Judgment : D. MURUGESAN, J. The issues that arise for our consideration these Contempt Appeals are as follows: (i) Whether an interlocutory order passed in Sub-Application in Contempt Petition is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? (ii) If so, whether a person who is not party to the contempt proceedings could prefer such Appeal? 2. For consideration of the above, the following few facts leading to the Contempt Petition may be summarised: On 212. 2004, a Suit in C.S. No. 981 of 2004 came to be filed before this Court by Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary Mr. M.P.T. Muthuraj for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein, namely, the Reserve Bank of India, the three Directory (Nominees of RBI), Chairman & Executive Officer and nine Directors of Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. and against some other power of attorney holders, from preventing the members whose name is registered in the Register of Members of Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. or their duly authorised proxies from participating and exercising their voting rights in the forthcoming Annual General Meeting dated 212. 2004. Along with the suit O.A. No. 597-599 of 2006 were also filed by the plaintiff Association seeking for interim injunction restraining the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd., Tuticorin from (i) holding its annual general meeting on 27. 2006, (ii) permitting the proxies issued by power of attorney holders not registered in terms of Article 85 of the Articles of Association of the Bank, and (iii) preventing the members, whose names are found in register of members of the Bank or their duly authorised proxies from participation and exercising their voting rights in the said meeting. By an interim order dated 27. 2006 a learned single judge of the Court had ordered in paragraphs 9 & 10 as follows: “9…..Till such time, without postponing the meeting, there can be better arrangement to conduct the Annual General Meeting as scheduled on 27. 2006 so far as the subject matter 1, 2 & 6 found in the agenda (by show of hands) are concerned and regarding the other subject matter Nos. 3-5 found in the agenda, the general body meeting may be adjourned until further orders of the Court and to which meeting fresh proxies may be allowed in accordance with the result of the enquiry to be made in these Applications. 3-5 found in the agenda, the general body meeting may be adjourned until further orders of the Court and to which meeting fresh proxies may be allowed in accordance with the result of the enquiry to be made in these Applications. Suppose, the proxies of GPA holders were not allowed to participate in the election, then no fresh proxies need be made. There is also no serious objection by anyone concerned (counsel). 10. Since the subject matters 3 to 5 in the agenda for the General Body Meeting on 27. 2006 are going to be adjourned, the erstwhile Directors shall be directed to continue in the office and to maintain status quo until further orders of this Court”. 3. Subsequently, one of the defendants, namely, Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd., Tuticorin filed Application No. 23 of 2007 seeking for a direction to hold the 84th Annual General Meeting of the bank. By order dated 23. 2008, a learned single Judge of this Court ordered as follows: “1. That the Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. BALASUBRAMANIAN, Judge (Retd.) High Court, Madras be and is hereby appointed to chair the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meetings of Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd., Tuticorin. 2. That the time for convening the 83rd, 84th, and 85th Annual General Meeting shall stand extended upto 6. 2008. 3. That all the applications be posted on 6. 2008.” 4. In the meanwhile, the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association, the plaintiff in C.S. 981 of 2004 represented by its President Mr. R. Muthuselvam filed a Suit in C.S. 481 of 2008, among other things, for a judgment and decree granting permanent injunction restraining the transferees of 95,418 shares, their men, agent, servants and the nominees from exercising any right as a shareholder of the Bank in relation to the shares. Primarily the said Suit relates to the transfer of 95,418 shares of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. approved at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the bank on 15. 2007. Along with the said suit, the plaintiff also filed Original Application Nos. 534 to 536 of 2008 for certain interim orders and a learned Judge of this Court, by order dated 24. 2008, had ordered as follows: “1. Mr. R. Sankaranarayanan, learned counsel takes notice for the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. Mr. 2007. Along with the said suit, the plaintiff also filed Original Application Nos. 534 to 536 of 2008 for certain interim orders and a learned Judge of this Court, by order dated 24. 2008, had ordered as follows: “1. Mr. R. Sankaranarayanan, learned counsel takes notice for the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. Mr. R. Murari learned counsel states that he is also appearing for some shareholders, who have not been parties to the Suit. The learned counsel, for the respondents seeks time to file counter. Post on 6. 2008. 2. In the meanwhile, it is submitted that the Annual General Meeting is scheduled to be held on 6. 2008. Taking into account the past history of the litigation, I do not propose to stall the meeting. Therefore, the Annual General Meeting shall go on. However, any resolution passed in the Annual General Meeting shall not be implemented until further orders of this Court. 3. Registry is directed to list the Applications along with C.S. 981 of 2004 on 6. 