ORDER The petitioner had approached the Tamilnadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai by filing O.A. No. 1427 of 1997 challenging the order of the first and second respondents dated 17.10.1996 and 25.11.1996 respectively. The said O.A. had been transferred to the file of this Court on abolition of the Tribunal and renumbered as W.P. No. 26040 of 2006. 2. The case of the petitioner before the Tribunal in nutshell is set out hereunder: The petitioner was working as N2 Assistant in the District Police Office, St. Thomas Mount, Chennai from 9.9.1992 to 7.10.1994. He was in charge of scrutinising and sanctioning of the Leave Travel Concession Bills. He has also looked after the Electricity Bills in connection with the entire District. He had been served with a charge memo under Section 17(a) of the TNCS Rules by the P.A. Administration to the Superintendent of Police, Chengai MGR District based on the enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Crime) Records Bureau, St. Thomas Mount. The petitioner submitted a reply for the charge memo on 20.9.1976. The enquiry officer submitted a proved minute to the disciplinary authority. The petitioner was not furnished with the copy of the enquiry officer's report. The disciplinary authority concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer and passed an order on 17.10.1996 imposing a punishment of postponement of increment for a period of two years with cumulative effect. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the DIG of Police and the DIG of Police without considering any of the points raised by the petitioner in the appeal, rejected the same by his proceedings dated 25.11.1996. Challenging the said punishment, the petitioner had preferred the said O.A. which is now transferred to the file of this Court. 3. Reply affidavit was filed by the first respondent on his behalf and on behalf of the other respondents. The petitioner while working as Assistant in District Police Office, St. Thomas Mount, was in charge of preparing LTC Bills. It was his primary duty to verify and admit the claim of LTC Bills adhering to the rules in existence and prevent the claim of bogus bills. The petitioner while working as Assistant in District Police Office, St. Thomas Mount, was in charge of preparing LTC Bills. It was his primary duty to verify and admit the claim of LTC Bills adhering to the rules in existence and prevent the claim of bogus bills. Contrary to this, during his tenure of service, he has committed various irregularities and hence he has been served with a charge memo under Rule 17(a) of the TNCS (D&A) Rules 1955 and the punishment has been awarded postponing the increment for a period of two years without cumulative effect by the Superintendent of Police, Chengalpattu East District and in appeal the same has been confirmed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Chengalpattu Range. Since the petitioner had been dealt with a minor charge under Rule 17(a) of the said Rules, a copy of the minute was not served on the petitioner. Further, no enquiry need be conducted for awarding the punishment. The charges have been dealt with on explanation and documentary evidence. The punishing authority and the appellate authority have considered all these aspects, while awarding the punishment and confirming the same respectively. Thus the reply affidavit sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner mainly contended that: (a) that no proper enquiry has been conducted by the enquiry officer before submitting the report. (b) the report of the enquiry officer has net been furnished to the petitioner which vitiates the entire proceedings. (c) the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have not discussed, all the contentions raised by the petitioner and decided the matter in issue, giving no reasons thereof. 5. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents contended that (a) since the petitioner had been dealt with minor charges, there is no necessity to conduct enquiry. (b) The report of the enquiry officer need not be furnished to the petitioner since the petitioner had been dealt with a minor charge under Rule 17(a) of the TNCS (D&A) Rules. (c) The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority had considered the relevant records before imposing the punishment confirming the order of punishment respectively. 6. I have considered the submissions made by Mr. K. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 7. (c) The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority had considered the relevant records before imposing the punishment confirming the order of punishment respectively. 6. I have considered the submissions made by Mr. K. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 7. It is an admitted case that the petitioner while he was working as N2 Assistant in the District Police Office, St. Thomas Mount, was in charge of scrutinising and sanctioning Leave Travel Concession Bills. While he was in charge of the same, he had been served with a charge memo under Rule 17(a) of the TNCS (D&A) Rules. The charges framed against the petitioner are as follows: "i) Settling the belated LTC claims to the tune of Rs. 74,507/- ii) Claiming first class train fare for those who are not eligible to travel by first class as their basic is less than Rs. 1400/- contravening the provisions of TA/LTC Rules and thus making a total settlement of Rs. 2,06,943/- falsely. iii) in settling incorrect false ticket Nos. in the LTC Bills for the journeys preferred by train and in settling claims in tickets which contain more than 6 persons after the introduction of a ceiling of only 6 persons after computerisation by the railways authorities for a sum of Rs. 1,39,981/- iv) improper timings in the passports of constabulary which do not agree the departure and arrival of train, timings in the LTC Bills and thereby falsely claiming Rs. 43,561/-" 8. The petitioner seems to have sent a reply for the charge memo on 20.9.1996. It is the case of the petitioner that without conducting any enquiry, the report has been submitted by the enquiry Officer which is totally an erroneous procedure. In the reply affidavit it is not the case of the respondents that the enquiry was conducted in respect of the charges against the petitioner. It is the definite case of the respondents that no enquiry need be conducted in view of the minor charges framed under Rule 17(a) of the said Rules. It is also the definite case of the respondents that the issues against the petitioner have been decided on his explanation and documentary evidence. It is the definite