Judgment H.K. Rathod, J.—Heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties. 2. The main Special Civil Application No. 12302 of 2004 is filed by petitioner, where, petitioner Corporation has challenged the order passed by Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara in Approval Application (IT) No. 89 of 1997 in Demand Reference (IT) No. 187 of 1994 dated 03.12.2003. The Approval Application is rejected by Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara. 3. This Court, by order dated 24.09.2004, issued ‘rule’ returnable on 24.11.2004. In the meanwhile, ad interim, relief in terms of Para 15(C) granted by this Court, where, implementation of order passed by Industrial Tribunal in Approval Application No. 89 of 1997 is stayed. Against the main petition, affidavit-in-reply is filed by respondent supporting the decision given by Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara. 4. The Civil Application No. 8323 of 2004 is filed in registry on 07.12.2004 with a prayer to grant 17-B wages to the respondent workman w.e.f. Date of order passed by Industrial Tribunal dated 03.12.2003. The copy of this Civil Application is served to learned Advocate Mr. A.M. Dagli on 07.12.2004. The urgent note was filed by learned Advocate Mr. Brahmbhatt on 09.05.2005 with a request to circulate Civil Application on 10.05.2005. This matter is not notified on board. The reason is that on 30.09.2005, this Court has ordered that ‘to be placed Civil Application alongwith main matter on 07.10.2005’. On 07.10.2005, matter was notified, but, main matter was not finally decided and time-to-time adjourned on each occasion. Ultimately, due to main matter is not decided, Civil Application remains pending without any order. Therefore, ultimately, learned Advocate Mr. Brahmbhatt has filed note in the registry dated 17.06.2008. According to him, because of ad interim relief granted by this Court, workman is not reinstated by petitioner Corporation and workman is facing very hard difficulties without any financial help. The Civil Application is not placed on board by the registry. Therefore, he requested the registry to place Civil Application before the Hon’ble Court as respondent is sufferer has not reinstated by petitioner Corporation. Ultimately, today Civil Application is notified by registry before this Court. 5. In Civil Application, though received by learned Advocate Mr. Dagli on 07.12.2004, no counter is filed by petitioner Corporation. This Civil Application is filed by respondent under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ultimately, today Civil Application is notified by registry before this Court. 5. In Civil Application, though received by learned Advocate Mr. Dagli on 07.12.2004, no counter is filed by petitioner Corporation. This Civil Application is filed by respondent under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The specific averments made in Para 5 by the respondent that he is out of job since 22.05.1997, more than 10 years have been passed and he is not gainfully employed in any establishment and facing financial difficulty and hardship and it is very difficult for the respondent to maintain his family without any source of income. He is not gainfully employed till the date from termination to the date of application is filed and he is not engaged any establishment during the pendency of this petition. He relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Regional Authority, Dena Bank & Another vs. Ghanshyam reported in 2001 AIR SCW 2150. Therefore, prayer is to grant full wages last drawn by the workman w.e.f. 03.12.2003 till the matter is finally decided by this Court. Against the aforesaid averments made in Para 5, no counter is filed by petitioner Corporation. 6. The law on the subject is very clear. The workman was dismissed from service on 22.05.1997. The approval of dismissal order is required under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, because, general industrial dispute was pending before the Tribunal, where, respondent workman was concerned workman. Therefore, approval application was filed by the Corporation. Ultimately, Tribunal has rejected the approval application on 03.12.2003. This Court has granted ex-parte ad-interim relief. At that occasion, respondent was not heard. This ad-interim relief still remains ad-interim and not decided by-parte hearing from ad-interim relief to interim relief. Not only that, more than four years have been passed and matter is not finally decided by this Court. On number of occasions, matter was adjourned and application for 17-B is also not decided by this Court. The legal effect, of rejection of approval application is that workman is deemed to be in service for all purposes. The dismissal order is not approved in approval application. Therefore, same is not came into effect and workman is deemed to be remained in service and relationship is continue as an employer-employee between the petitioner and respondent. The legal effect, of rejection of approval application is that workman is deemed to be in service for all purposes. The dismissal order is not approved in approval application. Therefore, same is not came into effect and workman is deemed to be remained in service and relationship is continue as an employer-employee between the petitioner and respondent. Therefore, respondent workman is entitled as a matter of right reinstatement in case of rejection of approval application under mandatory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The view taken by Apex Court in case of Jaipur Jilla Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors, reported in 2002 (2) SCC 244 . The relevant observation made by Apex Court in aforesaid decision in Para 