2008 immediately after motion list. 4. It is made clear that any matter relating to the dispute pertaining to the convening of the Annual General Meeting of the bank shall be dealt with only by this Court and not by any other Court. The applicants shall take private notice to all the other respondents returnable by 6. 2008.” 5. The said order was taken on Appeal in O.S.A. Nos. 192-194 of 2008 and the Appeals were dismissed by a Division Bench vide order dated 5. 2008. 6. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association filed Contempt Petition No. 508 of 2008 alleging disobedience of the order dated 27. 2006 passed by this Court in O.A. Nos. 597-599 of 2006 in C.S. No. 981 of 2004. It is alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the said Petition that while this Court by order dated 23. 2008 allowed the Bank to convene the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting it did not either modify or set aside or alter its earlier directions dated 27. 2006. In spite of the fact that the election was adjournment pertaining to the election of Directors in the Annual General Meeting and its binding effect on the Annual General Meeting was intimated in writing to the Bank, its Directors as well as the retired Judge of this Court appointed to supervise the Annual General Meeting convened. 2006. In spite of the fact that the election was adjournment pertaining to the election of Directors in the Annual General Meeting and its binding effect on the Annual General Meeting was intimated in writing to the Bank, its Directors as well as the retired Judge of this Court appointed to supervise the Annual General Meeting convened. Hence, the conduct of the Chairman of the Bank to proceed with the election of Directors is contrary to the specific, directions given in the order dated 27. 2006. Along with the said Contempt Petition, Sub-Application No. 163 of 2008 was also taken and by order dated 16. 2008, a learned judge has ordered as follows: “1. That G. Narayanamurthy, the respondent herein, be and is hereby restrained by an ad-interim injunction till 27. 2008 not to implement the resolution of item of business relating to the election of Directors of the respondent-bank at the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting held on 6. 2008 till disposal of the Contempt Application. 2. That the notice of this Sub-Application No. 163 of 2008 returnable by 27. 2008 be served on the respondents herein, and 3. That the Sub-Application No. 163 of 2008 be posted on 27. 2008.” 7. Questioning the ad-interim injunction restraining respondent therein till 27. 2008 not to implement the resolution or item of business relating to the election of Directors of the Bank at 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting held on 6. 2008 till the disposal of the Contempt Application, the present Contempt Appeals have been filed by Thiru. S.C. Sekar and Thiru. T. Rajakumar, who are not parties in the Contempt Petition. 8. On the above factual background, the two issues, which we have referred to earlier have arisen for our consideration. The proceedings of contempt is primarily between the Court and the person who is alleged to have committed contempt of Court. A person who brings to the notice of the Court as to the disobedience of the orders of the Court by the opposite party and thereby committed contempt of such Court is only to maintain and uphold the dignity and majesty of the Court. A person who brings to the notice of the Court as to the disobedience of the orders of the Court by the opposite party and thereby committed contempt of such Court is only to maintain and uphold the dignity and majesty of the Court. It need not necessarily be that each and every such notice brought before the Court must be entertained for commission of contempt of Court, as the discretion to proceed against those who have allegedly disobeyed the orders of the Court shall vest in the Court. 9. The power to punish for contempt is conferred on the High Court under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The said Section reads as under: “12. Punishment for Contempt of Court.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 2,000/-, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Explanation- an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. .(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a Court subordinate to it. .(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section, where as person is found guilty of a Civil Contempt the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. .(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any undertaking given to a Court is a Company, every person who, at the time of contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company, as well as the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the, contempt and the punishment may be enforced with the leave of the Court by the detention in civil prison of each such person: .Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all “due diligence to prevent its commission. .(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of Court referred to therein has been committed by a Company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any Director, Manager, Secretary or other Officer of the Company such Director, Manger, Secretary of other Officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment, may be enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer. .Explanation-For the purpose of sub-section (4) & (5),- .(a) “Company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individual; and .