Judgment :- This Writ Petition has been preferred by a property tax assessee on the file of the second respondent to declare Rule 14 of Schedule IV, Part V of Taxation Rules of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, as null and void, as it fail to provide for waiver or exemption of pre-deposit for entertaining the appeal by the third respondent Tribunal. 2.Facts as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition are as follows:- (a)The petitioner is the owner of the premises at Door No.52, Rajaji Salai, Chennai – 1, and the property tax in respect of the said property has already been assessed by the second Respondent, as per the provisions of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. Subsequently, property tax was revised arbitrarily by the second Respondent as per order dated 25.08.2003, whereby property tax originally assessed @ Rs.20,805/-was increased to Rs.40,720/-, which is almost double than the old rate. While passing the order for enhancement, the second Respondent did not give opportunity to the petitioner by way of personal hearing. The enhancement was nothing but a mechanical act on the part of the second Respondent without assessing the value as per the norms prescribed by the statute and the Municipal Corporation Act, as provided under Sections 99 and 100 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. Though the petitioner has submitted a representation to the second Respondent, the same was not considered and ultimately, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition before this Court in W.P.Nos.2618 and 2619 of 2006, challenging the enhancement of tax and the Writ Petitions were disposed of by this Court, directing the petitioner to prefer a statutory appeal before the third Respondent within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. (b)In accordance with the order of this Court dated 01.02.2006, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the third Respondent on 08.02.2006 along with an application for waiver of pre-deposit. However, the said appeal was rejected by the third Respondent on the ground of failure to produce proof of payment of the tax assessed originally, and 50% of the difference between the existing tax and the tax as enhanced by the Commissioner. However, the said appeal was rejected by the third Respondent on the ground of failure to produce proof of payment of the tax assessed originally, and 50% of the difference between the existing tax and the tax as enhanced by the Commissioner. In the said circumstances, having found that there was no provision in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act enabling the Appellate Authority to waive the statutory deposit as condition for preferring appeal, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition to declare Rule 14 of Schedule IV, Part V of Taxation Rules of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 as violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 3.Respondents have not filed counter in answer to the contentions raised in the Writ Petition. 4.I have heard Thiru S.Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Thiru. V.Bharathidasan, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the second Respondent. 5.The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that in almost all the other enactments there are provisions for filing appeal, as well as provisions to waive the statutory deposit, and no such provision is found in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. It was the further contention of the learned Counsel that appeal remedy itself has become illusory on account of the onerous conditions attached to the provision for filing appeal. According to the learned Counsel, the second Respondent has enhanced the property tax without any basis and there was total non-application of mind and a cyclostyled order, after filling up the column with the quantum of enhancement was issued by the second Respondent. Invariably, no notice used to be issued by the second Respondent before enhancing the tax and in any case, no personal hearing would be given to the affected party before enhancing the property tax. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that the very enhancement being illegal, the aggrieved assessee is liable to pay 50% of the amount so enhanced, which makes the assessee in many cases to leave the matter as it is without filing appeal. In the said circumstances, the learned Counsel prayed for declaring the impugned rule as unconstitutional and violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India. In the said circumstances, the learned Counsel prayed for declaring the impugned rule as unconstitutional and violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 6.The learned Standing Counsel for the second Respondent Corporation submitted that the appeal is a statutory remedy and as such, an assessee desirous of filing appeal should also comply with the condition precedent for entertaining such appeal and as such, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the provision is onerous and on such ground, the provision cannot be declared as unconstitutional. 7.The challenge in the Writ Petition is in respect of Rule 14 of the Taxation Rules. For better appreciation, Rule 12 and 14 are extracted below:- "12(1)There shall be one or more Taxation Appeal Tribunals (hereinafter referred to in this part as "Tribunal") for hearing and disposing of an appeal prepared by any person who is not satisfied with the assessment order made by the Commissioner under this Act, other than the orders relating to the transfer duty and the tax on timber. (2)The Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial officer not below the rank of a Sub-Judge. (3)The terms and conditions of the Tribunal shall be such as may be determined by the Government. (4)The salary and other allowances payable to the Tribunal shall be borne from the funds of the Corporation. ******* 14.No appeal shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless the appellant deposits in the Corporation the existing tax and also fifty percent of the difference between the existing tax and the tax as assessed by the Commissioner in the revision". 