JUDGMENT 1. Having lost his right arm in a bus accident and having been granted a compensation of merely Rs. 1,69,500/-, the appellant has challenged the award dated 15th June, 2006 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 4, Ajmer (in short, "the learned Tribunal"). 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 9th June, 1995 while the appellant, Mr. Kanno Bhai, was travelling in a bus, a truck, bearing registration No. DL-1-G-A/ 1186, being driven in rash and negligent manner, came and collided with the bus. The appellant suffered fracture of his right arm. However, during treatment his right arm was amputated from the shoulder. Prior to the said accident, the appellant was working in a mill at Ahmadabad, and was earning Rs. 3,000/- p.m. He was also earning Rs. 1,000/- p.m. as overtime. Thus, he was earning a total of Rs. 4,000/- p.m. Since, the appellant was seriously injured, since he had become permanently disabled, he filed a claim petition against the respondents before the learned Tribunal. The appellant examined himself as a witness. The Insurance Company neither examined any witness, nor submitted any documentary evidence to rebut the case set up by the appellant. However, vide order dated 15th June, 2006, the learned Tribunal held that since the appellant had not submitted any disability certificate, he is entitled to only Rs. 5,000/- for the grievous injuries suffered by him. He was granted Rs. 5,000/- for plastic surgery undergone by him. Moreover, he was granted Rs. 1,50,000/- for pain, agony and for the permanent disability suffered by him. Lastly, he was granted Rs. 9,500/- for nineteen days' treatment undergone by him in an hospital. Thus, a total of Rs. 1,69,500/- was granted to the appellant. Hence, this appeal for enhancement. 3. Mr. Reashm Bhargava, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has raised the following contentions before this Court : firstly, the Presiding Officer is supposed to take active role in the Court's proceeding. In case, the appellant were unable to produce the disability certificate, the medical record could have been summoned by the Court on its own. The Court could have also directed that a medical report be submitted with regard to disability suffered by the appellant. In case, the appellant were unable to produce the disability certificate, the medical record could have been summoned by the Court on its own. The Court could have also directed that a medical report be submitted with regard to disability suffered by the appellant. Secondly, even if the disability certificate were not submitted, even then according to the second schedule attached to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989 (in short, "the Act"), the learned Tribunal should have referred to the Schedule-I attached to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in order to decide the percentage of loss suffered due to the permanent total disability suffered by the appellant. However, the learned Judge has failed to do so. Thirdly, according to Item No. 5 of the Second Schedule of the Act, formula should have been applied which has not been applied in the present case. Fourthly, the appellant had clearly stated that his income was Rs. 4,000/- p.m. However, the said income has not been taken into account while calculating the loss of income suffered by the appellant. Since, there was no rebuttal from the Insurance Company, the income as stated by the appellant should have been accepted. In order to buttress this particular contention, the learned Counsel has relied upon Shri Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. The State of Assam and Others, 1999 S.A.R. (Civil) 837 S.C., Sunita and Another v. National Insurance Company Limited and Others, 2008 W.L.C. (U. C.) 480 and Laxmi Narain and Another v. Shakur Mohd. and Others, 2007 (1) D.N.J. (Raj.) 515. Lastly, the learned Counsel has contended that the rigours of the Evidence Act cannot be applied to a case decided by the learned Tribunal. In order to buttress this contention, the learned Counsel has relied upon the decision of the Constitution Bench given in the case of Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 882. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Pyare Lal, the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, has vehemently argued that it is not the role of the learned Tribunal to fill up the lacunae left by the appellant in his/ her case. Therefore, it is not the duty of the learned Tribunal to take an active role in the proceedings. Secondly, in case the claimant does not submit the disability certificate, then the learned Tribunal is justified in granting the compensation which it considers to be just and reasonable. Therefore, it is not the duty of the learned Tribunal to take an active role in the proceedings. Secondly, in case the claimant does not submit the disability certificate, then the learned Tribunal is justified in granting the compensation which it considers to be just and reasonable. Thirdly, just and reasonable compensation has been granted to the appellant for the disability suffered by him. Thus, he has supported the impugned award. 5. Heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused the record, and examined the impugned award. 