Judgment :- K.N. BASHA, J. The sole accused, Thangaraj, has come forward with this appeal challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 03.02.2006 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Salem, made in S.C.No.265 of 2005 convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life and also imposing a fine Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. 2. The occurrence in this case is shown to have taken place on 22.02.2003 at about 10.00 a.m. at the house of the deceased, Sulohana, wherein the accused was said to have poured kerosene on her face and set fire on her resulting the death of the deceased on 09.04.2003 at about 1.15 p.m. 3. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case examined P.Ws.1 to 14, marked Exs.P.1 to P.17 and M.Os.1 to 4. 4. The accused faced trial under the following backdrop : (i) The accused is the paramour of the deceased and both of them were residing together. P.W.1 is the son of the deceased and he was staying along with his grandmother and studying in the school. The deceased was selling flower at Attur bus stand. There were frequent quarrels between the deceased and the accused as the accused demanded money from her. .(ii) On the fateful day of occurrence, i.e., on 22.02.2003 at 10.00 a.m., the deceased came out of her house with burn injuries and raised hue and cry. P.Ws.2 and 4, the neighbours of the deceased, on hearing the shouting, saw the deceased with burn injuries. P.W.2 took the deceased to the hospital in an auto. (iii) The Doctor, P.W.7 attached to Attur Government Hospital, examined the deceased on 22.02.2003 at 10.10 a.m. P.W.2 informed the Doctor that the deceased sustained burn injuries at 10.00 a.m. on that day by pouring kerosene and setting fire on herself. The injured (deceased) was found conscious. He found the following injuries: L/E : Burns present over the face, head, both surface of neck, upper half of chest including both breast. Anterior surface of both upper arm. Scattered area of both forearm. Treatment given. Admitted in Female Ward. Ex.P.3 is the Accident Register issued by the Doctor, P.W.7 to the injured (deceased). .(iv) P.W.11, Head Constable, attached to Attur Police Station received the intimation, Ex.P.9 from the Government Hospital, Attur. Anterior surface of both upper arm. Scattered area of both forearm. Treatment given. Admitted in Female Ward. Ex.P.3 is the Accident Register issued by the Doctor, P.W.7 to the injured (deceased). .(iv) P.W.11, Head Constable, attached to Attur Police Station received the intimation, Ex.P.9 from the Government Hospital, Attur. He went to the hospital and recorded the statement from the deceased at 4.30 p.m. under Ex.P.10. It is stated in Ex.P.10 that there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased as the accused demanded an amount of Rs.5,000/- from her and as such the deceased provoked and poured kerosene which was kept in the plastic can and set fire on herself and the accused attempted to put off the fire by putting a gunny bag on her. P.W.11 entered Ex.P.10 in the general diary for the perusal of his higher officials. .(v) P.W.12 registered the case in Crime No.384 of 2003 for the offence under Sections 498-A IPC on the basis of Ex.P.10 recorded by P.W.11 on 27.02.2003 at 8.30 a.m. Ex.P.11 is the First Information Report and he sent the same to the higher officials and to the Magistrates Court. .(vi) P.W.12 took up investigation and went to the scene of occurrence at 10.15 a.m. on 27.02.2003. He recovered M.O.1, kerosene can and M.O.2, match box under Ex.P.2. He examined P.Ws.2 to 5 and others and recorded their statements. He arrested the accused on 10.03.2003 at 9.30 a.m. near Attur Thuluva Velaalar Kalyana Mandapam. (vii) P.W.13 took up further investigation. He went to the Government Hospital, Attur, and examined the deceased and recorded her statement, Ex.P.6, on 10.03.2003 at 8.30 p.m. in the presence of the Doctor, P.W.9. P.W.13 altered the offence from Section 498A IPC to one under 307 IPC. Ex.P.13 is the altered First Information Report and he sent the same to the Magistrates Court. He examined the Doctor, P.W.9,and the witnesses, P.W.3 and P.W.1 and recorded their statements. (viii) P.W.8, learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Attur, recorded the dying declaration, Ex.P.5 as per the requisition, Ex.P.4 on 11.03.2003 at 5.55 a.m. and the Doctor certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration. (ix) P.W.14 took up further investigation. He went to the scene of occurrence and seized M.O.3, kerosene stove under Ex.P.14. He examined P.W.7, the Doctor, and other witnesses. (ix) P.W.14 took up further investigation. He went to the scene of occurrence and seized M.O.3, kerosene stove under Ex.P.14. He examined P.W.7, the Doctor, and other witnesses. He received the death intimation on 09.04.2003 to the effect that the deceased died at 1.15 p.m. on that day as per the death intimation, Ex.P.15. He altered the offence under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC to under Sections 498 (A) and 302 IPC. Ex.P.16 is the Express First Information Report. He held inquest on the dead body from 4.