Judgment :- Being aggrieved by the order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sub Court, Villupuram in MCOP No.33/1997, apportioning 50% liability on the Insurance Company for the death of car driver Murugaiyan, the Insurance Company has preferred this appeal. 2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are as follows:-The deceased Murugaiyan was working as a driver in Ambassador Car bearing Registration No.TCF 1440 which is owned by the fifth respondent. On 14.06.1998, Murugaiyan was driving the car for a trip to Madras along with one Subramaniya Reddiar. While the car reached near Padira Puliyur Cross Road, in Madras -Trichy Road, Transport Corporation bus bearing Registration No.TN 32 N 0357 driven in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the car. The car was crushed and driver Murugaiyan and occupant Subramaniya Reddiar died on the spot. Alleging that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of bus driver and stating that the Insurance Company, with whom the car was insured, are liable to pay the compensation, wife, daughter and mother of deceased Murugaiyan have filed Petition under Section 166 M.V.Act, claiming compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-. 3. Opposing the claim, Insurance Company has filed counter statement, alleging that accident was due to rash and negligent driving of State Transport Corporation bus and therefore, Insurance Company is unnecessary party to the Petition. The Insurance Company also disputed the age, income and quantum of compensation claimed. Insurance Company had also taken an alternative plea that in the event of the Tribunal holding that the driver of the car is also guilty of negligent driving, Petition is not maintainable against the Insurance Company as there cannot be a claim for compensation for the negligence of the deceased himself. 3. State Transport Corporation also contested the claim alleging that the accident was due to the negligent driving of the Car Driver and denying its liability. 4. In the Tribunal, first claimant examined himself as PW-1 and eye-witness was examined as PW-2. Exs.P-1 to P-3 were marked. On the side of Corporation, driver of the bus was examined as RW-1. Appellant Insurance Company has not adduced any evidence. 5. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held that the driver of the bus as well as driver of the car [deceased] were responsible for the accident. Exs.P-1 to P-3 were marked. On the side of Corporation, driver of the bus was examined as RW-1. Appellant Insurance Company has not adduced any evidence. 5. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held that the driver of the bus as well as driver of the car [deceased] were responsible for the accident. The Tribunal held that it was an head on collision and each of the drivers were equally responsible for the accident. On those findings, the Tribunal held that STC is liable to pay 50% of the compensation. Tribunal further held that 5th respondent/owner of the car and insured appellant Insurance Company are jointly and severally liable to pay 50% of compensation. Without adopting any multiplier, the Tribunal has awarded a lump sum of Rs.1,75,000/- and ordered that STC and the appellant Insurance are liable to pay each 50%. 6. Challenging the order of the Tribunal, appellant Insurance Company has preferred this appeal. Contention of the appellant is two fold: -Firstly, the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of bus driver and the entire liability ought to have been fastened upon the STC. Secondly, while proving contributory negligence of car driver at 50%, invoking provisions of MV Act, Claim Petition is not maintainable as the deceased being an employee of the insured, claimants can maintain Petition only under Workmens Compensation Act. 7. The learned Counsel for the fourth respondent STC submitted that the Tribunal has rightly held that the accident was due to composite negligence of both drivers and rightly apportioned negligence at 50:50. It was further submitted that pursuant to the order of Tribunal, STC has paid 50% of compensation and Insurance Company is not justified in filing the appeal. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondents/claimants also assailed the findings of Tribunal apportioning 50% negligence and contended that such a finding is not based on evidence. Submitting that the claimants can choose any one form for claiming compensation, the learned Counsel contended that if the claimants are not entitled to invoke provisions of M.V.Act, the award amount could be restricted to W.C.Act. 9. Submitting that the claimants can choose any one form for claiming compensation, the learned Counsel contended that if the claimants are not entitled to invoke provisions of M.V.Act, the award amount could be restricted to W.C.Act. 9. In the light of the contentions, the following points arise for consideration:- "(i)Who was responsible for the accident and whether the driver was right in proving negligence at 50:50; (ii)When the car driver who himself was a tortfeasor, whether the claimants are entitled to claim compensation in the claim petition filed under Motor Vehicles Act." .10. On the fateful day, 14.06.1998, at about 2.30 p.m., the deceased was driving car in Trichy to Madras Road. When the car reached Padira Puliyur Cross road, STC bus which was driven in high speed and in a rash and negligent manner hit against the car and due to impact, car was crushed, killing the driver and occupant instantaneously. PW-2 – Selvam, a resident of Padira Puliyur had clearly spoken about the accident. It is relevant to note that PW-2 though said to have witnessed the accident has not lodged any complaint. 