Judgment : 1.1 A-1 has preferred the revision in Crl. R.C. No. 1490 of 2007 challenging the order passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing the petition filed for discharge dated 31.08.2007 in Crl. M.P. 321 of 2007 in C.C. No. 5 of 2006. 1.2 A-2 has come forward with the petition to quash the proceeding in Crl. O.P.No. 16711 of 2007 and the quashing petition was admitted on 12.06.2007 and while the same was pending, A-2 preferred a petition of discharge before the learned trial Judge in Crl. M.P. No. 441 of 2007 in C.C. No. 5 of 2006 and the same was dismissed by the learned trial Judge by the order dated 10.09.2007 and against that he has preferred the revision in Crl. R.C. No. 1656 of 2007. 1.3 A-3 has preferred the revision in Crl. R.C. No. 708 of 2007 challenging the order of dismissal of the discharge petition passed by the learned trial Judge dated 13.03.2007 in Crl. M.P. No. 67 f 2007 in C.C. No. 5 of 2006. 2. In all these matters, this court has not granted any stay of the proceedings in view of Section 19 (3) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) as the petitioners have also been implicated for the offence under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Act and as such the charges were framed against the petitioners on 25.09.2007 and the case is pending for trial. 3. All the above matters are arising out of one and the same case. The petitioners have been arrayed as A-1 to A-3 and they are facing trial for the alleged offences under Sections 120 (b) I.P.C. read with 420, 468 and 471 I.P.C. and under Section 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Act. There are totally five accused in this case and one f the accused, viz. Dr. Mohammed Zubair, who has been arrayed as A-2 earlier, has been discharged by the learned trial Judge by the order dated 26.04.2007 in Crl. M.P. No. 160 of 2007 in C.C. No. 5 of 2006. 4. There are totally five accused in this case and one f the accused, viz. Dr. Mohammed Zubair, who has been arrayed as A-2 earlier, has been discharged by the learned trial Judge by the order dated 26.04.2007 in Crl. M.P. No. 160 of 2007 in C.C. No. 5 of 2006. 4. A-1 V. Thiagarajan, was working as Senior Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as “UIIC”) Erode, A-2, V.S. Balasamy is a practising Advocate at Kangayam; A-3, Manimehalai, is also a practising Advocate working as junior under A-2; A-4, Narayanasamy, is a claimant, who has filed M.C.O.P. No. 89 of 2000 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Court, Dharapuram, through A-3, Advocate, Manimehalai. Dr. J. Paramasivam (approver) is said to have issued false and bogus medical certificates to the claimant -Narayanasmay (A-4) and the claimants Velliangiri and Ponnusamy. The said Velliangiri is the claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 118 of 2000 and his claim petition was filed by A-3 and Ponnusamy is the claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 470 of 2000 and his petition contains the names of A-2 and A-3 as Advocates for service and the order copy of the award passed by the Tribunal contains the names of A-2 and A-3 as Advocates for the claimant and Velliangiri and Ponnusamy, claimants for motor accident claims compensation and Dr. J. Paramasivam have turned approvers. 5. The sum and substance of the allegation against the petitioners is to the effect that the petitioners along with another accused Narayanasamy (A-4) and the approvers/claimants, viz. Velliangiri and Ponnusamy, and the approver, Dr. Paramasivam who is said to have issued medical bills and certificates, have hatched a conspiracy during the period from January 2000 to December 2001 at Erode, Kangeyam, and Dharapuram and other places in Tamil Nadu as A-1, along with the other accused and approvers, to cheat the UIIC in the matter of settlement of third party claims of compensation relating to the approvers Velliangiri, Ponnusamy and Narayanamy (A-4) and in pursuance of the conspiracy A-1, Thiagarajan, misusing or abusing his official position fraudulently and dishonestly settled third party motor accident claims of the approvers, Velliangiri, Ponnusmay and Narayanasamy (A-4) through compromise settlement by negotiating with them knowing fully well that the Motor Accident Claims were not genuine, the documents submitted in support of these claims wee forged and thus caused wrongful loss of an amount of Rs. 4,90,000/- to the UIIC and also wrongfully obtained pecuniary gain to themselves. 6. The specific allegation as per the charge against each of the petitioners, viz. A- 1 to A-3 are as follows: (i) A-1 is the Divisional Manager of the UIIC and he was in charge of settlement of claims pending before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Court and he has also empowered to entertain compromise settlement before the respective courts. It is the responsibility of A-1 to verify wound certificate, disability certificate and corresponding medical bills to ascertain the nature of the injury, copy of the First Information certificate and charge sheet to find out whether the claimant actually met with the accident as claimed. It is also the responsibility of A-1 to select the claims for out of Court settlement. The Company has given power to A-1 for selecting such claims for settlement out of Court and condition for such settlement is that there should be no prima facie doubt about the claims and if there is any doubt he should have ordered for independent investigation to verify the genuineness of the claims. It is further alleged that A-1 selected the cases of claims made by the approvers, Velliangiri, Ponnusamy and A-4 / Narayanasamy knowing fully well that these claimants had not met with accidents for which the claims were made and their names were not found in the First Information Report or in the final report of the police pertaining to the accident and thereby caused wrongful loss to the UIIC by paying huge compensation to the claimants and corresponding gain to himself and others. (ii) It is alleged that A-2 and A-3 are the practising Advocates and A-3 is the junior of A-2 and both of them said to have filed false claim petitions of insurance compensation (M.C.O.P.) for the approvers Velliangiri, Ponnusamy and A-4 Narayanasamy by arranging false and fabricated medical bills and certificates said to have obtained from Dr. J. Paramasivam (approver), Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, and also by showing the accidents which were not actually met by the claimants and the claimants name were also not found either in the First Information Report or in the charge sheet and with the connivance of A-1 obtained award of compensation to those claims through Lok Adalat settlement. 7.1 The approver, Velliangiri filed M.C.O.P. No. 118 of 2000 claiming Rs. 7.1 The approver, Velliangiri filed M.C.O.P. No. 118 of 2000 claiming Rs. 4,00,000/- and an award for Rs.2,75,000/- was passed and Rs.1,50,000/-was withdrawn by the claimant and the balance amount is in the Court deposit. 7.2 The approver, Ponnusamy, filed claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 470 of 2000 claiming Rs.1,00,000/- and an award for Rs.90,000/- was passed and Rs.50,000/-was withdrawn and the balance amount is in the Court deposit. 7.3 The claimant, A-4, Narayanasmay, filed M.C.O.P. No. 89 of 2000 claiming Rs.4,00,000/-and an award for Rs,1,25,000/- was passed and the entire amount was withdrawn by the claimant (A-4), Narayanasamy. 7.4 All the above said awards of compensation were passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Sub Judge) through the compromise settlement before the Lok Adalat. 8. