Judgment :- This Second Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree in A.S.No.1/1995 reversing Judgment of the trial court and thereby dismissing Plaintiffs suit for Specific Performance. Unsuccessful Plaintiff is the Appellant in the Second Appeal. For convenience, parties are referred as per they array in the suit. 2. Suit property is a tiled house in S.F.No.4/1 to an extent of east to west 25 feet, north to south 24 ½ feet, a total extent of 612 ½ sq.ft. Appellant/Plaintiff has entered into a sale agreement on 06.06.1986 (Ex.A2) with the Respondent/Defendant and another paternal uncle Subbarayan to purchase the suit property and also another half share of the Defendant, the same extent of suit property, for a valid consideration of Rs.6,000/-. Soon after the execution of sale agreement, Plaintiffs two paternal uncles, the Defendant Duraiswamy and Subbarayan had divided the said property orally, in which western half to an extent of east to west 25 feet, north to south to an extent of 24 ½ feet, a total extent of 612 ½ sq.ft. was allotted to Subbarayan and likewise the same extent on the eastern side was allotted to Duraiswamy. To honour the sale agreement (Ex.A2), Subbarayan had registered the said extent by means of registered sale deed dated 12.02.1987 (Ex.A1) in favour of the Plaintiff. But the Defendant was evading to perform his part of contract by executing the sale deed. Inspite of demand and issuance of lawyers notice Ex.A3 dated 14.03.1987, Defendant has been evading execution of sale deed under one pretext or another. Plaintiff filed the suit for Specific Performance on 21.03.1990 within the period of three years from the date of refusal of execution of sale deed as per the denial in the reply notice Ex.A4 dated 27.03.1987. Stating that Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract, Plaintiff has filed the suit for Specific Performance. 3. Defendant has resisted the suit inter alia contending that Plaintiff had obtained Defendants signature in a blank stamp paper and the same was used for fabricating the suit agreement. According to the Defendant, he is entitled to only ¼th share and the remaining ¾th share belongs to his three sons. Out of three sons, two sons are major and one major son alone consented for execution of sale agreement and the other minor sons are not even eonomiee party to the sale agreement. According to the Defendant, he is entitled to only ¼th share and the remaining ¾th share belongs to his three sons. Out of three sons, two sons are major and one major son alone consented for execution of sale agreement and the other minor sons are not even eonomiee party to the sale agreement. Defendant contended that the suit is barred by limitation and limitation period starts from the date of sale agreement 06.06.1986 (Ex.A2) and not from the date of refusal of performance in reply notice dated 27.03.1987 (Ex.A4) and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. 4. On the above pleadings, trial court framed relevant issues. Observing that no date has been fixed in Ex.A2 sale agreement and reply notice was sent by the Defendant (Ex.A4) only on 27.03.1987, trial court held that the suit filed on 21.03.1990 is within the period of three years from the date of refusal of notice and therefore, suit is well within the period of limitation as contemplated under Article 54 of Limitation Act. Trial court further held that time is not essence of the contract and hence, limitation would start running from the date of refusal by Defendant. Trial court further held that suit property is ancestral property and Plaintiff would be entitled to obtain sale deed only for half share (¼th + ¼th share) and decreed the suit to that extent. 5. In the appeal preferred by the Defendant, lower Appellate court held that Ex.A2 agreement was fabricated. Lower Appellate court further held that Plaintiff had notice of refusal to perform the contract even on the date of Ex.A1 (12.02.1987) and therefore, suit filed on 21.03.1990 is beyond the period of limitation. Lower Appellate court held that Plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation. On those findings, lower Appellate court reversed the Judgment of trial court and allowed the appeal. 6. Aggrieved, Plaintiff has preferred Second Appeal. At the time of admission, the following substantial question of law was formulated for consideration: "Whether the lower Appellate court has properly appreciated the scope and applicability of law regarding the specific performance of contract on the facts and in the circumstances of the case after having held that Exs.A-1 to A-4 and the Koorchit dated 14. At the time of admission, the following substantial question of law was formulated for consideration: "Whether the lower Appellate court has properly appreciated the scope and applicability of law regarding the specific performance of contract on the facts and in the circumstances of the case after having held that Exs.A-1 to A-4 and the Koorchit dated 14. 