JUDGMENT 1. 1. These five writ petitions questioning the land acquisition proceedings under the notifications dated 16.2.2006 and 17.5.2006 issued respectively under Section 4 and Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act'/'the Act of 1894' hereafter) having similar facts and involving almost identical issues have been heard together; and are taken up for disposal by this common order. 2. The -petitioners have questioned in these writ petitions the legality of the disputed acquisition proceedings for non-compliance of the requirements of Part VII of the Act of 1894 when the acquisition is allegedly made for the purpose of the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Limited ('RIICO'). The petitioners have also questioned the legality of the notification dated 17.5.2006 invoking the provisions of Section 17 and dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act; and have further assailed the order dated 28.6.2006 as passed by the Land Acquisition Officer while rejecting their objections to the said acquisition. 3. A brief reference to the facts relevant for the purpose of issues involved would suffice. On 16.2.2006, the respondent State Government issued the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act notifying that certain parcels of land as stated therein and situated at village Ramsara, Tehsil and District Churu were to be acquired in favour of RIICO, a registered Government company under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 ('the Act of 1956' hereafter) for public purpose namely, for development and expansion of industrial area. It was, of course stated in the said notification that the land was proposed to be acquired for the company at the costs of the company, and this notification was issued in supersession of earlier notification issued for the same purpose on 24.10.2005. It was, of course stated in the said notification that the land was proposed to be acquired for the company at the costs of the company, and this notification was issued in supersession of earlier notification issued for the same purpose on 24.10.2005. Opening part of the said notification dated 16.2.2006, reads as under:- pwfd jkT; ljdkj larq"V gS fd xzke jkeljk rglhy o ftyk pw: dh 341-11 ch?kk futh [kkrsnkjh Hkwfe lkoZtfud iz;kstukFkZ vFkkZr~ vkS/kksfxd {ks= ds fodkl ,oa foLrkj djus gsrq dEiuh ,DV 1956 dh /kkjk 617 ds vUrxZr iathd`r jktdh; dEiuh jktLFkku jkT; vkS/kksfxd fodkl ,oa fofu;kstu fuxe fy- fjdks t;iqj ds i{k esa vokIr fd;k tkuk vfrvko';d gSA vr,oa mDr Hkwfe dEiuh ds [kpZ ij dEiuh ds fy, vf/kxzfgr dh tkuh gSA vr% jkT; ljdkj mi;qZDr iz;kstukFkZ layXu lwph esa of.kZr Hkwfe dks vtZu djus gsrq ,rn~ }kjk vf/klwfpr djrh gSA ;g vf/klwpuk Hkwfe vtZu vf/kfu;e 1894 tks fd jkT; esa Hkwfe vtZu jktLFkku la'kks/ku vf/kfu;e 1987 1987 dk vf/kfu;e la[;k 8 izlkfjr djus gsrq jkT; esa ykxw gS dh /kkjk 4 mu lcds fy, tks blls lacaf/kr gS] ds vUrxZr cuk;h x;h gSA 4. Objections were invited under the said notification within 30 days of its publication. The persons likely to have interest in the land sought to be acquired, including the petitioners, were also issued individual notices to submit their objections, if any. The petitioners did submit their objections to the proposed acquisition, substance of which had been that they were residing for the last 40 years by constructing pucca houses on the land in question; that they were not having any other land for residence and agriculture; that the Collector concerned had already sent proposal for expansion of municipal limits encompassing the land in question too and such proposal was pending with the Government; that on its northern and western sides, the land in question was surrounded by thickly populated area and, if acquired for industrial purpose, residential development shall be adversely affected; that the acquisition would be violative of the notification dated 12.9.2003 requiring that the industrial area should not be put up within the periphery of 1.5 kms. from the outer limits of any village population; that the land in question was situated just 100 feet from the centre of the road connecting the revenue villages Ramsara, Uthmalia and others with Churu Township; that alternative land was available including about 1100 bighas of Government land that could be utilised for the purpose. 5. While the petitioners had submitted their objections in response to the notification dated 16.2.2006 and personal notices issued thereunder and while the matter was pending consideration, the State Government, in its Industries Department issued a notification on 17.5.2006 under Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Act of 1894 declaring that there was urgency for such acquisition; and in exercise of powers under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, directed that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act would not apply in relation to the land in question and in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 6, the Land Acquisition Officer, Sub-Divisional Officer, Churu was directed to proceed with the acquisition and to take possession of the land after 15 days of the publication of the notice under Section 9 of the Act but after compliance of sub-section (3-A) of Section 17. The petitioners have pointed out that even after publication of such notification dated 17.5.2006, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Churu proceeded to reject their objections in a casual manner while merely stating that the notifications have been issued for industrial development and expansion and the land was required to be acquired in the interest of the State. 