JUDGMENT Rajesh Bindal, J.:- The prayer of the petitioners is for quashing of the order dated 10.7.2007, the criminal complaint No. 105/2 of 2000 dated July 24, 2002 and the summoning order dated July 16, 2005 alongwith all subsequent proceedings or in the alternative for setting aside the order dated July 10, 2007 and for remanding the case back to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar for deciding the revision petition filed by the petitioners on merits. 2. The present proceedings arise out of a complaint filed by the appropriate authority-cum-Senior Medical Officer, Incharge Sub Division Hospital, Phillaur filed under Sections 4 (1) (2) (3), 6 and 29 Rule No. 9 (4) (6) and Rule No. 10 of the Pre-Natal diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 (for short “the Act) . Vide order dated July 16, 2005 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Phillaur, petitioners were summoned, prima facie, for violation of Sections 4 (1) (2) (3), 6 and 29 Rule No. 9 (4) (6) and Rule No. 10 of the Rules. Against the order of summoning, petitioners filed revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, who vide order dated July 10, 2007 dismissed the revision as not maintainable holding the order to be interlocutory in nature. 3. Though in the petition quashing of complaint and summoning order is also prayed for but counsel for the petitioner limited his arguments on the issue that against the summoning order revision was competent before the learned Sessions Judge and while dismissing the revision, he had gone wrong while holding that revision was not maintainable. He has relied upon K.K. Patel and another Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 195 and Bhaskar Industries Ltd. Vs. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd.and others (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 401. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted that the order summoning the petitioner for facing trial is interlocutory in nature and against that revision before the Sessions Judge was not maintainable. He has relied upon a judgment of this Court in State through Dy. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Ludhiana Vs. P.C. Aggarwal 1997 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 357. 5. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Sita Ram Pande and others Vs. He has relied upon a judgment of this Court in State through Dy. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Ludhiana Vs. P.C. Aggarwal 1997 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 357. 5. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Sita Ram Pande and others Vs. Uttam and another (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 134, while considering the issue as to whether order of the Magistrate directing issuance of process is interlocutory in nature, answered the same in negative. The relevant passages from the judgments are extracted below:- “5. The very object of conferring revisional jurisdiction upon the superior crimina courts is to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of procedure. 6. Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should, therefore, be exercised within the four corners of Section 397, whenever there has been miscarriage of justice in whatever manner. Under sub-section (2) of Section 397, there is a prohibition to exercise revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. But the expression “interlocutory order” has not been defined in the Code. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, this Court has held that the expression “interlocutory order” in Section 397 (2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and merely denotes orders of purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and any order which substantially affects the right of the parties cannot be said to be an “interlocutory order”. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra’ a three Judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In V.C. Shukla v. State this Court has held that the term “interlocutory order” used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final. This being the position of law, it would not be appropriate to hold that an order directing issuance of process is purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar under subsection (2) of Section 397 would apply. On the other hand, it must be held to be intermediate or quasi-final and, therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against the same. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order in view of the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code” 6. In Bhaskar Industries Ltd.’s case (supra), Hon’ble the Supreme Court while considering the issue as to what should be considered to be an order of interlocutory nature opined that if the result of acceptance of revision is termination of proceedings in its entirety, the same cannot be termed to be interlocutory in nature. The relevant passage is extracted below:- “8. The interdict contained in Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this : if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If they would, then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage. 9. A three Judges Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharashtra laid down the following test: (SCC p. 560, para 15). “An order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2).” Similar view was expressed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in K.K. Patel’s case (supra). Para ll thereof is relevant:- “11. That apart, the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that no revision was maintainable on account of the bar contained in Section 379 (2) of the code, is clearly erroneous. Para ll thereof is relevant:- “11. That apart, the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that no revision was maintainable on account of the bar contained in Section 379 (2) of the code, is clearly erroneous. It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, V.C.Shukla v. State through CBI and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397 (2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.” 7. As against this learned counsel for the State has cited judgment of this Court in P.C.Aggarwal’s case (supra), which is not only prior in time but even considering the fact that Hon’ble the Supreme Court consistently opined that where the fact of acceptance of plea of the petitioner in the revision is that entire proceedings could be culminated, the same cannot be held to be interlocutory in nature. In the present case, if the law referred to above is applied, it can very well be opined that the order impugned by the petitioners before learned Sessions Judge was not interlocutory in nature as they had challenged their summoning in the complaint filed by the appropriate authority-cum-Senior Medical Officer, Incharge Sub Division Hospital, Phillaur and in case of acceptance of revision, the entire proceedings against the petitioner would have finished. For the reasons stated above, the revision petition is accepted. The impugned order dated July 10, 2007 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar is set aside and case is remitted back to him for fresh decision on merits. Parties through their counsels are directed to appear before learned Court below for further proceedings on February 02, 2008. ————————————