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Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 2639 (ALL)

MOHD. SALIM v. BHANU MATI

2008-12-15

RAN VIJAI SINGH, V.M.SAHAI

body2008
JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have seen the office report dated 15.12.2008. Sri S.K. Misra appears for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and service of notice on respondent Nos. 4 to 6 is deemed to be sufficient under Rule 12 of Chapter VIII of Allahabad High Court Rules,1952. 2. This appeal is barred by time one year and 54 days. The cause for not filing the appeal well within time has been explained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay. It appears that earlier the applicant/ appellant has filed an appeal before this Court and that appeal was dismissed on 21.3.2007 on the ground that the appellant/applicant has already filed a review application for redressal of his grievance before the Tribunal. However, the liberty was given to the appellant to file an appeal in case review application is decided. 3. It appears that appellant/applicant has withdrew his review application on 11.4.2008 and thereafter filed the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant submits that the delay which has occurred in filing the present appeal is bonafide and there is no deliberate delay on his part in not filing the appeal well within time. The delay occurred is neither deliberate nor malafide nor with a view to delay the proceedings as the applicant has been pursuing legal remedies on the advice of his counsel therefore, liberal view should be taken and the delay should be condoned and the appeal be heard on merit. 5. Refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that review application was not maintainable before the Tribunal, therefore, the appellant/applicant has been pursuing a remedy not legally available hence, he deliberately delayed the filing of the appeal, therefore the application for condonation of delay should be rejected and appeal be dismissed as barred by time. 6. We have heard Sri S.F.A . Naqvi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S.K. Misra learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 7. The law relating to the delay condonation has been dealt with by the Apex Court in numerous decisions of Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. We have heard Sri S.F.A . Naqvi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S.K. Misra learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 7. The law relating to the delay condonation has been dealt with by the Apex Court in numerous decisions of Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537 : 1987 (2) SCR 387 , has given following guidelines while dealing with the delay condonation application : (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 8. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, JT 1998 (6) SC 242 : 1998 (7) SCC 123 , this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed : “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court.” 9. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) SC 389, after considering various cases of the Apex Court on condonation of delay application has held : “12................The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause’’. 10. Looking into the explanation submitted by the applicants as noticed earlier and the law laid down by the Apex Court, we find no substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents that the delay occurred is deliberate as no remedy of filing Review application against award is available under the relevant statute, as it is the respondent on whose instance earlier appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground of pendency of Review application before the Tribunal. Now this does not lie in the mouth of the respondents that the Review application was not legally maintainable. We are of the view that under the facts and circumstances of the case even if Review application was not maintainable even then no inference can be drawn against the appellant that he has deliberately delayed the filing of the appeal. 11. We are of the opinion that the process of justice should not be scuttled on the technical grounds as primary function of the Court is to impart substantial justice to the parties. 12. In view of that we are satisfied that there is sufficient explanation available on the record for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The application for condonation of delay is allowed. 13. Office shall allot regular number to the appeal and list the same in the next cause list for admission. ————