1962 admitted by the Respondent during cross examination that the suit property was already partitioned between Rajagopal, Subbarayan and the Respondent and their legal heirs cannot claim any share in the suit property?" 7. Mr. T.V. Krishnamachari, learned counsel for the Appellant inter alia contended that starting point of limitation was only when the Plaintiff had notice of refusal of performance of contract i.e. the date of Ex.A4 reply notice (27.03.1987) and lower Appellate court erred in saying that the suit is barred by limitation. Assailing the findings of the trial court that suit property is ancestral property of Defendant and that Plaintiff can obtain decree only for half share, Appellant has filed Koorchit dated 11.04.1962 to be received as additional evidence in support of his contention that the suit property was the absolute property of three brothers. 8. Praying to receive additional document, learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff contended that as per the Koorchit, Defendant is absolutely entitled to the entire extent and therefore, even Judgment of the trial court has to be modified granting decree for Specific Performance to the entire extent of suit property. 9. Learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that even on the date of Ex.A1 (12. 1987), Plaintiff knew very well that the Defendant has refused to perform his part of contract and therefore, the suit ought to have been filed within three years. Main plea of the Respondent is that suit filed on 21.03.1990 is barred by limitation and therefore, there is no reason warranting interference in the Judgment of the lower Appellate court. 10. Plaintiff and Defendant are closely related. Rajagopal (Plaintiffs father), Subbarayan and Duraiswamy (Defendant) are the sons of Kesava Naicker. The said three brothers divided the suit property along with other two portions of the tiled house by Koorchit dated 11.04.1962. As per the recitals in the Koorchit, A schedule was allotted to Plaintiffs father Rajagopal; B schedule was allotted to his paternal uncle Subbarayan and C schedule was allotted to Defendant who is the paternal uncle of Plaintiff. The said three brothers divided the suit property along with other two portions of the tiled house by Koorchit dated 11.04.1962. As per the recitals in the Koorchit, A schedule was allotted to Plaintiffs father Rajagopal; B schedule was allotted to his paternal uncle Subbarayan and C schedule was allotted to Defendant who is the paternal uncle of Plaintiff. As seen from C schedule, Defendant was allotted east to west 25 feet, north to south 24 ½ feet and other lands. Suit property being ancestral property, trial court has held that Plaintiff would be entitled to Specific Performance only in respect of half share i.e. ¼th share of Defendant plus ¼th share of his son Selvakumar. 11. On behalf of the Appellant, it was contended that as per the partition effected by Koorchit dated 11.04.1962 between three brothers the property is their independent property and while so, learned District Munsif erred in arriving at the conclusion that suit property is ancestral property and that Defendant has no right to sell his entire share by Ex.A2 agreement of sale (06.06.1986). 12. In this aspect, Appellant has filed C.M.P.No.5041/1998 to receive Koorchit as additional document. Additional document is sought to be filed to assail the conclusion of the trial court that suit property is ancestral property of Defendant and that the trail court erred in decreeing the suit for half share alone. 13. Second Appellate court can entertain application for additional evidence if it was rejected by the first Appellate court. But when party failed to apply under Rule 27 of Or.XLI C.P.C. in the first Appellate court, Appellant cannot insist for entertaining additional evidence in the Second Appeal. Inspite of the conclusion by the trial court, admittedly, Plaintiff/Appellant has not filed Koorchit before first Appellate court. No reasonable explanation is forthcoming for not filing the Koorchit before first Appellate court. 14. Of course, during cross examination Defendant has accepted the said Koorchit. This court is not inclined to admit Koorchit on such admission by the Defendant. Koorchit is sought to be filed to prove that the suit property and other two portions of the house are self acquired property of Rajagopal, Subbarayan and Defendant and that trial court ought not to have passed decree for half share alone. This court is not inclined to admit Koorchit on such admission by the Defendant. Koorchit is sought to be filed to prove that the suit property and other two portions of the house are self acquired property of Rajagopal, Subbarayan and Defendant and that trial court ought not to have passed decree for half share alone. Koorchit is sought to be produced as additional evidence to prove that trial court fell in error in not appreciating the evidence in respect of Koorchit and granting Specific Performance only for half share. 