11. The complaint was lodged by one Rajendran on the basis of which, case was registered against the bus driver in Cr.No.365/1996 under Sec.279, 337 and 304 A IPC. In Ex.P-1 FIR, complainant has stated that while the car was proceeding near the Crops Road, STC bus hit against the car and due to impact, the car was crushed and driver and occupants of the car died instantaneously. In Ex.P-1 FIR, the complainant has not stated anything about the negligent driving of the bus. He has only averred 12. In his evidence, driver of the bus RW-1 has stated that the place of accident was a curve and the car driver was negligent while traversing the curve and accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the car. No doubt criminal case was registered against the bus driver. Entire negligence cannot be fastened upon the bus driver on the ground that criminal case was registered against the bus driver. 13. To determine as to who was negligent and who is responsible for the accident, evidence of PW-2 and RW-1 is to be tested in the light of other evidence on record. Ex.A-3 is M.V.I. Report of STC Bus. Entire negligence cannot be fastened upon the bus driver on the ground that criminal case was registered against the bus driver. 13. To determine as to who was negligent and who is responsible for the accident, evidence of PW-2 and RW-1 is to be tested in the light of other evidence on record. Ex.A-3 is M.V.I. Report of STC Bus. It is seen from Ex.A-3 that in the accident, right side head light was damaged, wind screen glasses were broken and Air tank was damaged and under chassis bent. By analysis of pattern of damages to the bus, it appears that there was impact only on the right side of the bus. 14. Ex.A-2 is the M.V.I. Report in respect of Ambassador Car. By perusal of Ex.A-2, it is seen that there was extensive damages to the car. Both the head lights damaged and both doors dis-aligned, under chassis fully bent, upholding in the right side also damaged. While we try to reconstruct the pattern of damages to the car, I find that the entire front portion of the car came into contact with the bus and in the impact, car suffered extensive damages. .15. From the pattern of damages, i.e. right side of the bus being damaged and the car suffering extensive damages, and from recitals in Ex.P-1 – FIR, I am of the considered view that the Tribunal has rightly held that both bus driver and the deceased were equally responsible for the accident. Contributory negligence means the failure of a person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his vehicle, so that he becomes partially author of his own wrong. As is seen from the evidence of RW-1, place of accident was a cross road. While the car was traversing a curve, to proceed to the main road, equal responsibility was cast upon the car driver to be careful in driving. The facts and circumstances of the case i.e. not only right side of the car but the entire front portion being damaged, the car driver does not appear to have exercised due care in driving. 16. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company has submitted that the bus driver who was on the wheels in a heavy vehicle, owed higher degree of duty to the on-coming vehicles and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have held the bus driver responsible for the accident. 16. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company has submitted that the bus driver who was on the wheels in a heavy vehicle, owed higher degree of duty to the on-coming vehicles and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have held the bus driver responsible for the accident. This contention does not merit acceptance. Negligence is failure in the duty to take care. It is axiomatic that when two parties are so moving in relation to one another as to involve a risk of collusion each owes to the other, a duty to move with care, no matter whether both are in control of heavy vehicle or light vehicle. Bus driver who was on wheels in a heavy vehicle and the deceased who was driving LMV/owed a duty towards other to take and exercise due and proper care. The materials on record would show that both RW-1 and the deceased were equally negligent to take due care of the on coming vehicles. Upon analysis of evidence of PW2 and RW-1, and Ex.P-1 and other materials on record, in my considered view, the Tribunal has rightly held that the bus driver and car driver were equally responsible for the accident and the Tribunal was right in fixing negligence at 50:50. 