6. The raison d'etre (the reason to be) of the judiciary is to do justice to the people. In order to do justice to'the people, the Courts are duty bound to take an active role in the proceedings. In catena of case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Presiding Officer is not a mute witness to the proceedings. In fact, in order to do justice to the people, the Courts have been sufficiently empowered to summon documents, to summon witnesses and to call for expert opinions. These armaments have been given to the judiciary in its arsenals so that complete justice can be done to the parties. Moreover, the role of the learned Tribunal is not only limited to a pedantic functionary, but, most importantly, it extends to being a healer. Since, the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, the learned Counsel has to ensure that the beneficial provisions reach the claimants. Therefore, the legislation itself requires the learned Tribunal to be a sensitive forum to understand the agony and suffering of the claimant. If the learned Tribunal, were to turn a Nelson's eyes to the condition of the claimant, the learned Tribunal would singularly fail in its duty towards the litigants. Burdened as the Tribunal may be, it is expected to invoke its, powers in order to do complete justice to the claimants. 7. In the present case, for reasons best known to the appellant, he could not produce the disability certificate before the Court. But, none theless the learned Tribunal could have directed the medical board to examine the appellant and to submit its report with regard to the extent of disability suffered by him. It was the duty of the learned Tribunal to discover the truth. However, the learned Tribunal has failed to do so. But, none theless the learned Tribunal could have directed the medical board to examine the appellant and to submit its report with regard to the extent of disability suffered by him. It was the duty of the learned Tribunal to discover the truth. However, the learned Tribunal has failed to do so. Even in absence of the disability certificate and considering the fact that the medical record did prove that the appellant had lost his right arm in a motor accident, the learned Tribunal should have considered the extent of his disability on the basis of Schedule-I of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 8. According to the said Schedule-I, amputation of an arm is taken to be 80% of permanent disability. Thus, the learned Tribunal could have easily calculated the loss of income suffered by the appellant due to his disability. But instead of applying the formula given in the Motor Vehicles Act, the learned Tribunal has conjured up a lump sum amount as compensation. Surprisingly, the lump sum amount for permanent disability has been clumped together with the compensation paid to the appellant under the category of "pain and suffering". Thus, this Court has no way of discovering the amount granted by the learned Tribunal for the disability suffered by the appellant. 9. According to Sarkar on Evidence (5th Edition, 1999 Vol. 2 p. 2179) in the contest of Section 138 of Evidence Act "generally speaking, when cross- examining, a party's Counsel should put to each of his opponent's witnesses, in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which he had a share." It is a settled principle of law that in case a witness has not been cross-examined on a particular point then the statement of said witness on that particular point, should be accepted by the concerning Court. [Refer to Shri Ravinder Kumar Sharma (supra), Sunita and Another (supra) and Laxmi Narain and Another (supra). 10. In order to support his statement with regard to his income, the appellant had submitted salary certificate as Ext. 11. According to the said certificate, the claimant was earning Rs. 3,600/- p.m. Since, Insurance Company did not cross-examine the appellant about the salary certificate or about his income, the learned Tribunal was legally bound to accept the appellant's statement as the gospel truth. At the time of accident the appellant's age was twenty-one, years. 11. According to the said certificate, the claimant was earning Rs. 3,600/- p.m. Since, Insurance Company did not cross-examine the appellant about the salary certificate or about his income, the learned Tribunal was legally bound to accept the appellant's statement as the gospel truth. At the time of accident the appellant's age was twenty-one, years. Therefore, the formula given in Item No. 5 of the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act could be worked out completely. Hence, the formula works out as under : Rs. 3,600 x 12 x 17 x 80% =. Rs. 5,87,520/ Hence, the award dated 15th June, 2006 is modified as under : The loss of income is calculated as, Rs. 3,600 x 12 x 17 x 80% = Rs. 5,87,520/ The rest part of award is confirmed. 11. The registry is directed to send the record of this case back to the concerned learned Tribunal. 12. The learned Tribunal is directed to ensure that the Insurance Company pays the enhanced amount, after deducting the amount already disbursed to the appellant, alongwith the interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. from-13th September, 1996 till the date of realisation. 13. The learned Tribunal is directed to ensure that the remaining compensation amount is paid to the appellant within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment.Appeal allowed. *******