Judgment Navaniti Pd.Singh, J. 1. Heard. 2. The petitioner had opened a savings account with the respondent- Muzaffarpur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. The account was opened in the year 1976.The petitioner alleges close of account in that very year but the same is disputed. What is admitted by respondent- bank is that the last transaction that took place was in 1979. In the year 2004, the present certificate proceedings were initiated on the basis of a requisition made by the respondent- bank under the provisions of Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914. On basis of the said requisition, a certificate was issued, both of which are annexed to the writ petition and Certificate Case no. 2803/2004-05 was thus registered before the Certificate Officer . The petitioner has come directly to this Court challenging the very initiation of the certificate proceeding on the ground that they are wholly without jurisdiction. 3. The respondent- bank has appeared and filed a counter affidavit. 4. The first objection raised by the respondent-bank is as to the maintainability of the writ petition and non availing of alternative remedy. In my view, the plea of the respondent- bank is only to be noted for the purpose of rejection. It is well settled that the plea of alternative remedy is a bar created by discretion and not by rule. Secondly, the said bar does not apply where the parties act without jurisdiction . The law does not contemplate that first a party objecting to jurisdiction must submit to the jurisdiction suffer an order and then challenge the jurisdiction. This position in law is well settled and recognized. The objection is thus misconceived on the face of it. 5. The petitioner has challenged the proceedings basically on two grounds. Firstly, he submits that the respondent- Cooperative being a bank, the dues are covered by Entry 15 of Schedule 1 of Public Demand Recovery Act. Therefore, in absence of an agreement in writing having been produced, it cannot be said that it is a public demand and recoverable under the provisions of PDR Act. Firstly, he submits that the respondent- Cooperative being a bank, the dues are covered by Entry 15 of Schedule 1 of Public Demand Recovery Act. Therefore, in absence of an agreement in writing having been produced, it cannot be said that it is a public demand and recoverable under the provisions of PDR Act. The second contention is that on the face of it, the last transaction being of the year 1979, which resulted in the amount being over drawn, the same could be recovered within a period of three years by a Suit and beyond that period Money Suit itself would be barred and as such in terms of Sec. 6 of the Act, the Certificate Officer erred in law in assuming the jurisdiction in the matter and issuing a certificate for such a stale claim of over 25 years old as the certificate proceedings were initiated only in 2004 for dues of 1979. 6. The respondent submits that the dues being sought to be recovered are not by virtue of Entry 15 of Schedule 1 to the Act but by virtue of Entry 3 of Schedule 1 of the Act. Secondly, it is submitted that no provision under the Co-operative Act makes the law of limitation applicable and if law of limitation is not made applicable to the Cooperative bank then the dues could be recovered ad infinitum. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and with their consent this application is being disposed of at the stage of admission itself. 8. So far as first contention with regard to absence of agreement is concerned, I am afraid the petitioners contention is misconceived. Section 52 of the Bihar Cooperative Socieities Act, 1935 clearly provides that any amount, that is found due from a member can be recovered as the public demand or arrears of land revenue. If we see Entry 3 of Schedule 1 to the public Demand Recovery Act, which provides as to what natures of demand are public demand, we would find that any money which is recoverable as arrears of land revenue is a public demand. If we see Entry 3 of Schedule 1 to the public Demand Recovery Act, which provides as to what natures of demand are public demand, we would find that any money which is recoverable as arrears of land revenue is a public demand. Thus, in my view, the amount sought to be recovered by the respondent- bank is recoverable as a public demand and it is not covered by Entry 15 of Schedule 1 which refers to Bank and institution of which Corporative bank , which are beyond the control of the Government, is not included therein. Respondent- bank thus, rightly has the authority to move for recovery of the demand as a public demand in absence of an agreement in writing in terms of Entry 15 of Schedule 1 of the Public Demand Recovery Act.The contention of the petitioner is not sustainable in this regard. Coming to the question of limitation, the facts speak for themselves. A due outstanding in 1979 with no transaction whatsoever thereafter is being sought to be recovered for the first time by initiating a proceeding after 25 years in 2004. The plea of respondent-bank that there is no provision under the Co-operative Act, which makes the Limitation Act applicable to the right under those Acts, in my view, that is of no consequence. If we refer Negotiable Instrument Act and Contract Act, none of them says that for enforcement of due thereunder, Limitation Act will apply. On the contrary the Limitation Act says that the provisions thereof shall apply to all claims and enforcement thereof when they are made before a Court. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent very fairly submitted that if a Suit was to be filed today by the respondent- bank for recovery of the said money, the same would be barred on the face of it and the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. If that be the position, two things arise. Firstly can a person be permitted to circumvent the provision of the bar of limitation and resort to Public Demand Recovery Act, where the Certificate Officer is not a Court, as defined for the purposes of Limitation Act and thus avoid the bar of Limitation and secondly whether in view of provision of Section 6 of the Public Demand Recovery Act, such a plea is at all available to the respondent. Sec. 6 of the Public Demand Recovery Act reads thus: "6. Filing of certificate on requisition.- On receipt of any such requisition, the Certificate Officer, if he is satisfied that the demand is recoverable and that recovery is not barred by law, may sign a certificate, in the proscribed form, stating that the demand is due; and shall include in the certificate the fee if any paid under Section 5, sub-section (2); and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office." Firstly, where the law restricts the remedy to a Court of law, then it should not be so interpreted that in another proceeding solely for the purpose of recovery it can be permitted; that would be circumventing the law. If the claim is not enforceable in Civil Court the bar cannot be circumvented by resorting to Public Demand Recovery Act. Therefore, this part of the submission cannot be accepted. Secondly, It is in view of this principle that Sec. 6 of the Public Demand Recovery Act, as quoted above, says that the Certificate Officer, if he is satisfied that the demand is recoverable and the recovery is not barred by law, he can proceed. Here, recovery of money due after 25 years is barred by law of limitation . Therefore, in terms of Section 6, the law bars recovery and thus the Certificate officer had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter once he found so.If one refers to the certificate as appended to the writ petition as issued by the Certificate Officer, one would find that he had to certify that the recovery was not barred, he has so certified without even bothering to look or enquire into the very basic fact. In that view of the matter, in the facts of this case , which are not in dispute, the recovery being barred by law , the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. The proceedings being wholly without jurisdiction , the same are quashed in toto. 9 The writ petition stands allowed.