case of the respondents that no enquiry need be conducted in view of the minor charges framed under Rule 17(a) of the said Rules. It is also the definite case of the respondents that the issues against the petitioner have been decided on his explanation and documentary evidence. Though the petitioner had been charged under Rule 17(a) of the said Rules, I am of the considered opinion that instead of deciding the matter on the basis of the explanation and documentary evidence, an enquiry should have been conducted by the enquiry officer before coming to the conclusion that the petitioner is liable for the charges levelled against him. The enquiry Officer ought to have submitted the report after full-fledged enquiry considering the nature of the charges. Hence, I am of the considered view that the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that holding that the petitioner is liable for the charges levelled against him without conducting any enquiry has resulted an injustice to him has to be accepted. 9. Regarding the next contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the failure to furnish the report of the enquiry officer along with the show cause notice by the disciplinary authority inviting explanation from him, vitiates the entire procedure is also to be upheld. The reason being that without the report of the enquiry officer, the petitioner would be in an disadvantageous position to reply on the show cause notice issued to him. To have the proceedings completed, by using the report of the enquiry officer behind the back of the petitioner cannot be considered to be a fair procedure. The denial of right to have the copy of the enquiry report, definitely amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and violation of the principles of natural justice, In this connection, learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision of the Honourble Apex Court (1991) 1 SCC 583, wherein the Apex Court has held that the enquiry report shall be furnished on the delinquent and the failure to do so is violation of principles of natural justice. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are relevant for the purpose of this Court, which is extracted hereunder: "13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Article 311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural justice in the matter of meeting the charges. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are relevant for the purpose of this Court, which is extracted hereunder: "13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Article 311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural justice in the matter of meeting the charges. This Court on one occasion has stated that two phases of the inquiry contemplated under Article 311(2) prior to the Forty-second Amendment were judicial. That perhaps was a little stretching the position. Even if it does not become a judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles, of natural justice. As this Court rightly pointed out in the Gujarat case the disciplinary authority is very often influenced by the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and even by the recommendations relating to the nature of punishment to be inflicted. With the Forty-second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material; if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. PROF. WADE has pointed out: "The concept of natural justice has existed for many centuries and it has crystallised into two rules: that no man should be judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing.... PROF. WADE has pointed out: "The concept of natural justice has existed for many centuries and it has crystallised into two rules: that no man should be judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing.... They (the Courts) have been developing and extending the principles of natural justice so as to build up a kind of code of fair administrative procedure, to be obeyed by authorities of all kinds. They have done this once again, by assuming that Parliament always intends powers to be exercised fairly." 14. This Court In Mazharul Islam Heshmi v. State of U.P. pointed out: "Every person must know what he is to meet and he must have opportunity of meeting that case. The legislature, however, can exclude operation of these principles expressly or implicitly. But in the absence of any such exclusion, the principle of natural justice will have to be proved." 10. Yet another decision of the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has been cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the same is AIR 1994 SC 1074 : (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1994-I- LLJ- 162. Here again, their Lordships have held that the denial of right to the copy of "the enquiry report amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and violation of principles of natural justice. Paragraph 29 of the said judgment is usefully extracted hereunder at p. 177 of LLJ: "29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive 2 copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice." 11. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice." 11. The above rulings will make it very clear that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the petitioner delinquent has got a right to have a copy of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority arrives at a conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the delinquent with regard to the charges levelled against him. A denial of the report is a denial of reasonable opportunity. It is a right of an employee to have the report of the enquiry officer to defend himself effectively, otherwise he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him and what is held against him. If the report is furnished to him, he could have persuaded the disciplinary authority that the finding arrived at by the enquiry officer is perverse or that the finding is based on no evidence or irrelevant materials and evidence. Definitely it would cause prejudice to a delinquent, if the report is not furnished to him. Hence, for the reasons stated above, I am in full agreement with the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that non-furnishing of the report of the enquiry officer has vitiated the entire proceedings. 