ORDER Both the civil revision petitions filed under Section 22 of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960 (the Act, for brevity) arise out of same original proceedings and therefore it is expedient to dispose of by common order. These civil revision petitions are filed by thirteen petitioners. Petitioners 1 to 5 are brothers, petitioner No.6 is wife and petitioners 7 to 13 are children of late Mohammed Abdul Rasheed (other brother of petitioners 1 to 5). All of them filed R.C. No.473 of 1998 before learned IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, for eviction of respondents from non-residential premises bearing Municipal No.5-2-1020. Grounds urged are wilful default in payment of rent from January 1998 to June 1998 and bona fide requirement of leased premises for personal occupation for commencement of business in 'tobacco khiwam' by petitioner No.9. Learned Rent Controller negatived allegation of WILFUL default but held that requirement of petitioner No.9 is genuine and bona fide, and accordingly ordered eviction of respondents. Aggrieved by the same, respondents herein filed rent appeal being R.A. No.l96 of 2002 whereas petitioners herein filed R.A. No.222 of 2002 insofar as finding of wilful default went against them. Learned Appellate Authority, namely, Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, by common order dated 26.10.2006 while reversing order of learned Rent Controller, dismissed R.A. No.222 of 2002 and allowed R.A. No.196 of 2002. Aggrieved by the same, CRP No.414 of 2007 is filed against R.A. No.222 of 2002 and CRP No.517 of 2007 is filed against R.A. No.l96 of 2002. In this order, petitioners and respondents are referred to as landlords and tenants respectively. 2. Petition schedule mulgi bearing Municipal No.5-2-1020 is part of a large order building constructed in an area of 500 Sq.yards in a busy business locality in Hyderabad known as Moazam Jahi Market. One Manikyarao Antoo was owner of property. B. Satyanarayana Das took petition schedule mulgi on lease sometime in 1960. After death of Manikyarao Antoo, his son Pasupathirao Antoo succeeded to the property to whom Satyanarayana Das was paying rents. He also took two other rooms in the first floor of building. He was carrying on business in selling electrical light fittings and chandeliers. Petitioners 1 to 5 along with their father, Mohammed Rasool, purchased property from Pasupathirao Antoo. Tenancy was attorned in favour of petitioners. He also took two other rooms in the first floor of building. He was carrying on business in selling electrical light fittings and chandeliers. Petitioners 1 to 5 along with their father, Mohammed Rasool, purchased property from Pasupathirao Antoo. Tenancy was attorned in favour of petitioners. After death of Satyanarayana Das, his wife and son (respondents 1 and 2 herein) succeeded to tenancy. It is the case of landlords that Mohammed Rasool was carrying on business of 'tobacco khiwam' and after his death, his six sons carried on business. After death of Mohammed Abdul Rasheed (brother of petitioners 1 to 5), his son Mohammed Abdul Muzeeb, petitioner No.9, joined tobacco shop and gained experience. Family of Rasheed - wife, daughters and. sons - were residing at Shahgunj. In the rent control petition, they alleged that tenants failed to pay rent from January 1998 to June 1998 and that petition schedule mulgi is required for commencement of business by petitioner No.9 as the family of late Rasheed was facing difficulty and inconvenience at Shahgunj house belonging to mother of petitioners 1 to 5. They also alleged that petitioners 6 to 13 do not have premises in Hyderabad which is their own and therefore they required petition schedule mulgi for personal occupation. 3. Tenants opposed petition. They stated that when first petitioner refused to receive rents, they were sent by money order for the months of September 1991 to December 1991, which was also refused. Therefore, Satyanarayana Das filed R.C. No.394 of 1992 and obtained interim in I.A. No.444 of 1992 seeking permission to deposit rents in the Court. R.C. No.394 of 1992 was allowed on 5.8.1993 and Satyanarayana Das used to pay rents in the Court. After his death, respondents 1 and 2 tendered rent for the month of January 1998, as the same was refused after giving notice to landlords, tenants filed R.C. No.182 of 1998 seeking permission of Court to deposit rents which was allowed. As rents are being deposited in the Court, there is no wilful default. Insofar as bona fide requirement is concerned, they alleged that landlords are owners of a non-residential building at Moazam Jahi Market and another non-residential building at Shahgunj and therefore petition for eviction of tenants is not maintainable. As rents are being deposited in the Court, there is no wilful default. Insofar as bona fide requirement is concerned, they alleged that landlords are owners of a non-residential building at Moazam Jahi Market and another non-residential building at Shahgunj and therefore petition for eviction of tenants is not maintainable. They also alleged that landlords demanded enhancement of rent to Rs.5,000/- per month with deposit of Rs.2.50 lakhs and when it was refused, they filed eviction petition with an intention to evict tenants besides filing eviction petitions against other tenants of premises bearing Municipal Nos.5-2-1019, 5-2-1021 and 5-2-1022. 