has been stated that the petitioner was working in Chatrakudi police station in Ramanathapuram District, between 16. 1990 and 12. 1992. While so, a petition has been received by the Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, containing the allegation that illicit arrack was sold in the limits of 26 Panchayats falling within the Chatrakudi police station, with the connivance of the local police of Chatrakudi police station and Uthrakesa mangai police station. Therefore, the matter was enquired into by R. Velayutham, Inspector of Police, Control Room, Ramanathapuram. Based on the report of the enquiry officer, the petitioner was placed under suspension, with effect from 12. Therefore, the matter was enquired into by R. Velayutham, Inspector of Police, Control Room, Ramanathapuram. Based on the report of the enquiry officer, the petitioner was placed under suspension, with effect from 12. 1992 and a departmental action was initiated against him under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955. The charge levelled against the petitioner was that he had connived with the prohibition offenders by allowing them to sell illicit arrack in villages lying within the jurisdiction of Chatrakudi Police Station, inspite of the Government instructions against such illicit sale, spoiling the name of the police Department. The enquiry officer had held that the charge against the petitioner was not proved. Disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer, the then Superintendent of Police had drawn up a dissenting minute and held the charge as proved, on 25. 1994. The dissenting minute was sent to the delinquent, on 6. 1994, to offer his further representation. The petitioner had acknowledged the memo, on 6. 1994 and had submitted his explanation, on 7. 1994. Final orders were passed by the then Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, on 27. 1994, by awarding the punishment of reduction in pay by one stage for one year, without cumulative effect. 4. It has been stated that the petitioner had preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ramanathapuram, against the punishment awarded to him in P.R.No.20/93. The appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ramanathapuram, in his proceedings No.C.No.A4/6157/AP.19/95, dated 5. 1995. In such circumstances, the claims made by the petitioner are unsustainable as they are devoid of merits. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had submitted that the charge leveled against the petitioner is vague and devoid of material particulars. The enquiry officer, who had conducted the enquiry against the petitioner, had rightly held that there was no evidence to prove the charge. However, the second respondent, by a dissenting note, had held that the charge against the petitioner stood proved based on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. Against the order passed by the second respondent, dated 28. 1994, imposing the punishment of reduction in the time scale of pay by one stage for one year without cumulative effect, the petitioner had filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ramanathapuram, the first respondent herein. Against the order passed by the second respondent, dated 28. 1994, imposing the punishment of reduction in the time scale of pay by one stage for one year without cumulative effect, the petitioner had filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ramanathapuram, the first respondent herein. The appeal was filed by the petitioner, on 210. 1994, after having received the impugned order of the second respondent, on 9. 1994. Even though the appeal had been filed by the petitioner within the time limit prescribed by the relevant Rules, the first respondent, had held by his order, dated 5. 1995, that the appeal was time barred. In spite of holding that the appeal was time barred, the first respondent had further held that there were no merits in the appeal filed by the petitioner. The first respondent had not stated in his order, dated 5. 1995, as to how the appeal was time barred. He had not given the particulars based on which the appeal could be held as time barred. Further, there are no reasons given by the first respondent to reject the appeal of the petitioner except saying that the enquiry had been conducted as per the established procedures and that the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to defend his case at the time of the oral enquiry. Thus, it is clear that the impugned order of the first respondent, dated 5. 1995, has been passed without giving reasons and without application of mind. 6. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents had produced the related records. From the records available before this Court, it is found that the impugned order of the second respondent, dated 28. 1994, has been received by the petitioner on 9. 1994. After receiving the said order, on 9. 1994, the petitioner had preferred an appeal before the first respondent, on 210. 1994, well within the time limit prescribed for filing such appeal. Therefore, the finding of the first respondent that the appeal is time barred cannot be accepted. Further, it is seen that the first respondent had summarily rejected the appeal, both on the ground that it is time barred and on the ground that the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to defend his case during the oral enquiry. Therefore, the finding of the first respondent that the appeal is time barred cannot be accepted. Further, it is seen that the first respondent had summarily rejected the appeal, both on the ground that it is time barred and on the ground that the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to defend his case during the oral enquiry. Thus, it is clearly seen that the order passed by the first respondent is a non-speaking order, without sufficient reasons being shown to confirm the order of the second respondent, dated 28. 1994. In such circumstances, the order of the first respondent, dated 5. 1995, is liable to be set aside. Hence, it is set aside. However, it is made clear that it is open to the first respondent to pass appropriate orders in the appeal, dated 210. 1994, filed by the petitioner, on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition stands partly allowed. No costs.