I.A. Ansari, J;- 1. Whether the appellants herein, who are both doctors, stood absorbed, unconditionally and absolutely, in the service of Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur, ('the Institute'), on the strength of the office memorandum, dated 16.2.2004, issued by the Director of the Institute, is the principal subject of controversy in the present appeal. 2. Before coming to the office memorandum, dated 16.2.2004, aforementioned, let me, set out, in a nutshell, the undisputed material facts, which have led to the present appeal: - (i) The Institute was formerly known as Tezpur Mental Hospital. The pathetic conditions prevailing in various mental hospitals in India and the plight of the patients suffering from various kinds of mental disorder were brought to the notice of the Apex Court by way of a Public Interest Litigation initiated on the basis of a report of the eminent social worker, Shila Barse. On the basis of the recommendations made by Gopal Subramanium Commission, the Apex Court passed an order, on 3.10.1994, in Crl. MPNo.505/1994, arising out of WP(Crl.) No.237/1989 (Shila Barse v. Union of India and Another), directing the Government of India to take over management of the Institute and upgrade the same so as to provide better medical facilities. The orders of the Apex Court passed from time to time, in the said PIL, were required to be monitored by this court. Based on various orders passed, from time to time, by a Division Bench of this court, Government of India took the decision to hand over Tezpur Mental Hospital in the North-Eastern Council ("the NEC'), which is constituted and established under the North-Eastern Council Act, 1971, in order to develop the Institute into a Regional Institute of Mental Health. Pursuant to the decision so taken, a deed of agreement, dated 11.2.1999, was executed by and between the Government of Assam and the NEC, whereby Tezpur Mental Hospital, as had been then known, was handed over to the NEC for better management. This agreement perceived formation of a Society with the aim and objective of investigation, diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill patients in all its forms and rehabilitation of such patients of the North-Eastern Region. This agreement also perceived up-gradation of the Tezpur Mental Hospital into an autonomous regional institute of mental health with participation, in its management, by the NEC and the Government of Assam. This agreement also perceived up-gradation of the Tezpur Mental Hospital into an autonomous regional institute of mental health with participation, in its management, by the NEC and the Government of Assam. Following the agreement, so executed, the Institute was formally handed over to the NEC by the Government of Assam by an order, dated 22.10.1999, passed in this regard. (ii) At the time, when the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, was executed, the present appellants were serving, at the Institute, as doctors, they all being the employees of the State of Assam inasmuch as the Institute was a State Government hospital and was accordingly managed by the Government of Assam. Clause 6 of the said agreement made provisions for absorption of the existing State Government's employees, in the Institute, on certain terms and conditions. The terms and conditions, embodied in clause 6, stipulated that all the incumbent officers and other employees of the Institute shall, as from the date of the commencement of the agreement, be, governed by and be subject to, the Rules set out in the Constitution and Bye-laws of the Institute as may be amended from time to time. This Clause further stipulated that all the existing employees would be given the choice of absorption in the new set up, but the terms and conditions governing all employees, serving and employed by the Institute, shall not be altered to their disadvantage. (iii) As provided by clause 6, the existing employees of the Institute numbering, in all, 184, continued in the Institute with the rights vested in them to exercise option, as aforesaid, for absorption, until the time the terms and conditions subject to which they were to be absorbed were finalized. In the meanwhile, a Society, in the name of Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur, came to be formed and steps were taken for development of the Institute and its Academic Departments for teaching and training and also for improving the quality of psychiatric care to be provided by the hospital wing of the Institute. In the meanwhile, a Society, in the name of Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur, came to be formed and steps were taken for development of the Institute and its Academic Departments for teaching and training and also for improving the quality of psychiatric care to be provided by the hospital wing of the Institute. Notwithstanding the agreement entered into, on 11.2.1999, between the Government of Assam and the NEC, since the terms and conditions of further retention/absorption of the Government employees, who were, at the relevant point of time, working at the Institute, had not been finalized till then and yet, on the other hand, a new body had taken over the management of the Institute, the two appellants, namely, Dr. Robin Chandra Debnath and Dr. Manoranjan Medhi, same as many others, sought for granting them lien for a period of one year, with effect from 17.2.999, on the ground that the service rules of the Institute had not yet been completed and they were not in a position to exercise their option. As the terms and conditions of their absorption had not been finalised even till 17.2.2000, the appellants herein, again, wrote to the State Government seeking extension of their lien for one more year, with effect from 17.2.2000, so as to enable them to exercise their option if they wished to continue, in the Institute, on such terms and conditions as would be finalised. (iv) Having considered the fact that the terms and conditions had not been finalized in respect of the Government employees, who were till then working, at the Institute, on the basis of the agreement, reached on 11.2.1999, between the Government of Assam, on the one hand, and the NEC, on the other, the State Government issued a letter, on 25.4.2000, granting quasi-lien to all the 184 numbers of their employees, which included the present two appellants, making it clear that the said employees would retain their lien for a period of two years with effect from 17.2.1999 or till the time of submission of option by the employees on finalization of the terms and conditions of service as per clause 6 of the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, aforementioned. This letter was issued with the concurrence of the Department of Finance, Government of Assam, and stated as under : - "From : Mrs. This letter was issued with the concurrence of the Department of Finance, Government of Assam, and stated as under : - "From : Mrs. Dipti Deuri (Borah), ACS, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam. To : The Director, LGB Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur. Sub. : Grant of lien. Ref. : No. LGB/Estt.A/Lien 99/1580 dated 27.10.1999 and No. LGB/Estt.A/Lien 8172000/203 dated 23.1.2000. Sir, I am directed to say that the Governor of Assam is pleased to grant quasi-lien to the following 184 Nos. of officers and staff of LGB Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur, for a period of 2 (two) years w.e.f. 17.2.1999 or till the date of submission of option by the employees on finalisation of terms and conditions of service as per para 6 of the agreement signed between Government of Assam and NEC. whichever is earlier. This issues with the concurrence of Finance Estt.