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for A-1 put forward the following contentions : (1) There is absolutely no material available on record to show any link between A-1 with the other accused and the approvers and as such the conspiracy charge is baseless and the case against A-1 falls into the ground. (2) There is no material available on record to the effect that A-1 had knowledge about the alleged forged medical bills and certificates. (3) The statement of the official witness of UIIC and the panel advocates of the UIIC do not implicate A-1 and they have stated only about the procedure. (4) The statement of Vigilance Officer of the UIIC, Coimbatore, clearly shows that the conduct of A-1 may amount to procedural lapse and the same does not amount to an offence under Sections 13 (2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and as such A-1 maybe liable for departmental proceedings and not for criminal misconduct. (5) The award of compensation was passed and 50% of the amount was already paid to the claimants and the remaining amount was deposited before the Court and there is no materials available on record to show that A-1 received any consideration. 9. (5) The award of compensation was passed and 50% of the amount was already paid to the claimants and the remaining amount was deposited before the Court and there is no materials available on record to show that A-1 received any consideration. 9. In support of the above said contentions the learned senior counsel for A-1 placed reliance on the following authorities in respect of the principle of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court for the proof of charge of conspiracy, guidelines for quashing the proceedings and discharge of the accused and for proving the corruption charges : i. AIR 1980 SC 499 : (1980) 3 SCC 710: 1980 Cril L.J. 220 ii.2002 (1) L.W. (Cril) 37. iii.(2003) 8 SCC 442): (2004) 1 MLJ (Crl) 62 iv. AIR 1972 SC 545 : (1972) 3 SCC 282 v. 1997 Cril L.J. 2559 vi. AIR 1980 SC 1382 : (1989) 2 SCC 665): (1980) MLJ (Cri) 664. vii. AIR 1977 SC 1489 : (1977) 2 SC 699. 10. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for A-2/a practising Advocate, after taking this Court through the entire materials available on record, vehemently contended that there is no prima facie ground made out for proceeding against A-2 and put forward the following contentions : (1) The conspiracy charge is founded in the First Information Report mainly alleging that A-1/Thiagarajan, Divisional Manager, UIIC conspired with claimants and others to cheat the insurance company by settling the claims. A-2s name was not mentioned in the First Information Report which was registered on source information. (2) The materials available through the statements of approver Dr. Paramasivam and other approvers/claimants viz., Velliangiri and Ponnusmay do not disclose the involvement of A-1 and once the conspiracy charge goes, the entire prosecution case falls into the ground. (3) The claims were settled by the Lok Adalat. The M.C.O.P.s filed enclosing only the documents viz., (i) Vakalat, (ii) Claim petition and (iii) First Information Report and no other documents were enclosed along with the M.C.O.P.s petition including the medical bills or medical certificates. Therefore the question of using the forged and fabricated medical bills and certificates for claiming compensation is baseless. (4) The claims were settled even before the preparation of false and fabricated medical bills and medical certificates as Dr. Therefore the question of using the forged and fabricated medical bills and certificates for claiming compensation is baseless. (4) The claims were settled even before the preparation of false and fabricated medical bills and medical certificates as Dr. Paramasivam stated in his 161 statement that A-2 approached him during 2002 for medical certificates in respect of claimants, the approvers, viz., Velliangiri, Ponnusamy and A-4 Narayanasamy, and before that the Lok Adalat settlements were over as in respect of the approver/Velliangiri, the award of compensation was passed on 21.2.2001, in M.C.O.P. No. 118 of 2000, in respect of the approver / Ponnusami the Lok Adalat settlement of the compensation award passed on 06.12.2000 and in respect of A-4 Lok Adalat settlement of the award of compensation was passed on 15.11.2000. (5) Three claims settled on three different dates in respect of the claims of Velliangiri and Ponnusamy (approvers) and Narayanasamy (A-4) and one Dr. Mohamed Zubair (originally arrayed as A-2), who has said to have issued medical bills and certificates, was discharged by the trial Court in Crl. M.P. No. 160 of 2007 in C.C. No. 5 of 2006 and therefore, the question of conspiracy not at all arises. (6) As far as A-2 is concerned, except the approvers statements no other corroborating materials available and as such there is no prima facie case made out for proceeding against A-2 and A-2 has not appeared before the Lok Adalat and not signed the compromise memo. (7) The claims were settled through the legal forum, viz. Lok Adalat and the settlements were signed by the Judge and other members including the claimant and the insurance company and therefore, the question of making false claim on the basis of the fabricated medical bills and certificates can not be accepted and the insurance company has not initiated any legal proceedings to declare the decree of award of compensation was obtained by fraud. (8) Advocate one Mr. R. Thirugnana-sambandam, who has faced the similar charge field a quash petition in W.P. No. 2148 of 2004 and the same was allowed by the Maduari Bench of this Court by the order dated 11.10.2007. (9) No evidence to show as to who procured medical bills and certificates and as to who handed over the same to whom and there is no material to show that whether the same is produced for claiming compensation. (9) No evidence to show as to who procured medical bills and certificates and as to who handed over the same to whom and there is no material to show that whether the same is produced for claiming compensation. (10) Lok Adalat decree was not attached along with charge sheet. (11) On the basis of the allegations contained in the First Information Report and on the basis of the statements recorded from the witnesses including the approvers under Section 161 and under Section 164 Cr.P.C. there is absolutely no implication of A-2 for the alleged offence of cheating and other offences. 11. The learned senior counsel appearing for A-2 placed reliance on the following decisions in support of the contentions viz., I. for the reliability of the evidence of the approvers: (i) (1963) MLJ (Crl.) 450) (ii) AIR 1977 SC 1579 : (1977) 1 MLJ (Crl) 462. (iii) AIR 2001 SC 2637 : (2001) 6 SCC 181 : (2001) 1 MLJ (Crl) 961. (iv) 2003 Cri L.J. 682 and (v) AIR 1966 SC 119 : II. for the proposition that if chances of conviction is bleak, charges can be quashed: i. AIR 1988 SC 709 : (1988) 1 SCC 692 : (1988) 1 MLJ (Crl) 339. ii. AIR 2002 SC 564 : (2002) 2 SCC 135 . III. AIR 2005 SC 3575 : (2005) 6 SCC 478 : (2005) 4 MLJ 72 for the validity of the award passed by the Lok Adalats. IV. for the proposition regarding the ingredients for the proof of allegation of conspiracy: i. AIR 1992 SC 1831 : (1992) 3 SCC 178 : (1993) 1 MLJ (Crl) 364. ii. 1995 (1) SCC 142 iii. AIR 1999 SC 1086 : (1999) 3 SCC 54 iv.2002 Cri. L.J. 97 v. 2003 AIR SCW 2735: (2003) 5 SCC 257 vi. AIR 2006 SC 35 : (2005) 12 SCC 631: V. for the guidelines regarding the scope and power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings: i.JT 1996 (6) SC 480 ii. (1998) 5 SCC 749 iii. AIR 2001 SC 2960 iv. 2004 AIR SCW 6185 and v. 2007 (5) CTC 614; VI. for the proposition that in a discharge petition statements of witnesses can be perused: i. 1995 Cri. L.J. 757 and ii. (1972) Cri. L.J. 329; VII. for the proposition of reliability of confession of co-accused: i. 1996 (I) CTC 439 ii. AIR 2001 SC 2960 iv. 2004 AIR SCW 6185 and v. 2007 (5) CTC 614; VI. for the proposition that in a discharge petition statements of witnesses can be perused: i. 1995 Cri. L.J. 757 and ii. (1972) Cri. L.J. 329; VII. for the proposition of reliability of confession of co-accused: i. 1996 (I) CTC 439 ii. (1998) 7 SCC 337 . The learned senior counsel vehemently contended that there is no material available on record to make out an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act in respect of A-2. 