Judgment :- This writ petition has been preferred by a Tutor in Anesthesiology, in the Institute of Social Obstetrics, Government Kasturba Gandhi Hospital for Women and Children, Chennai, challenging clause 14(a) of the Prospectus for the year 2008-2009 issued by the second respondent in respect of admission to Post Graduate Degree course for the academic year 2008-2009. 2. The factual details as culled out from the affidavit it filed in support of the writ petition are as under: The petitioner is functioning as Tutor in Anesthesiology, in the Institute of Social Obstetrics, Government Kasturba Gandhi Hospital for Women and Children attached to Madras Medical College, Chennai and he joined the services of the Government of Tamil Nadu in the year 1996. The petitioner has been applying for admission to the post graduate degree course continuously for the past four years, and having failed in his attempt, took steps to apply again for the current year. However, to his shock and surprise, it was found that the second respondent had introduced for the first time a condition that candidates above 50 years as on 33. 2008 are not eligible for admission to the post-graduate course. The said provision as contained in Clause 14(a) of the prospectus has been challenged by the petitioner as arbitrary, unreasonable besides violation of Rules as well as the provisions of the Constitution of India. 3. The second respondent has filed counter affidavit wherein they have indicated that it was only in pursuance of the policy of the Government, that such a clause was inserted with regard to the maximum age. It was further submitted that the Government has taken a policy decision to the effect that the service candidates should serve the public till the age of superannuation, as the Government has been spending considerable amount for the studies of the medical professionals in Colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu. It was also indicated that in case a service candidate join the post graduate course after the age of 50 years, he would be continuing with his education till 53 years and as such only five years would be left to serve the Government. It was also indicated that in case a service candidate join the post graduate course after the age of 50 years, he would be continuing with his education till 53 years and as such only five years would be left to serve the Government. Since the tax amount of the poor people were being used for the education of these professionals, the Government thought it fit to prescribe the maximum age limit of 50 years with a view to make available the services of these professionals for poor and needy. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that no such age limit has been prescribed by the Medical Council of India or by the Premier Medical Institutions like All India Institute of Medical Sciences and as such the respondents are not justified in putting such an onerous condition in the Prospectus so as to make the candidates like the petitioner ineligible to apply for the post graduate course. It was further contended that the so called policy of the Government cannot be taken as a ground to make an unreasonable classification, on account of which, the petitioner is not in a position to pursue his higher studies. 5. The Learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that the Government has taken a policy decision to fix the upper age limit at 50 years as on 33. 2008 for admission to post graduate course and the said decision having been taken in larger public interest, the Government cannot be found fault with and as such there is absolutely no merit in the contention of the petitioner. 6. It is found from Clause 14(a) of the Prospectus that the candidates, above 50 years as on 33. 2008 were not eligible to apply. The petitioner has been applying for the last four years for admission to the post-graduate course and he could not get admission on account of his poor performance in the entrance examination. 7. The impugned provision has been challenged on the ground that in the Medical council Act or in the Prospectus relating to some of the Premier Medical Institutions in the country, there were no such age restriction in the matter of post-graduate education and as such the restriction as per Clause 14(a) is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. 8. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, a specific contention has been taken to the effect that the impugned proviso was inserted only on account of the policy decision taken by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the effect that service candidates should serve the Government till the age of their superannuation and in case they are permitted to join the post-graduate course, their period of Government Service would be restricted to a minimum period of five years and the same is lot in the interest of the people, as the Government has considerable amount for the education of these medical professionals. The second respondent has also indicated in their counter statement that similar age restrictions are prevailing in the State of Karnataka, Kerala, Rajasthan and Delhi. 9. It is also found from the format of undertaking affidavit to be given by the service candidates during the time of admission to post-graduate course, that the intention was only to get the service of these professionals for a considerable period, to serve the general public. The policy of the Government as culled out from the prospectus is extracted below: “The Government of Tamil Nadu is offering Medical Education including Post-Graduate and Higher Specialty Training through its 14 Medical Colleges/Hospitals and Specialized institutes. The Government spends a large amount of money to impart Medical Education including Post Graduate/Higher Specialty Education. It levies nominal fees and at the same time provides a stipend to private candidates and salary to Service candidates. It is natural that the Government desires to ensure that these seats are not wasted. Further, the Government looks forward to these Doctors who have undergone Post-Graduate training to serve the poor and the needy for this country at large and this State in particular. The public have the right to expect the Specialists to utilize the skills they acquired during their training for the benefit of the sick, the poor and the needy. To ensure that the services of trained Post Graduate Doctors are made available, an undertaking is obtained from them at the time of their admission. It is sincerely, believed that this will discourage an attitude of not paying attention to those poor people at whose expense they have been educated”. 