4. During enquiry before original authority, petitioners 1, 9 and 6 gave evidence as P.Ws.l to 3 respectively. They marked Exs.A.l to A.5. Second respondent gave evidence as RW.1 and marked Exs.B.1 to B.19. Eviction was ordered on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal occupation, which was reversed by appellate authority. In these CRPs two issues, which need to be considered are in relation to wilful default and bona fide requirement. 5. It is now well settled that jurisdiction of High Court under Section 22 of the Act is revisional jurisdiction. Though the power is a little wider than revisional jurisdiction, it is not equal to appellate jurisdiction. A limited scrutiny is to see that order passed by appellate authority is not vitiated by illegality, irregularity or impropriety. Mere possibility of a different conclusion in background facts does not enable High Court to reverse finding of appellate authority. A reference may be made to Mudigonda Chandra Mouli Sastry v Bhimanepalli Bikshalu, 1999 (5) ALD 101 (SC) = (1999) 7 SCC 66 = AIR 1999 SC 3095 , N. Prabhakar Rao v. J.R. Ramesh Kumar, 2002 (1) ALD 127 (SC) = (2002) 1 SCC 176 = AIR 2002 SC 95 , Harshavardhan Chokkani v Bhupendra N. Patel, (2002) 3 SCC 626 = AIR 2002 SC 1373 = 2002 AIR SCW 1207 and Champa Lal v Shaik Najmuddin, (2002) 5 SCC 20 = AIR 2002 SC 2076 . Except last cited authority other three decisions were rendered by Apex Court while interpreting Section 22 of the Act. In all these judgments, it was held that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act, High Court cannot reappreciate evidence. Wilful Default 6. Learned Counsel for landlords submits that as per order of learned Rent Controller in RC. In all these judgments, it was held that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act, High Court cannot reappreciate evidence. Wilful Default 6. Learned Counsel for landlords submits that as per order of learned Rent Controller in RC. No.394 of 1992 dated 5.8.1993 marked as Ex.B.5, tenants should first offer monthly rent to landlords and only when they failed to receive, tenants have to deposit rent in the Court. Tenants never offered rent and therefore it would amount to wilful default. Learned Counsel also submits that notice of deposit under Rule 5(4) of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules 1961 (the Rules, for brevity), was never given by tenants and therefore impugned order of appellate authority In reverse finding of learned Rent Controller suffers from irregularity. The submission cannot be accepted for reasons more than one. On this aspect, learned appellate authority observed that failure of tenants to strictly comply with Ex.B.5 order cannot by itself be a ground to order eviction under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act. Secondly landlords failed to prove that there was noncompliance with Rule 5(4) of the Rules and that P.W.1 admitted in his evidence that he received copies of challans showing deposit of rents. Indeed applying rule of evidence in Section 58 of Indian Evidence Act 1872, when P.W.1 admitted that he is receiving challans regularly, there was no further necessity for tenants to advert to this aspect of the matter. 7. The record would show that landlords purchased petition schedule mulgi sometime in 1991 and tenancy was attorned by vendor of landlords advising tenants to pay rent from September 1991. As the rent was not received, Satyanarayana Das filed RC. No.391 of 1992 and obtained interim order. He deposited rent from September 1991 to December 1997. He died. Hereafter his legal heirs - respondents 1 and 2 herein - filed RC. No.182 of 1998. Order passed by learned Rent Controller on 21.9.1998 is Ex.B.4. They also filed order dated 20.8.1998 in I.A.No.322 of 1998, in obedience to which, they paid rents from January 1998 to August 1998. Rent control petition being R.C. No.473 of 1998 out of which CRPs arise, was filed on 4.9.1998. A perusal of Exs.B.4 and B.5 would therefore show that from September 1991 till August 1998, tenants had been depositing rents in the Court and plea of wilful default cannot be accepted. Rent control petition being R.C. No.473 of 1998 out of which CRPs arise, was filed on 4.9.1998. A perusal of Exs.B.4 and B.5 would therefore show that from September 1991 till August 1998, tenants had been