JUDGMENT Hon'ble VYAS, J.—In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 12.6.2007 (Annexure-11) and order dated 16.7.2007 (Annx.12) passed by the respondent No. 1 -Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur. 2. According to the facts of the case, the petitioner along with 26 other persons purchased 21 bighas and 2 biswas of agricultural land of Khasra No. 83 and 104 of Village Chopasni Jagir, Tehsil and District Jodhpur by two registered sale-deeds dated 24.5.1996 from original Khatedar Shri Girdhari. After purchasing the said land, a lay out plan was prepared to use the agricultural land for residential purposes and in all 112 plots were demarcated and the said lay out plan was sanctioned by the Senior Town Planner, Jodhpur on 20.11.2003. According to the petitioner, plot Nos. 79 to 84 came as share of the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner along with other persons moved an application under Section 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereafter referred to as "the Act of 1956" only). By that application, the land was surrendered in the form of plots and as per provisions of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, the respondent No. 2 passed an order under sub-section (3) of section 90-B of the Act of 1956 for resumption of the land. The said land so resumed by the respondent No. 2 is free from all encumbrances at the disposal of respondent No. 3 under sub-section (6) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. After due process, pattas were issued to the petitioner for these plots by the respondent No. 2. 3. For the purpose of satisfying this Court, the petitioner has narrated some facts with regard to status of the land. In this connection, it is stated by petitioner in the writ petition that the original khatedar Girdhari filed a revenue suit for declaration of his khatedari rights and the Revenue Appellate Authority decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 21.12.1995. Thereafter, the respondent Urban Improvement Trust filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue, Ajmer and the matter was remanded to the Revenue Appellate Authority by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 15.12.2000. 4. Upon remand, the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur after impleading respondent No. 4 and 5 as respondents by judgment and decree dated 28.6.2003 accepted Shri Girdhari as khatedar of the said land. 4. Upon remand, the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur after impleading respondent No. 4 and 5 as respondents by judgment and decree dated 28.6.2003 accepted Shri Girdhari as khatedar of the said land. The said judgment delivered by Revenue Appellate Authority has become final as appeals against the same filed by U.I.T., so also by respondent No. 4 and 5 were dismissed on 3.9.2003, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 also filed a review petition before the Board of Revenue against the order dated 3.9.2003 but the same was also rejected on 6.12.2003. As per the petitioner, upon perusal of the order, it is revealed that the claim of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 is nothing but a fraud. 5. The respondent Nos. 4 and 5 again filed a Civil suit for specific performance of alleged agreement to sale in their favour dated 16.7.1994, which is said to be executed by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar Girdhari. Along with the suit, an application for temporary injunction was filed before District Judge, Jodhpur, that too was dismissed by learned District Judge vide order dated 22.11.2003. Meaning thereby, initially the order of final revenue Court which the Board of Revenue became final because no further legal proceedings were initiated by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 against the judgment of Board of Revenue, Ajmer dated 3.9.2003 and 6.12.2003. The case of the petitioner is that he along with 26 other persons purchased 21 bighas and 2 biswas of agricultural land of Khasra No. 83 and 104 of village Chopasani Jagir, Tehsil and District Jodhpur by way of registered sale-deed on 24.5.1996 from original khatedar Shri Girdhari but the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are claiming their rights on the basis of so called agreement which is alleged to be executed on 16.7.1994 by the power of attorney holder of original Khatedar Girdhari but in the suit filed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 before the District Judge, Jodhpur, the Original Khatedar Girdhari has categorically denied that any agreement was executed by him for sale of the aforesaid land, so also, it is stated that the said agreement is forged documents. 6. 4 and 5 before the District Judge, Jodhpur, the Original Khatedar Girdhari has categorically denied that any agreement was executed by him for sale of the aforesaid land, so also, it is stated that the said agreement is forged documents. 6. According to the petitioner, he along with other persons purchased the land in dispute from original khatedar in whose favour final decision was given by highest revenue court which is the Board of Revenue and that judgment has become final, so also, the so called agreement which is alleged to be executed by Original Khatedar Girdhari was also not executed by him as per his reply before the Civil Court. Meaning thereby, the petitioner is bona fide purchaser of the land in question from original khatedar Girdhari through registered sale deed dated 24.5.1996. Therefore, it is submitted by petitioner in the writ petition that the land for which he applied for issuing patta under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 was free from all angles. 7. In the writ petition, it is stated by the petitioner that according to Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, he was entitled to get patta because he surrendered his land, which was purchased from original khatedar Girdhari and thereafter, an objection was raised by respondent No. 4 before the competent authority that suit for specific performance is pending but the competent authority after considering the judgment and decree of the revenue Courts and also the fact of rejection of application for Temporary Injunction by District Judge, Jodhpur took legal advise from the Collector, State Government and counsel for U.I.T. The competent authority finally decided the matter vide order dated 22.4.2004 Annexure-7. Thereafter, against the said order, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 filed as many as 110 applications for permission to file appeals under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 after a period of more than one year in the month of July, 2006 before the respondent No. 1. Upon that application along with appeals, the appeals were registered subject to the objections by the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur. 8. Upon that application along with appeals, the appeals were registered subject to the objections by the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur. 8. In reply after receiving notice from the Divisional Commissioner, the petitioner along with other persons filed their replies and raised objections regarding right to appeal, so also upon limitation but the respondent No. 1 Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur finally decided the appeals on merits by order dated 12.6.2007 and accepted the appeal and remanded the matter to the Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur for deciding the case afresh. After decision of Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur since the appeals were decided on merits in breach of principles of natural justice, the petitioner along with other persons moved an application for review of the order dated 12.6.2007 but the review application was also rejected vide order dated 16.7.2007 by common order. 