8.It is found that the Taxation Appeal Tribunal consists of a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge and as a condition precedent for filing the statutory appeal, the appellant is made liable to pay the admitted tax as well as 50% of the difference between the existing tax and the tax re-determined by the Commissioner by way of revision of assessment. 9.It was the contention of the petitioner that the enhancement has been made by the Commissioner without giving personal hearing to the petitioner and the enhancement was not done in the manner it should have been done. However, for filing the appeal, the petitioner has to deposit 50% of the difference amount and as such, the very appeal remedy is illusory. However, for filing the appeal, the petitioner has to deposit 50% of the difference amount and as such, the very appeal remedy is illusory. 10.It is trite that appeal is a statutory remedy and in case an appeal has to be filed against a particular order, necessarily, the appellant has to comply with the condition precedent for preferring such appeal. It is true that in some of the statutes, there are provisions for waiver of the statutory deposit. However, it cannot be said that the impugned provision is bad in law in the absence of provision for waiver of statutory deposit. Failure to give notice or personal hearing before enhancing the tax is a different matter and on that ground alone, it cannot be said that the provision has to be declared as unconstitutional. The petitioner was not able to demonstrate that the impugned provision is violative of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act or any other provisions of the said statute. Right of appeal being a creature of statute, and the condition being part of the provision permitting such appeal, in case the assessee wants to file appeal challenging the assessment, necessarily the condition has to be complied with. There is no statutory prohibition for imposing such condition. Merely because the said condition causes difficulties to the assessee, it cannot be said that the same is a valid ground to invalidate the provision. It is true that in some of the provisions for filing appeal, discretion has been granted to the Appellate Authority to waive the condition regarding pre-deposit. So long as no such power is given to the Appellate Authority in the statute in question, it cannot be said that the Appellate Authority is bound to receive the appeal without proof of such payment of pre-deposit. Of course, mechanical exercise of power of revision by the Commissioner without giving notice or personal hearing to the party, is a serious matter, but the same will not invalidate the very provision. Such being the position, I do not find any valid ground to declare the impugned Order as unconstitutional or ultra vires. 11.The Apex Court in Shyam Kishore and ors. Such being the position, I do not find any valid ground to declare the impugned Order as unconstitutional or ultra vires. 11.The Apex Court in Shyam Kishore and ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, reported in AIR 1992 SC 2279 , considered the issue as to whether prescription of condition with regard to statutory deposit for filing appeal would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and after considering catena of decisions on the point, held thus: "28.In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, (1974)(3) SCR 882: ( AIR 1974 SC 1126 ), Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that “There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature, but the right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law.” 29.In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1975(3) scr 220 : AIR 1975 SC 1234 , which is an appeal from the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1973(14) Guj letter 826, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider vires of Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act (Bombay Act 59 of 1949) as amended by Gujarat Acts 8 of 1968 and 5 of 1970 to the entertainment of the appeal by a person who had not deposited the amount of tax due from him and who had not been able to show to the appellate Judge that the deposit of the amount would cause him undue hardship arising out of his own omission and default. A disability or disadvantage arising out of a party’s own default or omission cannot be taken to be tantamount to the creation of two classes offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, especially when that disability or disadvantage operates upon all persons who make the default or omission. The High Court had taken the view that there was a discrimination between an appellant who deposited the tax and an appellant who did not, which is the necessary consequence of the condition requiring deposit of the amount of tax, which was unreasonable and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court had taken the view that there was a discrimination between an appellant who deposited the tax and an appellant who did not, which is the necessary consequence of the condition requiring deposit of the amount of tax, which was unreasonable and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Setting aside the view of the Gujarat High Court, Khanna, J. speaking for the Supreme Court at pages 246 to 248 observed as under: “After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the High Court. Section 406(2)(e) as amended states that no appeal against a rateable value or tax fixed or charged under the Act shall be entertained by the Judge in the case of an appeal against a tax or in the case of an appeal made against a rateable value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to the appellant, unless the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him with the Commissioner. According to the proviso to the above clause, where in any particular case the Judge is of opinion that the deposit of the amount by the appellant will cause undue hardship to him, the Judge may in his discretion dispense with such deposit or part thereof, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he may deem fit. The object of the above provision apparently is to ensure the deposit of the amount claimed from an appellant in case he seeks to file an appeal against a tax or against a rateable value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to him. Power at the same time is given to the appellate