depositing rents in the Court and plea of wilful default cannot be accepted. One should not forget that supine indifference or wanton negligence in payment of rent can only be a ground under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act. Proviso to Section 10(2) of the Act mandates that it is only when Rent Controller is satisfied that default in payment of rent was wilful, eviction can be ordered. Landlords failed to prove this. Therefore plea of wilful default is without any substance and therefore cannot be accepted. Bona fide requirement 8. Admitted facts relevant to the issue are as follows. Mohammed Rasool was carrying on 'tobacco khiwam' business along with his six sons. After his death, sons through first petitioner continued business at Moazam Jahi Market in Mulgi No.5-2-1023, which is part of same building in which petition schedule mulgi is also situated. Another son of late Mohammed Rasool, Mohammed Abdul Basit, is also carrying on 'Tobacco and General Stores' business (Star Enterprises) in one of the mulgis at Shahgunj property bearing Municipal No.204-662 with five mulgis. Shahgunj property in addition to five mulgis, also have other portions, which are used by the petitioners for residential purpose. After death of Rasool's son, his widow and children are staying in Shahgunj premises. Petitioner No.9, who is eldest son of late Mohammed Abdul Rasheed, failed 10th class. He gained experience in tobacco shop of first petitioner and decided to start business of his own in 'tobacco khiwam'. 9. Here one important event is to be noted. Satyanarayana Das had taken mulgi bearing Municipal No.5-2-1020 in ground floor for electrical fittings shop and two other rooms (mulgis) in the first floor. Landlords filed three rent control cases. RC. No.473 of 1998 for eviction from ground floor premises and R.C. Nos.471 and 472 of 1998 for eviction from first floor portions. In all these cases separate orders were passed on 29.4.2002. R.C. No.472 of 1998 was filed for eviction of respondents from premises bearing Municipal No.5-2436 and R.C.No.471 of 1998 for eviction of respondents from another room in same premises. Landlords wanted these portions for residential purpose of petitioners 6 to 13 herein. They were dismissed. In all these cases separate orders were passed on 29.4.2002. R.C. No.472 of 1998 was filed for eviction of respondents from premises bearing Municipal No.5-2436 and R.C.No.471 of 1998 for eviction of respondents from another room in same premises. Landlords wanted these portions for residential purpose of petitioners 6 to 13 herein. They were dismissed. R.A. Nos.208 and 209 of 2002 were filed - against R.C. Nos.472 and 471- of 1998 respectively. During pendency of these appeals, tenants surrendered two first floor portions vide letters of acknowledgement of receipt of possession, Exs.B.22 and B.23. Exs.B.20 and B.21 are orders in R.C. Nos.471 and 472 of 1998 respectively. These additional documents were marked at the appellate stage. 10. Having regard to these subsequent events, tenants amended their counter incorporating paragraphs 14(a) to 14(c). They alleged that having regard to the fact that petitioners have non-residential portions in first floor of property situated at Moazam Jahi Market, they are not entitled to seek eviction of tenants from non-residential premises. Learned appellate authority having considered this aspect also, held that landlords are in occupation of non-residential buildings of their own and therefore under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act, they are not entitled to evict tenants. Learned Counsel for landlords contends that Shahgunj property was owned by parents of petitioners 1 to 5 and being children of pre-deceased son, petitioners 7 to 13 cannot have any share in Shahgunj property. Secondly he submits that premises bearing No.20-4-662 is situated in slum area of Shahgunj, which is mainly residential and it is not suitable for commencing 'tobacco khiwam' business. Thirdly he submits that when mother of petitioners 1 to 5 and wife of third petitioner commenced bookbinding business and STD booth in one of the mulgis of Shahgunj property, they could not run the business profitably, which would show that it is not suitable for 'Tobacco khiwam' business. Insofar as Moazam Jahi Market property is concerned, he submits that even though landlords took possession of two rooms in the first floor of the building those rooms are not suitable for commencing proposed business. Learned Counsel would urge that tenants also admitted that they are not willing to shift their business either to Shahgunj or first floor of Moazam Jahi Market property. He also submits that first floor portion is residential premises and it is not suitable for Tobacco business. Learned Counsel would urge that tenants also admitted that they are not willing to shift their