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. Ex.P.17 is the inquest report. He sent the body for post-mortem. (x) The Doctor, P.W.10, attached to Government Hospital, Attur, conducted postmortem on 10.04.2003 at 9.00 a.m. and he found the following injuries : Ext.Injuries: Partially healed burn injuries involving. Face Neck. Anterior chest. Posterior chest. Anterior abdominal wall. Int. Examination: On cut section of burn wound haemorrhagic spots present which suggestive of Ante-mortem in nature. Thorax/Abd Thoracic cage intact. Both lungs congested. Heart filled with blood. Stomach: empty. Intestines: distended with gas. Liver: Spleen. Kidneys: congested. Bladder: empty. Uterus with Adnexa Normal in all aspects. Skull: Intact. Membranes intact. Brain solid. Pelvis and spinal column intact. Ex.P.8 is the Post-mortem Certificate. The Doctor, P.W.10, opined that the deceased would appear to have died of shock (septicemic) 20-24 hrs prior to the autopsy. (xi) P.W.14, in continuation of his investigation, recorded further statements from P.Ws.1 to 3 and others. He also examined the Doctor, P.W.10, who has conducted post-mortem and others. The further investigation was done by one Inspector Sethupathy and P.W.14, who was having acquaintance with the signature of the said Inspector, stated that after receiving the post-mortem certificate, Ex.P.8 and after completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the accused on 10.06.2003 for the offence under Section 302 IC. 5. When the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in respect of the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, he has come forward with the version of total denial and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. 6. Mr.A.Abdul lathif, learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that the entire prosecution case rests on the circumstantial evidence and there are several missing links in the circumstances put forward by the prosecution. 6. Mr.A.Abdul lathif, learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that the entire prosecution case rests on the circumstantial evidence and there are several missing links in the circumstances put forward by the prosecution. It is submitted that at the earliest point of time, namely, on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 22.02.2003 at 4.30 p.m., the deceased stated in Ex.P.10 recorded by P.W.11, Head Constable, that she poured kerosene on her and set fire on herself and as such this is a case of suicide. It is contended that even before the Doctor, P.W.7, it was informed by P.W.2, the neighbour of the deceased, that the deceased poured kerosene on her and set fire on herself and as such the earlier version to the Doctor as well as to the police is to the effect that the deceased has poured kerosene on her and set fire on herself. The learned counsel would further submit that it is not safe to place reliance on the subsequent dying declaration said to have been recorded by the Magistrate under Ex.P.5, wherein, she has implicated the accused as there is no consistency in the dying declaration. It is submitted that the evidence of P.W.2 , the neighbour, clearly shows that the accused attempted to put off the fire by putting gunny bag on the deceased and the accused was not absconding and the conduct of the accused clearly establishes his innocence. 7. We have heard Mr.N.R.Elango, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. 8. We have given our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and also thoroughly scrutinized the entire materials available on record and perused the impugned judgment of conviction. 9. The entire prosecution case rests on the circumstantial evidence. It is well-settled that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime. 10. In the light of the above principle of law laid down by the Honble Apex Court regarding the circumstantial evidence, let us now scrutinize the circumstances put forward by the prosecution. 11. 10. In the light of the above principle of law laid down by the Honble Apex Court regarding the circumstantial evidence, let us now scrutinize the circumstances put forward by the prosecution. 11. The prosecution mainly put forward the following circumstances, namely, .(i) the occurrence took place in the house of the deceased and the presence of the accused at that time was spoken by P.W.2 ; and .(ii) the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.8, under Ex.P.5 implicating the accused. 12. As far as the first circumstance, namely, the occurrence was said to have taken place inside the house of the deceased, it is pertinent to be noted that the accused has not disputed the occurrence took place inside the house. As a matter of fact, the accused was residing along with the deceased in the same house. It is pertinent to be noted that while the deceased came out from the house with burn injuries and flames, the accused attempted to put off the fire by putting gunny bag on her as stated by P.W.2. P.W.2 is a neighbour and she is an independent witness. The version of P.W.2 is also corroborated by P.W.4 as P.W.4 has admitted in his cross-examination that he has stated to the police that the accused attempted to put off the fire by putting gunny bag on the deceased. Yet another witness, P.W.5, has also corroborated the version of P.Ws.2 and 4 to the effect that he heard that the accused attempted to put off the fire on the deceased. It is also relevant to note that the accused not ran away from the scene or absconded. The conduct of the accused is also a relevant factor to test the credibility of the prosecution version. Therefore, in view of the above said conduct of the accused, we have no hesitation to hold that the conduct of the accused to put off the fire on the deceased and he was not absconding clearly establishes his innocence. 13. The next circumstance put forward by the prosecution is the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.8, under Ex.P.5. It is seen that in Ex.P.5, the deceased implicated the accused for pouring kerosene and setting fire on her. 13. The next circumstance put forward by the prosecution is the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.8, under Ex.P.5. It is seen that in Ex.P.5, the deceased implicated the accused for pouring kerosene and setting fire on her. It is pertinent to be noted that the said dying declaration, Ex.P.5, was recorded long after the occurrence, i.e., on 11.03.2003, whereas, the occurrence is said to have taken place on 22.02.2003. The medical evidence through the Doctor, P.W.7, who has first examined the deceased on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 22.02.2003, clearly shows that the deceased was found conscious at that time on 22.02.2003 as mentioned in the accident register, Ex.P.3 and there is absolutely no explanation from the prosecution for the delay in recording the dying declaration by the Magistrate. 