17. The next point falling for consideration is as whether the claimants being Legal Representatives of deceased Murugaiyan, would be entitled to maintain their claim under M.V.Act in the background of the fact that car driver/deceased himself was found to be guilty of negligence and having caused the accident, by 50:50 ratio. .18. The foremost contention of the appellant Insurance Company is that if the car driver was negligent, himself being tortfeasor, the claimants cannot maintain Claim Petition under M.V.Act. The learned Counsel for the Appellant Insurance Company further submitted that it may be that the claimants might be entitled to compensation under Workmens Compensation Act and the claimants having invoked the provisions of M.V.Act, they cannot turn round and fall upon the provisions of Workmens Compensation Act and claim compensation. 19. Placing reliance upon 2007 AIR SCW 2362 [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal & Ors.], it was submitted that once it is found that the deceased was also negligent, the claimants cannot claim compensation under M.V.Act. 20. 19. Placing reliance upon 2007 AIR SCW 2362 [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal & Ors.], it was submitted that once it is found that the deceased was also negligent, the claimants cannot claim compensation under M.V.Act. 20. Of course, it is fairly well settled that if the claimant/deceased himself was negligent and the accident was only on account of his own negligence, no claim for compensation can be maintained either by the claimants or by legal representatives of the deceased. In this context, reference could be made to Minu B.Mehta v. Balakrishnan [ AIR 1977 SC 1248 ]. 21. But in this case, collision of two vehicles are involved wherein, both, car driver and STC bus driver are found to be equally responsible for the accident. Cr.No.365/1996 was also registered against the bus driver for rash and negligent driving. Having regard to the available materials, since another vehicle is also involved, it cannot be said that by filing claim petition under section 166 M.V.Act, claimants have chosen a wrong forum. 22. Section 167 of the 1988 Act statutorily provides for an option to the claimant stating that where the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under the 1988 Act as also the 1923 Act, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. Section 167 contains a non-obstante clause providing for such an option notwithstanding anything contained in the 1923 Act. [See 2006 (1) CTC 222 – National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan and another]. .23. The learned Counsel for the claimants submitted that the deceased was employed under the insured and the deceased was under statutory insurance coverage and would be entitled to compensation. It was further submitted that the claimants could maintain the claim petition either under M.V.Act or under Workmens Compensation Act and the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability. The learned Counsel for the claimants has submitted that even though the Insurance Company may not be liable under the provisions of M.V.Act, invoking the provisions under Workmens Compensation Act, it would be proper to assess the damages under Workmens Compensation Act and award the same in favour of the claimants under Workmens Compensation Act. The learned Counsel for the claimants has submitted that even though the Insurance Company may not be liable under the provisions of M.V.Act, invoking the provisions under Workmens Compensation Act, it would be proper to assess the damages under Workmens Compensation Act and award the same in favour of the claimants under Workmens Compensation Act. It was further submitted that both M.V.Act and Workmens Compensation Act are social welfare legislation to compensate the claimants and the compensation awarded by the Tribunal may be construed as the one best under Workmens Compensation Act. 24. Placing reliance upon 2007 AIR SCW 2362 [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal & Ors.], the learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the claimants having chosen the forum under M.V.Act, now cannot fall back upon the Workmens Compensation Act make claim on the basis of the provisions under M.V.Act. 125. The learned Counsel for the appellant Insurance Company has further submitted that if the claimants have filed claim petition before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation Act, questions falling for consideration would have been different as to whether the deceased was employed and whether the death arose out of and in the course of his employment. It was further submitted that in the Petition filed under M.V.Act., the tortuous liability has to be determined and the scope of enquiry in the claim petition before the forums are entirely different and the compensation awarded cannot be construed as one limited to the compensation payable under Workmens Compensation Act. 126. The contention of the appellant Insurance Company cannot be countenanced. When the accident involves collision of two vehicles, the claimants cannot be expected to approach Workmens Compensation Tribunal where the compensation would be limited. Secondly, if the provisions of Workmens Compensation Act were invoked, tortuous liability of STC cannot be determined. That apart, the claimants cannot maintain a Petition in both the forums. As the accident was due to collision of two vehicles, and negligence of another tortfeasor was also involved, the claimants have rightly filed claim petition under Section 166 M.V.Act where the Tribunal could adjudicate upon contentious issues as to who was responsible for the accident. 