Judgment :- 1. The petitioner seeks to challenge the order of the first respondent dated 312. 2002 in proceedings No.Na.Ka.1423/02/K3, dismissing the petitioner from his services and the confirmation of the same by the second respondent by his proceedings No.Na.Ka.1026/03/K3 dated 18.06.2003. 2. The brief facts which are required to be stated are that the petitioner was working as Warehouse Manager Grade I at Dindigul Warehouse of the first respondent. He was issued with charge memo dated 23.02.2002, in which as many as five charges were leveled against him alleging that he failed to carry out periodical fumigation of the stock, that he failed to keep the godown open for cross ventilation of the stock, that he failed to ensure that there was no leakage in the storage space, which resulted in damage to a large extent of COPRAS stored in various warehouses in his custody. The COPRAS were stated to have been belonged to various third parties who had entrusted the safe storage of such goods with the first respondent. 3. The petitioner submitted his explanation dated 24.07.2002 denying the allegations. Not satisfied with the explanation of the petitioner, an enquiry was ordered to be held by proceedings dated 30.09.2002 and an enquiry officer was appointed. There was an oral enquiry held at Trichy on 111. 2002, in which the petitioner participated. According to the petitioner, in the said enquiry, except recording the statement of the petitioner, no other evidence was left in on behalf of the first respondent. The Enquiry Officer stated to have submitted his report dated 212. 2002, a copy of which was not furnished to the petitioner. Based on the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the first respondent passed the impugned order of punishment of dismissal, dated 312. 2002. When the petitioner preferred his appeal to the second respondent on 22.01.2003, the same came to be rejected by the second respondent by his order dated 18.06.2003, confirming the order of punishment of dismissal of the petitioner. 4. Heard Mr. M.L. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S.A. Hafiz, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. Assailing the impugned orders of the first and second respondents, Mr. 4. Heard Mr. M.L. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S.A. Hafiz, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. Assailing the impugned orders of the first and second respondents, Mr. Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioner in his submissions contended that the principles of natural justice were completely violated in the holding of the enquiry, that the enquiry officer’s report was not furnished to the petitioner prior to the order of dismissal, that no second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, that the misconduct was not made out as alleged by the first respondent in the enquiry held by him, that the third respondent was not ultimate authority to impose the punishment also acted as appellate authority while dealing with the petitioner’s appeal and therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan ( AIR 1991 SC 471 ) and the decision in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Ltd. v. B. karunakar (1994 – II L.L.N.9). 7. As against the above submissions, Mr. S.A. Hafiz, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in his submissions contended that as per the amended rule of the first respondent corporation contained in Rule 14(2)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation General and Staff Regulations, there was no necessity to furnish the copy of the report or to issue any second show cause notice before passing the order of dismissal and that the third respondent has recused himself from the proceedings when the second respondent dealt with the appeal filed by the petitioner and therefore, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner to the disposal of the appeal filed by him. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and after perusing the material papers and the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am convinced that there is a serious flaw in the proceedings of the first and second respondents in passing the impugned order of punishment of dismissal dated 312. 2002 and the rejection of the same at the appellate stage. 9. Mr. 2002 and the rejection of the same at the appellate stage. 9. Mr. S.A. Hafiz, learned counsel for the respondents contended that at the time of issuance of charge memo, the petitioner was called upon to furnish the list of witnesses and the documents which he wanted to rely upon in the enquiry and the petitioner did not site any witness nor sought for any documents to be produced to support his stand. The learned counsel therefore the manner in which the enquiry was held against him by recording his statement. 10. The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted for more than one reason. In the first place, when serious allegations of causing huge loss to the first respondent corporation were leveled against the petitioner, it is the bounden duty of the respondents to let in necessary evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary before the Enquiry officer to prove those allegations. It is not in dispute that other than the recording of the statement of the petitioner, no other evidence was let in on the side of the first respondent before the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry held on 111. 2002. 11. In the said circumstances, when the petitioner alleges serious prejudice as to the manner in which enquiry was held and the statement of the petition was recorded, it will have be held that such a claim of prejudice pleaded by the petitioner is well founded. Over the said conclusion as regards the prejudice pleaded by the petitioner is to be accepted and the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1994 – II L.L.N.9 (Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Ltd. v. B. Karunakar) is applied, I am constrained to hold that the grievance of the petitioner that the non-furnishing of enquiry officer’s report, seriously prejudiced his rights, merits acceptance. The stand of the respondents that Rule 14(2)(b) as it stood on the date of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner did not warrant for furnishing of copy of the report is concerned, the said stand can no longer be accepted in the light of the decision of the above referred to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The stand of the respondents that Rule 14(2)(b) as it stood on the date of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner did not warrant for furnishing of copy of the report is concerned, the said stand can no longer be accepted in the light of the decision of the above referred to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Paragraph No.3(iv), the Supreme Court has laid down the law as under: “In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohamed Ramzan Khan case [1991 – I L.L.N.380] (vide supra), should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the inquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges leveled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly.” Therefore, for the non-furnishing of the copy of the report, the orders impugned in this writ petition are liable to be set aside. 12. After reaching the above said conclusion, I am bound to consider as to what should be the course of action to be adopted in relation to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner. In the very same decision, in paragraph No.31, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated as to how such a situation should be dealt with. Therefore, Paragraph No.31 needs extraction which is to the following effect: “31. In the very same decision, in paragraph No.31, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated as to how such a situation should be dealt with. Therefore, Paragraph No.31 needs extraction which is to the following effect: “31. Hence, in all cases where the inquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” 13. As I have held in the earlier paragraphs of my order that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer in recording the statement of the petitioner without any evidence having been let in on the side of the first respondent has caused serious prejudice, I hold that even while setting aside the order of dismissal as well as the confirmation of the same by the appellate authority namely, the first and second respondents respectively, the authority should be relegated to the stage at which the enquiry proceedings commenced as against the petitioner, since the learned counsel for the first respondent has also stated that no evidence was let in since the petitioner did not cite any witness or called for any documents in the questionnaire form. It is therefore imperative that the first respondent is allowed to hold the enquiry from the stage of examination of witnesses in support of the charges and thereafter, allow the petitioner to cross examine those witnesses and also permit the petitioner to let in’ evidence on his side. 14. As has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, even though the order of dismissal is set aside, the petitioner shall be deemed to be under suspension and as to in what manner the period of suspension should be treated can be left to be decided by the first respondent after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and at the time of passing of final orders. 15. Mr. 15. Mr. M.L. Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice that the petitioner will be reaching his age of superannuation in the month of November 2008. Therefore, while setting aside the orders impugned in the writ petition and directing the first respondent to recommence the enquiry proceedings from the stage of recording of the evidence of both parties, the respondent is directed to conclude the entire proceedings including the passing of the final orders expeditiously preferably within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 16. The writ petitioner stands allowed in the above lines. No costs.