12. Mr. S. Shanmugavelayutham, learned senior counsel appearing for A-3/a practising Advocate and junior of A-2 put forward he following contentions : (1) The approvers statements do not directly implicate A-3; (2) Except the approvers‘ statements there is no materials available on record to implicate A-3 and there is no corroboration for the statements of approvers. 13. The learned senior counsel in support of the submissions placed reliance on the following decisions : i. 1957 MWN (Cr.) SC 40 ii. AIR 1963 SC 599 iii.1970 SCC (Cri.) 99 iv. AIR 1994 SC 2420 v. 2007 Cri. L.J. 1157 14. Mr. N. Chandrasekaran, learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases by placing reliance on the materials available on record contended that there are enough materials available on record to implicate the petitioners, who have been arrayed as A-1 to A-3 and made the following submissions : (1) All the points raised by the defence are matter for trial as the same relating to appreciation of evidence. (2) The Statements of the approvers are inculpatory in nature and their statements are corroborated in materials particulars through statements recorded from the witnesses under Section 161 Cr. P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C. and the documents produced before the Court. (3) A-1 as the Officer of the UIIC abused his official position and conspired with the claimants and other accused and settled the Motor Accident Claims through Lok Adalat knowing fully well that the claims are not genuine and based on fabricated and forged documents. (4) The statements of the panel Advocates and the statements of the official witnesses of the UIIC recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. implicated A-1 to the effect that the panel Advocate signed the compromise memo only at the instance of A-1. (4) The statements of the panel Advocates and the statements of the official witnesses of the UIIC recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. implicated A-1 to the effect that the panel Advocate signed the compromise memo only at the instance of A-1. The officials of the UIIC stated that it is the responsibility of A-1 to verify the genuineness of the claim and once the name of the claimant is not figuring in the First Information Report and final report of the police, it is the duty of A-1 to order for independent investigation to verify the genuineness of the claims and A-1 has not followed such procedure. Therefore, there is a clear implication of A-1 based on materials available on record. (5) The conduct of A-1 is not a mere procedural lapse but a blatant abuse of his official position which would constitute the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. (6) The Statements of claimants/approvers and the statements of the officials of the UIIC Limited clearly show that A-1 was in conspiracy with other accused for settling the motor accident claims before the Lok Adalat and the judicial forum was taken for a ride. (7) As far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned, the statements recorded from the approvers /claimants and Dr. J. Paramasivam (approver) under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. implicate A-2 and A-3 as their statements disclose the medical bills and certificates issued by Dr. J. Paramasivam (approver) were not produced by them and they have acted as per the instruction of their Advocates A-2 and A-3. (8) L.W. 24 the shirastadar, Sub Court, Dharapuram, in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. stated that A-2 and A-3 filed the vakalats for the approvers / claimants and he has also identified the signatures of A-2 and A-3. 15. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases would place reliance on the decisions of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in (2005) SCC (Cri) 1640 for the proposition that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and not to stifle legitimate prosecution. For the same proposition, the learned Special Public Prosecutor also placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in (2004) SCC (Cri) 1805 and (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272. For the same proposition, the learned Special Public Prosecutor also placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in (2004) SCC (Cri) 1805 and (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272. It is contended that in this case there are overwhelming materials available on record and the prosecution has made out a prima facie ground against the petitioners. 16. The learned Special Public Prosecutor would also place reliance on the decision of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in AIR 1968 SC 594 for the proposition that if the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interest of a successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approvers testimony, it will indubitably agree to the tendering of pardon. 17. The learned special Public Prosecutor has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in AIR 1980 SC 52 for the proposition that even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials is enough to frame a charge. 18. The learned Special Public Prosecutor, in respect of the charge under the Corruption Act against A-1, placed reliance on the decision of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in AIR 1963 SC 1116 for the proposition which reads as follows: “…. on a plain reading of the express words used in the clause, we have no doubt, that every benefit obtained by a public servant for himself, or for any other person by abusing his position as a public servant falls within the mischief of the said clause. 19. Lastly the learned Special Public Prosecutor also submitted that a learned single Judge of this Court in a decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2005) 2 L.W. 439 considering the seriousness of the cases of this nature regarding the false claims of motor accident compensation, directed the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.B., C.I.D, to constitute a Central Agency for dealing with the complaints relating to bogus claims before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, filed based on fabricated records. 20. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that in a casein (2006-2-L.W. 176) the first Bench of this Court directed the C.B.I. to investigate into the complaints of bogus claims of compensation in the State. 21. It is submitted that after the order of the First bench, 800 Motor Accident Claims Petitions (M.A.C.O. Ps) were withdrawn before the tribunals in the State. 21. It is submitted that after the order of the First bench, 800 Motor Accident Claims Petitions (M.A.C.O. Ps) were withdrawn before the tribunals in the State. It is further submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that claims of compensation to the tune of more than Rs.100/- Crores have been withdrawn. 22. I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scrutinized the entire materials available, on record including the first Information Report, Charge Sheet, Statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the documents produced and relied by the prosecution. 23. The sheet-anchor of the contents of the learned senior counsels appearing for A-1 to A-3 is that the conspiracy alleged to have rooted through A-1, but there is no material available on record to show the connecting links between A-1 and other accused and there is no materials available for meeting of minds or agreement between the petitioners and therefore, once the charge of conspiracy goes the entire prosecution case falls into the ground. 