6. It may be pointed out that in this batch of petitions, CWP No. 3271/2006; Hanuman Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan & others was filed on 28.6.2006 essentially questioning the notification dated 17.5.2006 but the original writ petition was permitted to be amended so as to take other grounds of challenge to the order dated 28.6.2006 and so also to the validity of acquisition proceedings particularly for non-compliance of Part VII of the Act of 1894. CWP Nos. 7228/2006 and 7229/2006 were field on 6.12.2006 whereas CWP Nos. 7227/2006 was filed on 7.12.2006 while taking comprehensively the grounds as taken in the amended petition of CWP No. 3271/2006; and CWP No. 1559/2007 was filed on the same grounds on 13.3.2007. CWP Nos. 7228/2006 and 7229/2006 were field on 6.12.2006 whereas CWP Nos. 7227/2006 was filed on 7.12.2006 while taking comprehensively the grounds as taken in the amended petition of CWP No. 3271/2006; and CWP No. 1559/2007 was filed on the same grounds on 13.3.2007. There has been an objection raised on behalf of the respondents regarding delay and latches in relation to these writ petitions but in the overall circumstances particularly when CWP No.3271/2006 was indeed filed on 28.6.2006 and the said petition was permitted to be amended and the matters have been heard on merits, it appears appropriate to deal with the submissions made on behalf of petitioners on their merits. . 7. Seeking to challenge the proceedings as adopted and maintaining that the right to property cannot be taken away in a casual manner, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted in the first place that these acquisition proceedings are required to be quashed because the procedure prescribed under Part VII of the Act has not been followed. It is submitted that as per the notification dated 16.2.2006, the land is to be acquired for and at the cost of the company i.e. RIICO and, therefore, it is an admitted position that State revenue would not be invested for the purpose; and it is contended that in these circumstances, the procedure as contained in Part VII of the Act was required to be followed but no agreement has been published nor previous enquiry as contemplated by Section 40 has been made. It is submitted that the acquisition in question is neither by the Government company nor for a public purpose but only for the sake of development of the company and, with reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of (1) Devinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2008) 1 SCC 728 , it is contended that the present proceedings being not in accord with the requirements of law deserve to be quashed. Learned counsel submitted in the alternative that there had not been anything worth the name available on record for which the requisite enquiry under Section 5-A could have been dispensed with. Learned counsel submitted in the alternative that there had not been anything worth the name available on record for which the requisite enquiry under Section 5-A could have been dispensed with. It is submitted with reference to the decision of this Court in (2) Syed Hasan All & others v. State of Rajasthan & others, 2006 (6) RDD 3403 that there being no reason to dispense with enquiry, if at all the acquisition is to be proceeded with, the respondents may be directed to continue with the enquiry and to pass appropriate orders after considering all the objections of the petitioners. Learned counsel has also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in (3) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Darius Shahpur Chenai and others, 2005 (4) RLW 2407 . It is further pointed out that even while the Government proceeded to issue the notification dated 17.5.2006, the Land Acquisition Officer gave out as late as on 18.6.2006 that enquiry shall be made and then, dealt with the matter under Section 5-A of the Act but proceeded to pass a cryptic and cursory order without dealing with objections of the petitioners in their right perspective. It is submitted that when the objections were indeed to be considered on merits, the same could have been disposed of in a cryptic manner as that of the impugned order dated 28.6.2006. 8. Refuting the contentions aforesaid, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that acting on the recommendation of the respondent RIICO as made under the communication dated 17.4.2006, the State Government after considering the record came to the specific conclusion that the land was required for the industrial area urgently and, therefore, urgency clause was rightly invoked. It is contended that for invoking urgency clause, no reasoned order is required to be made because such an action is essentially based on the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government arrived at with reference to the material on record. It is submitted that for urgency clause having been invoked and enquiry having been dispensed with, there was no question of considering the objections as proposed to be taken by the petitioners. It is submitted that for urgency clause having been invoked and enquiry having been dispensed with, there was no question of considering the objections as proposed to be taken by the petitioners. It is further submitted that RIICO is a Government company as defined under Section 617 of the Act of 1956 and in view of Section 3(cc) of the Act of 1894, the