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2008 DIGILAW 265 (PAT)

Aman Enterprises v. Union Of India

2008-02-07

NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

body2008
Judgment Navaniti Prasad Singh, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. The Central Government in the Department of Foreign Trade is duly represented and has filed a counter affidavit. 3. The present writ application is directed against the order of the Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade, Patna dated 13.07.2006 (Annexure-4). By the said order, 38 Duty Free Replacement Credit Licences (DFRC Lincences) granted to the petitioner in terms of Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 have been cancelled. 4. The petitioner is a manufacturer of garments and has one establishment at Patna and other at Malvianagar, Delhi. Both the units of the petitioner supplied some garments io M/s Khan Garments of Hyderabad which was granted a 100% export Oriented Unit (EOU) status. As a consequence of those supplies made by the petitioner, those supplies were treated to be deemed exports and entitled the petitioner to DFRC Licences to the extent of C1F value of those supplies. 5. These supplies were made in the year 2005 and the licences were mostly issued in December 2005/January 2006. 6. It appears that Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Ahmedabad, pursuant to information received from Superintendent of Customs and Circle Excise, Hyderabad conducted an investigation into the affairs of M/s Khan Garments and formed the opinion that the unit was not in operation. It, accordingly, informed various authorities who were then required to take consequential actions as in view of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, supplies made to a non-operational unit could not qualify for the DFRC Licences. Accordingly, two proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, one at Delhi and the other at Patna. In these proceedings, such licences, those were issued to the petitioner, were sought to be cancelled. The authorities at Delhi then cancelled the 10 DFRC Licences issued from there to the petitioner-firm at Delhi against which the statutory appeal was preferred by the petitioner and by order in appeal dated 26.05.2006, the appellate authority set aside the order of cancellation after fully considering the facts and circumstances. At Patna, before that order could be passed or before an order on adjudication could be passed, on 04.05.2006, a circular was issued blacklisting the petitioner and he was put under denied entity list. At Patna, before that order could be passed or before an order on adjudication could be passed, on 04.05.2006, a circular was issued blacklisting the petitioner and he was put under denied entity list. This is being noticed to show that admittedly in the said order of blacklisting, it is itself noticed that pursuant to show cause notice, action against the firm is pending for the time being, yet it was thought appropriate to blacklist the firm even without final adjudication. Then notwithstanding the appellate order, as aforesaid, which was passed on 26th May 2006, the present impugned order has been passed on the 13th of July 2006. As noticed above, the appellate order has set aside the cancellation order and found the petitioner not guilty and not liable to suffer the consequences of cancellation of the said licences yet the original authority at Patna on the same very facts and on the same very investigation and on the same very finding deems it proper to cancel the licences. 7. This is what the petitioner is aggrieved by. The petitioners grievance is that when the appellate authority, on the same set of facts, decided the matter as between the parties in a particular manner then the original authority at Patna could not take a different view of the matter. Both the appellate and the two original authorities at Delhi and Patna being disciples of the same statute and acting under the same statute and acting on basis of the same very investigation and reports, the order of the appellate authority had to be regarded. In my view, the contention is to be accepted. 8. One of the principles that is involved in the present case is where a higher authority has decided on a particular set of facts in a particular mariner then all subordinate authorities or authorities below in hierarchy on the same set of facts cannot be permitted to take a different view much less as between the same parties. This is what is rule of law. Expecting otherwise would be destruction of the basic principles of rule of law and would give rise to conflicting orders in respect of same matter in different competent jurisdiction. That is never the intention. 9. To me, it appears that first without even adjudication. This is what is rule of law. Expecting otherwise would be destruction of the basic principles of rule of law and would give rise to conflicting orders in respect of same matter in different competent jurisdiction. That is never the intention. 9. To me, it appears that first without even adjudication. the petitioner was blacklisted at Patna by order dated 04th May 2006 though on 26th May 2006, he was exonerated in appeal. The authorities at Patna had to apparently pass an order consistent to their order of blacklisting which was done without adjudication. It is, thus, manifest that the order of the authorities at Patna was only consistent with the blacklisting order passed by them earlier but without reference to the appellate order. 10. Once the appellate order exonerates the petitioner on the same set of facts, the authorities at Patna could not have held him a guilty on the same set of facts. 11. In that view of the matter, I have no option but to set aside the order passed by the authorities at Patna (Annexure-4) and hold that the 38 DFRC Licences granted to the petitioner from Patna are valid in view of the findings as recorded in the appellate order, as referred to above. 12. The writ application, thus, stands allowed.