12. The third submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellant authority has given any independent reasons for coming to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner had been proved. The order of the original authority dated 17.10.1996 clearly discloses that the disciplinary authority has not given any independent reasons while accepting the finding in the minutes. After extracting the charges against the petitioner, the conclusion that has been arrived at by the disciplinary authority is extracted hereunder: 2. I have carefully perused the minute and other related records. (i) The charges were correctly proved by the minute drawing officer. After extracting the charges against the petitioner, the conclusion that has been arrived at by the disciplinary authority is extracted hereunder: 2. I have carefully perused the minute and other related records. (i) The charges were correctly proved by the minute drawing officer. (ii) Further ignorance of an Assistant who has put in more than 2 decades of service in this most disciplined force that too when dealing a subject related to financial matters cannot be accepted as it is. (iii) I agree with the findings in the minute which are cogently argued. I award him the punishment of postponement of increment for a period of 2 years without cumulative effect." Except saying that the charges were correctly proved by the minute drawing officer and agreeing with the findings in the minute drawing officer, the disciplinary authority has not given any independent reason for coming to his own conclusion regarding the charges against the petitioner. 13. The appellate authority also fell in error in confirming the said order of punishment without assigning any reason whatsoever. After extracting the facts of the matter, paragraph 3 is the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority, which is extracted hereunder. "3. I have gone through the appeal petition and the connected file. The appellant has given arguments which have been dealt with already by the Enquiry Officer. There is no fresh point in defence to be given any favourable consideration. The appeal is hence rejected." 14. The above extracted portion in the order of the original authority as well as appellate authority will clearly establish that neither of the authorities have considered the charges against the petitioner independently and arrived at their own conclusion in finding that the charges against the petitioner had been proved. Thus, it makes me to arrive at a conclusion that neither the original authority nor the appellate authority has not given any independent reason and the orders passed by them are liable to be set aside on the said sole ground. In fact, this Court had an occasion to consider similar type of order passed by the appellate authority in the decision (2006) 4 MLJ 1382 : 2007 Writ L.R.486 and has come to the conclusion that such orders are liable to be set aside. In the said judgment it has been held thus at p. 1383 of MLJ: "7. In fact, this Court had an occasion to consider similar type of order passed by the appellate authority in the decision (2006) 4 MLJ 1382 : 2007 Writ L.R.486 and has come to the conclusion that such orders are liable to be set aside. In the said judgment it has been held thus at p. 1383 of MLJ: "7. It is seen from the aforesaid portion of the impugned order that the Appellate Authority did not deal with any of the grounds of appeal raised by the petitioner. A departmental appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. It is needless to point out that the last opportunity available for a delinquent, to canvass his case on merits, is at the appellate stage. After the appeal, a delinquent loses his right to challenge any disciplinary proceedings on merits, since the scope of interference on a revision or on a writ petition is very limited. Therefore, the rules themselves contemplate appellate authorities to go into the factual details and consider all the grounds of appeal before deciding an appeal. Unfortunately, the first respondent has chosen to dismiss the appeal by a non-speaking order and hence the appellate authorities order is liable to be set aside. 8. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in 1989 Writ L.R. 274. In the said case also, an identical order similar to the one involved in the present case was passed by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, after considering the scope of the powers conferred upon the Appellate Authority, this Court held as follows in paragraph-3: "Rule 6(1) of the Tamil Nadu, Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 reads as follows: "In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any penalty specified in R.2, the appellate authority shall consider- (a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action, and (c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and after such consideration shall pass orders as it thanks, proper." The rule enjoins the concerned authority to consider the three aspects set out therein specifically. Unless the appellate authority considers them it cannot be said that it has carried out its duties properly. Unless the appellate authority considers them it cannot be said that it has carried out its duties properly. The Supreme Court had occasion to discuss a similar question under Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Dealing with the word 'consider' used In the said rule, the Supreme Court observed that the word 'consider' implies due application of mind vide AIR 1986 SC 1040 : (1986) 2 SCC 651 . The following paragraph in the above judgment of, the Supreme Court can be usefully referred to with advantage- "The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) implies 'due application of mind'. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) Whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc, the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were unwarranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (2) of Rule 27(2) viz., whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 9. Thus it is clear that the appellate authority's order is in violation of the rules relating to disposal of appeals and consequently, it is liable to be set aside. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 9. Thus it is clear that the appellate authority's order is in violation of the rules relating to disposal of appeals and consequently, it is liable to be set aside. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed." 15. Considering the above facts and circumstances and considering the judgments cited above, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order of the original authority dated 17.10.1996 and the order of the appellate authority dated 25.11.1996 are liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The writ petition stands allowed. No costs. Writ petition allowed.