procedure as prescribed by its Part VII was not required to be followed and prior agreement was not required. It is also submitted that the petitions suffer from delay and latches and deserve to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the respondents have also referred to several of the decided cases including (4) Idol Shri Thakurji, Temple Bhadra v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1997 (3) WLC 366 , (5) Parshottam Jadavji Jeni v. the State of Gujarat and others (1971) 1 SCC 843 , (6) Jai Narain and others v. Union of India and others, (1996) 1 SCC 9 , (7) Union of India and others v. Praveen Gupta and others, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 170 , and (8) First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Niroddhi Prakash Gangoli and another, AIR 2002 Supreme Court 1314 . 9. Taking up the question if the present proceedings remain invalid, this Court is unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Part VII of the Act was required to be complied with in relation to these acquisition proceedings. Part VII of the Act essentially relates to and is meant for operation when the acquisition is made for a company but not for a Government company. The notification under Section 4 itself states that the respondent RIICO is a Government company per Section 617 of the Act of 1956. Correctness of this particular statement in the said notification has not been questioned. For the acquisition in question Part VII of the Act of 1894 has no applicability at all. The aspect may be dilated upon a little more. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devinder Singh's case (supra) has been pleased to point out the clear distinction between the acquisition under Part II and that under Part VII of the Act of 1894. The fundamental distinction in the scheme of the Act of 1894 remains that the acquisition is either for a 'public purpose' or it is for a 'company's purpose'. The fundamental distinction in the scheme of the Act of 1894 remains that the acquisition is either for a 'public purpose' or it is for a 'company's purpose'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devinder Singh's case (supra) pointed out, "40. Distinction between acquisition under Part II and Part VII are self-evident. The State was not only obligated to issue a notification clearly stating as to whether the acquisition is for a public purpose or for the company. Section 6 categorically states so, as would appear from the second proviso appended thereto. 41. A declaration is to be made either for a public purpose or for a company. It cannot be for both." 11. The distinction in application of Part II and Part VII is essentially based on the reason for acquisition; and Part VII applies only when the acquisition is for a company as defined under the Act of 1894. There is an illustrative definition of the expression "public purpose" as given under Section 3(f) of the Act of 1894; however, coming to the main provision of Section 3(f) later, relevant it is to notice at this juncture that as per exclusion provided in Section 3(f) of the Act, the expression 'public purpose' does not include acquisition of land for companies. The expression 'company' has been defined in clause (e) of Section 3 as under: "3.(e) The expression "company" means:- (i) A company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), other than a Government company referred to in Clause (cc); (ii) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, other than a society referred to in Clause (cc); (iii) A co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, other than a co-operative society referred to in Clause (cc); 12. For a comprehension of the meaning of the company as given out in Section 3(e) aforesaid, it is necessary to look at clause (cc) of Section 3 of the Act that reads as under: "3(cc) the expression "corporation owned or controlled by the State" means any body corporate established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, and includes a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, being a society established or administered by Government and a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, being a cooperative society in which not less than fifty-one per centum of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or by any State Government or Governments or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments." 13. Thus, the exclusion as stated in Section 3(f) of the Act is meant for operation when acquisition is for a company; but when it is a Government company, per Section 3(e) read with Section 3(cc), such exclusion does not apply. Part VII of the Act when read as a whole makes it clear that acquisition of land for companies has been provided for certain limited purposes when the purpose is for company itself and is not a public purpose. The respondent RIICO being indisputably a Government company, the acquisition of land for RIICO is not referable to Part VII of the Act and in this view of the matter, all the contentions regarding non-compliance of Sections 39 to 42 of the Act fall to the ground. It may be noticed that this Court in the case of Idol Shri Thakurji (supra) has pointed out inapplicability of the said provisions of Sections 39 to 42 of the Act and in relation to the then existing Rajasthan State Electricity Board, and said, "4. There is a lot of substance in the submission made by Mr. Jain that when the urgency clause is applied then there- is no question of considering the