24. The yet another main contention put forward by the learned senor counsels for A-1 to A-3 is that there is no material available on record to corroborate the statements of approvers and as such there is no prima facie ground made out for proceeding against the petitioners, A-1 to A-3. 25. Therefore, two main questions are arising for the consideration of this Court, viz., (i) Whether a prima facie ground made out against A-1 to A-3 for the charge of conspiracy and (ii) Whether the question of corroboration of the statements of approvers recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. should be considered at the threshold of the case and whether there are other materials available on record to corroborate the version of the approvers. 26. In order to consider the above two questions, this Court has to necessarily look into the materials available on record and scrutinize those records, viz., statements recorded from the witness under sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. and the documents produced by the prosecution before the Court for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case made out for proceeding against the petitioners. 27. Let me now consider the materials available on record in respect of the charge of conspiracy. 28. 27. Let me now consider the materials available on record in respect of the charge of conspiracy. 28. At the outset, it is to be stated that in order to find out form the materials available on record whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case for conspiracy, this court has to look into the materials available on record implicating A-1. A perusal of the First Information Report, as pointed out by the learned senior counsel for A-2, shows that the charge of conspiracy rooted through A-1. It is seen that there is no reference about A-2 and A-3. It is needless to state that the First Information Report is not an encyclopedia and it is only for setting the law in motion and the prosecution is entitled to collect materials during the course of investigation and if the investigation reveals through the collection of materials about the involvement of other persons in the alleged offences, who were not mentioned in the First Information Report, the prosecution is entitled to file the final report implicating them as accused. It is pertinent to note that as far as A-1 is concerned, it is specifically mentioned in the First Information Report itself that he was working as Senior Divisional Manager UIIC, and he is the deciding and accepting authority of settling third party motor accident claims which were fit for settlement as per the procedures and guidelines of the UIIC. It is further specifically mentioned that A-2 is in-charge and empowered to entertain settlements before the Lok adalat of the concerned Courts. It is relevant to note that it is further specifically mentioned that it is the mandatory requirement for A-1 for arranging independent investigation in respect of the third party claims for settlement in Lok Adalats in the event of the name of the claimant is not figured either in the First Information Report or in the final report and further A-1 made the settlements through the Lok Adalat without following the mandatory requirements of conducting independent investigation and on the basis of the forged and fabricated documents. 29. Therefore, it is crystal clear that in the First Information Report itself there is a specific and definite allegations levelled against A-1. 29. Therefore, it is crystal clear that in the First Information Report itself there is a specific and definite allegations levelled against A-1. During the process of investigation, the investigating agency has collected materials through the examination of the official witness of UIIC as well as the examination of the claimants/approvers and other witnesses. 30. In respect of the mandatory requirements the investigating agency examined the following officers of the UIIC, viz., L.W.12, Administrative Office, L.W.13 Vigilance Officer, L.W.14 Senior Assistant, L.Ws. 19 and 20, Assistant Administrative Officers. A perusal of the statements of these witnesses disclose that it is the responsibility and duty of A-1 as Senior Divisional Manager to verify the genuineness of the claim and further, for setting the claims through Lok Adalats two conditions have to be fulfilled, viz. (i) the policy should be alive and (ii) the claimants name must have been reflected either in the First Information report, Accident Register copy or in the charge sheet and if the claimants name were not mentioned in those documents, it is the duty of the officer in-charge to verify the genuineness of the claim by engaging independent investigating officers from the panel of UIIC. The statements of these witnesses further revealed that the names of the claimants relating to this case were not mentioned in the First Information Report or in the final report of the police and in spite of the same A-1 had not conducted or ordered any independent investigation to verify the genuineness forth claim. The statements of the above said witness also disclose that it is the duty and responsibility of A-1 to call for independent Government Doctor to give opinion about the injuries in order to arrive at a correct amount for settlement and even the panel advocates were not consulted before arriving at the claim amount and the entire decisions were taken only by A-1. The statement of L.W.14, the Senior Assistant of UIIC further discloses that the claimants in this case, viz., Narayanasamy (A-4), Velliangiri and Ponnusamy (approvers) were not named in the First Information Report or in the final report and in spite of the same A-1 had not conducted or ordered any independent investigation to verify the genuineness of the claims. The statement of L.W.14, the Senior Assistant of UIIC further discloses that the claimants in this case, viz., Narayanasamy (A-4), Velliangiri and Ponnusamy (approvers) were not named in the First Information Report or in the final report and in spite of the same A-1 had not conducted or ordered any independent investigation to verify the genuineness of the claims. L.W.19 the Assistant Administrative Officer, in his statement has stated that the decision of selecting the claims for settlement was done only by A-1 and A-1 informed him that he had verified all the documents and L.W. 19 need not go through the said documents. This witness further stated about the circulars/D-2 to D-19 and those circulars are relating to the settlement of third party claims. A perusal of the above said documents corroborates the version of the above official witnesses regarding the mandatory requirement and procedure for settling the third party claims. 31. The statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. from the panel Advocates viz., L.W.3 Padma and L.W.18 Gunasundary disclose that A-1 informed them that already settlement was finalized and the panel Advocates have to sign and they need not go into the details of the settlement and accordingly, they have signed the compromise memo and on the basis of the compromise memo the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation. They have also reiterated that the basic documents required for proving the claim is the First Information Report and the final report of the police to show that the claimant has actually met with such accident. 