9. The petitioner is challenging the said order on various grounds including the ground that the order passed by Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur-respondent No. 1 is ab initio void and without jurisdiction because appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 can be filed against the order passed by the competent authority under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act and in this matter order was passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, as such the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal against the order passed under sub-section (3) of section 90-B of the Act of 1956. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner upon aforesaid facts submits that both the impugned orders passed by Division Commissioner, Jodhpur may kindly be quashed and set aside and for the said purpose following grounds are raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that after the judgment of Board of Revenue which attained finality with regard to title of the land of original Khatedar Girdhari, there is no question of saying that the land was illegally sold out by original khatedar Girdhari to the petitioner and other persons. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, all the judgments of revenue Courts placed on record clearly speak that Girdhari was original khatedar of the land in dispute and he was having all rights to transfer the land and from him the petitioner along with other persons purchased the land, which cannot be questioned by the respondent Nos. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, all the judgments of revenue Courts placed on record clearly speak that Girdhari was original khatedar of the land in dispute and he was having all rights to transfer the land and from him the petitioner along with other persons purchased the land, which cannot be questioned by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, therefore, the Divisional Commissioner has exercised its jurisdiction without any merit in the case. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised ground that the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are claiming their rights that an agreement was executed by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar Girdhari prior to sale of land to the petitioner and other persons by original khatedar Girdhari in their favour in the year 1994 and on that basis they raised objections in all the Revenue Courts below and finally they filed a suit before the District Judge for specific performance in which the application for Temporary Injunction filed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has already been dismissed. Therefore, there is no right in favour of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to interfere in the matter on the basis of so called agreement because admittedly Shri Girdhari was original khatedar of the land of khasra Nos. 83 and 104 from whom the petitioner and other persons purchased the agricultural land by registered sale deed in the year 1996 and thereafter, they surrendered the said land before the U.I.T. under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 and after considering all the aspects of the matter and taking into consideration the relevant provision, the competent authority passed an order Annexure-7 dated 22.4.2004 by which while rejecting the objection of respondent No. 4 on the basis of legal opinion, the competent authority passed an order for regularizing the land in favour of the petitioner and likewise persons under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 in which there is no illegality. The petitioner has also invited the attention of this Court that in compliance of the said order, the pattas have also been issued in favour of the petitioner which are placed on record as Annexure-1 to 6 in which there is no illegality but the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has illegally interfered in the matter at the behest of respondent Nos. The petitioner has also invited the attention of this Court that in compliance of the said order, the pattas have also been issued in favour of the petitioner which are placed on record as Annexure-1 to 6 in which there is no illegality but the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has illegally interfered in the matter at the behest of respondent Nos. 4 and 5, who are claiming their right on the basis of the alleged agreement which is alleged to be executed by power of attorney holder of original khatedar Girdhari in their favour but their contention is not accepted by any of the Revenue Courts, so also, the learned District Judge, Jodhpur has also rejected the application for temporary injunction filed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5. Meaning thereby, till today, there is no right in favour of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to challenge the order passed in favour of the petitioners and other persons under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 by the competent authority of U.I.T. but the Divisional Commissioner without any jurisdiction has interfered in the matter which is totally illegal. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that according to Section 90-B of the Act, the Divisional Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear appeals under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 and upon perusal of sub-section (7) of section 90-B of the Act of 1956, it is revealed that the said appeal can be filed against the order passed under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 before the Divisional Commissioner or the officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days. According to sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 where, after hearing the parties, the Collector or the officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, is of the opinion that the land is liable to be resumed under sub-section (1), he shall after recording reasons in writing, order for termination of rights and interest of such person in the said land and order for resumption of the said land. Meaning thereby, appeal can be filed before the Divisional Commissioner being aggrieved by the order made under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B but the petitioner's case is not covered under this section because order for resumption