business either to Shahgunj or first floor of Moazam Jahi Market property. He also submits that first floor portion is residential premises and it is not suitable for Tobacco business. According to him it is always choice of landlord to choose suitable building. He placed reliance on the decisions in Padmanabha Setty v. Papiah Setty, AIR 1966 SC 1824 = (1966) 3 SCR 868 , R.C. Tamrakar v. Nidi Lekha, (2001) 8 SCC 431 = AIR 2001 SC 3806 , Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, 2002 (5) ALD 70 (SC) = (2002) 6 SCC 16 = AIR 2002 SC 2572 , SavitPt Sahay v. Sachidanand Prasad, 2008(4) FR-F-38 (2002) 8 SCC 765 = AIR 2003 SC 156 , Lingala Kondala Rao v. Vootukuri Narayana Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 672 = AIR 2003 SC 2077 , M/s. Ampro Food Products v. K.L. Narasanna, 1980 (2) APLJ 35 , Gopinath v. Manmohan Shah, 2001 (6) ALT 287 and Basanthilal v. Omprakash, 2005 (2) ALD 284 = 2005 (2) ALT 620 . 11. Learned Counsel for tenants placing reliance on Exs.B.20 and B.21, submits that during pendency of rent appeals, tenants surrendered non-residential portions in the first floor of property and therefore petition is not maintainable. He submits that plea of landlords that first floor was used for residential purpose was specifically rejected by learned Rent Controller in Exs.B.20 and B.21 placing reliance on an earlier order in R.C. No.178 of 1998, holding that first floor portion was non-residential portion and the same finding has become final. Learned Counsel would urge that under Section 16 of the Act, such a decision between the parties cannot be reopened by Rent Controller. Nextly he submits that except stating that petition schedule premises is required for the business of petitioner No.9, landlords did not prove that Shahgunj mulgis are not suitable for such business nor did they prove that first floor portions of Moazam Jahi property are not suitable for such business. Lastly he contends that petitioner No.9 as P.W.2 admitted that before filing rent control cases landlords demanded for enhancement of rent and that itself would be sufficient to infer that the requirement for personal occupation is not bona fide. Lastly he contends that petitioner No.9 as P.W.2 admitted that before filing rent control cases landlords demanded for enhancement of rent and that itself would be sufficient to infer that the requirement for personal occupation is not bona fide. Learned Counsel relied on decisions in Padmanabha Setty's case (supra), M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36 = AIR 1981 SC 1113 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 = AIR 1981 SC 1711 , D. Devaji v. K. Sudarshana Rao, 1993 (2) RLR 606, Duggi. Veera v. Sakala Veera, (1987) 1 SCC 254 = AIR 1987 SC 406 , Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah, (1998) 2 SCC 708 = AIR 1998 SC 994 and Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowear, (1988) 2 SCC 513 = AIR 1988 SC 1060. 12. The plea of the landlord that the premises is required for personal occupation for commencement of business in Tobacco khiwam by ninth petitioner is strongly opposed by tenants relying on Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act. The provision reads thus: 10(3)(a). 12. The plea of the landlord that the premises is required for personal occupation for commencement of business in Tobacco khiwam by ninth petitioner is strongly opposed by tenants relying on Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act. The provision reads thus: 10(3)(a). A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- (i) and (ii) omitted as not relevant (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise- (a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence: Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument 'inter vivos' shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered; Provided further that, where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause- (i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own; (ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building, for possession of another non-residential building of his own. (b) and (c) omitted as not relevant (d) Where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this sub-section before the expiry of such period. (b) and (c) omitted as not relevant (d) Where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this sub-section before the expiry of such period. (e) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, makes an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to landlord; Provided further that, the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate. 13. A similar provision as above appearing in Rent Control Acts of other States is subject-matter of interpretation by Supreme Court. Some of the decisions have been brought to the notice of this Court, but it is not necessary to refer