10. To ensure that the services of trained Post Graduate Doctors are made available, an undertaking is obtained from them at the time of their admission. It is sincerely, believed that this will discourage an attitude of not paying attention to those poor people at whose expense they have been educated”. 10. Government is entitled to take policy decision in public interest and it has also got the right to change its policy from time to time depending upon the exigencies of the situation as well as necessity. While formulating its policy, Government often takes into consideration so many factors and it had also got expertise for evolving such policy. It cannot be said that the policy shall be one and the same at all point of time. Government is the best Judge insofar as its policy is concerned. It is only when a particular policy infringes the provisions of the constitution or any of the statutory provisions, that the Courts step in to test the validity of such policy. Therefore, judicial review is very limited in the realm of government policy. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Radhakrishnan. K. v. Secretary, Bar Council of India 2006 (5) CTC 705 wherein the Division Bench had quashed the upper, age limit prescribed for Law graduates to enroll as advocates. In the said decision, the object of the impugned rule as projected before the Division Bench was only to curtail a group of persons from entering into the profession and satisfy the other group of persons and in the said factual context, taking into account the judgment of the Apex Court in Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice and Others v. Bar Council of India and Another AIR 1995 SC 691 : (1995) 1 SCC 732 declaring Rule 9 of the Bar Council, of India Rules as unconstitutional, wherein the provision was to the effect that a person completed the age of 45 years on the date on which he submits his application for enrolment as an advocate to the State Bar Council, shall not be enrolled as an advocate, declared the impugned rule as unconstitutional on the ground that misuse of the profession by a minority cannot be a reason to restrict entry of law graduates above 45 years from enrolling as advocates. The facts of the said judgment are entirely different/and as such the said judgment cannot be relied on to invalidate the impugned clause in the prospectus. In the present case, Government was within their powers to prescribe the maximum age limit for admission to post-graduate medical course and there is no statutory bar for such a course. 12.There is nothing indicated in the writ petition to show that the Government is not entitled to formulate its policy in the matter of medical education. There is no conflict between the Union Law and State Law in this regard and as such the question of repugnancy also does not arise. 13. The Apex Court in Union of India v. P.M. Works AIR 1974 SC 2349 : (1975) 1 SCC 305 after considering the choice of date as basis for classification held as under: “The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark”. 14. In Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 2349 : (1997) 9 SCC 31 , the Apex Court held that cut off date fixed for deciding eligibility was valid and observed thus: “This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cutoff date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cutoff date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable”. 15. In Union of India v. S. Vinod Kumar AIR 2007 SCW 5989 , the Apex Court while considering the prerogative of he employer to fix the eligibility criteria, held thus: “10. It may be true that the cut-off marks at 71 had been fixed for unreserved candidates on the basis that marks obtained by the last candidate, i.e. 240th candidate, calculated at 50% of the 480 candidates, but concededly 56 marks were fixed for Other Backward Classes candidates and 20 marks were fixed for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates. Only because the cut-off marks at 71 had been fixed on the basis of the aforementioned criteria, the same by itself, in our opinion, would not mean that no cutoff mark had been fixed. The fact that the Railway Administration intended to fix the cutoff mark for the purpose of filling up the vacancies in respect of the general category as also reserved category candidates is evident from the fact that different cut-off marks were fixed for different categories of candidates. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the cut-off marks fixed was wholly arbitrary so as to offend the principles of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The power of the employer to fix the cut-off marks is neither denied nor disputed. If the cutoff mark was fixed on a rational basis, no exception thereto can be taken. 11. Respondents herein had approached the Tribunal in the year 2000. The Tribunal directed the appellants to consider this case of lowering of the cut-off marks. An inference, therefore, can be drawn from the aforementioned fact that the main prayer of the respondents was that the cut-off marks should be lowered. Appellants admittedly did not agree to the said proposal. The action of the appellants impugned before the Tribunal must, therefore, be considered from the view point as to whether it had the requisite jurisdiction to do so. The Tribunal upheld the contention of the appellant. Appellants admittedly did not agree to the said proposal. The action of the appellants impugned before the Tribunal must, therefore, be considered from the view point as to whether it had the requisite jurisdiction to do so. The Tribunal upheld the contention of the appellant. Once it is held that the appellants had the requisite jurisdiction to fix the cut-off marks, the necessary corollary thereof would be that it could not be directed to lower the same. It is trite that it is for the employer or the expert body to determine the cut-off marks. The Court while exercising its power of judicial review would not ordinarily intermeddle therewith. The jurisdiction of the Court, in this behalf, is limited. The cut-off marks fixed will depend upon the importance of the subject for the post in question. It is permissible to fix different cut-off marks for different categories of candidates. (See Banking Service Recruitment Board v. V. Ramalingam AIR 1999 SC 2861 : (1998) 8 SCC 523 )”. 