applicability of Sections 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Act. There is a lot of substance in the submission made by Mr. Jain that when the urgency clause is applied then there- is no question of considering the applicability of Sections 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Act. In my opinion, the respondent Rajasthan State Electricity Board is a company which is different from other ordinary private or public company. For acquisition of land in favour of such company like RSEB there is no need for observing formalities provided under Sections 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Act." 14. It may further be noticed that Rule 11-A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Industrial Area Allotment) Rules, 1959 ('the Rules of 1959') making provisions for grant of land for industrial purposes provides the terms and conditions whereunder the land would be allotted by the Government to RIICO; and RIICO has been empowered to make allotment of the land in accordance with its Laud Disposal Rules in the industrial areas notified by the State Government and transferred to them. The purpose of the acquisition in the present case being directly for a Government company who is authorised under the relevant Land Disposal Rules to develop and expand the industrial areas, the acquisition could only be held to be for a public purpose. 15. It may be pointed out that during the course of submissions in these writ petitions, learned counsel Mr. Rajeev Purohit and Mr. S.D. Vyas, though not representing any of the parties, sought permission to intervene and looking to the points canvassed, they were permitted to address the Court. Learned counsel Mr. Rajeev Purohit while supporting the submissions of the petitioners attempted to argue with reference to Sections 43 and 44 of the Act of 1894 that the provisions of Part VII apply to a Government company as well as a non-Government private limited or public limited company with the only exception being a railway company. The argument does not appear correct. Section 43 only carves out an exception in relation to such particular cases where under an agreement the Government is bound to provide land to the company concerned and in such cases, Sections 39 to 42 do not apply, and Section 44 only provides the manner of proof of agreement with the Railway Company. It is difficult to deduce from these provisions that Sections 39 to 42 shall otherwise apply in relation to all the companies. It is difficult to deduce from these provisions that Sections 39 to 42 shall otherwise apply in relation to all the companies. In fact Section 43 of the Act of 1894 essentially distinguishes and separates out the entities which are Government undertakings from the ambit and scope of the definition of the company and with insertion of Section 3(cc) and with substitution of Section 3(e) by the Amendment Act of 1984 and other provisions as noticed above, in the opinion of this Court it is clear that acquisition for a Government company like RIICO is out of the purview of Part VII of the Act. 16. Learned counsel Mr. S.D. Vyas, however, referred to the definition of "public purpose" as contained in Section 3(f) of the Act and particularly its clause (iv) and contended that so far as a Corporation owned or controlled by the State is concerned, the acquisition could be said to be for a public purpose only when resorted to for the purpose of making provision of land for such Corporation itself but not beyond. Learned counsel submitted that development of an industrial area is not envisaged by Section 3(f) of the Act to be a public purpose. These submissions clearly overlook the fundamental fact that the definition as contained in Section 3(f) of the Act is not an exhaustive one but the provision reads thus: 3. Learned counsel submitted that development of an industrial area is not envisaged by Section 3(f) of the Act to be a public purpose. These submissions clearly overlook the fundamental fact that the definition as contained in Section 3(f) of the Act is not an exhaustive one but the provision reads thus: 3. (f) The expression 'public purpose' includes- (i) The provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village-sites; (ii) The provision of land for town or rural planning; (iii) The provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned; (iv) The provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (v) The provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (vi) The provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the _ appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a cooperative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State; (vii) The provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority; (viii) The provision of any premises or building for locating a public office, but does not include acquisition of land for Companies.;" 17. The list of 'purposes' as stated in Section 3(f) is, obviously not exhaustive and anything having a public element in it and serving a public purpose, depending on the facts and circumstances, could be considered to be a public purpose. The list of 'purposes' as stated in Section 3(f) is, obviously not exhaustive and anything having a public element in it and serving a public purpose, depending on the facts and circumstances, could be considered to be a public purpose. Planned development of industrial area by way of systematic development of land and its disposal is directly a public purpose and when