14, which is quoted as under : “14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval, of the authority under the said provisions in other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position, there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position, there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given, by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such a approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33-A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside, under Section 33-A and that till such time, he should suffer misery of unemployment inspite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge, or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33-1 would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted.” 7. Recently, Delhi High Court has also taken the view that in case of approval application is rejected, the workman is deemed to be in service in case of D.T.C. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Another reported in 2008 (116) FLR 879. 8. Even in case of during the pendency of industrial dispute, if, the workman is dismissed without obtaining approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, such order of dismissal is void inoperative as per view taken by Gauhati High Court in case of Satyabrata Goswami vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Dibrugarh & Ors. reported in 2008 LabIC 332. 8. Even in case of during the pendency of industrial dispute, if, the workman is dismissed without obtaining approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, such order of dismissal is void inoperative as per view taken by Gauhati High Court in case of Satyabrata Goswami vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Dibrugarh & Ors. reported in 2008 LabIC 332. The relevant Para 21 is quoted as under : “21. In the light of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Boomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra), it becomes clear that the decisions, in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (Supra), Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. (Supra), Punjab National Bank Ltd. (Supra) and Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. (Supra) are no longer good law. In fact, in the backdrop of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra), a two Judge Bench, in India Telephone Industries Ltd. vs. Prabhakar H. Manjuare, reported in (2003) I SCC 320 = (2002) LabIC 3746, has held that once the breach of Section 33(2)(b) is found to have been committed by an employer, it would make the order of discharge or dismissal void and inoperative and, hence in such a case the employee would be deemed to have continued in service as if no order of dismissal was passed.” 9. The Delhi High Court has taken the view that once the approval application is rejected/ the workman is deemed to be in service entitled full back-wages of interim period except gainful employment is proved by employer in case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Ram Bhaj, Ex-Conductor reported in 2008 (1) CLR 148 (Delhi). 10. In view of aforesaid law followed by subsequently different High Court Larger Bench decision of Apex Court in case of Jaipur Jilla Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra), the rejection of approval application, workman is deemed to be in service impliedly amounts to grant the relief of reinstatement with full back-wages of interim period. Therefore, the question arise that whether the workman is entitled the benefit of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or not. 11. Therefore, the question arise that whether the workman is entitled the benefit of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or not. 11. This Court has examined the question in case when approval application is rejected and employer is challenging the said order of rejection and obtained stay against the said order, then, Section 17-B is applicable or not in case of Birla NGK Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat and Others in Special Civil Application No. 11401 of 2006 to Special Civil Application No. 11419 of 2006, dated 12.06.2006. This Court has held that in case of rejection of approval application, Section 17-B is applicable and petitioner who challenged the order of rejection of approval application, must have to pay last drawn full wages to the workman unless gainful employment is proved by employer. The following observations made by this Court in above group of Special Civil Application are quoted as under : “In light of the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties, question is whether Section 17-B of the ID Act, 1947 will apply in case wherein order of rejection of approval application is challenged and the Court is considering the question of staying such an order of rejection of approval application or not. In case of Samser Ali (Sk) and Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. and Another, reported in 1988 I LLJ Page 1, Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has made following observations : In this case the enforceability of an order made under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act in an application under Section 27-B of the aforesaid Act has been considered. Held that an order made under Section 33(2)(b) of Industrial Disputes Act can be enforced in an application under-Section 17-B of the said Act having regard to the definition of ‘Award’ and the definition of “Industrial Dispute”. Section 17-B not only applies in respect of Awards granting reins tateraent but also in cases where an order has been made under Section 33(2)(b) rejecting the application for approval. Section 17-B is a piece of social welfare