127. That apart, the claimants cannot maintain a Petition in both the forums. As the accident was due to collision of two vehicles, and negligence of another tortfeasor was also involved, the claimants have rightly filed claim petition under Section 166 M.V.Act where the Tribunal could adjudicate upon contentious issues as to who was responsible for the accident. 127. For the negligence of car driver, even though Insurance Company is not liable under the provisions of M.V.Act, whether it would be proper to award compensation as per Workmens Compensation Act, adopting the factors for working out compensation is the next point to be considered. .28. The learned Counsel for the Appellant Insurance Company has submitted that the claimants having chosen the forum under M.V.Act, cannot fall back upon Workmens Compensation Act and placed reliance upon 2006 (1) CTC 222 [cited supra], wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows :- ."A party suffering an injury or the dependants of the deceased who has died in course of an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle may have claims under different statutes. But when cause of action arises under different statutes and the claimant elects the forum under one Act in preference to the other, he cannot be thereafter permitted to raise a contention which is available to him only in the former." 129. In Mastans case, lorry involved in the accident was insured with the appellant Company. Claimant was a cleaner and he suffered injuries in the accident which led to his disability to the extent of 45% to 50%. Claimant initiated proceedings under Workmens Compensation Act. By the order dated 30.04.1997, Commissioner for Workmens Compensation Act awarded compensation to the workman/claimant payable by the Insurance Company. The claimant has not chosen to withdraw his claim under the Workmens Compensation Act, with a view to approach Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In that factual background, Honble Supreme Court has held that when claimant has chosen to pursue his claim under Workmens Compensation Act, till the award was passed and also to invoke the provisions of M.V.Act, the claimant is not entitled to do so and that he cannot chose both the forums and having chosen one forum, he is not entitled to do so. .30. .30. In 2007 AIR SCW 2362, one Suresh Chandra Variyal was employed as Regional Manager in M/s.Apace Savings and Mutual Benefits (India) Ltd. Suresh Variyal was provided with a car by the employer. In the accident on 14.06.1999, Suresh Variyal died. Widow and daughter of Suresh Variyal filed claim petition under Section 166 M.V.Act. During trial, it came to light that deceased himself drove the vehicle. Since deceased was a Regional Manager of the Corporation, whether he could be treated as an employer under the Workmens Compensation Act was in dispute. In the factual matrix of the case, Supreme Court has held that Regional Manager was not covered by the insurance policy taken in terms of M.V.Act and Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured and is not obliged to satisfy the award. 131. Factual matrix and ratio of Mastans case and Meena Variyals case are not applicable to the present case. Admittedly, Murugaiyan was employed under the fifth respondent/insured. Continuously he had statutory insurance coverage in terms of the statute. Having admitted insurance of the car, Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the insured in respect of death of employee/car driver. 132. For the foregoing reasons, I find that claim petition filed under Sec.166 M.V.Act is maintainable. Though Murugaiyan was equally negligent for the accident, Tribunal has rightly apportioned the liability upon STC and the insured and the Insurance Company. When the liability is apportioned, Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the insured to the extent of its liability under Workmens Compensation Act. 133. Coming to the quantum, the Tribunal has awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs.1,75,000/-. At the time of death, deceased Murugaiyan was aged 25 years. In her evidence, PW-1 has stated that husband was earning Rs.150/-per day. Ignoring the evidence of PW-1, Tribunal observed that income of the deceased would be Rs.1,800/-p.m. Observing that monthly income at Rs.1800/-is not supported by other evidence, Tribunal proceeded to award lump sum compensation of Rs.1,75,000/-. The Tribunal has not chosen to adopt the scientific method of applying multiplier as per Second Schedule. The multiplier method is scientific and logically sound and well established. Awarding lump sum compensation is not scientific, and is wholly impermissible. .34. The Tribunal has not chosen to adopt the scientific method of applying multiplier as per Second Schedule. The multiplier method is scientific and logically sound and well established. Awarding lump sum compensation is not scientific, and is wholly impermissible. .34. In 1994 ACJ 1 (SC) General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas and others, it is held that multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a just compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards, departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases. 35. The Tribunal was not right in awarding lump sum compensation. The Tribunal did not keep in view the logical and scientific method of applying multiplier. The Tribunal has also not recorded any reasons for deviating from the multiplier method and awarding lump sum compensation. 