(A) Deptt. U.O. No. FE 710 dated 9.8.1999." (v) In order to give effect to the aims and objectives, with which the said Society was formed, its Executive Council constituted an Empowered Committee, which was vested with the responsibility of identifying appropriate persons and their position in the Institute in the changed context. The Empowered Committee made its recommendations. The recommendations made by the Empowered Committee, with regard to the qualifications, were in tune with the relevant recruitment rules, which were applicable to the employees of the Government of India, who were availing pay scales of the Government of India. These recommendations were also in tune with the guidelines and requirements of the Medical Council of India. As many as 19 posts were created, in various faculties of the Institute, requiring post-graduate degree in respective disciplines. Certain posts were also created at the administrative side of the Institute. On the strength of the orders, passed by this court, which had been monitoring the taking over of the Institute by the NEC, the recommendations of the Empowered Committee were approved by the Home, Finance and Health Departments of the Government of Assam. Certain posts were also created at the administrative side of the Institute. On the strength of the orders, passed by this court, which had been monitoring the taking over of the Institute by the NEC, the recommendations of the Empowered Committee were approved by the Home, Finance and Health Departments of the Government of Assam. (vi) Based on such approved recommendations, Government of India too issued a letter, on 13.5.2002, according its approval to the re­structuring of a certain number of posts, in the Institute, in the pay scales of the Government of India and also laid down guidelines for offering the said posts to the existing employees of the Institute, who were eligible and qualified. However, those serving employees, who were not eligible and qualified for such absorption at that point of time, were given the option of acquiring necessary qualification within a period of five years and, in the meantime, to give offer and enjoy the pay scales of the employees serving under the Government of India. (vii) In terms of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforesaid, the posts of Mental Health Officer-I, which the appellants were, at the relevant point of time, holding, came to be re-designated as Deputy Medical Superintendent with the scope for further promotion to the posts of Assistant Medical Superintendent and Assistant Professor (Psychiatry). Part II of the said letter, which incorporated the conditions, subject to which absorption and further retention of the employees was possible, laid down that these posts will, only be in the Central Government pay scales at the corresponding entry level and that the employees, in order to be fitted against these posts in the Central Government pay scales, should fulfil RR stipulations and experience; but, as a one time exception, the then serving employees would be allowed to come over to the Government of India pay scale even if they did not fulfil the RR stipulations provided that they would acquire/fulfil these conditions within a period of five years and if they did not meet these conditions in the given period of five years they shall be reverted to their parent cadre. (viii) In course of time, the Director of the Institute issued an Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2004. (viii) In course of time, the Director of the Institute issued an Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2004. It is, this Memorandum, which, as already indicated above, forms the principal subject of controversy, for, the appellants rely on this letter to support their contention that they were permanently, absolutely and unconditionally absorbed, in the said Institute, by virtue of the letter aforementioned; whereas the case of the respondents is that the absorption, which the letter aforementioned stated about, was an absorption subject to the conditions of absorption, which were made known to all concerned including the present appellants by letter, dated 3.5.2002, aforementioned, which specifically stipulated that since the pay scales of the Central Government were higher than those of the Government of Assam, the employees, in order to be fitted against the re-designated posts, must fulfil the criteria prescribed by the recruitment rules and they were accordingly required to acquire necessary educational qualifications within a period of five years or else, they were to be reverted to their parent cadre. This apart, the further case of the respondents is that the copy of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, while according approval to the re-structuring or creation of certain number of posts in the Government of India's pay scales, also laid down guidelines for offering such posts to the existing employees of the Institute, who were eligible and qualified. The respondents plead that those employees serving the Institute, who had not acquired eligibility criteria, were given the option of acquiring necessary qualifications within a period of five years and, in the meantime, to come over to the Government of India's pay scales. According to the respondents, as the present appellants had failed to acquire the educational qualifications, which, in terms of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, they ought to have had acquired, the Director of the Institute issued a letter, on 11.6.2006, addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Family Welfare (A) Department, informing the latter that some of the doctors, including the present appellants, could not acquire their requisite qualifications within the stipulated period of five years and, therefore, cannot be absorbed in the Institute after conversion of the Institute into a teaching-cum-training Institute. The Director of the Institute accordingly requested the Government to do the needful to repatriate to their parent cadre those doctors, who could not acquire the requisite qualifications for enabling them to be retained in the service of the Institute. Aggrieved by the letter, dated 11.10.2006, aforementioned, the present appellants along with some others filed a writ petition, which gave rise to WP(C) No.5462/2006 with prayer to set aside and quash the letter, dated 11.10.2006, aforementioned and also to restrain the respondents from reverting the writ petitioners to their parent cadre in the Health Department of the State Government. By judgment and order, dated 9.10.2007, since the writ petition stands dismissed, two of the writ petitioners have, as appellants, preferred this appeal. 2. We have heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, and Mr. I. Choudhury, learned counsel, appearing for the Institute. We have also heard Mr. P. Gogoi, learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 5, and Mr. N. Borah, learned Central Government Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 7. 3. Presenting the case on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Dutta, pointing to the contents of the Office Memorandum, dated 16.10.2004, aforementioned, issued by the Director of the Institute, has contended that by virtue of this Office Memorandum, the appellants stood permanently absorbed in the Institute and, hence, in such circumstances, they could not have been regarded as employees of the State Government on deputation to the Institute. The learned Single Judge, according to Mr. Dutta, erred in not taking into account the contents of the said Office Memorandum in their proper prospective and in holding that the impugned order, dated 11.10.2006, cannot be interfered with, because the petitioners have not acquired necessary qualification to get themselves absorbed in the service of the Institute in terms of the conditions stipulated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned. It is further contended by Mr. Dutta that the contents of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, are not binding on the appellants inasmuch as they were never informed about the letter, dated 13.5.2002, nor were they ever told that they would be reverted to their parent department if they failed to acquire such qualifications as the letter, dated 13.5.2002, stipulated. 