15. It is relevant to note that as against the decree of trial court granting Specific Performance for half share Appellant/Plaintiff has not preferred any appeal or filed cross objection in the first Appellate court. When a party/Plaintiff has allowed the decree of trial court to become final, it is not open to the Plaintiff now to agitate half share in respect of which decree was not granted. When the trial court passed decree only to an extent of half share and Plaintiff having not filed any cross objection, Plaintiff now cannot challenge the extent of decree passed by the trial court. 16. Of course, under Or.XLI, Rule 33 C.P.C. where the ends of justice so demand, the court is empowered to mould the relief by passing any decree or order which ought to have been passed despite the fact that the other side has not filed any appeal. By reading of Judgment of first Appellate court, it is seen that in the lower Appellate court, Plaintiff does not seem to have raised any objection in respect of the relief disallowed by the trial court. When the point was not taken in the first Appellate court, exercising jurisdiction under Sec.100 C.P.C., High Court cannot grant relief to the Plaintiff in respect of half share disallowed by the trial court. In such circumstances, in my considered view, Koorchit produced as additional document need not be received as evidence. Receiving of additional document and going into factual aspects may not be permissible exercising jurisdiction under Sec.100 C.P.C. 17. Let us make it clear that this Second Appeal is only in respect of half share granted by the trial court. In such circumstances, in my considered view, Koorchit produced as additional document need not be received as evidence. Receiving of additional document and going into factual aspects may not be permissible exercising jurisdiction under Sec.100 C.P.C. 17. Let us make it clear that this Second Appeal is only in respect of half share granted by the trial court. In so far as decree granted by the trial court, lower Appellate court reversed the findings of trial court on the ground:-(i) Ex.A1 was not executed as alleged by the Plaintiff; (ii) for execution of Ex.A2 dated 06.06.1986, stamp paper was purchased on 16.05.1986 in the name of one Pachiappan; and (iii) there are several discrepancies and contradictions as to how partition was effected and allotment of properties. 18. To prove Ex.A1, Plaintiff has examined himself as P.W.1. Scribe Moorthy (a licensed document writer) as P.W.2. Pachiappan in whose name stamp paper was purchased was examined as P.W.3 and the Defendants son Selvakumar who has attested Ex.A2 sale agreement as P.W.4. P.Ws.1 to 4 have consistently spoken about execution of Ex.A2 agreement of sale. Upon consideration of oral evidence, trial court held that Subbarayan and Defendant have received sale consideration of Rs.6,000/-and had executed Ex.A2 sale agreement. The factum of execution of Ex.A2 agreement of sale is fortified by the conduct of parties. Pursuant to Ex.A2 agreement of sale, Defendants brother Subbarayan had executed Ex.A1 sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of his share. Lower Appellate court erred in ignoring the material aspect of execution of Ex.A1 sale deed by Subbarayan dated 12.02.1987. Execution of Ex.A1 sale deed by Subbarayan would go a long way strengthening execution of Ex.A2 agreement of sale. 119. Upon consideration of evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4, trial court held that Ex.A2 was duly executed by the Defendant. Upon consideration of oral evidence when the trial court has held that Ex.A2 was duly proved, lower Appellate court ought not to have interfered with the findings of trial court. 120. As held by the Honble Supreme Court in 2008(3) CTC 528 (Jagadish Singh v. Madhuri Devi) and AIR 1951 SC 120 (Sarju Pershad Randeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and others) the Appellate court has to bear in mind that it did not have opportunity of seeing the witness and to know their demeanor. 120. As held by the Honble Supreme Court in 2008(3) CTC 528 (Jagadish Singh v. Madhuri Devi) and AIR 1951 SC 120 (Sarju Pershad Randeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and others) the Appellate court has to bear in mind that it did not have opportunity of seeing the witness and to know their demeanor. It is a rule of practice when there is conflict of oral evidence of any matter and the decision of the lower court hinges upon credibility of witnesses unless there is something to indicate that a special feature has escaped notice of the trial judge, Appellate court should not lightly interfere with the findings of the trial Judge. Demonstrably, there is no perversity in the Judgment of the trial court or some special feature escaping notice of trial court which has warranted interference by the Appellate court. Upon appreciation of oral evidence when the learned trial Judge has upheld execution of Ex.A1 sale deed, lower Appellate court was not justified in interfering with the findings of trial court. 