32. The statements recorded from the approvers/claimants, Ponnusamy and Velliangiri under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as under Section 164 Cr.P.C. clearly disclose that they went to UIIC Office at the instance of A-2 and A-3. and it further discloses that the approver Velliangiri has only suffered a minor injury due to a skid while he was travelling in his scooter. But the same accident was shown as a separate road accident and A-2 and A-3 informed that they will make arrangements for some other documents to get insurance compensation and another approver/claimant, Ponnusamy also specifically stated that A-3 came to the insurance company office and further specifically stated that he has not taken treatment at Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, or Apollo Bone & Joint Hospital, Dharapuram and he was unaware as to how these bills and certificates were arranged by the Advocates. Therefore, these materials available on record makes out a prima facie case that A-1 has not verified all these basic documents, viz., the First Information Report, Final Report, Medical Bills and Certificates and the approvers/claimants also went to the office of the UIIC and as such there is no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion at this stage that there are prima facie materials available on record to infer that there are meeting of minds of A-1 to A-3 and agreement between them to obtain motor accident claims compensation by producing false and fabricated documents. 33. It is well settled that from the very nature a conspiracy must be conceived and hatched in complete secrecy and it is impossible and very rare to get direct evidence. It is also equally well settled that it is not necessary that each member to conspiracy must know all the details of the conspiracy. 34. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court in (2002) 7 SCC 334 held that, “… For an offence punishable under Section 120-B the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or caused to be done an illegal act; the agreement maybe proved by necessary implication.” It is further held in the very same decision that, “Offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. However, conspiracies are not hatched in the open, by their nature, they are secretly planned. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is therefore seldom available. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in he formation of the conspiracy, about the object, which the objections set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Where trustworthy evidence establishing all links of circumstantial evidence is available the confession of a co-accused as to conspiracy even without corroborative evidence can be taken into consideration. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Where trustworthy evidence establishing all links of circumstantial evidence is available the confession of a co-accused as to conspiracy even without corroborative evidence can be taken into consideration. It can in some cases be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties.” 35. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has held in AIR 2006 SC 35 as follows:” 13. Toconstitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one of the conspirators takes active part in he commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implications. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence; as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deducted from the circumstance of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy”. 36. If the materials available on record in respect of the charge of conspiracy, as pointed out earlier by this Court, is considered in the light of the well settled principle of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra, then this Court has no hesitation to hold that the materials available on record make out a prima facie case for the charge of conspiracy. As already pointed out in the instant case, the conduct of A-1 by not following the mandatory requirements in respect of the settlements of third party motor accident claims compensation would not only amount to a mere procedural lapse, but the same amounts to an abuse of his official position and thereby enabling the settlements of claims made on false, fabricated and bogus documents. Therefore, there are enough materials available on record not only to implicate A-1 but also to make out a prima facie case for the charge of conspiracy against A-1 to A-3. 37. Therefore, there are enough materials available on record not only to implicate A-1 but also to make out a prima facie case for the charge of conspiracy against A-1 to A-3. 37. As it is contended by both the learned senior counsels for A-1 and A-2 that no offence is made out under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, it is necessary for this Court to deal in respect of that question also. It is seen hat there are charges for the offence under Section 120 (b) read with 420, 468, 471 I.P.C. and under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act. This Court in the earlier paragraph held that there is a prima facie case made out for the charge of conspiracy on the basis of the materials available on record. Section 13(1) of the Act reads hereunder: “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant -(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,- (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the officials functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned ; or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person to do so; or (d) if he, - (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage ; …” 38. Now we are concerned in this case with Section 13(1) (d) of the Act and the said provision contemplates if a public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, he will be guilty of criminal misconduct punishable under section 13 (2) of the Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 39. The corresponding Sections in the old Act in respect of Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) are Sections 5(1)(d) and 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Hon‘ble Apex Court dealt with the said corresponding provision under the old Act in AIR 1963 SC 1116 and held as follows: “… As the Act is a socially useful measure conceived in public interest, it should be liberally construed so as to bring about the desired object, i.e. prevent corruption among public servants and to prevent harassment of the honest among them. It will not be correct to say that S. 5 (1) (d) would only take in cases of direct benefit obtained by a public servant for himself or for any other person from a third party in the manner described therein and does not cover a case of a wrongful loss caused to the Government by abuse of his power. Taking the phraseology used in the clause the case of a public servant causing wrongful loss to the Government by benefiting a third party squarely falls within it. The Act was brought in to purify public administration. When the Legislature used comprehensive terminology in S. 5(1) (d) to achieve the said purpose, it would be appropriate not to limit the content by construction when particularly the spirit of the Statute is in accord with the words used therein. The juxtaposition of the word ‘otherwise‘ with the words ‘corrupt or illegal means‘, and the dishonesty implicit in the word ‘abuse‘ indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on the part of the public servant to bring him within the meaning of the clause. AIR 1956 SC 476 , AIR 1962 SC 195 , (1872) 4 AC 184 Rel. on.” 40. AIR 1956 SC 476 , AIR 1962 SC 195 , (1872) 4 AC 184 Rel. on.” 40. The above said principle of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case there are materials available on record to show that the motor accident compensation claims were made by placing reliance on the alleged bogus, forged and fabricated documents and ultimately such claims were settled by A-1 before the Lok Adalats of the Tribunal and thereby causing wrongful loss to the UIIC. Therefore, it is crystal clear that there are prima facie materials available on record to make out a charge for conspiracy as well as for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act against A-1 to A-3. 