4. Resisting the appeal, Mr. Dutta that the contents of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, are not binding on the appellants inasmuch as they were never informed about the letter, dated 13.5.2002, nor were they ever told that they would be reverted to their parent department if they failed to acquire such qualifications as the letter, dated 13.5.2002, stipulated. 4. Resisting the appeal, Mr. I. Choudhury has taken us through all material events, which led to the establishment of the Institute including the contents of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, and contended that the appellants all along knew about the letter, dated 13.5.2002, and that the appellants could not have been legally absorbed in violation of the eligibility criteria fixed by the letter aforementioned and that the appellants have, in fact, not been absorbed in the service of the Institute unconditionally. As an alternative plea, Mr. Choudhury submits that even if the Director of the Institute had, by letter, dated 16.10.2004, absorbed the appellants permanently in the service of the Institute, such a letter of absorption, in the light of the materials on record, must be held to have been issued by mistake by the Institute and such a mistake would not create enforceable rights in favour of the appellants, for, enforcement of such rights, according to Mr. Choudhury, would run contrary to the supervening public interest. Mr. Choudhury passionately pleads that the impugned letter, dated 11.10.2006, may not be interfered with as this letter serves the cause of public interest and is valid in law. 5. Appearing on behalf of the State, Mr. P. Gogoi, learned counsel, has pointed out that the State Government has all along been extending the lien of the appellants treating them as the employees of the State Government and it is for this reason that the State Government has also given pro forma promotion to these employees treating them, as on deputation, in the service of the Institute and since the appellants have not acquired the requisite qualification as contained in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned, the State Government has, now, issued an office order, dated 22.2.2008, recalling the appellants to their parent department. There is, therefore, according to Mr. Gogoi, no merit in the present appeal and the anneal may be dismissed. As far as learned Central Government Counsel is concerned, his submissions are in tune with the submissions, which have been made by the other respondents. 6. There is, therefore, according to Mr. Gogoi, no merit in the present appeal and the anneal may be dismissed. As far as learned Central Government Counsel is concerned, his submissions are in tune with the submissions, which have been made by the other respondents. 6. We are, now, required to consider, in the light of the admitted facts as narrated above and the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, the question as to whether, by virtue of the Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2004, the appellants stood permanently absorbed and, if so, whether enforceable right has accrued to them warranting this court's interference with the letter, dated 11.10.2006, aforementioned. 7. To find a correct answer to the question, let us assume, for a moment, that by the Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2004, the Director of the Institute had permanently absorbed the present appellants in the service of the Institute and that such absorption was unconditional and absolute. Let us also assume, for a moment, that the appellants were unaware of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned. 8. The question, posed above, gives rise to yet another question and it is this: Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the High Court would be justified in setting aside the impugned letter, dated 11.10.2006, and in directing the Institute to retain the appellants in the service of the Institute and/or prohibit the State Government from repatriating the appellants to their parent cadre? 9. The questions, raised above, necessarily takes us to the PIL to which the Institute owes its birth. The very fact that the Institute is born as a result of the directions issued in the PIL, one is left with no choice but to conclude that it was in exercise of the powers vested in the Supreme Court, under article 32 of the Constitution of India, that the directions had been given by the Supreme Court to the Government of India to take over the management of Tezpur Mental Hospital (as it was then known) and up-grade the same with a view to providing better medical facilities to those, who are mentally sick or might have suffered from mental illness. The directions, so given, were, undoubtedly, to enforce the rights of those, who were suffering from various mental disorder, and also to safeguard the rights and interest of all those, who were likely to become mental patients. The directions, so given, were, undoubtedly, to enforce the rights of those, who were suffering from various mental disorder, and also to safeguard the rights and interest of all those, who were likely to become mental patients. This is the predominant public interest, which the Apex Court's directions, given in Sheila Barse's case (supra), aimed at protecting. Treating this public interest as the pivot around which revolves the entire appeal, it needs to be further pointed out that the Apex Court's orders, in Sheila Barse's case (supra), had cast unavoidable responsibility on the Government of India and also on the Government of Assam to ensure that the directions, in Sheila Barse's case (supra), are scrupulously and faithfully abided by all concerned. It was for this reason that this High Court too was required to monitor the developments, which had been taking place as a result of the directions issued in Sheila Barse's case (supra). 10. No wonder, therefore, that the Government of India took a decision to vest Tezpur Mental Hospital in the NEC and develop the same into a regional Institute of Mental Health. As the Government of Assam could not have had shirked its responsibility as a State, the deed of agreement, dated 11.2.1999, was executed by and between the Government of Assam, on the one hand, and the NEC, on the other. By virtue of thi» agreement, Tezpur Mental Hospital was to be handed over to the NEC for better management. This agreement, as already indicated above, perceived formation of a Society with the aim and objective of investigation, diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill patients in all its forms and rehabilitation of patients of the North-Eastern Region of India. The hospital was to be up-graded as an autonomous regional institute of mental health with participation in its management by the NEC and the Government of Assam. Following the agreement, so executed, the Institute was formally handed over to the NEC by the Government of Assam by an order, dated 22.10.1999, passed in this regard. 11. It is in terms of the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, that a Society was formed under the name and style of Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur. Following the agreement, so executed, the Institute was formally handed over to the NEC by the Government of Assam by an order, dated 22.10.1999, passed in this regard. 11. It is in terms of the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, that a Society was formed under the name and style of Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi Regional Institute of Mental Health, Tezpur. Since the Society has been formed under the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, aforementioned and it is funded by the NEC as well as the State Government, the Institute could not have acted and cannot be allowed to act in" violation of the conditions, which were stipulated under the terms and conditions of the said agreement, nor can the State Government, the NEC and/or the Government of India disown their responsibility to ensure that the objective with which the Institute was established are not defeated by any independent or unilateral action or decision of the Institute or any of its functionaries. This obligation is an integral and inseverable part of the predominant public interest, which warranted and still warrants the Institute to ensure that the purpose with which the Apex Court had passed various directions, in Sheila Barse's case (supra), leading, eventually, to the birth of the Institute, does not get violated or diluted. 