Judge to relieve the appellant from the rigour of the above provision in case the Judge is of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship to the appellant. The requirement about the deposit of the amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal which seeks to challenge the imposition or the quantum of that tax, in our opinion, has not the effect of nullifying the right of appeal, especially when we keep in view the fact that discretion is vested in the appellate Judge to dispense with the compliance of the above requirement. All that the statutory provision seeks to do is to regulate the exercise of the right of appeal. The object of the above provision is to keep in balance the right of appeal, which is conferred upon a person who is aggrieved with the demand of tax made from him, and the right of the Corporation to speedy recovery of the tax. The impugned provision accordingly confers a right of appeal and at the same time prevents the delay in the payment of the tax. We find ourselves unable to accede to the argument that the impugned provision has the effect of creating a discrimination as is offensive to the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is significant that the right of appeal is conferred upon all persons who are aggrieved against the determination of tax or rateable value. The bar created by Section 406(2)(e) to the entertainment of the appeal by a person who has not deposited the amount of tax due from him and who is not able to show to the appellate Judge that the deposit of the amount would cause him undue hardship arises out of his own omission and default. The above provision, in our opinion, has not the effect of making invidious distinction or creating two classes with the object of meting out differential treatment to them it only spells out the consequences flowing from the omission and default of a person who despite the fact that the deposit of the amount found due from him would cause him no hardship, declines of his own volition to deposit that amount. The right of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutory provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not entitled to file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the Legislature while granting the right of appeal cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right. In the absence of any special reasons there appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to the imposition of such conditions. It is permissible, for example, to prescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convicted person is released on bail, he must surrender to custody before his appeal against the sentence of imprisonment would be entertained. In the absence of any special reasons there appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to the imposition of such conditions. It is permissible, for example, to prescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convicted person is released on bail, he must surrender to custody before his appeal against the sentence of imprisonment would be entertained. Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lie against an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had been paid. Such a provision was on the statute book in Section 30 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The proviso to that section provided that ‘... no appeal shall lie against an order under sub-section (1) of Section 46 unless the tax had been paid’. Such conditions merely regulate the exercise of the right of appeal so that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party and there is no difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in case the appeal is ultimately dismissed. It is open to the Legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom a legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. Any requirement for the discharge of that liability or the fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and we can discern no contravention of Article 14 in it. A disability or disadvantage arising out of a party’s own default or omission cannot be taken to be tantamount to the creation of two classes offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, especially when that disability or disadvantage operates upon all persons who make the default or omission.” 12.According to the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the main reason for challenging the very provision is on account of the procedure adopted by the second respondent in enhancing the property tax, inasmuch as no opportunity of personal hearing is contemplated before such enhancement. According to the learned Counsel, in case opportunity is granted to an assessee, it would enable the concerned assessee to submit their case before the second Respondent with materials and it would be possible for the Corporation to consider every aspect of the matter before enhancing the property tax. According to the learned Counsel, in case opportunity is granted to an assessee, it would enable the concerned assessee to submit their case before the second Respondent with materials and it would be possible for the Corporation to consider every aspect of the matter before enhancing the property tax. 13.The learned Counsel for the second Respondent contended that there is no provision in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 to give notice to the assessee and also to give personal hearing before enhancing the property tax and as such, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that there is violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. 