121. Yet another substantial question of law raised is the question of limitation. Ex.A2 agreement was dated 06.06.1986. Ex.A1 sale deed by Subbarayan was executed on 12.02.1987. During the cross examination, Plaintiff appears to have stated that Defendant who accompanied Subbarayan had refused to execute the sale deed and that only Subbarayan had performed is part of contract by executing Ex.A-1 sale deed. Cross examination of P.W.1 reads as under:- 122. The learned Appellate Judge calculated the period of limitation from Ex.A1 sale deed (12.02.1987) and held that suit filed on 21.03.1990 was barred by limitation. Pointing out the above answers elicited during the cross examination, Mr. R. Margabandhu, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that Plaintiff had notice of refusal to perform the contract even on 12.02.1987 and suit filed on 21.03.1990 is barred by limitation and the lower Appellate court was right in holding that Plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation. 123. Learned counsel for Appellant has drawn attention of the court to the evidence of D.W.1 to the effect that D.W.1 was not aware of Ex.A1 sale deed dated 12.02.1987 and that it was not executed in his presence and that Defendant did not appear before Sub Registrar on that date. Even going by the evidence of Defendant, it cannot be said that Plaintiff had notice of refusal of performance. 24. Even going by the evidence of Defendant, it cannot be said that Plaintiff had notice of refusal of performance. 24. Limitation is three years for a suit for Specific Performance and under the first part the period of limitation starts from the date fixed for the performance. On the contrary in the absence of a date fixed for performance of the contract, the time does not start to run until there has been demand and refusal and date commences from the date when the Plaintiff got the notice of refusal. 25. Answers elicited from P.W.1 during cross examination extracted in Para-20 are only casual answers elicited during cross examination. "Notice" implies knowledge and this knowledge comes from direct perception or from inference reasonably arising out of several facts and circumstances. Defendant is none other than the paternal uncle of Plaintiff and therefore, Plaintiff would have quite naturally waited for his paternal uncle to perform his part of contract. Assuming that earlier there was any refusal by the Defendant to execute sale deed, it cannot be said that it would constitute cause of action so as to run limitation. 26. On noticing that Defendant had not turned up for execution of sale deed, Plaintiff had issued Ex.A3-legal notice on 14.03.1987. Defendant had sent reply Ex.A4 on 27.03.1987 denying sale agreement and refusing to perform his part of contract. As rightly held by the trial court, only then Plaintiff can be said to have notice of refusal of performance. Suit filed on 21.03.1990 is well within the period of three years from the date of refusal of performance. 27. In Ex.A2 no specific date was fixed when sale deed was to be executed. So limitation would run from the date of notice of refusal of specific performance by the vendor and not from the date fixed in the agreement. So suit for specific performance of the contract for sale filed within three years from the date of notice of refusal is within time. 28. The learned Appellate Judge erred in saying that the period of limitation started from Ex.A1 sale deed i.e. 12.02.1987. The learned Appellate Judge also erred in observing that Sec.3 of Limitation Act will apply and that suit is barred by limitation. 29. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, trial court rightly upheld Ex.A1 sale deed. 28. The learned Appellate Judge erred in saying that the period of limitation started from Ex.A1 sale deed i.e. 12.02.1987. The learned Appellate Judge also erred in observing that Sec.3 of Limitation Act will apply and that suit is barred by limitation. 29. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, trial court rightly upheld Ex.A1 sale deed. Findings of the lower Appellate court are vitiated by non-consideration of evidence and the same is liable to be set aside. Upon appreciation of evidence and conduct of parties trial court has rightly granted Specific Performance in respect of half share. In the absence of any cross objection before the first Appellate court by Plaintiff, there is no other alternative excepting to confirm the findings of the trial court in granting decree for Specific Performance to the limited extent of half share in the suit property. 30. In the result, "Judgment of the lower Appellate court in A.S.No.1/1995 dated 210. 1997 on the file of the Sub-Court, Vellore is set aside and this Second Appeal is allowed. Judgment of the trial court in O.S. No.415/1990 dated 27.09.1994 on the file of District Munsif, Vellore is confirmed. "C.M.P.No.5040/1998 is closed. "C.M.P.No.5041/1998 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.