12. Bearing in mind the above basic duty, which stood cast on the Government of India, the Government of Assam, the NEC and the Institute, let us, now, consider further developments in the matter. 13. What is, now, of great relevance to point out is that at the time, when the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, was executed, Tezpur Mental Hospital was a hospital"owned and maintained by the State Government. Obviously, the employees of the Tezpur Mental Hospital were employees of the State Government. These employees could not have been forced to serve the new Institute, which was to be formed. At the same time, the transition of the Tezpur Mental Hospital into an Institute of the standard, which Sheila Barse's case (supra) envisaged, was not possible without providing the Institute, which was yet to be born, with suitable employees. Provisions were accordingly made in the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, delineating the manner in which the Institute, on its birth, would function with the help and support of the Government and its employees. It was this object, which clause 6 of the said agreement proposed to meet. Provisions were accordingly made in the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, delineating the manner in which the Institute, on its birth, would function with the help and support of the Government and its employees. It was this object, which clause 6 of the said agreement proposed to meet. As clause 6 is extremely relevant for the purpose of this appeal, clause 6 of the agreement is reproduced hereinbelow : "6. All the incumbent officers and other employees of the Institute shall as from the date of the commencement of this Agreement be governed by and be subject to the Rules set out in the Constitution and Bye-laws of the Institute hereto as amended from time to time. All the existing employees will be given choice of absorption in the new set up of reversion to the Government of Assam. The terms and conditions governing all employees serving and employed by the Institute shall not be altered to their disadvantage." 14. In the face of the provisions made in clause 6, it becomes clear that notwithstanding the fact that clause 6 made further service of the employees of the Institute subject to the Rules set out in the Constitution and Bye-laws of the Institute as may be amended from time to time, Clause 6 provided the freedom of choice to the existing Government employees, serving Tezpur Mental Hospital, to either get absorbed in the new setup on new terms and conditions, which were yet to be settled and finalized, or revert to the service of the State Government. Clause 6, however, made it explicitly clear that the State Government employees would not be able to serve the Institute except in accordance with the Rules and the Bye-laws of the Institute. 15. Since no service rules have been, admittedly, framed by the Institute as yet, it logically follows that all steps taken by the Institute with regard to the conditions of recruitment or conditions of service of its employees have to yield to the predominant object and public interest with which the Institute was given birth to. The Institute could not have, thus, deviated from its primary objective, which had been judicially determined. Logically, therefore, the service conditions, to be set out by the Institute, were to be such, which would have sub-served the object with which the Institute was formed. The Institute could not have, thus, deviated from its primary objective, which had been judicially determined. Logically, therefore, the service conditions, to be set out by the Institute, were to be such, which would have sub-served the object with which the Institute was formed. Upon its birth, the Institute, as already indicated above, had two wings, one of the wings being academic and the other administrative. The Academic Department was to be involved in teaching and training of persons, who could impart knowledge of psychiatric treatment, so as to improve the quality of psychiatric care, which the hospital wing of the Institute were to provide. It was to meet this object that the Executive Committee of the said Society constituted an Empowered Committee. This Empowered Committee, as already indicated above, made recommendations with regard to the various service conditions of the employees of the Institute including the conditions of recruitment. The conditions of recruitment were not only in tune with the requirements of the Medical Council of India, but were also in tune with such conditions, which enabled an employee of the Government of India to avail the pay-scale fixed by the Government of India. 16. The Institute accepted the recommendations made by the Empowered Committee and the same received the seal of approval of this High Court, which had the responsibility to monitor the taking over of the Tezpur Mental Hospital by the NEC. It was, therefore, natural that the State Government also agreed with the recommendations made by the Empowered Committee. In terms of the recommendations, made by this Empowered Committee and also the orders of the High Court, posts of various faculties of the Institute requiring Post-Graduate degree were created. Obviously, the Institute could not have ignored the recommendations so accepted and so approved by the High Court. The Institute, thus, confronted a situation, where it could not have retained, in its service, anyone, who did not fulfill the criteria laid down as the conditions of recruitment, for, the eligibility criteria of a doctor (who was already serving the Institute, as a State Government employee), admittedly, perceived Post-Graduate degree in various disciplines as one of the conditions of recruitment. It was in order to ensure that such conditions of recruitment are faithfully adhered to that the Government of India, Department of Development of North-Eastern Region ('DONER'), declared, vide its letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned, creation of various posts in the Institute. This letter, in unambiguous terms, made it clear that the existing posts would no longer exist and that these posts would be re-designated in terms of the said letter so as to bring the employees of the Institute at such pay-scales, which other employees of the Central Government would receive for such posts. The relevant portion of this letter reads : 81. No. Name of existing post Name of new/re-designated post No. of new/re-designated post 1.. ** * * * * 2. ** ** ** 3. * * * * * * 4. M & HO-I Deputy Medical Superintendent Assistant Medical Superintendent Assistant Prof. (Psychiatry) 1 2 4 5. ** ** * * 6. ** ** * * 7. * * ** ** 8. * * ** ** 9. ** ** ** "2. The creation of the above posts is subject to the following conditions : (i) These posts will only be in the Central Government pay scale at the corresponding entry level (subject to this being equal or higher than the Assam Government pay scales). (ii) The employees to be fitted against these posts in the Central Government pay scales should fulfill RR stipulations and experience. As a one time exception, the present incumbents may be allowed to come over to the GOI pay scale even if they do not fulfill the RR stipulations, provided they acquire/fulfill these conditions within a period of five years. If they do not meet these conditions in five years, they shall be reverted to their parent cadre. (iii) The post of Director of the Institute may be in the pay scale of Rs. 18,400-22,400 corresponding to the Joint Director of Health Services." 