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2008 DIGILAW 278 (KAR)

G. Somashekara v. State of Karnataka, by its Secretary to Govt. Higher Education and Others

2008-06-10

AJIT J.GUNJAL

body2008
Order Ajit J. Gunjal, J. The petitioner is questioning Annexure -Q. Pursuant to Annexure -Q, the extreme penalty of compulsory retirement is handed to the petitioner. 2. The petitioner during the course of his service with respomdents 3 and 4 was saddled with two inquiries, one inquiry resulted in the modification of the order by the appellate Tribunal and the other has resulted in a compulsory retirement. 3. The backdrop of the case is that the petitioner possesses qualification of M.Sc. in Physics. Having regard to his qualification he was appointed on 01.02.1976 in the Institution run by the third respondent. It is not in dispute that the institution is in receipt of grant-in-aid. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner initially in the year 1984 on the ground that he was unauthorizedly absent from duty from 05.03.1983. He was not taking classes allotted to him regularly and failed to cover the portion prescribed in the syllabus while working as a lecturer in Science evening polytechnic, he borrowed monies from the students and public thus affecting the reputation of the Institution thereby guilty of misconduct. While he was working with the institution, he had taken up another full time appointment in Mt. Carmel College, Bangalore. While working as a lecturer in the polytechnic he did not furnish correct address of the residence to avoid service of letter and notices and that he has made certain allegations against the then principal. A charge memo was issued, reply was sought, given, an enquiry was conducted and a finding of guilt was handed. The Disciplinary authority, having regard to the conduct of the petitioner, terminated his service, which was subject matter of an appeal before the Tribunal. It is not necessary for us to go into the reasons given by the Tribunal while modifying the order, inasmuch as, the said order has been accepted by the institution. The appeal was partly allowed by the Tribunal and the order of dismissal from service with effect from 16.04.1984 was set aside and the petitioner was reinstated but however on certain conditions; one of them was that the petitioner will not be entitled for any benefits or salary or service conditions for the period between 05.03.1983 till reporting to duty. He was also directed to give an undertaking medicating that he shall not indulge in such activities of charges alleged and levelled as stated in Sl. He was also directed to give an undertaking medicating that he shall not indulge in such activities of charges alleged and levelled as stated in Sl. Nos. 1 to 6 in the memo dated 07.10.1983. An undertaking was also given to the effect that he shall not have any claim whatsoever on the benefits, salary or service conditions for the period from 05.03.1983 till reporting to duty. He also had no objection for the management making necessary entries in service register pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal. Another solemn undertaking was given that he shall not give any room or indulge in any unlawful activities and in violation of the code of conduct and the management would be at liberty to take any action in accordance with law in case of violation of the undertaking. The undertaking was given by the petitioner on 25th July 1991. Notwithstanding such an undertaking given, the petitioner has once again indulged in certain activities which are certainly not expected of a Teacher, inasmuch as, cases were foisted against him for the offences punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. It is not one but as many as 14 cases were foisted and during that relevant point of time he was detained in custody by Chamrajpet Police between 3rd August 1993 to 7th August 1993, Thus, he had remained absent during that period. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner had indulged in criminal activities, thus violating the undertaking given by him on an earlier occasion, the respondents did not have any option, but to suspend him. The last of the criminal cases according to the petitioner ended in acquittal on 25.03.2006. Incidentally, it is to be noticed that out of 14 cases, in 6 cases, on the basis of a joint memo, offences were compounded under Section 320(2)(8) of the Cr. P.C., in the remaining cases, the benefit of doubt was extended to the petitioner and thus he was acquitted. 4. Having regard to the conduct of the petitioner, the respondents did not have any option, but to initiate proceedings and with reference to his conduct between 1983 and 1991 and his conduct thereafter in the year 1993 persuaded the respondents to award compulsory retirement to the petitioner having regard to Rule 10 Explanation 2(vi) of the Karnataka Private Education Institution (Discipline and Control), Rules 1978 (For short, the Rules). Incidentally, it is also to be noticed that the impugned order at Annexure-Q would also indicate that taking into consideration the past and the present service records of the petitioner as well as the fact that he was attaining the age of superannuation in October 2006 and also in the larger interest of the Institution and to maintain discipline, retiring the petitioner compulsorily will not carry any stigma on his career. Further, on humanitarian grounds his salary and allowances for four months covering from July to October 2006 without any