and beneficial legislation enacted with a view to do away with a hardship caused to the employees who are deprived of the benefits of the order of reinstatement when stay of operation of orders of reinstatement is granted by the High Court or Supreme Court. Section 17-B is a piece of social welfare and beneficial legislation enacted with a view to do away with a hardship caused to the employees who are deprived of the benefits of the order of reinstatement when stay of operation of orders of reinstatement is granted by the High Court or Supreme Court. The section cast an obligation on the employer to pay to the employee full back wages on the basis of the last pay drawn including any admissible allowance for maintenance under any rules. An application under Section 17-B will not be maintainable if during the pendency of the proceedings in a High Court or Supreme Court, the employee is employed in any establishment or elsewhere. The section further requires an affidavit from the workman concerned to the effect that he was not employed in any establishment during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court or Supreme Court.” In case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, reported in 2001-I-III CLR Page 700, it has been observed in Para 11 at Page 705 as under: “11. In my considered view, there is no need to travel beyond Section 17-B itself. As has been repeatedly observed, the Management’s order of dismissal effects de facto termination of services and this is transformed into de jure character only once the approval is granted. If approval is declined, the immediate consequence is that even the de facto status is reversed and obliterated. The workman continues in service and it should be open to him to recover his wages and entitlement by pursing the most convenient and expeditious legal recourse available to him. This was the view of the two separate Division Benches of the High Court of Calcutta in the case of Samser Ali and Bata India (Supra). Observations in the last case call for extraction herein, and read as follows : ‘In our view, it a liberal interpretation is given to Section 17-B for the purpose of giving effect to the beneficial object which it seeks to achieve, there will be no difficulty in extending the benefit of the said section even in such a case where the employer challenges an order passed by the Tribunal disproving an order of dismissal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act in the High Court and the Supreme Court. Although in case of such disapproval by the Tribunal under Section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, Tribunal does not actually direct reinstatement in service, the real effect of such order is, in our view amounts to reinstatement. “Reinstatement” means as per “Words and Phreases”, Permanent Edition Volume 36-A, “To “To restore to a former state, authority or station”. “To return to a former status”. To restore to a state from which one has been reserved”. as per Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition, Reinstatement’ means “To reinstall’ to reestablish, to place again in a former state, condition, or office, to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed.” Under such circumstances, legal effect of disapproval under Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act by the Tribunal although may make the order of dismissal void ab initio, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of P.D. Sharma vs. State Bank of India and the workman concerned deems to continue in service, the same is really by a fiction of law. Factually and effectively, however, the workman concerned is restored back to the position which he held before the order of dismissal only after the order of such disapproval is passed by the Tribunal under aforesaid Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act and consequently as a matter of right is entitled not only to all arrear wages and other benefits, but also is entitled to his salary month by month. In that view of the matter we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Ginwala that provision of 17-B would not be applicable as there was no award directing reinstatement. The definition of Award and Industrial Disputes as it would appear from Section 2(b) and Section 2(k) of the said Act themselves, are of the widest amplitude. Award has been defined under Section 2(b) of the Act as an interim of final determination of any industrial disputes or of any question relating thereto of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and Industrial Disputes has been defined under Section 2(k) of the said Act as any disputes between the employers and employees or between the employees and workman and between the workman and employers which is concerned with the employment or non-employment or with the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any persons. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act disapproving the order of dismissal is certainly a matter relating to employment or non-employment of the workman and is certainly a determination by the Tribunal in respect thereto. Such decision is certainly a determination that the decision in question is invalid and, therefore, cannot be approved. There is no reason, therefore, as to why, giving a liberal interpretation to the provision of Section 17-B of the said Act, such a decision of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act cannot be termed as an award within the meaning of Section 17-B of the said Act.” In Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. and Another vs. Prabhakar H. Manjure reported in 2003 (1) SCC 320 , it has been observed as under in Para 5 at Page 323 and in Para 9 at Page 325: “5. Constitution Bench of this Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. has ruled that the conditions contained in the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) are mandatory in nature and their non-compliance would render the order of discharge or dismissal void or inoperative. It is further held that if the Tribunal refuses to grant the approval sought for under Section 33(2)(b), the effect of it shall be that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed and consequently the employee would be deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. It is also made clear that not making an application under Section 33(2) (b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). While approving the cases of Straw Board and Tata Iron & Steel Co. the case of Punjab Beverages is overruled. 