of the petitioner's land was passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, which reads as under:- "90-B. Termination of rights and resumption of land in certain cases. (1)"..." (2) "..." (3) when the tenant or the holder of such land or any person duly authorised by him, as the case may be, makes an application to the Collector or the officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf, expressing his willingness to surrender his rights in such land, with the intention of developing such land for housing or commercial purposes, the Collector or Officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, shall upon being satisfied about the willingness of such person, order for termination of rights and interest of such person in the said land and order for resumption of such land." 13. Meaning thereby, as per petitioner, no appeal lies against the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 but the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur without any provision of appeal against the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 entertained the appeals while treating the order of resumption of the land by the competent authority under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, therefore, the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner is totally without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are unnecessarily disturbing and interfering in the matter knowingly well that they lost the battle before the revenue Court, so also, their application for temporary injunction filed before the District Judge, Jodhpur has already been dismissed against the original khatedar Girdhari. Therefore, the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner for remanding the matter again to U.I.T is illegal and contrary to the basic principles of law as such the order impugned deserved to be quashed and set aside being illegal and without jurisdiction. 15. Therefore, the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner for remanding the matter again to U.I.T is illegal and contrary to the basic principles of law as such the order impugned deserved to be quashed and set aside being illegal and without jurisdiction. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently raised ground that the respondent No. 1 has cancelled the pattas issued in favour of the petitioner without any authority of law and as such the impugned order is ab initio void being violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, so also the interference of respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the matter is totally misconceived and for their rights on the basis of so called alleged agreement with the original khatedar Girdhari, the civil suit has already been filed by them in which their application for temporary injunction has also been rejected, therefore, the patta issued in favour of the petitioner on the basis of the order passed by the competent authority under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 does not require any interference but the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur without any authority of law while entertaining time barred appeals on illegal premises and without any jurisdiction set aside the pattas issued in favour of the petitioner and remanded the case to the competent authority for re-adjudicating the matter, which is not justified, therefore, does not stand before eye of law. There was no ground in existence to pass such order by the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur but he has illegally interfered and passed the order, which is not tenable. Hence, the order impugned dated 12.6.2007 and the order dated 16.7.2007 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. Per contra, by way of filing reply, it is submitted by the respondents that the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has passed the order in consonance with the provisions of law because land in question was purchased by the respondent Nos. Hence, the order impugned dated 12.6.2007 and the order dated 16.7.2007 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. Per contra, by way of filing reply, it is submitted by the respondents that the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has passed the order in consonance with the provisions of law because land in question was purchased by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 from original khatedar Girdhari through his power of attorney holder by way of agreement prior to registered sale to the petitioner and other persons, therefore, this fact was to be taken into account by the competent authority at the time of deciding the matter under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 but the competent authority has ignored very important fact that the land in question is disputed land for which no pattas can be issued by the U.I.T. under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 vehemently argued that after resumption of the land, the land in question vested in U.I.T. and according to the U.I.T. Act, remedy before the Divisional Commissioner against the order of regularization under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 is available, therefore, the ground taken by the petitioner that the Divisional Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain such appeal, have no force of law. 18. According to learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 and 5, the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has rightly interfered in the matter within its jurisdiction and ambit of law. No illegality has been committed by Divisional Commissioner because at the time of passing the impugned order arc! issuing patta, the U.I.T. has committed irregularities and for rectifying such irregularities, the Divisional Commissioner while cancelling the pattas has remanded the matter for re-deciding the matter in which there is no illegality. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that no fraud has been committed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and they are bona fide purchaser of the land in question from the original khatedar by an agreement which is executed by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar Shri Girdhari, therefore, on the basis of a valid agreement which is executed in favour of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 on 16.7.1994 by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar Shri Girdhari, there is legal right in favour of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5. 4 and 5 on 16.7.1994 by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar Shri Girdhari, there is legal right in favour of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5. The competent authority of U.I.T. has wrongly entertained applications under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 for grant of pattas and illegally passed an order Annexure-7 and issued pattas in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has remitted the matter for the purpose of re-deciding the matter in which there is no illegality. 