17. The letter, dated 13.5.2002, makes it clear that no post, which was in existence until 13.5.2002, would exist at the pay-scales of the Government of Assam, which the doctors, serving the Institute at the relevant point of time, were, otherwise, enjoying. 18,400-22,400 corresponding to the Joint Director of Health Services." 17. The letter, dated 13.5.2002, makes it clear that no post, which was in existence until 13.5.2002, would exist at the pay-scales of the Government of Assam, which the doctors, serving the Institute at the relevant point of time, were, otherwise, enjoying. Consequently, each of the then existing post, according to the letter, dated 13.5.2002, was to be re-designated and re-named with a new pay-scale, consistent with the pay-scale of the Central Government, from its very inception, i.e., from the very entry level. 18. The letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned also made it clear that every newly designated post, with new pay-scale, would be available only to such a person, who fulfilled the conditions of recruitment so far as the qualification and experience were concerned. Since all the employees of the Institute did not fulfill the eligibility criteria as regard their qualification and experience, they ought to have been repatriated to their respective parent departments. 19. However, as a one-time exception, Government of India decided that the then serving employees would be allowed to come over to the Government of. India's pay-scale without fulfilling the conditions of recruitment, but their such absorption or their being allowed to enjoy the Government of India's pay-scale was conditional and the condition appended to the enjoyment of such pay-scale was that the employee, who did not fulfill the eligibility criteria, must acquire the same within a period of five years and if anyone of them did not acquire such qualification within five years, he was to be repatriated to his parent cadre. These conditions, incorporated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, made it clear that the continuation of any of the doctors, in the service of the Institute, would not be permitted beyond the period of five years from the date, when the Institute was born, unless the doctor concerned acquired the educational qualification and experience in terms of the conditions of recruitment as had been finalized by the authorities concerned and had received the seal of approval of the High Court. 20. 20. Nothing had been pointed out, at the time, when the writ petition was heard, nor was anything pointed out at the time, when this appeal was heard, to show that the contents of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, were not in tune with the objectives, which the directions given by the Apex Court, in Sheila Barse's case (supra), aimed at achieving. The appellants have expressed, at the time of hearing of the appeal, their ignorance about the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Whether the appellants were really ignorant or not is a question, which we would answer a little latter. Suffice it to point out here that assuming that the present appellants were not aware of the contents of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned, the question, which stares at us, is this: Whether, in the face of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, the law would permit even the Director of the Institute to 'permanently' absorb the appellants without any conditions appended thereto, when the appellants do not, admittedly, satisfy the eligibility criteria for their further retention in the service of the Institute. It'is also worth remembering that many a times, the word absorption appears to be a misnomer in service jurisprudence, for, absorption means nothing, but appointment into a service, wherein the person, sought to be absorbed, was not actually born. The service jurisprudence does not permit a person to be absorbed unless and until he satisfies the conditions of recruitment. The Institute, in the present case, is not such a Society, which can recruit, to its service, anyone with any qualification. The Institute, though a registered Society, functions under the ultimate control of the Central Government and is, thus, an instrumentality of the State. It cannot alter, vary or modify the conditions of recruitment in respect of any post without the agreement and/or concurrence of the authorities concerned. Independent, therefore, of the directions given by the Central Government, accepted by the NEC and the State Government and also approved by the High Court, the Institute, on its own, could not have, in the past, nor can, in future, relax, vary, modify or alter the conditions of recruitment. 21. Independent, therefore, of the directions given by the Central Government, accepted by the NEC and the State Government and also approved by the High Court, the Institute, on its own, could not have, in the past, nor can, in future, relax, vary, modify or alter the conditions of recruitment. 21. While considering the above aspects of the case, it needs to be pointed out, at the cost of repetition, that the conditions for continuance of the service of the employees of the State Government, in the Institute, laid down in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aimed at achieving the object with which the Central Government had been directed by the Apex Court to take over Tezpur Mental Hospital. When the Central Government had assumed the responsibility, under the orders of the Supreme Court, to take over Tezpur Mental Hospital and convert the same into an appropriate Institute, which could provide psychiatric care, treatment and teaching of requisite standard, it could not have allowed continuance, in the Institute, of any employee of the State Government, who did not fulfill the conditions laid down in the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Since the Institute is not a wholly independent body and the Central Government has the legal as well as constitutional obligation to manage the Institute in terms of the directions given in Sheila Barse's case (supra), the Institute could not have passed any order, far less an order of absorption, in breach of the conditions stipulated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002. 22. Hence, even if it is assumed, for a moment, that the Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2002, does speak of the appellants having been 'permanently' absorbed in the service of the Institute without any condition(s) appended thereto, such absorption cannot be said to sub-serve the public interest with which Tezpur Mental Hospital had been taken over by the Central Government. Mr. 22. Hence, even if it is assumed, for a moment, that the Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2002, does speak of the appellants having been 'permanently' absorbed in the service of the Institute without any condition(s) appended thereto, such absorption cannot be said to sub-serve the public interest with which Tezpur Mental Hospital had been taken over by the Central Government. Mr. Choudhury is, therefore, not entirely incorrect, when he contends that even if the Office Memorandum, dated 16.2.2002, is assumed to have conveyed to the appellants their absorption in the service of the Institute in the posts of Senior Medical & Health Officer-I, such absorption was a mistake and wholly invalid inasmuch as no post of Medical & Health Officer-I existed and, in such a situation, the supervening public interest, which aims at developing the Institute into a regional institute of mental care and treatment, must prevail upon the individual rights, if any, statutory or contractual, of the present appellants. 