9. Having not challenged the earlier order dated 01.09.1987, it was not open to the petitioners to make a second application seeking approval for the order of dismissal of the respondent, that too without paying full back wages. The Division Bench of the High Court has found that the second order of dismissal amounted to unfair labour practice and victimization. The Tribunal was not justified in allowing the second application seeking approval by ignoring the dismissal of the earlier application made by the management for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law. The Division Bench of the High Court has found that the second order of dismissal amounted to unfair labour practice and victimization. The Tribunal was not justified in allowing the second application seeking approval by ignoring the dismissal of the earlier application made by the management for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law. The Tribunal proceeded on the ground that the earlier application was not decided on merits and held that it was open to the petitioners to file a second application. This is clearly contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench. It appears to us that the petitioners designed to defeat the claim of the respondents by making a second application when the order suffered by them on the first application had become final. Even as stated in the decision of Tata Iron & Steel Co. the petitioners failed to pay full wages to the respondents between the period of two dismissal orders. The case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. on facts of the present case does not help the petitioners. The question that was dealt with that case was altogether different.” In case of Anil R. Joshi vs. Air India Ltd. Reported in 2003 (I) CLR Page 131, Division Bench of Bombay High Court has observed in Paras 8 and 9 at Page 133: “Para 8 : The law laid down in the aforesaid two judgments has been further reiterated in the recent judgment of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors., 2002 (2) SCC 244 . The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., in Para 14 of the report held thus: 14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as a if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as a if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval, of the authority under the said provisions in other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given, by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such a approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. Section 33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33-A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33-A and that till such time, he should suffer misery of unemployment inspite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2) (b) it is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso ‘to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33-1 would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted. Para. 9: It would thus seen that the order of dismissal passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing an employee de facto brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal but this relationship comes to an end de jure only when approval is granted. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge had never been passed.” In case of Rane Brake Linings Ltd. Chennai vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, 2004 II CLR 855, it has been observed as under in Para 26 by the Madras High Court, at Pages 862 and 863: Para 6.3.4(16) : From the conspectus of the views taken in the decisions referred to above the position is manifest that while the employer has the discretion to initiate a departmental inquiry and pass an order of dismissal or discharge against the workman the order remains in an inchoate state till the employer contains order of approval from the Tribunal. By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de facto the relationship of employer and employee may be ended but not the de jure relationship for that could happen only when the Tribunal accords its approval. The relationship of employer and employee is not legally terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given by the Tribunal. In a case where the Tribunal refuses to accord approval to the action taken by the employer and rejects the petitions filed under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act on merits the employer is bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and give him all the consequential benefits. If the employer refuses to grant the benefits to the employer the latter is entitled to have his right enforced by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no rational basis for holding that even after the order of dismissal or discharge has been rendered invalid on the Tribunal’s rejection of the prayer for approval the