20. The main contention of learned counsel for the respondents is that on 16.7.1994, an agreement to sale was executed by Harnarayan Heda S/o Laxmi Narayan Heda who was power of attorney holder of original khatedar Girdhari and the said agreement was executed in favour of Dwarka Parsad and Vikram Singh for the land situated in khasra No. 83 and 104 and they agreed to pay Rs. 21 lakhs as consideration, out of which they paid Rs. 2 lakhs as advance payment but the original khatedar has sold the said land to the petitioner and other persons subsequently knowingly well that there is an agreement in between him and respondent Nos. 4 and 5 through power of attorney holder but all these facts were not taken into account by the competent authority and straight away passed an order dated 20.4.2004 (Annexure-7) and issued pattas in favour of the petitioner and other persons contrary to the facts and provisions of law. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents also invited attention towards the fact that an application was filed by Dwarka Parsad and Vikram Singh before the Police and registered a FIR No. 130 on 6.3.2008 against 53 persons including the petitioner for offence under Sections 193, 406, 407, 408, 409, 420, 467, 468 and 120B I.PC. in which anticipatory bail application of one Mohan Lal Sutrakar was rejected by learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 18.3.2008. in which anticipatory bail application of one Mohan Lal Sutrakar was rejected by learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 18.3.2008. Meaning thereby, the land in question was in dispute but ignoring all the facts, the competent authority U.I.T. has entertained the application filed under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 and passed an order for resumption of the land and thereafter, issued pattas illegally in favour of the petitioner and other persons, against which an appeal was filed before the Divisional Commissioner and while considering all the aspects of the matter, the Divisional Commissioner has accepted the appeal and case is remitted to the competent authority- U.I.T. for afresh decision in which there is no illegality, therefore, it is prayed that this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 22. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submits that there is no question of asking that the Divisional Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under Sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act because as per U.I.T. Act, appeal is competent before Divisional Commissioner because after surrendering the land, the land in dispute vested in the U.I.T. vide order dated 20.4.2004 Annexure-7 and against that order obviously under the U.I.T Act appeal can be filed by the U.I.T, therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Divisional Commissioner by entertaining the appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, therefore, the impugned order passed in appeal, so also the order passed on review application does not require any interference and this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 23. I have considered the rival submission and perused the entire record of the case. 24. In this case, admittedly Girdhari was original khatedar of the land in question and this question is not in dispute. The main controversy in this case is that the private respondent Nos. 4 and 5 preferred an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur and claimed their rights over the land in question on the basis of an agreement which is said to be executed by power of attorney holder of original khatedar Girdhari in their favour in the year 1994. The case of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 is that they paid consideration of Rs. The case of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 is that they paid consideration of Rs. 2 lacs for the land in question when agreement was executed by power of attorney holder Harnarayan Heda S/o Laxmi Narayan, resident of Khetanadi, Jodhpur and the said agreement was executed on 16.7.1994. Meaning thereby the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 being aggrieved with the subsequent registered sale deed executed by original khatedar in favour of the petitioner and other 26 persons disputing the sale made by original khatedar to the petitioner and for that purpose they contested the matter upto Revenue Board but did not succeed in it, thereafter a suit was preferred by the respondent No. 4 and 5 against the original khatedar Girdhari, which is pending before the District Court, Jodhpur but the application for temporary injunction has already been dismissed by the trial Court, which is not in dispute in this case. 25. According to the facts of the case, the petitioner along with 26 other persons purchased 21 bighas and 2 biswas of agricultural land of khasra No. 83 and 104 of village Chopasani Jagir, Tehsil and District Jodhpur by two registered sale-deeds from original khatedar Shri Girdhari in the year 1996, that too, is not disputed in this case. 26. The petitioner and other persons after purchasing the said agricultural land surrendered the same as per the provisions of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 for the purpose of regularization. As per Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, there are two provisions for surrendering the land; firstly in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 90-B and; secondly under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. Under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, the land can be resumed from tenant or the holder of such land or any person duly authorized by him as the case may be as and when it is surrendered before the Collector or Officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, expressing his willingness to surrender his rights in such land with the intention of developing such land for housing or commercial purposes. Here in this case, the petitioner purchased the land from the original khatedar, therefore, he was holder of such land on the basis of legal title and his land was resumed for the purpose of developing the said land for housing and commercial purposes. Thereafter, the authorized officer regularized the said land and issued patta in his favour, therefore, action of authorized officer is in consonance with the relevant provisions of law. 27. I have perused sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act, so also, the documentary evidence placed on record, which show that the petitioner and other persons purchased the land in question from original khatedar by registered sale deed, therefore, it is obvious from the facts that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner and other likewise persons through registered sale deed by original khatedar and if any dispute arose under any agreement executed by power of attorney holder of original khatedar then the petitioner has nothing to do with the said dispute because he purchased the land from the original khatedar and paid the consideration. 