41. Let me now consider and scrutinize the materials available on record implicating A-2 and A-3 as well as regarding the reliability of the approvers statements and the necessity for the corroboration for the statements of the approvers. A-2 and A-3 are the practising Advocates. It is not disputed that A-3 is the junior of A-2. The statements recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. of the approvers ?claimants viz., Velliangiri and Ponnusamy and the other approverDr. Paramasivam, who is said to have issued medical bills and certificates and L.W. 24, the Sheristadar of Dharapuram Sub Court, and L.W. 22, Vijayakumar, the owner of the tourist van, implicate A-2 and A-3 for the alleged offence. It is pertinent to note that the said statements recorded from the approvers/claimants, Velliangiri and Ponnusamy and the approver Dr. J. Paramasivam are inculpatory in nature. 42. As already pointed out, a perusal of the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. from the approver/claimant, Velliangiri shows that he met with an accident due to skid of his scooter and A-2 assured him that he would get some compensation from UIIC and A-3 met him along with A-2 and informed that they would arrange some other medical certificates enabling him to get insurance compensation. It is also specifically stated by him that they have shown his self-accident as a separate road accident and further they told him that they will arrange documents and as such he made false claims only at the instance of A-2 and A-3. It is also specifically stated by him that they have shown his self-accident as a separate road accident and further they told him that they will arrange documents and as such he made false claims only at the instance of A-2 and A-3. This approver/claimant, Velliangiri, made more or less similar statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. A perusal of the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. from the another approver/claimant, Ponnusmay, discloses that he went to the office-cum-residence of A-2 and met A-3, the junior of A-2. He also stated that he has paid Rs.1,500/- for arranging bills for the claim of compensation and the amount was paid to the juniors of A-2. It is specifically stated by him that he has not taken any treatment at Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, or Apollo Bone and Joint Hospital, Dharapuram and he was unaware as to how the medical bills and certificates were arranged by the Advocates. He has made more or less similar statement under Section 164 Cr. P.C. 43. The yet another witness, L.W.12, Sivasanmugam, the Court Sheristadar, Sub Court, Dharapuram, has stated in his statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. that A-3 is the junior of A-2 and he has also stated about the filing of motor accident claim petitions by the approvers, Velliangiri, Ponnusamy and A-4 (Narayanasamy) mentioning the numbers as M.C.O.P. Nos.118 of 2000, 470 of 2000 and 89 of 2000 respectively and he has also identified the signatures of A-2 and A-3. in the vakalat filed in those petitions. 44. L.W. 17 the approver, Dr. J. Paramasivam, Resident Medical Officer, Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore has also implicated A-2 and A-3. He has stated that he was working in the hospital from 1981 till 2002 and he is looking after the accident cases and used to issue wound certificates and he further stated that he has issued several wound certificates at the request of A-2 and A-3 and some others Advocates without verifying the hospital records. He has further stated that A-2 approached and requested him to issue certificates pertaining to A-4 and the approvers, Velliangiri and Ponnusamy, the claimants and he has issued the certificates in their names without verifying the hospital records at the instance of A-2 and A-3. He has further stated that A-2 approached and requested him to issue certificates pertaining to A-4 and the approvers, Velliangiri and Ponnusamy, the claimants and he has issued the certificates in their names without verifying the hospital records at the instance of A-2 and A-3. He has also stated that the bills and discharge summary relating to the approvers/claimants, Velliangiri and Ponnusamy, the claimants and he has issued the certificates in their names without verifying the hospital records at the instance of A-2 and A-3. He has also stated that the bills and discharge summary relating to the approvers/claimants, Velliangiri and Ponnusamy and A-4 are found to be forged documents and those documents were not issued by Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore. It is further stated by him that as per the hospital register the approver, Velliangiri, admitted in the hospital from 12.8.1999 to 23.8.1999 and taken treatment but he had issued wound certificate as if he had taken treatment form 8.2.1999 to 29.2.1999 which were not correct and he has issued such certificate at the request of A-2. Dr. Paramasivam has given a similar statement under Section 164 Cr. P.C. 45. The statements recorded from L.W.4 Dr. S. Rathnavel, Ortho Doctor, Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, L.W.5 Bill Clerk, Ramakrishna Hospital and L.W. 6 Dean, Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, corroborated the statement of the approver, Dr. Paramasivam in respect of forging the medical bills and wound certificates using the name of Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore. It is pertinent to note that the prosecution has also produced all the documents, viz., alleged forged and fabricated medical bills and certificates, discharge summary of the hospital in respect of the claimants as contained in the UIIC claim dockets pertaining to M.C.O.P. No. 118 of 2000, 470 of 2000 and 89 of 2000. Therefore, there are overwhelming materials available on record to implicate A-2 and A-3 also in this case. 46. The contention of the learned senior counsel for A-2 is that the approver Dr. Paramasivam has stated in his 161 Cr.P.C. statement that during the year 2002, A-2 approached him and requested him for the issue of wound certificates in respect of A-4 and the approvers/claimants, Velliangiri and Ponnusami, whereas the award of compensation were passed in the Lok Adalat between November 2000 and February 2001 itself and on this ground one of the accused, Dr. Mohd. Mohd. Zubhair, was discharged by the learned trial Judge. It is stated by the approver, Dr. J. Paramasivam, in his 161 statement that he remembers that A-2 approached him during the year 2002 for the issue of wound certificates to the approvers/claimants and A-4. But the fact remains that the said certificates do not bear the date of issuance and in the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. the approver Dr. Paramasivam has not mentioned the issuance of the dates of the wound certificates. This point raised by the learned Senior Counsel is relating to the appreciation of evidence. At the risk of repetition it is to be reiterated that at this stage, this court can not sift and weigh the materials available on record and it is not necessary to twelve deep into certain cotransduction in the materials available on record and all that required for this court at this stage is to consider whether the materials available on record if generally accepted would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. Therefore, it is open to the petitioners to raise all these aspects and points only at the time of full-fledged trial as the petitioners are having opportunity to cross examine any witness including the approvers. 47. The perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, discharging one of the accused viz., Dr. Mohd Zubair, shows that the learned trial Judge has not discharged him only on the above said ground. The learned trial Judge has held that the statements of witnesses do not reveal any incriminating materials against him and do not show that the said Doctor/accused was contacted by A-2 over phone or directly for issuance of medical certificates in respect of the approver/claimant, Ponnusamy. Therefore, the discharge of Dr. Mohd. Zubhair by the learned trial Judge is not a ground for giving the same benefit to the petitioners herein, in view of the overwhelming materials available on record making out a prima facie case against the petitioners. 