examined in the light of the Rules of 1959 whereby the Government allots the land to RIICO and whereby the RIICO is empowered to make allotment for the purpose of industrial area development, this Court is unable to agree that such would not be a public purpose. Broadly speaking, such purpose could very well be considered covered even in the illustrative definition aforesaid in its clauses (iii) and (iv). Though this aspect of the matter needs no further dilation, however, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Parshotam Jadavji Jeni (supra) as referred by learned counsel for the respondent RIICO could usefully be reproduced to point out that establishment of industrial area by a Corporation established by the State Government and acquisition of land for the said purpose was held to be for a public purpose. The Hon'ble Supreme Court said, "The second ground pressed before the High Court was that the establishment of Industrial Area by the Corporation was not a public purpose but a private purpose. In our view the High Court was right in holding that this was a public purpose." 18. The edifice on which the argument in these writ petitions has been developed by the petitioners is the principle explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devinder Singh's case (supra) that the decisive test is the source of funds to cover the costs of acquisition and in the present case, for the notification under Section 4 having clearly stated that costs shall be borne by the company i.e., RIICO only, no State fund is involved and hence, the acquisition being for the company, Part VII was required to be complied with. The submission is not correct. It may be pointed out that the acquisition proceedings in Devinder Singh's case (supra) were not relating to a Government company but were specifically and indisputably for a private company. The submission is not correct. It may be pointed out that the acquisition proceedings in Devinder Singh's case (supra) were not relating to a Government company but were specifically and indisputably for a private company. In the present case the notification dated 16.2.2006 clearly states that RIICO is a Government company under Section 617 of the Act of 1956 and such statement has not been questioned by the petitioners; and, as noticed above, for the Government company, Part VII does not apply. This apart, there is yet another aspect unfailingly pointing out that acquisition for a company like RIICO would indeed be an acquisition for public purpose even when the source of funds to cover the costs of acquisition is treated to be decisive of the matter as to whether it is a public purpose acquisition or Part VII acquisition as per the ratio of Devinder Singh (supra). In the acquisition proceedings under Part II of the Act of 1894, after publication of preliminary notification under Section 4 and hearing of objections under Section 5-A, declaration of intended acquisition that a particular land is needed for public purpose or for a company is to be made as per the prescribed procedure under Section 6 of the Act. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 contemplates that "no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority."; however, Explanation 2 to sub- section (1) of Section 6 of the Act of 1894 makes it clear that where the compensation is to be paid out of funds of Corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be the compensation paid out of public revenues. As noticed, the Government company concerned, RIICO, answers to the description of the 'Corporation owned or controlled by the State' per Section 3 (cc). The fiction created by Explanation 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 6 makes the funds of all such entities covered by Section 3(cc) as those of public revenues for the purpose of the Act. As noticed, the Government company concerned, RIICO, answers to the description of the 'Corporation owned or controlled by the State' per Section 3 (cc). The fiction created by Explanation 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 6 makes the funds of all such entities covered by Section 3(cc) as those of public revenues for the purpose of the Act. Thus, acquisition for a company like RIICO, which is a Government company and covered under Section 3(cc) of the Act is clearly an acquisition for public purpose; the funds thereto even when borne by RIICO, being treated to be public revenue. The stipulation regarding funds as made in the notification dated 16.2.2006 seem to have been made in the light of such provisions as contained in second proviso and Explanation 2 to Section 6(1). This Court has no hesitation in concluding that the impugned one is an acquisition for public purpose whereto Part VII of the Act of 1894 does not apply. The acquisition in question does not appear suffering from any infirmity. 