workman should suffer the consequences of such invalid order of dismissal or discharge till the matter is decided by the Tribunal again in an industrial dispute. Accepting this contention would render the bar contained in Section 33(1) irrelevant. In the present case as noted earlier the Tribunal on consideration of the matter held that the employer had failed to establish a prima facie case for dismissal/discharge of the workman, and, therefore, dismissed the application filed by the employer on merits. The inevitable consequence of this would be that the employer was duty bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and pay him his wages for the period even though he may be subsequently placed under suspension and an inquiry initiated against him.” In case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Jagdish Chander reported in 2005 (III) LLJ Page 390, Full Bench of the Delhi High Court has observed as under at Page 390. “Respondent, who was a Conductor in petitioner - Delhi Transport Corporation, was removed from service on charges of irregularity and irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, amounting to misconduct in terms of Paras 4 and 19(f) among others of the Standing Orders. The Corporation sought approval of the removal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal declined to grant the approval. The Corporation challenged the Tribunal’s order in the present petition. The Corporation sought approval of the removal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal declined to grant the approval. The Corporation challenged the Tribunal’s order in the present petition. Respondent filed an application seeking relief under Section 17-B of the Act. A reference was made upon this application to the present Full Bench the issue being whether Section 17-B would be applicable to writ proceedings challenging an order of the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) declining approval. The Full Bench answered the reference in the affirmative. HELD: Referring to decisions on the point, the Full Bench observed the emphasis of the Legislature (in Section 17-B) was on the expression ‘reinstatement’ rather than on ‘award’. (Pare 10) The cumulative effect of Sections 2(b) and 2(k) defining ‘award’ and ‘industrial dispute’ demonstrated that the expressions had been widely worded to take within their ambit duties relatable to any person who satisfied the conditions stated therein. (Para 16) Section 17-B as well as the judgements of the Supreme Court interpreting it discernibly predicated the principle that a workman was entitled to relief under Section 17-B where the Labour Court found that action of employer in dismissing the workman was illegal or unjustified and directed his reinstatement under Section 17-B. (Para 21) The language of Section 17-B could not be stated to be unambiguous but the rule of liberal construction would have to be applied to achieve the social goal underlining this provision. (Para 24) Merely because the scope of jurisdiction by Court or Tribunal had some noticeable difference, it should not be treated as paramount consideration for giving narrower interpretation to a section. (Para 34)” In Paras 33 and 35 of the same decision, it has been further observed as under at Pages 405 and 406: “33. In the case, of Bharat Singh vs. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Center, New Delhi and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 842 = 1986 (2) SCC 614 = 1986 (II) LLJ 217 , while determining the retrospective effect of the newly introduced provisions of Section 17 -B of the Act, the Supreme Court held that there are no words in the section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively and in such a situation Court should give a purposive interpretation to the section. While looking into the objects and reasons which according to the judgements provide an insight into the back ground why the section was introduced and also the fact that Court would necessarily not take a rigid view in relation to interpretation of the provisions where the object of enactment is to provide benefit to the persons in whose favour the provision was enacted. Though the views expressed by different Courts to some extent are divergent, but there is by and large unanimity in all the referred decisions that the provisions of the Act need liberal interpretation and it is undoubtedly a beneficial legislation enacted for protection of the workman against exploitation, resulting from prolonged litigation which normally is stretched as a result of the affluent employer preferring proceedings before the higher Court against every order. It also cannot be disputed that the order of dismissal affects de facto determination of services and this attains de jure character only after the action of the employer is approved by the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its powers. There is complete and comprehensive determination by the Industrial Tribunal while deciding such an application. It is in compliance of a strict sense. The principle of exclusion can be applied where it is explicitly stated in the statute. Unanimity of judicial view in all the above referred judgements clearly shows that the Courts have uniformly applied the rule of liberal and purposive interpretation while treating the Objects and Reasons of the Act as an incite to the necessity for legislation. No doubt, in terms of the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Lord Krishna Textile Mills vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 = 1961 (I) LLJ 311. The Tribunal exercised its limited jurisdiction but it is a complete and final determination, quite analogous to the conclusions of the proceedings