48. The yet another contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for A-2 is that there is no material available on record to show as to who had procured the medical bills and certificates and as to who had handed over the same to whom and there is also no material available on record to show whether the same is produced for claiming compensation. This Court is unable to accept such contention in view of the materials available on record through the statements of approvers / claimants Velliangiri and Ponnusamy and the statement of the approver Dr. J. Paramasivam. It is seen from the statements of approver/claimant, Velliangiri, that he has specifically stated that A2 and A3 informed him that they will show his self accident as a separate road accident and they will arrange documents and further it is stated that he has handed over the original bills of Sri Ramakrishna Hospital to A2. It is also specifically stated by him that he was asked by A2 to accompany his junior A3 to meet Dr. J. Paramasivam of Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore. A perusal of the statement of another approver/claimant, Ponnusamy, also discloses that he has paid Rs.1,500/- for arranging bills for the purpose of claiming compensation. It is further stated by him in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. that he has not taken any treatment from Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, or Apollo Bone & Joint Hospital, Dharapuram, and he was unaware has to how the medical bills were arranged by the advocates. These statements of approvers/claimants coupled with the statement of Dr. Paramasivam clearly shows that A-2 and A-3 said to have obtained false, fabricated and bogus medical bills and certificates from Dr. J. Paramasivam of Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore and therefore, there are prima facie case is made out even in respect of this aspect. 49. The yet another contention put forward by both the learned senior counsel appearing for A-2 and A-3 that there is no corroboration for the statement of the approvers is untenable in law. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has held in (2002) 7 SCC 334 that, “Where trustworthy evidence establishing all links of circumstantial evidence is available the confession of a co-accused as to conspiracy even without corroborative evidence can be taken into consideration. It can in some cases be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties.” Even in respect of the confession of the co-accused, in the decision cited supra, the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held that such confession can be taken into consideration even without corroborative evidence. It can in some cases be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties.” Even in respect of the confession of the co-accused, in the decision cited supra, the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held that such confession can be taken into consideration even without corroborative evidence. But as far as the instant case is concerned, we are having the statements of approvers as they have been given pardon and as such their evidence are to be recorded by the trial Court and consequently the defence is having opportunity to cross-examine the approvers. 50. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in AIR 1968 SC 594 has held that, “… If the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of a successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approvers testimony, it will indubitable agree to the tendering of pardon…” Therefore, the statement of approvers stands entirely on a different footing than that of the confession of the co-accused. 51. It is well settled that in respect of the approvers, the Court has to apply double test, viz., (i) reliability and (ii) voluntariness. Therefore, the points regarding the contradictions and other infirmities in respect of the statement of the approvers necessarily to be raised only at the time of full fledged trial as the accused is having opportunity to cross-examine the approvers and they are entitled to discard their version by eliciting answers. 52. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for A-2 vehemently contended that the claims were settled in the Lok Adalat and the awards passed by the Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all parties to the dispute. It is also submitted that as per the provisions 21 (c) of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987, the proceedings before a Lok Adalat is deemed to be a civil Court. It is also submitted that as per the provisions 21 (c) of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987, the proceedings before a Lok Adalat is deemed to be a civil Court. Therefore, it is pointed ut that the award of compensation in respect of the claims in this case have been passed after the settlement as arrived before the Lok Adalat consisting of a Judge and other members and the award was signed by the Judge and other members of the Lok Adalat and the award was finally passed only after settlement by undergoing full and frank discussion of all issues and as such the approvers/claimants now can not claim that they are unaware about the proceedings before the Court and Lok Adalat and they have only received the award of compensation through their Advocates. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has held in (2005) 6 SCC 478 that, “Though a Lok Adalat award is not the result of a contest on merits, it is as equal and on a par with a decree on compromise and will have the same binding effect and be conclusive - It is final and permanent is equivalent to a decree executable, and is ending to the litigation among the parties.” This Court is of the considered view that merely because the settlement was made before the Lok Adalat, no sanctity could be attached to the claims for compensation made by the claimants and in the event of establishing that such award was obtained by a party by playing fraud, it is vitiated and such order cannot be held legal or valid. 53. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in (1994) 1 SCC 1 that, “25. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as wholly perverse, Kuldip Singh, J. stated : “The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the curt, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal - gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whos case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. Property grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal - gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whos case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” 54. It is further held by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the very same decision that, “The principle of ‘finality of litigation‘ cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants”. 55. In yet another decision, the Hon‘ble Apex Court reiterated the same view in (2007) 2 SCC 837 and held that, “Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is nonexistent and non est and can not be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by every Court, superior or inferior”. Therefore, it is open to the insurance company or to the prosecution to take appropriate action in accordance with law in respect of obtaining the award of compensation by playing fraud.” 