36. It is well settled that while applying multiplier method, future prospects of advancement of life, career should also be taken into account to agument the multiplicand. Even by strict standard of income, the deceased being employed as driver, he would have been earning not less than Rs.120/-per day. After a few years, the deceased might have found a better job as a driver, he would have earned more and the future prospects are necessarily to be kept in view. In the claim petition, claimants have stated the monthly income as Rs.1,800/-. The Tribunal was not justified in doubting the monthly income, which by itself was a very low amount. .37. The question arising for consideration is whether in the absence of any cross objection, the Appellate Court could suo motu enhance the compensation. The Appellate Court exercising power under Or.41 R.33 CPC could enhance the quantum of compensation even without cross objection. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh various factors and quantify the amount of compensation which should be just. Reference could be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in 1971 ACJ 206 (SC) [Sheikhupura Trans. Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Ins. Co. Ltd.], wherein it is held that pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately, but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. Reference could be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in 1971 ACJ 206 (SC) [Sheikhupura Trans. Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Ins. Co. Ltd.], wherein it is held that pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately, but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. The general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to the claimants of future pecuniary benefits and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever sources come to them by reason of the death, i.e. the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained. The determination of the question of compensation depends on several imponderables. In the assessment of those imponderables, there is likely to be a margin of error. Broadly speaking, in the case of death, the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependants of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses, etc. and loss to estate. Object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive nor deficient. 38. Of course, the claimants who are widow, minor daughter and mother have not filed any cross objection. Even without a cross-objection, questioning the quantum, the Court could suo motu enhance compensation under Or.41 R.33 CPC. In this context, reference could be made to 1999 ACJ 977 [Karnataka] wherein it has been held as follows :- "(6) I am in general agreement with the basic proposition of law that has been canvassed by the appellants learned advocate when he points out that it is a well settled principle that a party who suffers an order or a decree and does not appeal against it or assail it would normally not be permitted at the hearing of the appeal to try and take advantage of the situation by asking for enhancement. The issue is not that but really as to whether this situation prescribes an absolute and total bar to the court granting a relief if in the interest of justice such a relief is an absolute must. The issue is not that but really as to whether this situation prescribes an absolute and total bar to the court granting a relief if in the interest of justice such a relief is an absolute must. One has to view the situation from a rather practical point of view the first of them being with regard to the very poor quality of legal assistance that is usually available in and around the M.A.C.T. and thereafter, the second aspect of the matter being that the status of the parties and their general condition themselves may be such that they are unable to agitate the matter further and the third aspect of the matter which is relevant having regard to the present case, is the possibility of certain further tragic occurrences such as deaths that may have intervened, all of which may contribute to a situation wherein the court finds that no appeal or cross-objections have been filed. The essence of doing justice requires that compensation when awarded has got to be reasonable and fair and it has also got to be adequate having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The hearing of the appeal involves a total review of the case and the appeal is virtually an extension of the