19. It has strenuously been contended in the alternative by the learned counsel for the petitioners, while placing strong reliance on the decisions in Syed Hasan Ali and Hindustan Petroleum (supra) that even if Part II would apply, dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and invocation of urgency clause per Section 17 of the Act cannot be readily resorted to and in the present case there being no relevant material with the State Government, the notification dated 17.5.2006 intending to do away with the enquiry deserves to be quashed. Per contra it is contended on behalf of the respondents with reference to the decisions in jai Narain, Praveen Gupta and Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli's case (supra) that the authority is not required to pass a reasoned order for the purpose of invoking the urgency clause and it is the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government formed on the basis of material on record. The gist of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties could well be noticed from the decision in Syed Hasan Ali that so long there existed the material upon which the Government could have formed the satisfaction for the purpose of Section 17(4) of the Act fairly the Court would not interfere nor the material would be examined by the Court as an appellate authority; and the decision of the Government to disspense with enquiry under Section 5-A could be challenged only on the grounds of non-application of mind or mala fide. It does not require much of the discussion that no detailed reasoned order is required to be passed for the purpose of dispensing with the enquiry. Having regard to the principles applicable, each case wherein formation of opinion by the Government is questioned, is required to be considered on its own facts. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum (supra) the fact situation had been that the appellant, a Government company was a lessee of the premises in question; on expiry of the lease period, an eviction suit was filed against the appellant that was decreed; and an appeal preferred was also dismissed. The appellant thereafter sent a requisition for acquisition of premises for continuing the business and in this backdrop the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued. The respondent filed objections, contending, inter alia, that there existed no public purpose. The Collector conducted an enquiry and submitted his report and declaration was thereafter issued under Section 6 of the Act. The respondent filed writ petition against the notification so issued that was allowed by the High Court; however in an appeal preferred there-against, the Hon'ble Supreme Court remitted the matter to the High Court for the reason that several other contentious issues had been raised and the parties were granted liberty to file additional pleadings. The respondent thereafter successfully contended before the High Court that there had been a total non-application of mind on the part of State Government before issuing the notification under Section 4(1) and so also before issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The respondent thereafter successfully contended before the High Court that there had been a total non-application of mind on the part of State Government before issuing the notification under Section 4(1) and so also before issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that when the High Court directed the State to produce the records relating to the case, an affidavit affirmed by a Principal Secretary to the Government was filed stating that records were not readily traceable and an apology was tendered for non-production of records. In the given fact situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the State failed to justify its action by production of records and rejected the contention that the circumstances pointed out in the counter-affidavit filed before the Court could be taken to be substitute for the necessary reasons. The Hon'ble Court pointed out that a statutory authority cannot be permitted to support its order relying on or on the basis of the statements made in the affidavit dehors the order or dehors the record. 20. In the case of Syed Hasan Ali (supra), this Court found after scanning through the relevant record that even though the matter stood scrutiny upto highest level in the Government, there was no material before the State Government justifying issuance of notification under Section 17 of the Act and non-application of mind by the State Government to the relevant facts was found evident. Significantly, the Court found that the land in question was covered by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court requiring that the park and green areas in the city and towns shall not be allowed to be converted for any other purpose; and it was found that conversion of the land in question for the purpose of installing industries would amount to flouting the directions of this Court. This Court further found the land in question to be covered by Rule 2-B of the Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment (Amendment) Rules, 2003 whereby it was to be treated unavailable for industrial allotment. This Court further found urgency clause having been invoked as a substitute and support for the laxity, lethargy and lack of care on the part of State Administration; and that the State Government while invoking urgency clauses did not act with due care and responsibility. 21. This Court further found urgency clause having been invoked as a substitute and support for the laxity, lethargy and lack of care on the part of State Administration; and that the State Government while invoking urgency clauses did not act with due care and responsibility. 