14.It is evident from the materials produced by the petitioner that property tax has been enhanced by the second Respondent on the basis of materials collected by them without notice to the assessee and without giving personal hearing. It is also the grievance of the petitioner that enhancement was made mechanically, by just filling up the cyclostyled forms without application of mind. 15.It is trite that every authority whether it be administrative or quasi judicial, should act in a fair and reasonable manner and in case their decision involves civil consequences to the affected parties, necessarily, Principles of Natural Justice should be followed and reasonable opportunity should be given to the person who is likely to be affected by such decision. The Commissioner is empowered to enhance property tax and when such enhancement results in civil consequences to the assessee, necessarily, the assessee should be heard before finalizing the assessment. In case the assessee is aggrieved by the said assessment, the remedy is to file an appeal after making the pre-deposit, as contemplated under the statute. Admittedly, there is no provision in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 or Rules framed thereunder denying such right of hearing to the assessee and as such Principles of Natural Justice should be read into the provision and as a result, before enhancing tax, opportunity should be given to the assessee to submit their objection and they should also be given a further opportunity of hearing before making the assessment. 16.The Apex Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. 16.The Apex Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , considered the concept of Natural Justice and the broad principles governing its application in the construction and administration of statutes and the exercise of judicial and administrative powers by the authorities and observed thus: "Well then, what is “natural justice”? The phrase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Historically, “natural justice” has been used in a way “which implies the existence of moral principles of self-evident and unarguable truth”. In course of time, Judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to “equity and good conscience”. Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between “natural justice” and “natural law”. “Natural justice” was considered as “that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice”. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind, as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially, objectively and fairly. Described in the form of Latin tags these twin principles are: (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. For the purpose of the question posed above, we are primarily concerned with the first. This principle was well-recognised even in the ancient world. Seneca, the philosopher, is said to have referred in Medea that it is unjust to reach a decision without a full hearing. In Maneka Gandhi case, Bhagwati,J. emphasised that audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Hence its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed". In Maneka Gandhi case, Bhagwati,J. emphasised that audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Hence its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed". 17.In State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan and ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 1301 , the Supreme Court has observed that in cases where exercise of power results in civil consequences to citizens, Principles of Natural Justice should be followed unless there is exclusion of such principles in the statute itself and held thus : "8.Considered in this light, the section must be interpreted to imply that the person who may be affected by such a decision should be afforded an opportunity to prove that the proposed step would not advance the interest of mines and mineral development. Not to do so will be violative of the Principles of Natural Justice. Since there is no suggestion in the section to deny the right of the affected persons to be heard, the provisions have to be interpreted as implying to preserve such a right. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1987 (2) SCC 510 : AIR 1987 SC 1239 , that where exercise of power results in civil consequences to citizens, unless the statute specifically rules out the application of natural justice, such rules would apply." 18.In a recent Judgment in SAHARA INDIA (FIRM), LUCKNOW v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX reported in 2008(6) SCALE 733, the Apex Court observed that the phrase "natural justice is not capable of a precise definition and the said principle evolved under the common law is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State and its functionaries and held thus:- "11. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see: Income Tax Officer & Ors. Vs. M/s Madnani Engineering Works Ltd., Calcutta). 12.In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of "natural justice". Referring to several decisions, his Lordship observed thus (SCC p.666; Headnote): "Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application -seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." ..... 17. In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. , explaining as to what is meant by expression civil consequence, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the majority said: "Civil Consequences undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence." (emphasis supplied) 19.The second respondent being an authority vested with powers under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 to enhance the property tax, is expected to discharge the said function in a fair manner. There should be procedural fairness in the actions of administrative as well as quasi judicial authorities. Such a course is all the more necessary in view of the stringent provision as contained in Rule 14 of Schedule IV, Part V of Taxation Rules of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 which prescribes that as a condition precedent for filing appeal, against the order of assessment, the assesse shall deposit 50% of the difference between the amount originally assessed and the amount enhanced. Therefore, in case of request made by an assessee for personal hearing before revising the assessment, the second Respondent or his delegate is bound to give such a hearing and the assessment shall be revised only after following the Principles of Natural Justice. 20.In the result, while declaring the impugned Order as intra vires, I am inclined to direct the second Respondent to issue notice to the assessee and grant an opportunity of personal hearing by following the Principles of Natural Justice before enhancing property tax. The petitioner is given four weeks time to represent the appeal with the statutory deposit before the third respondent. The Writ Petition is disposed of subject to the above directions. No costs.