to them. A Division Bench of this Court in Balaiah v. Lachaiah, AIR 1965 AP 435 , while interpreting Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act held that, "when a landlord is in occupation of his own non-residential building or entitled to possession of such building can still seek eviction of a tenant by proving that the building in his occupation is not sufficient or suitable". This view was again tested before Full Bench in Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal, AIR 1988 AP 184 (FB). Question was considered afresh. It was held that the bar under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act against securing eviction of a tenant is absolute and that suitability, convenience and sufficiency of nonresidential building already in occupation of a landlord for carrying on business are not relevant. The Full Bench observed: " ... Question was considered afresh. It was held that the bar under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act against securing eviction of a tenant is absolute and that suitability, convenience and sufficiency of nonresidential building already in occupation of a landlord for carrying on business are not relevant. The Full Bench observed: " ... a landlord in occupation of a nonresidential building is not entitled, for carrying on his business or for commencing a business, to get back possession of another non-residential building in the occupation of a tenant; the bar under the section against securing eviction of the tenant of such non-residential building is absolute; suitability, convenience and sufficiency of the non-residential building already in the occupation of the landlord for carrying on the business of the landlord or to meet the bona fide need of any other member of the family of the landlord, independent of and over and above the need of the landlord, are all, in our view, irrelevant considerations in the context of construing the provisions in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act which, in clear terms, interdicts the landlord, in absolute terms, from seeking recovery of the non-residential building belonging to him in the occupation of the tenant. We, therefore, hold that the ruling given by Division Bench to the contrary in Balaiah's case (supra), does not represent the correct legal position. (emphasis supplied) 14. The plain language of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act would not permit any interpretation that a landlord who is in occupation of own building can still seek eviction of a tenant from non-residential building if it is not suitable or convenient. In M/s. Vijayalaxmi Printing Press v. Nandula Shankar, 1991 (1) ALT 249 , the ratio in Shankerlal's case (supra), was again reconsidered by another Full Bench. In that case, the landlord was in occupation of tenanted premises. He was facing proceedings for eviction from the said leased premises. The question therefore was whether the landlord in occupation of a tenanted non-residential building can seek eviction of his tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Placing reliance on Shankerlal's case (supra), the tenants contended that Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is a bar. He was facing proceedings for eviction from the said leased premises. The question therefore was whether the landlord in occupation of a tenanted non-residential building can seek eviction of his tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Placing reliance on Shankerlal's case (supra), the tenants contended that Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is a bar. The Full Bench, relying on decision of Constitution Bench in Padmanabha Setty's case (supra), held that the landlord who was occupying a non-residential building as a tenant, 'can still seek eviction of a tenant from non-residential building and that Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is not a bar. The relevant observations of Full Bench are as below: We accordingly hold that the landlord here, who is only a statutory tenant, is not debarred from seeking possession of his own non-residential building. It is not incumbent• on such a landlord to first vacate the non-residential premises in his occupation as a condition precedent for maintaining an eviction petition in respect of his own non-residential premises in the occupation of his tenant. 