14. Yet another vital aspect to be considered by this Court is the earliest dying declaration recorded by the Head Constable, P.W.11 under Ex.P.10 on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 22.02.2003. It is pertinent to be noted that Ex.P.10 was recorded by P.W.11 at 4.30 p.m. on 22.02.2003 and in that dying declaration it was categorically stated by the deceased that there was a wordy quarrel between herself and the accused as the accused demanded Rs.5,000/-and as she was provoked, she poured kerosene on her and set fire on herself. This earliest version of the deceased cannot be brushed aside lightly. It is relevant to note that this version of the deceased is also further substantiated by the evidence of P.W.4 as P.W.4 has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he has stated to the police during the course of his investigation that the deceased poured kerosene and set fire on herself. P.W.5 has also stated in his cross-examination that he heard that the deceased poured kerosene on her and set fire on herself. Therefore, the dying declaration under Ex.P.10 is corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 5. The contradictory versions given by the deceased under Ex.P.10 and under Ex.P.5 clearly shows that there is no consistency in the dying declarations. 15. The Honble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay D.Rajhans reported in 2004 AIR SCW 6320 held that, 17. Therefore, the dying declaration under Ex.P.10 is corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 5. The contradictory versions given by the deceased under Ex.P.10 and under Ex.P.5 clearly shows that there is no consistency in the dying declarations. 15. The Honble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay D.Rajhans reported in 2004 AIR SCW 6320 held that, 17. Thus, the version of homicide set up by the prosecution as well as the version of suicide set up by the accused appear to be highly improbable and do not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to believe either version. In this stage of things, when two incredible versions confront the Court, the Court has to give benefit of doubt to the accused and it is not safe to sustain the conviction. The contradictions in the two dying declarations coupled with the high degree of improbability of the manner of occurrence as depicted weight to these dying declarations. It is not the plurality of the dying declarations that adds weight to the prosecution case, but their qualitative worth is what matters. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its truthfulness and correctness (vide the observations of Five-Judge Bench in Laxman V. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 ). Inasmuch as the correctness of dying declaration cannot be tested by cross-examination of its maker, "great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence. When there is more than one dying declaration genuinely recorded, they must be tested on the touchstone of consistency and probabilities." 16. The Honble Apex Court in Muthu Kutty V. State reported in 2005 (9) SCC 113 , while incorporating the principles laid down in its several earlier decisions governing dying declaration, referred one of the principles as hereunder: "15 . .... (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani V. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1982 SC 839 )." 17. .... (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani V. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1982 SC 839 )." 17. In yet another decision in P. Mani V. State of T.N. Reported in (2006) 3 SCC 161 the Honble Apex Court has held that, "14. Indisputably conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone but therefor the same must be wholly reliable. In a case where suspicion can be raised as regards the correctness of the dying declaration, the court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. Suspicion, it is trite, is no substitute for proof. If evidence brought on record suggests that such dying declaration does not reveal the entire truth, it may be considered only as a piece of evidence in which event conviction may be not rested only on the basis thereof." 18. If, the two dying declarations given by the deceased under Ex.P.5 and Ex.P.10, which are totally contradictory to each other, as Ex.P.10, the earliest statement discloses that the deceased poured kerosene on her and set fire on herself and Ex.P.5, which was recorded by the Magistrate on 11.03.2003 long after the occurrence which took place on 22.02.2003 discloses that the deceased stated that only the accused poured kerosene and set fire on her are considered with the touchstone of the principles laid down by the Honble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra, then we are constrained to come to the inevitable conclusion that no sanctity could be attached to the dying declarations given by the deceased and as such we are constrained to give the benefit of doubt to the accused. 19. There is no other incriminating circumstance put forward by the prosecution excluding the above said circumstances and as such the prosecution has miserably failed to put forward incriminating circumstances by completing the chain unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused and as such we are constrained to state that the impugned judgment of conviction is unsustainable and the appeal is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Salem, in S.C.No.265 of 2005 by the judgment dated 03.02.2006 are hereby set aside. Bail bond executed, if any, shall stand cancelled. Fine amount paid, if any, is directed to be refunded to the appellant.