56. It is also submitted by Mr. T.R. Raja-gopalan, the learned senior counsel, that so far no action has been taken by the insurance company to declare the decree of award of compensation was obtained by fraud. But the fact remains that the sequence of events of this case discloses that the First Information Report was registered on 09.03.2004 and A-2, A-3 and A-4 and other accused have been implicated on 17.01.2006. Section 17 of the Limitation Act contemplates that the limitation runs from he knowledge of discovery of fraud and as such it is open to the insurance company to initiate legal proceedings in accordance with law. 57. Section 17 of the Limitation Act contemplates that the limitation runs from he knowledge of discovery of fraud and as such it is open to the insurance company to initiate legal proceedings in accordance with law. 57. Now let me refer the settled principle of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in respect of the guidelines for framing charges and for quashing the proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. 58. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in AIR 1986 SC 2045 has held as follows: “The Cr.P.C. contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 277 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. Under Section 227 the trial Judge is required the discharge the accused if he considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless.” The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245 (1) when ‘the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction….” It is a fact that Sections 227 and 239 provide for discharge being ordered before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the two parties to be heard. The stage for discharge under Section 245 on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245 (1) is a preliminary one and he test of ‘prima facie‘ case has to be applied. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245 (1) is a preliminary one and he test of ‘prima facie‘ case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed”. Therefore the learned trial Judge at the stage of framing charge only to find out whether there is a prima facie case made out from the materials available on record against the accused. 59. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has held in AIR 1996 SC 1744 that, “If there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame charge against him for committing that offence. In Blacks Law Dictionary word ‘presume‘ has been defined to mean ‘to believe or accept upon probable evidence‘. Legal Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which ‘A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged‘. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exits. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record can not be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.” 60. It is equally well settled that a roving enquiry into the merits and demerits in details to decide whether a particular charge will ultimately stand scrutiny or not, cannot be gone into at the time of framing charge and even if there is a strong suspicion on the basis of the materials available on record charges have to be framed. It is equally well settled that a roving enquiry into the merits and demerits in details to decide whether a particular charge will ultimately stand scrutiny or not, cannot be gone into at the time of framing charge and even if there is a strong suspicion on the basis of the materials available on record charges have to be framed. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has held in Superintendent and AIR 1980 SC 52 that, “At the stage of framing charges, the prosecution evidence does not commence. The Magistrate has therefore, to consider the question as to framing of charge on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating Police Officer. The standard test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of S/ 227 or 228. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 61. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. If the entire allegations contained in the complaint or in the First Information Report are taken to be true in its face value, if no offence is made out, then the First Information Report is liable to be quashed. 62. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for A-2 apart from citing other decisions cited a decision in (2007) 5 CTC 614 pointing out that all the earlier decisions were dealt by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in that decision. 62. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for A-2 apart from citing other decisions cited a decision in (2007) 5 CTC 614 pointing out that all the earlier decisions were dealt by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in that decision. That decision arises out a breach of contractual obligation and he Hon‘ble Apex Court in that decision has held that the dispute in question is purely of a civil nature and also further held that the civil suit is also pending between the parties and as such initiating criminal proceedings is a clear case of abuse of process of Court and no offence is made out for the offence under Section 420 and 467 I.P.C. even the averments made in the First Information Report are taken to be correct and ultimately quashed the proceedings. But as far as the instant case is concerned, as already pointed out, there are sufficient materials available on record to make out a prima facie case to proceed against the petitioners. 63. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in (2006) 2 SCC (Crl) 272 held by referring several cases including the earliest decision rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) “… When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complaint to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death”. 64. The Hon‘ble Apex Court also referred another leading decision in reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 indicating certain categories of cases wherein, the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has also held in the very same decision that, “The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.” 65. 64. The Hon‘ble Apex Court also referred another leading decision in reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 indicating certain categories of cases wherein, the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has also held in the very same decision that, “The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.” 65. It is pertinent to note that in this case as on date the charges were already framed by the learned trial Judge and the date of commencement of trial is also fixed. At this stage it is relevant to refer a decision rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court is (2000) 8 SCC 239 and in that decision the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held as follows: “It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the trial court is not to examined and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against accused persons. At this stage of charge the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr. P.C. seeking for the quashing of charge framed against them the court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avid abuse of the process of the court the charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. Moreover, once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases.” 66. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases.” 66. Therefore, if the materials available on record is considered or the touch-stone of the principle of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra, then the inevitable conclusion of this court is that the impugned orders passed by the learned II Additional Special Court for CBI cases, Coimbatore, dismissing the petition filed for discharge do not suffer from any infirmities or illegalities warranting interference of this Court. In view of the overwhelming materials available on record making out a prima facie against the petitioners, A-1 to A-3 these revision petitions and the petition for quashing filed by A-2 are liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits and accordingly, all these revisions and the petition for quashing are dismissed as devoid of merits.