16. In identical circumstances, when there was a challenge with respect to fixation of 50 years as maximum age for admission to three year Higher Specialty Course in the Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu, a learned Judge of this Court repelled the said contention and dismissed the writ petition. The said order dated 26. 2008 in W.P.No.13824 of 2008 in the case of Dr. M.A. Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others squarely covers the issue involved in the present writ petition. .17. In State of Punjab v. Ram Lobhaya Baggam AIR 1998 SC 1703 : (1998) 4 SCC 117 : 1998-II-LLJ-867, the Apex Court had considered the limited scope of judicial review in respect of pros and cons of the Government policy and held thus at p. 874 o LLJ: .“25. …… So far as questioning the validity of governmental policy is concerned in our view it is not normally within the domain of any Court, to weigh the pros and cons of the policy or to scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable disposition for the purpose of varying, modifying or annulling it, based on howsoever sound and good reasoning, except where it is arbitrary or violative of any constitutional, statutory or any other provision of law. When Government forms its policy, it is based on a number of circumstances on facts, law including constraints based on its resources. It is also based on expert opinion. It would be dangerous if Court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive”. .18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chaudhari Ran Beer Singh (2008) 4 MLJ 465 : (2008) 3 SCALE 611 , the Supreme Court while Considering the scope of interference in policy decision held thus at p. 468 of MLJ: .“12. ….. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the State, in matters of policy decisions, the scope of interference is extremely limited. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can decide which policy should be adopted after considering all relevant aspects from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown. Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government”. 19. In a very recent judgment in Seema Silk & Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement (2008) 7 SCALE 624 : (2008) 3 MLJ (Crl) 1196, the Apex Court held that discrimination on the ground of valid classification which answers the test of intelligible differentia does not attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and observed thus at p. 1200 of MLJ (Crl): “12. Appellants have questioned the validity of the Act only on the ground of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Apart from the fact that the Act is protected under Article 31-B of the Constitution of India having been placed in the Ninth Schedule thereof, even otherwise we do not find any reason to arrive at a conclusion that the Act is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Apart from the fact that the Act is protected under Article 31-B of the Constitution of India having been placed in the Ninth Schedule thereof, even otherwise we do not find any reason to arrive at a conclusion that the Act is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A discrimination on the ground of valid classification, which answers the test of intelligible differentia does not attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hardship, by itself, may not be a ground for holding the said provision to be unconstitutional”. In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1130 : (1984) 3 SCC 127 : 1984-I-LLJ-368, this Court held at p. 386 of LLJ: “48. Differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on the basis of which differentiation has been made with the object sought to be achieved by particular provision, then such differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution. This principle is too well-settled now to be reiterated by reference to cases. There is intelligible basis for differentiation. Whether the same result or better result could have been achieved and better basis of differentiation evolved is within the domain of legislature and must be left to the wisdom of the legislature. Had it been held that the scheme of 1980 was within the authority given by the Act, we would have rejected the challenge to the Act and the scheme under Article 14 of the Constitution”. 20. In State of Punjab v. Ram Lobhaya Baggam (supra) the Apex Court while considering the obligation of the State under Article 47 of the Constitution of India, held thus at p. 874 of LLJ: “26. When we speak about a right, it correlates to a duty upon another, individual, employer, government or authority. In other words, the right of one is an obligation of another. Hence the right of a citizen to live under Article 21 casts obligation on the State. This obligation is further reinforced under Article 47, it is for the State to secure health to its citizen as its primary duty. In other words, the right of one is an obligation of another. Hence the right of a citizen to live under Article 21 casts obligation on the State. This obligation is further reinforced under Article 47, it is for the State to secure health to its citizen as its primary duty. No doubt the Government is rendering this obligation by opening government hospitals and health centres, but in order to make it meaningful, it has to be within the reach of its people, as far as possible, to reduce the queue of waiting lists, and it has to provide all facilities for which an employee looks for at another hospital. Its upkeep, maintenance and cleanliness has to be beyond aspersion. To employ the best of talents and tone up its administration to give effective contribution. Also bring in awareness in welfare of hospital staff for their dedicated service, give them periodical, medico-ethical and service-oriental training, not only at the entry point but also during the whole tenure of their service. Since it is one of the most sacrosanct and valuable rights of a citizen and equally sacrosanct scared obligation of the State, every citizen of this welfare State looks towards the State for it to perform its this obligation with top priority including by way of allocation of sufficient funds. This in turn will not only secure the right of its citizen to the best of their satisfaction but in turn will benefit the State in achieving its social, political and economical goal”. 21. In view of the reasons aforementioned, I do not find any merit in the contention of the petitioner and as such the writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected MPs are also closed. No costs.