statutory deductions was paid to him. Thus, the petitioner is before this Court questioning Annexure -Q. 5. Mr. Srikanth, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the provision which was invoked for imposing the extreme penalty of compulsory retirement i.e., Rule 10 Explanation 2(vi) of the Rules was not applicable to the respondent, inasmuch as, the said rule is repealed. Hence the respondent did not have any power to compulsorily retire the petitioner. He further submits that under Section 92 of the Education Act, 1983 (for short, ‘the Act’) the maximum period of suspension is only six months and any further suspension requires authorization. That having not been done, the suspension was also bad. 6. Mr. Satyanarayan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 3 to 5 submits that having regard to the misconduct of the petitioner, on two different occasions within a span of 10 years, the management did not have any option, but to retire him compulsorily. Indeed, he submits that specific care is taken by the Management to see that by such compulsory retirement, no stigma is attached and he has been given the entire salary including the allowances without any deductions for a period of four months i.e., from the date, the last of the criminal cases ended in an acquittal till October 2006. 7. Insofar as the applicability of Rule 10, he submits that notwithstanding the Gazette Notification, no new rules, as contemplated therein, are framed, inasmuch as, 1978 Rules still continues to hold the field and operate till the new rules are enacted. He further submits that under Section 146 of the Act, which would deal with the repeals and savings, whatever actions are initiated and done under the old rules are saved. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. 9. He further submits that under Section 146 of the Act, which would deal with the repeals and savings, whatever actions are initiated and done under the old rules are saved. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. 9. In the first instance, the main contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner regarding exercising power of dismissal under Rule 10 is required to be considered and disposed of. Indeed a perusal of the impugned order at Annexure -Q would early indicate that the powers under Rule 10 Explanation (2)(vi) has been invoked for awarding the major penalty of compulsory retirement. It is no doubt true that pursuant to a Gazette notification dated 15th October 2004, the existing 1978 Rules are repealed and new Rules, The Karnataka Private Education Institution (Discipline and Control) (Repealed), Rules, 2004 is deemed to have been framed. It is also stated that it shall come into force on the date of the publication in the Official Gazette. Indeed, what is contemplated under the Gazette is that the new Rules would come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. Indeed, even as on today, the said Rules of the year 2004 have not been framed and Gazetted. In the absence of the New Rules being framed and Gazetted, the 1978 Rules would certainly prevail, inasmuch as, the discipline and control of the Private Education Institution cannot be left in vacuum. In the absence, as such, if the 1978 Rules are still in force, then necessarily one will have to fall back on Rule 10 of the Rules to consider what are the nature of penalties. 10. Explanation (2) to Rule 10 would relate to the nature of penalty to be imposed under Rule 10 of the Rules. What has been invoked by respondents 3 to 5 is Explanation (2)(vi) to Rule 10 which would read as under: “(vi) Compulsory retirement of an employee in accordance with law the provision relating to his superannuation or retirement;” Apparently, in the case on hand, it is to be noticed that the petitioner was to attain the age of superannuation in October 2006. The last of the criminal cases ended in acquittal in the year 2006. The last of the criminal cases ended in acquittal in the year 2006. Hence having regard to the fact that acquittal of the criminal cases was closer to the date of retirement, the respondents have invoked the said provision. Having regard to these facts, I am of view that pursuant to the said Gazette notification, it cannot be said that the 1978 Rules are no longer in the statute Book as the new Rules i.e., 2004 Rules have not as yet been framed or Gazetted. Indeed, the learned Government Advocate also would submit that even as on today, 1978 Rules hold the field, inasmuch as, the 2004 Rules hold the field, inasmuch as, the 2004 Rules have not as yet been framed. 11. This takes us to the next question as to whether once it is held that the removal of the petitioner by way of compulsory retirement pursuant to a statutory provision, the compulsory retirement, without stating that it is in public interest, could be said to be bad. When under the Rules regulating the age of retirement and when such rule confers the power on the respondents, the mere fact that the order of retirement does not state that it is in public interest does not render the order invalid. In fact, the Rules do not state that the retirement should be made in public interest. It is also well settled that if an order of compulsory retirement attaches a stigma to the character and conduct of an employee, it attracts the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. But unless it is established from the order itself that a charge or imputation of misbehaviour or incapacity or that of the officer is losing the benefits already earned, the order cannot be said to be one of removal or in the nature of penalty. Indeed, it is not open for the Court to go behind the order and hold that it attaches a stigma on the basis of the proposal or recommendation made by an officer subordinate to the authority exercising the power. Indeed, the rule of compulsory retirement should not be a threat to the public servant so as to haunt him but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and freedom from corruption and incompetence. 