proceedings before the lower court. The law is well settled with regard to one interesting aspect of the matter, namely, that the courts do come across a few instances where instead of overpitching the case before the trial court, a very modest amount is claimed and the Tribunals in these circumstances have been wrongly limiting the relief to the amount that has been claimed on the ground that even though the party is entitled to something higher, what was asked for is a lower figure. This court had occasion to correct these orders and to lay down that the Tribunal is required to pass an order quantifying the compensation correctly irrespective of what has been claimed on the basis of the principle that it is not the amount that is claimed in that matter, insofar as if the court has to the power to award a lesser amount, that it is equally equipped with the power to award a higher amount. It is that principle which applies with equal force to the appeal court and though I do not dispute that a court would normally not permit a party to ask for enhancement unless an appeal or cross-objections have been filed but there could be a very small category of cases in which the court would make an exception, the reason being that the essence of doing justice requires that a court will not refuse a relief only because of a technical or a procedural bar. I need to amplify here that if the technicalities are upheld, the result would be doing injustice insofar as the party will be left with a compensation lesser than what a fair evaluation entitles the party to. Again, I do not on the basis of the law as enunciated by the courts in the decisions set out by me above, subscribe to the view that there exists any bar in the way of this court exercising such powers. The powers do exist under Order 41, rule 33, Civil Procedure Code and more importantly, such powers can certainly be exercised under section 151, Civil Procedure Code in the interest of justice." (underling added). Applying the above decision, in 2006 (3) ACJ 1917 [Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. Vasnathan and Ors.], Justice Arumuga perumal Adithyan has enhanced compensation, exercising power under Or.41 R.33 CPC and Sec.151 CPC. 39. The deceased being a driver would have earned not less than Rs.3,000/-p.m. Though in the Petition his monthly income is stated as Rs.1,000/-, however, as per averments in the Petition, his monthly income is taken as Rs.1,800/- p.m., from out of which, he would have spent 1/3rd for his personal expenses. The balance amount of Rs.1,200/-, he would have contributed to the family. At the time of accident, the deceased being aged 25 years, multiplier of 18 would be proper. Loss of dependancy is calculated at Rs.1,200 x 12 x 18 = Rs.2,59,200/-. For loss of consortium to the first claimant Rs.10,000/- is awarded. For funeral expenses, awarding Rs.5,000/- would be just and proper. At the time of accident the second claimant was only aged four months. Before ever the second claimant could recognize her fathers face, she lost her father. Therefore, for loss of love and affection to the second claimant, compensation of Rs.20,000/- is awarded. For funeral expenses, awarding Rs.5,000/- would be just and proper. At the time of accident the second claimant was only aged four months. Before ever the second claimant could recognize her fathers face, she lost her father. Therefore, for loss of love and affection to the second claimant, compensation of Rs.20,000/- is awarded. The compensation is enhanced to Rs.2,94,500/- as under :- Amount in Rs. For loss of dependancy [1200 x 12 x 18] 2,59,200 Loss of consortium 10,000 Funeral expenses 5,000 Loss of love and affection 20,000 2,94,200 41. Compensation amount is to be apportioned. The amount of compensation is to be apportioned amongst the claimants. First claimant is entitled to Rs.1,50,000/-. Minor second claimant is entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- and third claimant is entitled to Rs.44,200/-. 41. With the following directions, the appeal is disposed of :- "In exercise of power under Or.41 R.33 CPC, compensation of Rs.1,75,000/-is enhanced to Rs.2,94,200/-. The compensation amount is to be apportioned amongst the claimants as stated in paragraph no.41; "Enhanced compensation of Rs.1,19,200/-is payable with interest @ 5. % from the date of Petition; "The compensation amount of Rs.1,75,000/-awarded by the Tribunal is payable with interest @ 9% from the date of Petition; "Fourth respondent State Transport Corporation is liable to pay 50% of the compensation; "Appellant Insurance Company and the insured/fifth respondent are jointly and severally liable to pay 50% of the compensation payable to the claimants. "It is stated that the State Transport Corporation has paid 50% of the compensation payable to the claimants. Fourth respondent STC shall pay 50% of enhanced compensation to the claimants within a period of three months from the date of copy of this order; On such deposit, first and third claimants are entitled to withdraw the entire compensation amount payable to them. The compensation amount payable to the second claimant shall be invested in a nationalized Bank till she attains majority.