upon a reference to the labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The jurisdiction under the two provisions may not be identical in absolute terms but still it is a comprehensive and complete adjudication leading to the determination by a labour Court or Tribunal of an industrial dispute or any question relating thereto. It will also include the matters of employment or non-employment or variation in terms of the employment. The jurisdiction under the two provisions may not be identical in absolute terms but still it is a comprehensive and complete adjudication leading to the determination by a labour Court or Tribunal of an industrial dispute or any question relating thereto. It will also include the matters of employment or non-employment or variation in terms of the employment. The action of the employer in terminating the services of the petitioner, subject to statutory compliance indicated in Section 33(2)(b) is a question relating to employment or non-employment. The determination may not be an award in stricto senso having not been required to be published in terms of Section 17-A and its manner of execution may be somewhat at. variance, but still the order under Section 33(2)(b) has all the ingredients of a complete and final determination by the Labour Court and the industrial Tribunal entitling the workman with relief of reinstatement in law. Quando lex est specialis ratio qutem generalis generaliter lex est intelligenda. The Industrial law is a special law but its reasons are general and thus must be generally understood.” 35. Thus, our answer to the following formulated question as to whether the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable in a case where the management in writ petition has challenged the order of the labour Court industrial Tribunal whereby its application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking approval of the order of dismissal was dismissed by such Court or Tribunal is as under: ‘The provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable to a case where the management in the writ petition has challenged the order of Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal whereby its application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking approval of the order of dismissal was dismissed by such Court or Tribunal, subject to conditions stated in Section 17-B itself. In case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Bal Kishan and Another, reported in 2006 LabIC Page 1229, Division Bench of Delhi High Court has observed as under in Paras 15 and 16 : “15. In case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Bal Kishan and Another, reported in 2006 LabIC Page 1229, Division Bench of Delhi High Court has observed as under in Paras 15 and 16 : “15. However, in the mean time, a Full Bench of this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Jagdish Chander, 2005 V AD (Delhi) 227, has taken the view after relying on MD Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation vs. Neethivilangah Kumbakonam 2002 LIC 1801 and Jaipur Zila Sehkari Bhoomi Bank Ltd. Vikas vs. Ram Gopal Sharma, JT 2002 (1) SC 182 = 2002 LabIC 523, that once an application filed by an employer under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act is rejected, the order of removal against the workman is non-est and inoperative in law. The consequence of this is that for all inents and purposes, the workman continues to be in employment and is entitled to all benefits. Consequently, the employer is bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and to give him all consequential benefits. 16. As a result of the decision of the Full Bench, it must be held that the respondent workman was in employment at least till Appellant writ petition was dismissed. Since the respondent/workman must be deemed to be continuing in service throughout this period, he is entitled to the wages that are due to him in accordance with law, at least until 20.01.2003, when appellant’s writ petition was dismissed and its request for approval held bad.” In case of Amit Kumar and Indian Airlines Ltd. [2006 (109) FLR 387], Division Bench of Bombay High Court observed as under at Pages 387 and 368: “The occasion to award the wages under Section 17-B arises only when a petition to challenge the award granted by the labour Court or the Tribunal is admitted by High Court or the Supreme Court and the stay thereof is granted leading a workman to point out to the Court is to what are his difficulties and to apply for his last drawn wages. In the present case, an interim stay was granted by the Apex Court and subsequently, it has permitted the respondent to file a petition before the High Court and, therefore, the SLP was withdrawn. In the present case, an interim stay was granted by the Apex Court and subsequently, it has permitted the respondent to file a petition before the High Court and, therefore, the SLP was withdrawn. The petition to challenge the Award of the Tribunal came to be admitted by the Single Judge of this Court only on 06.05.2005 when he granted stay pending the disposal of the petition. It is at that stage that the appellant herein could have moved to apply for the last drawn wages under Section 17-B. This was applied by taking out the motion. Therefore, in absence of any specific observation by the Apex Court while granting the interim stay cannot take away the right of the appellant to move for his wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.” In view of the aforesaid decisions and the observations made by various High Courts as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that in the event of rejection of an application for approval, order of discharge/dismissal becomes