12. Indeed, the rule of compulsory retirement should not be a threat to the public servant so as to haunt him but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and freedom from corruption and incompetence. 12. Whether an order of compulsory retirement attaches a stigma to the character and conduct of the employee has been dealt by the competent authority and it is useful to extract the observation made by the competent authority. “(b) that taking into consideration your past and present service records as well as the fact that you are attaining the age of superannuation in October, 2006; and in the larger interests of the administration of the Polytechnic to maintain discipline among the staff and students; on the subjective satisfaction of the case, to retire you compulsorily from the service with effect from 01.7.2006 which is not by way of imposing any punishment nor does it carry any stigma on your career.” An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. In fact principles of natural justice certainly have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. Indeed, this does not necessarily mean that the judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, but however it may interfere if it is satisfied that the order is passed with malafides or that it is based on no evidence or that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. In the case on hand, it is not so. Indeed, it is to be noticed that notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was involved in two disciplinary proceedings, respondents 3 to 5 have taken kindly to him. 13. Indeed, respondents 3 to 5 have taken a lenient view and have paid the salary and allowances for four months covering the months from July to October 2006. They have also indicated that they have not made any statutory deductions, i.e. a sum of Rs. 45,680/- which is collected on the entitlement of the salary. Indeed, any further examination of the impugned order would be only academic, inasmuch as, the petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation in the year 2006. They have also indicated that they have not made any statutory deductions, i.e. a sum of Rs. 45,680/- which is collected on the entitlement of the salary. Indeed, any further examination of the impugned order would be only academic, inasmuch as, the petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation in the year 2006. We are in the year 2008. 14. Another contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the continuation of suspension beyond certain period. Rule 12 of the Rules would deal with suspension. Sub-rule 5(b) of Rule 12 reads as under: “(b) Where an employee is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension), the authority competent to place him under suspension may for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the employee shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings.” In the case on hand, it is to be noticed that the criminal proceedings were initiated as against the petitioner in the year 1991 and indeed an employee who is involved in criminal case, not in one, but 14 cases, cannot certainly be allowed to work in the institution. Indeed, it is not a case where the petitioner has been suspended at the behest of the respondents. In fact, it is on his own volition and the act committed by him, the suspension order is passed. In this regard, one can usefully refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE BANK OF INDIA Vs. BHOPAL SINGH PANCHAL reported in 1993 AIR SCW 4044. “The regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. As it is, even during such period, the employee earns subsistence allowance by virtue of the Regulations. In the circumstances, the Bank’s power in that behalf is unassailable.” Nearer home, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of SYNDICATE BANK Vs. A. RAGHUPATHY BHAT reported in ILR 2005 AR 5587 has also ruled that “The principle involved is that when the complaint is not at the behest of the management, the management has no role to play in the criminal prosecution launched against such employee.” Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, I am of the view that the question of interference with the penalty of compulsory retirement in the case on hand is not at all warranted. Mr. Srikanth, submits that at least a direction could be issued to the respondents to refix the salary of the petitioner and pay the consequential benefits arising out of the refixation. Indeed, whether such a request could be granted and refixation could be done and his entitlement for consequential benefits is required to be considered by the respondents 3 to 5. The peliniar can certainly lodge a claim in this regard and the said claim can be considered in the respondents 3 to 5 having regard to the antecedents of the petitioner and the observations made by this Court during the course of this order. No merit. Petition stands rejected. Mr. S.Z.A. Khureshi, learned AGA is permitted to file memo of appearance within four weeks.