21. In the present case, it is noticed that after issuance of the notification on 16.2.2006, RIICO did represent for invoking the urgency clause indicating the reasons and factors that there was already a saturation in the industrial area developed in Churu, several of wooden handicraft industries were coming up making out urgent requirement of the land. It was also pointed that industries were coming up in an unplanned manner. The communication sent by the respondent RIICO to the State Government reads as under:- mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr fuosnu gS fd vkS|ksfxd {ks= pq: dh LFkkiuk gsrq xzke jkeljk] rglhy o ftyk pq: dh 341 ch?kk 11 fcLok futh [kkrsnkjh Hkwfe dh vokfIr gsrq m|ksx foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk dzekad % i 4@2 m|ksx@1@06 fnukad 16-02-2006 }kjk /kkjk- 4 dh vf/klwpuk tkjh dh tk pqdh gSA orZeku esa pq: ftys esa cqMu gs.Mh ls lEcfU/kr m|ksx dkQh LFkkfir gks jgs gSaA bl gsrq Hkw[k.Mksa dh ekax dh tk jgh gSA lkFk gh {ks= esa vuIyk.M rjhds ls {ks= esa m|ksx LFkkfir gks jgs gSaA vr% m|fe;ksa }kjk Hkwfe dh vR;f/kd ekax dks ns[krs gq, u;s vkS|ksfxd {ks= ds fy, Hkwfe dh vR;Ur vko';drk gksus ls mDr Hkwfe dks Hkwfe vkokfIr vf/kfu;e ds vtsZUlh izko/kkuksa ds vUrxZr vokIr djus gsrq fuxe izcU/ku }kjk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gSA vr% fuosnu gS fd xzke jkeljk] rglhy o ftyk pq: dh dqy 341 ch?kk 11 fcLok Hkwfe dks vkokIr djus gsrq Hkwfe vkokfIr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 6 ,oa 17@4 ds vUrxZr vf/klwpuk tkjh djus dk d"V djsaA 22. It is also noticed from the record that in fact, the site in question was selected after due inspection by the relevant officers of the Government. In the overall circumstances, the present one does not appear to be a case where the Government had no material before it to arrive at the decision that urgency clause was required to be invoked; or that the urgency clause has been invoked as substitute for laxity or lethargy on part of the Government officers. In the overall circumstances, the present one does not appear to be a case where the Government had no material before it to arrive at the decision that urgency clause was required to be invoked; or that the urgency clause has been invoked as substitute for laxity or lethargy on part of the Government officers. The present one does not appear to be a case of colourable exercise of powers nor any other case of mala fide is made out at all. In these circumstances, this Court is dearly of opinion that the decision in Hindustan Petroleum and Syed Hasan Ali are of no help to the petitioners; and the notifications impugned in these writ petitions call for no interference. 23. It appears appropriate, however, to point out that the order dated 28.6.2006 as passed by the Land Acquisition Officer seems to have been passed in a casual and perfunctory manner inasmuch as the said Land Acquisition Officer proceeded to deal with the objections even after the notification had been issued under Section 17 of the Act dispensing with enquiry. It was, of course, expected of the Land Acquisition Officer to deal with the matter after due regard to the record. This Court is constrained to observe that had it been a case where enquiry was to be taken up per Section 5-A of the Act, the cursory order as passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 28.6.2006 would not have been countenanced. But then, in the circumstances of this case where a notification under Section 17 of the Act had already been issued, the said order dated 28.6.2006 could only be treated as nonest and deserves to be ignored. 24. It may also be pointed out that one of the submissions of the petitioners had been that as late as on 18.6.2006, the Land Acquisition Officer specifically gave out the press statement that enquiry for the purpose of acquisition was to be carried out; and the petitioners contended that in the totality of circumstances the notification purporting to invoke urgency clause had been nothing but a farce and was issued in colourable exercise of powers. According to the press report (Annex.6) the Land Acquisition Officer allegedly stated that notices to the land owners for making claims had been issued; that the matter was at initial stage; that the land was sought to be acquired in accordance with law; and that development of industrial area shall be giving a new direction to development. Though it is difficult to make out from such statement if the Land Acquisition Officer at all suggested that enquiry as contemplated by Section 5-A was definitely to be undertaken but then, this Court is unable to appreciate that the Land Acquisition Officer who was supposed to deal with the matters in accordance with his statutory duties that required, inter alia, dealing with the claims of private individuals too, and thereby discharging in a way quasi-judicial functions was at all making such press statement. For the Land Acquisition Officer making such statement and then passing the order dated 28.6.2006 in rejection of the objections in a cursory manner, the petitioners cannot be faulted in making grievance that on the one hand they were suggested about pendency of enquiry and on the other hand, enquiry was sought to be dispensed with by invoking urgency clause and yet the order was passed as if in conclusion of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. In the overall circumstances of the case, however, this Court would not like to make any further comment on this aspect of the matter because, as aforesaid, for the notification having rightly been issued under Section 17 of the Act and enquiry having been dispensed with, the order dated 28.6.2006 could only be treated non-est and ineffective. 25. The submissions as made on behalf of the petitioners remain untenable and are, therefore, rejected. 26. As a result of the aforesaid, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******