15. In D. Devaji's case (supra), the ratio in Shankerlal's case (supra), as well as Nandula Shankar's case (supra), received imprimatur of Supreme Court. Before Supreme Court, landlord contended that when bona fide requirement is proved, even if landlord was in possession of non-residential building as a owner and such building is not suitable for business, the Rent Controller has to consider the question and if it is found not suitable can order eviction. For such contention, reliance was placed in J. Pandu v. R. Narsubai, (1987) 1 SCC 573 = AIR 1987 SC 857 . Rejecting the same, Supreme Court held: We find no force in the contention. The analysis of the provisions made hereinbefore indicates that the landlord must be in possession of a non-residential building in the city, town or village and if he requires another non-residential building for expansion of his business or to establish another business or needs additional accommodation of a non-residential building in the same city, town or village, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) creates an embargo. Suitability or convenience does not appear to have, from the language found therein, been envisaged by the Legislature. As pointed out in Vijayalaxmi Printing Press's case (supra), it would be open to the Legislature to clarify the position, but on the explicit language, it is difficult to give countenance to the respondent's contention. Suitability or convenience does not appear to have, from the language found therein, been envisaged by the Legislature. As pointed out in Vijayalaxmi Printing Press's case (supra), it would be open to the Legislature to clarify the position, but on the explicit language, it is difficult to give countenance to the respondent's contention. In Pandu's case the finding was that the non-residential building which the appellant sought for eviction ceased to be a nonresidential building by virtue of its conversion into a residential to be a nonresidential building by virtue of its conversion into a residential building. Therefore, this question had not arisen in Pandu's case for decision. The ratio therein would be confined to those facts and circumstances. The decisions of the Madras High Court relied on by the learned Counsel does not appear to have laid down the law correctly. The language in the Madras Act in pari materia the same as in Section 10(3)(a)(iii). In the light of the above interpretation, the construction put up by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court is not correct. Therefore, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Balaiah 's case has not correctly laid the law. (emphasis supplied) 16. Both the Counsel as noticed while summarizing their arguments have relied on a score of decisions. It is however not necessary to consider all of them having regard the decision of two Full Benches of this Court and Supreme Court in Devaji's case (supra). It is now well settled that for the purpose of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, it is sufficient for the tenant to show that landlord owns a non-residential building, which is his own and/or to the possession of which he is entitled to. A reading of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act would show that even when in the opinion of Rent Controller, the landlord proves bona fide purpose to commence a new business and also owns another nonresidential premises which according to him is not suitable, still eviction cannot be ordered as it would amount to reading the suitability, sufficiency and convenience factor into the provision, which are very conspicuous by absence. Further, even while examining the bona fide purpose, the Controller has to keep in mind, the conduct of the parties, intention of the parties, the motive behind filing eviction petition and the efforts made by landlord to secure tenanted premises. 17. Further, even while examining the bona fide purpose, the Controller has to keep in mind, the conduct of the parties, intention of the parties, the motive behind filing eviction petition and the efforts made by landlord to secure tenanted premises. 17. There is no dispute that during the pendency of appeals, tenants handed over possession of two mulgis bearing Municipal No.5-2-436 as a result of which landlords who had filed rent appeals being R.A. No.208 of 2002 and 209 of 2002 did not press appeals. In view of this Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act certainly operates as a bar for evicting tenants from petition schedule mulgi bearing No.5-2-1020. Whether two rooms in the first floor are suitable for commencing Tobacco khiwam business, is a matter of fact as well as law. As held by the Supreme Court in Devaji's case (supra), suitability of available owner's place cannot dilute rigour of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Even as a question of fact, as found by appellate authority, P.Ws.1 to 3 did not even utter anything as to suitability or otherwise of the available first floor rooms. A contention is however raised that the two rooms which were handed over to landlords during pendency of R.A. Nos.208 and 209 of 2002, are residential portions and therefore they cannot be used for non-residential purpose. This submission cannot be accepted in view of Section 16 of the Act, which lays down that it is not permissible for the parties to raise same