(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” 10. While exercising such power, the Court must act with great care and caution and only when such exercise is necessary for the proper administration and justice. Hence, in the interest of administration of justice, when the Court has got the power to punish a contemnor, even pending such contempt proceedings, will be well within its jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders. Of course, there is no controversy that when such a power is exercised by a learned single Judge to punish a person for contempt, an Appeal shall lie to the Bench not less that two Judges of this Court under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act which reads as under: “19. Of course, there is no controversy that when such a power is exercised by a learned single Judge to punish a person for contempt, an Appeal shall lie to the Bench not less that two Judges of this Court under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act which reads as under: “19. Appeal-(1) An Appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- (a) Where the order or decision is that or a single Judge, to a Bench of not less that Two Judges of the Court; …” .11. While entertaining the Contempt Petition has learned Judge by or dated 16. 2008 had ordered an ad-interim injunction restraining respondents therein not to implement the resolution of the item of business relating to the election of Directors of the Bank at the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting held on 6. 2008. The said order came to be passed on the ground that contrary to the interim orders of this Court dated 27. 2006 made in an O.A. No. 597-599 of 2006, Annual General Meetings were held. It is contended by Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned senior Counsel that as the said interim order affects the contempt applicant who was not made a party, he made a mention for variance of the said order as the Annual General Meeting was conducted by the subsequent orders of this Court, and in fact the elections were held under the direct supervision of a retired Judge of this court and the reports of the resolutions were placed before the learned single Judge and the report disclosed the election of both the appellants as Directors. However, such, request was not entertained and permission was not granted on the ground that they were not parties to the contempt proceedings and therefore they have no alternative remedy except to prefer the Contempt Appeals. 12. On the background of the facts and the respective grievance and the various orders of this Court, we must first consider as to whether the appellants in the Contempt Appeals are aggrieved parties. By order dated 27. 2006, this Court had ordered as interim injunction from the conduct of Annual General Meetings. The direction was to maintain status quo until further orders. Though this order was passed in O.A. Nos. By order dated 27. 2006, this Court had ordered as interim injunction from the conduct of Annual General Meetings. The direction was to maintain status quo until further orders. Though this order was passed in O.A. Nos. 597599 of 2006 in C.N. 981 of 2004 at the instance of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association, it appears that by a subsequent order dated 23. 2008, a learned single Judge of this Court had varied the said order by appointing one of the retired Judges of this Court to chair the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting of Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Limited and has extended the time for convening the meeting upto 6. 2008. The learned Judge had directed all the Applications to be called on 6. 2008. By virtue of the above order, in our considered view, the earlier order dated 27. 2006 stands modified and the said order cannot be considered to be in force on the date the Contempt Petition was filed alleging disobedience of the said order. .13. That apart, at the instance of the very same Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association, another Suit in C.S. 481 of 2008 was filed, of course in respect of transfer of shares. While the Applications were filed in the said Suit for interim order, again on 24. 2008, the learned single Judge refused to stall the proceedings of the Annual General Meeting, but directed that any resolution passed in the Annual General Meeting shall not be implemented until further orders of the Court. The learned Judge had also directed the Applications to be called along with C.S. 981 of 2004 on 6. 2008. This order was taken on Appeal, but without any success. Therefore, by the subsequent orders dated 23. 2008 and 24. 2008, the order passed on 27. 2006 cannot be said to be in force. It is the specific case of the appellants in the Contempt Appeals that the Annual General Meetings were conducted and the result of the election electing the Board of Directors was placed before the learned Judge and both the contempt appellants have been elected. However, it is disputed by Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent/contemnor that the elections have not been so far declared by this Court. However, it is disputed by Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent/contemnor that the elections have not been so far declared by this Court. Hence, the learned senior counsel would contend that the contempt appellants cannot be considered to be persons elected as Directors. In our opinion, that fact whether the elections have been declared or not has less relevance insofar as the consideration of the question as to the disobedience of the orders of this Court. As already pointed out, the elections were held only pursuant to the orders of this Court and it appears that the appellants in the Contempt Appeals have been also elected as Directors, as could be seen from the list produced before this Court. In such event, the appellants are certainly the persons aggrieved by the ad-interim injunction granted in respect of the proceedings of 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting. 14. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the appellants are entitled to file the present Contempt Appeals. In this context, it would be relevant to point out that this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 12 is entitled to punish the contemnor and in such event, the person who visited with such punishment is entitled as a matter of right to prefer an Appeal under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. In terms of Section 19 of the Act, an Appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. To our mind, the said Section contains two parts. Firstly, an Appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court and secondly, such order or direction must be in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It need not necessarily, therefore, mean that only in such cases where this Court punishes the contemnor, an Appeal would lie and not when some adverse order is passed. If that interpretation is given to the said provision, the first limb of the said provision regarding the right to Appeal against any order or decision of the Court would lose its full meaning. Any order or decision passed by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction to punish the contemnor would mean the exercise of jurisdiction and the corresponding order or decision. Any order or decision passed by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction to punish the contemnor would mean the exercise of jurisdiction and the corresponding order or decision. In our opinion, even in case of any order passed adversely affecting any person, certainly he would be entitled to prefer an Appeal, as otherwise he would be left with no effective remedy and only to visit with such adverse orders. 15. The learned senior counsel on either side referred to some of the judgments of the Apex Court to impress upon the Court as to their respective submissions. Let us first consider the judgments relied upon by Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel for the second respondent. He would firstly rely upon the judgment in Barada Kanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC 1206 : (1977) 3 SCC 345 . The Apex Court in the said judgment has merely stated that when the interlocutory order pertains purely to the procedure of the Court, no Appeal is maintainable as against such order. In the absence of the facts of the case in detail and especially when it relates to the interlocutory order on procedural matters, we are of the considered view that the said judgment is of no assistance to the second respondent. in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Limited and Others vs. Chunilal Nanda and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2190 : (2006) 5 SCC 399 : (2007) 1 MLJ 804, the Apex Court has observed as to the maintainability of the Appeal in paragraph-11. In fact the Apex Court has also observed in paragraph-11 (IV) that when a direction or decision is issued/made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, such direction or decision will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19. However, the Apex Court has further added that “the only exception where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, an Appeal under the Section would be maintainable,” In this case the contempt is alleging disobedience of the order of this Court dated 27. 2006. As observed by us earlier, the said order has been subsequently varied by several orders of this Court and pursuant to the said order, the order dated 27. 2006. As observed by us earlier, the said order has been subsequently varied by several orders of this Court and pursuant to the said order, the order dated 27. 2006 was not in force on the date of the Contempt Petition. Having regard to the grievance of the contempt petitioner, the interim order is incidental and inextricably connected to the rights of the Board of Directors elected pursuant to the subsequent directions of this Court. When once such conclusion is arrived at, going by the above observation of the Apex Court, the order which is adversely affecting the parties could be appealable. In fact Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel placed heavy reliance on the direction of the Apex Court in paragraph-11 (V) and contended that it is not as if the persons aggrieved by such orders are without any remedy, as they can question such order in an intra-Court Appeal. We have carefully gone through the direction of the Apex Court in paragraph-11(V). That direction relates to a situation where the High court decides an issue or makes any direction relating to the merits of the disputes between the parties in a contempt proceedings, then such order or direction could be questioned in a intra-Court Appeal. As there is no decision on dispute while interim order was passed, the proper direction applicable to the facts of this case is only paragraph-11(IV). 16. The learned senior counsel would also rely upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the advocate general of Tamil Nadu, Madras v. R.M. Krishna Raju and Others, 1980 LW.(Crl) 263, and contended that in the absence of any rules, a third party cannot be permitted to implead himself in a contempt proceeding. We have also carefully gone through the said judgment. The said decision was rendered entirely on different set of facts of the said case. In that case, one of the respondents happened to be a member of the Madras High Court Advocates’ Association. On account of such fact the Madras Bar Association and the Madras High Court Advocates’ Association sought to intervene in the proceedings initiated by Advocate General against the said advocate and the press in respect of certain publications. In that case, one of the respondents happened to be a member of the Madras High Court Advocates’ Association. On account of such fact the Madras Bar Association and the Madras High Court Advocates’ Association sought to intervene in the proceedings initiated by Advocate General against the said advocate and the press in respect of certain publications. The Application by the Association was considered and this Court factually found that