23. The above glaringly noticeable facet of the case can be illustrated by an example. Let us assume, for a moment, that the Director of the Institute passes an order 'permanently' absorbing a State Government employee, who has been serving the Institute, though such absorption is ex facie in violation of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, aforementioned. Will such absorption be effective in law merely because of the fact that the Director of the Institute has passed such an order of absorption? As the Institute, in question, is not a wholly independent body, which can act in the manner as it wants and when it is under the ultimate control of the Central Government, it cannot act in a manner, which does not sub-serve the public interest, which the Institute is, otherwise, required to meet. Nothing has been pointed out to us, on behalf of the appellants, to show that the Director had the authority, under the Constitution or bye-laws of the Institute, to pass such an order of absorption. Nothing has been pointed out to us, on behalf of the appellants, to show that the Director had the authority, under the Constitution or bye-laws of the Institute, to pass such an order of absorption. In such a situation, it would be immaterial as to whether the person, who is absorbed, did or did not know about the existence of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, for, the Director remains wholly incompetent in law to make such an order of absorption and when the authority, which passes the order of absorption, is not legally competent to pass such an order of absorption, such an order of absorption would not bind the Institute nor will it vest any indefeasible right(s), in favour of such an absorbed employee, to demand that his absorption be not disturbed. 24. Coupled with the above, it is also important to point out that in the present case, the agreement between the State Government and the NEC was entered into on 11.2.1999. This agreement made it clear that the terms and conditions of the employees, who were, at the relevant point of time, serving Tezpur Mental Hospital, were not to be changed to their disadvantage and that their absorption in the Institute, which was yet to be borne, would be on obtaining their choice for such absorption. In the intervening period, the State Government employees, including, the present appellants, could have continued to serve the Institute only on lien. No wonder, therefore, that the appellants had applied and the State Government accordingly granted quasi lien for a period of two years with effect from 17.2.1999 or till the date of submission of option by the employees on finalization of terms and conditions of their service as per clause (6) of the agreement aforementioned. This lien would have obviously expired on 17.2.2001. The fact that the appellants also clearly understood that they would not be able to serve the Institute any longer without their lien having been extended, they applied, (as the letters, dated 7.2.2001, placed at Annexure VI(J) to the affidavit-in-opposition of the State respondents reflect), for further lien with effect from 17.2.2001. This lien would have obviously expired on 17.2.2001. The fact that the appellants also clearly understood that they would not be able to serve the Institute any longer without their lien having been extended, they applied, (as the letters, dated 7.2.2001, placed at Annexure VI(J) to the affidavit-in-opposition of the State respondents reflect), for further lien with effect from 17.2.2001. Thus, the lien, originally, granted by the State Government, continued and has, in fact, according to the records produced by the State Government, has been continued and in consequence thereof, some of the State Government employees, who have had been serving the Institute, have been granted even pro forma promotion. 25. Besides what have been discussed above, a reference, in this regard, to the provisions of Fundamental Rule 14A (TR 14-A') is imperative. This rule states as follows : "FR 14-A (a) Government servant's lien on a post in no circumstances be terminated, even with his consent, if the result will be to leave him without a lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post. (b) A Government servant's lien on a post shall stand terminated on his acquiring a lien on a permanent post (whether under Central Government or State Government) outside the cadre in which he is borne". 26. From a careful reading of FR 14-A, it becomes clear that a Government servant's lien cannot be terminated even with his consent if the result would be to leave him without a lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post. The termination of lien is possible only when the Government servant acquires a lien on a permanent post, under the Central Government or State Government, outside the cadre, where he was borne. The termination of lien is possible only when the Government servant acquires a lien on a permanent post, under the Central Government or State Government, outside the cadre, where he was borne. In the light of the provisions of FR 14-A, when the facts of the present case are dispassionately considered, it becomes transparent that with the birth of the Institute, since the posts, which the appellants held, were, strictly speaking, not posts held under the Central Government or the State Government, the question of not extending the lien of the appellants did not arise at all inasmuch as the appellants, in the light of the provisions of FR 14-A, could not have been left without a lien until the time their lien was terminated either on their absorption in the Institute or on their tendering of resignation from the cadre, where they were borne, or upon their retirement or removal or dismissal form service. Thus, the State Government was, under FR 14-A, obliged to continue to extend the appellants' lien. Logically, therefore, the lien, in the light of FR 14-A, could not have been discontinued even if the appellants so wanted until the appellants chose to resign. In short, thus, the only way in which the appellants, lien could have been terminated was that the appellants got themselves absorbed, in terms of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, and/or resigned. 27. In the context of the facts and attending circumstances of two different cases, wherein interpretation of clause 6 of the agreement, dated 11.2.1999, was involved, a Division Bench of this court, on 7.11.2006, in WA Nos. 398/2004 and 399/2004, observed as under : "As provided in clause 6, the existing employees numbering 184 appointed against substantive posts continued in the Institute with rights vested in them to exercise option for consideration for, absorption. The provisions in clause 6 make it clear that with effect from the commencement of the agreement, the officers and employees of the Institute will be governed by and be subject to the Rules set out in the constitution and bye-laws of the Institute and they will be given the choice of absorption in the Institute or repatriation to the parent department under the Government of Assam. The right of exercising option for consideration for permanent absorption in the Institute cannot be read in separation with the other provisions of the clause wherein it is provided that the terms and conditions governing all the employees serving and employed by the Institute shall not be altered to their disadvantage. This means that the incumbent officers and other employees should have been allowed to continue as such till finalization of the terms and conditions of service. It is in this context, the State Government by the letter dated 25th April, 2000 addressed to the Director of the Institute informed about the Government's decision granting quasi-lien to all the 184 officers and employees for a period of two years from 17.2.1999 or till the date of submission of option by the employees on finalization of the terms and conditions of service as per para 6 of the agreement signed between the Government of Assam and the North -Eastern Council, which ever is earlier. The words "which ever is earlier", in our considered opinion, are out of context. The lien in the instant case was granted obviously with a view to mark time to enable the authorities of the Institute to finalise the terms and conditions of service and to call for options from the officers and employees as provided in Clause 6 of the agreement. It is inconceivable that the officers and the employees could be asked to exercise their option before finalization of the terms and conditions of service. It is pertinent to mention here that all the 184 officers and employees are State Government employees appointed against substantive posts and their absorption in the Institute would bring in a drastic change in their conditions of service since the Institute is a co-operative society having its own identity. The status of the Government servants cannot be allowed to be changed by any authority without obtaining any option from them as well as concurrence of the State Government. Obviously such option could not be invited before finalization of the terms and conditions of service under the Institute." 