28. In my opinion, the petitioner is purchaser of the land in question from the original khatedar through a legal document, which is registered sale deed whereas the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are raising dispute on the basis of so called agreement alleged to be executed by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar in the year 1994 after making payment of Rs. 2 lakhs, which is part consideration of the total amount of Rs. 21 lakhs. Meaning thereby, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have claiming their rights on the basis of the said agreement whereas the petitioner was granted patta by the UIT after surrendering the said land being registered owner of the property in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, therefore, the title of the petitioner is based on a legal document whereas the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are unnecessarily raised dispute against the petitioner on the basis of the alleged agreement executed by the power of attorney holder of original khatedar in the year 1994 and for the same they preferred a suit before the District Court for specific performance of contract in which the application filed by them for temporary injunction was rejected by the District Judge vide order dated 22.11.2003. It is also required to be observed that the said suit was filed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 after losing battle before the revenue Courts against the petitioner, therefore, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are making their all attempts to get the land in question by any means. 29. In his case the main question raised by the petitioner that pattas were issued under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 by the U.I.T. to the petitioner on the basis of order passed by competent authority under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 but no appeal is provided before the Divisional Commissioner under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. According to the petitioner the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction while entertaining such appeal because as per sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, appeal can be filed against the order made under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B and not against the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 because under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B, agricultural land can be surrendered for resumption by the tenant or the holder of such land whereas under sub-section (5) of section 90-B of the Act of 1956, land can be resumed upon surrender by any interested party and for which the Collector or the officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf can form opinion that the land is liable to be resumed under sub-section (1) and they can resume the land after recording the reasons in writing, meaning thereby according to sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, appeal can be filed against the order made under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 but there is no provision for filing any appeal against the order made under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. Therefore, the Divisional Commissioner has illegality entertained the appeal against the order so made by the authorized officer for resumption of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. 30. In this view of the matter on the basis of above discussions, it is abundantly clear that the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner is totally without jurisdiction. 30. In this view of the matter on the basis of above discussions, it is abundantly clear that the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner is totally without jurisdiction. So also, the dispute with regard to agreement to sale alleged to have been executed by Harnarayan Heda - power of attorney holder of original Khatedar Girdhari is pending before the District Court and the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 can agitate their matter against the original khatedar before the District Court in the suit so filed by them but the Divisional Commissioner has entertained the appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 without any jurisdiction because the order which was challenged before the Divisional Commissioner was not passed by the authorized officer under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 with regard to provision of U.I.T. Act for entertaining the appeal is also not tenable because the land of the petitioner was resumed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 and order was passed by the authorized officer under the said section. Thereafter, pattas were issued by the U.I.T, meaning thereby, the provisions of U.I.T. Act with regard to remedy before the Divisional Commissioner is related to the order for the land which is subject matter of the U.I.T but here in this case, admittedly the petitioner along with other persons purchased the land in question from the original khatedar and surrendered the same under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 and thereafter, the said land was resumed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 that as per U.I.T. Act appeal filed before the Divisional Commissioner is maintainable have no force of law. Further upon perusal of Annexure-11, it is abundantly clear that in the top of the order, it is specifically stated that this appeal has been filed under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. Meaning thereby, the said appeal was filed under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 upon which the order impugned was passed by the Divisional Commissioner. Meaning thereby, the said appeal was filed under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 upon which the order impugned was passed by the Divisional Commissioner. Thus, in my opinion, the Divisional Commissioner has exercised its jurisdiction without any authority of law under sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. Hence, such an order cannot sustain before the eye of law because, it is totally without jurisdiction. 31. As a result of aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is allowed while holding that the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur is totally without jurisdiction. Consequently, the orders impugned dated 12.6.2007 Annexure-11 and dated 16.7.2007 Annexure-12 qua the petitioner are hereby quashed and set aside. However, it is made clear that any observation made in this order will not affect the merits of the suit filed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 before the District Court, Jodhpur. It is also made clear that the respondent State as well the competent authority are not precluded from making any enquiry with regard to any procedural lapses for granting pattas under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 to petitioner and any of the persons and further if in that enquiry any lapse or irregularity comes to the knowledge of the State Government or the competent authority then they are free to pass any order up to the extent of cancellation of pattas. There shall be no order as to costs.