the said advocate is not an office bearer of either Association nor has he written the article as a Spokesman of the Association and there is nothing in the article to show that it has been written by an Advocate, muchless as an Advocate in discharge of his duties of the law profession which he belongs to. With the above conclusion, the Applications for implement were rejected. In the very same judgment, this Court had made a note of caution that the unrestricted entry of third parties in the contempt proceedings would be an inevitable concomitant, as they may overstep their limits and canvas before the Court to adopt a harsh and severe attitude towards the contemnor. The said Judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case, as we have already held that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction in contempt proceedings, on the basis of decision, had granted interim order which had affected the contempt appellants who were elected as Board of Directors pursuant to the direction of this Court. 17. Let us now consider the judgments relied upon by Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel as to the maintainability. In R.N. Dey and Others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Others, (2000) 4 SCC 400 , the Apex Court, in paragraph 10, has observed as follows: “10. In our view the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the notice, officers concerned tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the rule issued for contempt action. When the Court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. When the Court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, Appeal would be maintainable.” 18. Mr. R. Yoshdh Vardhan, learned senior counsel would rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Another, (2004) 13 SCC 610 , where the Apex Court has held that even in case, where the order of the Court is made without jurisdiction, even in case when there is no punishment, an Appeal would lie. 19. There has been no difficulty that the application of sub-section (1) of Section 19 to cases where the Appeal is from an order imposing punishment under Section 12 of the Act. But when the Court had not imposed punishment under Section 12 and yet some adverse interlocutory orders are passed in the course of contempt proceedings, whether the parties aggrieved by such order would be entitled to invoke the appellate jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act itself. In Purushottam Das Goel v. Justice B.S. Dhillon, AIR 1978 SC 1014 : (1978) 2 SCC 370 , the Apex Court broadened the area of appealability of an order which decided some bone of contention raised before the Court affecting the rights of the parties aggrieved whether made at the filing stage of the proceedings or even at an early stage. In fact, the Court had observed that it was neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders, which may be appealable under Section 19. The said view of apex Court again reiterated by the Apex Court in UOI and Others v. Mario Cabrele Sa, AIR 1982 SC 691 : (1982) 3 SCC 262 . In our considered view, the provisions of Appeal under Section 19(1) cannot be restricted only to a case of punishment imposed by the Court in contempt proceedings and such right of Appeal shall also be extended where an order adversely affecting the party are passed. In our considered view, the provisions of Appeal under Section 19(1) cannot be restricted only to a case of punishment imposed by the Court in contempt proceedings and such right of Appeal shall also be extended where an order adversely affecting the party are passed. Considering the facts of this case, as the decision or order was made by this Court only in exercise of the contempt proceedings, the person aggrieved would be only entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and need not necessarily relegated to the other provisions, particularly intra-Court Appeal. 20. For the all the above reasons, we are of the considered view that the Contempt Appeals as the instance of both the appellants are maintainable. We hasten to add that the observations made in this order are only for consideration of maintainability of these Appeals and the same cannot be taken as observations on the merits of the Contempt Appeals. Consequently, office is directed to number the Contempt Appeal and list the same for admission. 21. After judgment is pronounced, Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel for the second respondent in both Contempt Appeals has sought for invocation of Section 19 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and suspend the order, so as to enable the second respondent to prefer an Appeal before the Supreme Court. 22. We have gone through the said provision. Prima facie we are of the considered view that only when some orders adversely affecting any person, who makes a claim that he is intending to prefer an Appeal, this court in exercise of the power under the provisions to sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 may suspend such an order. We have found that the contempt appellants are the persons aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge of this court and this Court has only on prima facie consideration held that the Contempt Appeals are maintainable and the rights of the respondents to canvas their arguments either in the contempt Petition or in the contempt Appeals are still open. We therefore find that the order holding that the contempt Appeals are maintainable, does not in any way adversely affect the right of the second respondent. We therefore find that the order holding that the contempt Appeals are maintainable, does not in any way adversely affect the right of the second respondent. Accordingly, the submission made by the learned counsel for the second respondent is not acceptable and the permission sought for is consequently rejected. Permission rejected.