28. From what have been observed above, it becomes crystal clear that the question of absorption, in the Institute, could have arisen only on finalization of terms and conditions. Obviously such option could not be invited before finalization of the terms and conditions of service under the Institute." 28. From what have been observed above, it becomes crystal clear that the question of absorption, in the Institute, could have arisen only on finalization of terms and conditions. In the present case, there is nothing other than the letter, dated 13.5.2002, laying down the terms and conditions subject to which absorption of the appellants was possible. Since the Institute was under the pervasive control of the Central Government in terms of the judicial orders, neither the Institute could have deviated from the terms and conditions, which the Central Government had set, nor could the present appellants, as State Government employees, got themselves absorbed on terms and conditions other than those, which stood incorporated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Situated thus, it is clear that since the present appellants, as the State Government employees, had not fulfilled, at any stage, the conditions of absorption as were incorporated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, the State Government had no option, but to continue to grant extension to the appellants' lien and since the appellants had not, within the stipulated period of five years, acquired the eligibility criteria for permanent absorption, the State Government had to pass and has, in fact, passed orders, dated 27.2.2008, recalling the appellants for being posted in their parent cadre. 29. What also cannot be ignored is that in their writ petition, the appellants, nowhere, gave any indication that they were ignorant about the letter, dated 13.5.2002. In fact, the very order of absorption, which the appellants, as writ petitioners, had relied, i.e., the letter, dated 16.2.2004, referred to the letter, dated 13.5.2002. This apart, the impugned letter, dated 11.10.2006, which the appellants sought to get set aside, clearly stated that the appellants could not acquire the requisite PG Degree qualification within the stipulated period of five years. Furthermore, the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents averred, in unequivocal terms, that the criteria for permanent absorption in respect of those, who had not fulfilled the requisite criteria, were incorporated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Even in the face of such clear and repeated assertions, the writ petitioners, at no stage in the writ proceeding, contended that they were ignorant about the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Even in the face of such clear and repeated assertions, the writ petitioners, at no stage in the writ proceeding, contended that they were ignorant about the letter, dated 13.5.2002. It is only when the appeal was filed that the appellants, for the first time, contended to the effect that they were ignorant about the letter, dated 13.5.2002. 30. In the absence of any clear explanation offered for the silence, which the appellants maintained so long, and when no explanation is discernible, in this regard, from the materials on record, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the appellants knew about the existence of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, which had clearly stipulated the conditions of absorption for a State Government employee, who did not have requisite educational qualification for permanent absorption. Considered in this light, one can have no option, but to hold that even the appellants knew and knew very well that they could not have been absorbed in the post of M and HO-1, which did not exist in the Institute, and that their absorption was in the re-designated posts, which they would not be able to hold beyond the stipulated period of five years without having Post Graduation Degree in the discipline(s) concerned. Viewed thus, it is clear that even if the letter, dated 16.2.2004, is treated to be a letter of absorption, it becomes clear that neither the Institute could have legally absorbed nor could the appellants, as State Government employees, got themselves absorbed permanently in violation of the terms and conditions, which the Central Government's letter, dated 13.5.2002, had embodied. 31. While considering the present appeal, it is also worth recalling that in order to sustain their request made for extension of lien, the appellants had clearly stated that they needed lien to remain in the service of the State Government, because they were not in a position to offer their option for absorption as the terms and conditions for absorption had not been finalized till then. The letter incorporating the terms and conditions for absorption, i.e., the letter dated 13.5.2002, was issued subsequent to the letters aforementioned, submitted by the appellants, seeking extension of their lien. These letters, seeking extension of lien, make it clear that the appellants did not offer to get themselves absorbed without clearly knowing the terms and conditions of their absorption. The letter incorporating the terms and conditions for absorption, i.e., the letter dated 13.5.2002, was issued subsequent to the letters aforementioned, submitted by the appellants, seeking extension of their lien. These letters, seeking extension of lien, make it clear that the appellants did not offer to get themselves absorbed without clearly knowing the terms and conditions of their absorption. In the backdrop of the fact that the appellants were unwilling to exercise their option for absorption without clearly knowing the terms and conditions of absorption, coupled with the fact that the letter, dated 13.5.2002, issued by the Central Government incorporated, in no uncertain words, the terms and conditions of absorption, there can be no room for doubt that the appellants could not have been absorbed without a free exercise of option by them. The chronology of events clearly reveals that had the appellants not known the terms and conditions incorporated in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, they could, not have offered their option and, at the same time, they could not have remained, in the service of the Institute, without seeking extension of their lien, for, had they not given their option, and were not granted lien, they would have been out of service, (which, as reasonable persons, the appellants can never be conceived to have done). In such circumstances, it is impossible to believe that the appellants had given their option for absorption without knowing the terms and conditions subject to which they could have been absorbed in the Institute. In fact, the appellants have, carefully and cautiously, not placed on record any material showing the circumstances in which they exercised their option for absorption. In such circumstances, one has no option, but to conclude that the appellants had all along known that if they were to remain in the service of the Institute beyond the prescribed period of five years, they were required to obtain Post-Graduate degree as prescribed by the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Not surprising, therefore, that though the respondents clearly stated that a copy of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, was hanged at the notice-board of the Institute, the appellants never disputed this fact. Not surprising, therefore, that though the respondents clearly stated that a copy of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, was hanged at the notice-board of the Institute, the appellants never disputed this fact. The appellants also did not contend, in their writ petition, that it was, on receipt of the letter, dated 16.2.2004, and/or the letter, dated 11.10.2006, that they came to know, for the first time, that their absorption in the Institute was subject to their obtaining of Post-Graduate degree within the prescribed period of five years. Considered from any angle, it is wholly impossible to infer that the appellants were all along ignorant about the existence and/or contents of the letter, dated 13.5.2002. 