non-est and inoperative and in such eventuality, workman is deemed to be in service for all purposes, for wages and other consequential benefits and, therefore, it impliedly includes reinstatement. Order of such rejection of approval application is challenged by employer before this Court with a prayer to stay the order of rejection of approval application which impliedly includes reinstatement of workmen concerned. Therefore granting of such prayer of stay against such order of rejection of approval application amounts to staying operation of award of reinstatement. In view of that, workmen are entitled for the last drawn wages from the date of the order of rejection application till the matter is finally heard and decided by this Court. . . . . .When the law on this point is settled that in the event of rejection of approval application, order of dismissal/discharge becomes non-est and inoperative, then, while considering the question of interim relief against such order of rejection of approval application in a petition challenging the order of rejection of approval application, workmen are entitled to last drawn wages as required under Section 17-B of the ID Act, 1947, being a subsistence allowance to litigate proceedings before the higher forum and maintain family during the pendency of petition. Otherwise, during the pendency of proceedings, without compliance of the provisions of Section 17-B of the ID Act, 1947, workmen would become helpless, their families will be ruined and will be put to starvation. That is how, to protecting interest in legal fight between two unequals, provisions of Section 17-B have been incorporated by the legislature in the Statute. Any other interpretation will go contrary to the Object, Purposes and Reasons of enacting Section 17-B in the Statute Book. In such a situation, in Babulal Nagar vs. Shree Synthetics Ltd., and Others, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1164 , it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court (Coram : D.A. Desai, O. Chinappa Reddy and A. Varadrajan, JJ.), as under : “Desai, J.:—Nothing appears more well settled than that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 conferred on the High Court was a weapon forged to overreach injustice and secure and advance justice. When, therefore, this extra ordinary power is used to defeat justice and to promote technicality not only its raison d’etre is violated but it becomes a handy instrument for those to whom litigation cost is a luxury enjoyed at the cost of others and employed to exhaust and harass an unequal opponent. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal.” 12. The aforesaid decision was challenged before the Division Bench of this Court by filing Letters Patent Appeal No. 889 of 2006, which was not entertained by the Division Bench of this Court and ordered to dismiss the appeal in limine on 06.07.2006. 13. The view has been taken by Bombay High Court that in case of rejection of approval application, Section 17-B is applicable and workman is entitled the relief under Section 17-B if the order of rejection of approval application is stayed by High Court in case of Amit Kumar vs. Indian Airlines Ltd., reported in 2006 (II) LLJ 699 = 2006 (109) FLR 387. 14. In view of aforesaid observations made by this Court, in this case, the workman, in whose favour, approval application is rejected, then, he is deemed to be in service for all purposes from date of dismissal and entitled the full back-wages of interim period as a matter of right. This order of rejection of approval application is stayed by this Court, therefore, applicant workman is entitled last drawn wages from the petitioner Corporation. This order of rejection of approval application is stayed by this Court, therefore, applicant workman is entitled last drawn wages from the petitioner Corporation. The petitioner Corporation has not filed counter to the application and not produced any evidence before this Court to prove gainful employment of the workman from the date of order passed by Industrial Tribunal. 15. Therefore, in light of this background, according to my opinion, respondent workman - present applicant is entitled last drawn full wages from the date of order i.e. 03.12.2003 till 31.07.2008 and thereafter, till the matter is finally decided by this Court. 16. Therefore, it is directed to petitioner Corporation to pay full wages last drawn to the workman w.e.f. 03.12.2003 to 31.07.2008 within a period of one month from the date of receiving the copy of the said order and it is further directed to petitioner Corporation to pay regularly continue full wages last drawn by the workman till the matter is finally decided by this Court. 17. However, it is made clear by this Court that in case, if, petitioner Corporation is having any material or concrete evidence to satisfy this Court that respondent is gainfully employed in any establishment and receiving adequate remuneration from establishment, then, to file such application before this Court for modification of this order. 18. It is made clear if the Corporation wants to reinstate the respondent workman in service, Corporation can reinstate the respondent workman in service, but, before that, being condition precedent, Corporation must have to pay last drawn full wages to the respondent workman from the date of order i.e. 03.12.2003 till the date of actual reinstatement without fail. In case, if, Corporation will reinstate the workman, then. Corporation has to pay regular current wages to the workman - applicant as per decision of this Court in case of Deva Gova vs. District Panchayat, reported in 2004 (2) GLH 273 . 19. In view of above observations and directions, present Civil Application is disposed of.