issues which have been finally decided. In two separate orders in R.C. Nos.471 and 472 of 1998 dated 24.9.2002 (Exs.B.20 and B.21) learned Rent Controller rejecting claim of landlords categorically held that two first floor rooms in premises No.52-436 are non-residential portions and the said finding has become final. Therefore insofar as Moazarn Jahi Market property is concerned, it must be held that by reason of landlords owning and possessing two rooms in Municipal No.5-2-436 in the first floor of building, petition for eviction of tenants from non-residential premises is barred under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act. 18. It is not denied that father and mother (Smt. Rasoolbi) of petitioners and of late Mohammed Abdul Rasheed (in any event mother), are owners of house bearing No.20-4-662, Shahgunj Chowk. There are six mulgis on the ground floor and residential portion in the first floor. 18. It is not denied that father and mother (Smt. Rasoolbi) of petitioners and of late Mohammed Abdul Rasheed (in any event mother), are owners of house bearing No.20-4-662, Shahgunj Chowk. There are six mulgis on the ground floor and residential portion in the first floor. It also has two other residential portions on the rear side of mulgis. It is also not denied that families of petitioners 1 to 5 and family of petitioners 6 to 13 are residing in the said house. It is also in the evidence that second petitioner is carrying on business in tobacco and general goods in one of the mulgis and two mulgis are vacant. Tenants contend that this is also a premises, which is owned by petitioners and therefore Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act is a bar. Learned Rent Controller found that being children of predeceased son petitioners 7 to 13 are not entitled to any share in the property owned by Smt. Rasool Bi (and Mohammed Rasool) and therefore it is not available to petitioner No.9 to commence business. Admittedly so far petitioners 1 to 5 never tried to exclude petitioners 7 to 13 from succession. Indeed family of petitioners 6 to 13 still resides in Shahgunj property and therefore submission of landlords cannot be accepted. In any event a question that a tenant is entitled to own a non-residential premises or is entitled to possession of such non-residential premises, is only arrived at on prima facie considerations. Whether by reason of Section 93(2) of Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law, 23, petitioners 7 to 13 being children of late Rasheed who predeceased his mother or his father, can succeed, is a matter to be gone into in an appropriate proceedings. Insofar as rent control proceedings are concerned enquiry is summary enquiry and Rent Controller is not expected to go into intricate question of law of succession. Indeed Legislature in its wisdom provided that if there is bona fide dispute regarding ownership of landlords, it is incumbent on the part of Rent Controller to record a finding that the dispute raised is bona fide in which event a landlord shall be entitled to sue tenant for eviction in a civil Court. Yet another submission of learned Counsel for landlords that Shahgunj premises is not suitable for commencing tobacco business cannot be accepted. Yet another submission of learned Counsel for landlords that Shahgunj premises is not suitable for commencing tobacco business cannot be accepted. Indeed admittedly second petitioner is already carrying on tobacco business in one of the mulgis and no evidence is available to show that he is not able to achieve financially break-even results in tobacco business. 23. (2) Where for purpose (a) the rule of exclusion applies (i.e., the nearer in degree excludes the more remote) it is true both of Sunnis and Shias that the principle of representation is not recognized as qualifying the rule of exclusion. Thus if A dies leaving him surviving a son and grandsons by a predeceased son, the grandsons, are excluded from inheritance by their uncle. They do not take in their father's stead though he would have been an heir had he survives his father. 19. Petition was filed by all the thirteen landlords. But they suppressed factum of owning mulgis at Shahgunj. Secondly it is clearly alleged that prior to filing petition, landlords made demand for enhancement of rent for Rs.5,000/- per month and also for deposit of Rs.2.50 lakhs. Petitioner No.9 as P.W.2 admitted this in his evidence. These two aspects would certainly make the conduct of parties prior to filing of eviction petition relevant. Petitioners not only suppressed the facts from the Court but also demanded enhancement of rent. Therefore an inference has to be drawn that plea of requirement for personal occupation for commencing business is not bona fide. 20. In the result, for the above reasons, civil revision petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.