32. Let me, now, come to the contents of the office memorandum, dated 16.2.2004. This letter reads : "In pursuance of the instructions contained in the Agenda No. 2 of the Minutes of the 12th Executive Council meeting of the LGB Regional Institute of Mental Health Society held in Shillong on the 9th December, 2003, the undersigned, as directed by the Chairman, Executive Council, do hereby permanently absorb Dr. Nirab K. Das, Senior M and HO, a permanent employee of the State Government of Assam in the equivalent same post consequent upon being taken over by the North Eastern Council on behalf of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, in compliance to the orders of the hon'ble Supreme Court of India and sanctioned by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs vide its letter No. 1/63/94-NE.II dated 18th December, 1997 and as per an Agreement signed between the North-Eastern Council and the Government of Assam on 11th February, 1999 in the LGB Regional Institute of Mental Health, registered as an autonomous Institute under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as LGB Regional Institute of Mental Health to the post of Sr. M. and HO held in the Government of Assam, subsequently to be fitted in the new/re-designated post approved by the Government of India, Department of Development of North Eastern Region vide its letter No. 2/46/2000-NE.II (D-I) (DONER) dated 13th May, 2002, in the equivalent Central Government pay scale and allowances at par rates applicable to other Central Government employees, which at a later date, made applicable by the Chairman, Executive Council, LGBRIMH Society, with effect from 11th February, 1999. As the matters pertaining to pensionary benefits, family pension, encashment of leave, subscription towards provident fund, subscription to group insurance scheme, mode of payment of pension and pensionary benefit as well as family pension and authorities who would be maintaining the above accounts and issuing authorities of pension payment orders, etc., are not yet decided, necessary administrative order is expected to be issued by the Administrative Ministry/Cadre controlling authority/authority competent to do so. You will be informed as and when a final decision is arrived at for these matters from the competent authority. It is also intimated to you that as per the stipulations made in the Agreement signed between the Government of Assam and the North-Eastern Council, on behalf of the Government of India, the terms and conditions of your absorption in the LGBRIMH, Tezpur, shall not be altered to your disadvantage by the competent authority while issuing administrative orders in the matter of absorption." 33. It is trite that conditions of recruitment and/or conditions of service need not necessarily be embodied in one piece of document or in any particular provision of a statute. Conditions of recruitment and/or conditions of service can be gathered from more than one documents or statutory provisions if the facts of a given case so warrant. Moreover, a letter or an agreement has to be read as a whole to understand the purport and meaning thereof. In the present case, though the letter, in question, does speak of the appellants being permanently absorbed in the posts of Senior M and HO-I, the fact remains that this very letter also, in no uncertain words, state that the appellants would be subsequently fitted in the new/re-designated post, approved by the Government in its letter, dated 13.5.2002. When seen from this angle, it becomes transparent that the appellants absorption was not absolute and unconditional inasmuch as they had been absorbed in the posts of Senior Medical and Health Officer-I so as to enable the Institute to fit them in the re-designated post on their obtaining Post-Graduate degree in term of the letter, dated 13.5.2002. 34. What emerges from the above discussion is that the letter, dated 13.5.2002, incorporated the terms and conditions of absorption. This letter clearly states that State Government employees are to be fitted in the new/re-designated post in terms of the requirement of the said letter. 34. What emerges from the above discussion is that the letter, dated 13.5.2002, incorporated the terms and conditions of absorption. This letter clearly states that State Government employees are to be fitted in the new/re-designated post in terms of the requirement of the said letter. The fact that the appellants considered themselves permanently absorbed without any condition(s) appointed thereto or the fact that the Institute absorbed them permanently without any condition attached thereto is not material. What is material is that the State Government did not permit and could not have, in the light of the directions given in Sheila Barse's case (supra), permitted absorption of its employees, which ran Contrary to the conditions embodied in the letter, dated 13.5.2002. Those, who did not have qualification, could not have been, in the light of the letter dated 13.5.2002, permanently absorbed until they attained the requisite qualification. The outer limit of the period within which one were to acquire such qualification was five years. Hence, until 2007, the State Government was justified in extending the lien as the appellants had not acquired the eligibility criteria for absorption. The appellants did not show ignorance about the letter, dated 13.5.2002, though the letter, dated 16.2.2004, spoke of the letter, dated 13.5.2002. The appellants also showed no inquisitiveness to find out the terms and conditions embodied in the letter, dated 13.5.2002, which affected their service conditions in future, even on receiving the impugned letter, dated 11.10.2006. In these circumstances, the only rational-conclusion can be, and I have no hesitation to draw the conclusion, that the appellants knew that they were to acquire the necessary qualification within the given period of five years in terms of the letter, dated 13.5.2002, and that their absorption under the letter, dated 16.2,2004, was inherently temporary in nature, for, notwithstanding the word 'permanent' appearing in the letter, dated 16.2.2004, their absorption was not unconditional and absolute. 35. Because of what have been discussed above, I do not find that the appellants are clothed with such legal rights as would warrant interference with the impugned letter, dated, 11.10.2006, in exercise of the High courts power under article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly, when the appellants rights, if any statutory or contractual, cannot override supervening public interest. Viewed thus, I do not find that the dismissal of the writ petition was untenable in law. 36. Viewed thus, I do not find that the dismissal of the writ petition was untenable in law. 36. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal shall, in our opinion, fail and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.