Judgment :- This appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 19.04.1991 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mayiladuthurai in dismissing the suit in O.S.No.68 of 1986, which was filed by the plaintiffs as against the defendants. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. This appeal is directed only relating to item No.3 of the suit property and hence, the facts relating to item Nos.1 and 2 are not set out here under. 3. Broadly but briefly, the case of the plaintiff as stood exposited from the plaint could be portrayed thus: Three items of immovable properties described in the schedule of the plaint originally belonged to one Mohammed Ibrahim. He had two wives by name Rohayya Ammal and Sultan Beevi. Rohayya Ammal had one daughter by name Sabiya Ammal whose children are D1 Sultan Abdul Khadar and D2 her daughter Subedha Beevi. The said Mohammed Ibrahim through his first wife Sultan Beevi had two daughters by name Asiya Ammal and Mariam Beevi. Asiya Ammal had one son by name Badruzamane who, in turn had three children viz., the plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 through his wife, the first plaintiff. The said Asiya Ammal was entitled to 3588/5760 shares in the suit properties. Badruzamane as the only son of Ayisa Ammal inherited her share. On his death on 07.08.1983, the plaintiffs as his legal representatives entitled to the same 3588/5760 shares in the suit properties. Even though Badruzmane took steps to get the suit properties partitioned amicably, the defendants did not came forward to agree for such proposal. After exchange of notices, the suit has come to be filed. 4. Per contra, denying and refuting, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, D1 filed the written statement, which was adopted by the second defendant with the averments, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: The description of the properties in the schedule of the plaint is not correct. The said Asiya Ammal during her life time executed the release deed in respect of the third item of the suit property, as per Ex.B5 in favour of Sabiya Ammal, the mother of the defendants 1 and 2. The said Sabiya Ammal in turn executed Ex.B6 dated 112. 1974 settling the said third item of the suit property in favour of D1. The said Sabiya Ammal in turn executed Ex.B6 dated 112. 1974 settling the said third item of the suit property in favour of D1. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During the trial, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A12 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 to B8 were marked. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 6. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellants/plaintiffs preferred this appeal on the following grounds, the warp and woof of them, would run thus: 1. The trial court failed to note the actual share of Asiya Ammal in the third item of the suit properties. 2. The trial court erroneously held that Ex.B5 is the one, duly executed by Asiya Ammal. 3. The evidence of DW2 should not have been relied on by the trial Court. 4. Without deciding the entitlement of Sabiya Ammal and Asiya Ammal in respect of the third item of the suit property the trial court passed the judgment. 5. Sabiya Ammal had no right to execute the Settlement deed as per Ex.B6. 6. The trial court failed to hold that the plaintiffs and the defendants are in joint possession of the third item of the suit properties. 7. The trial court erroneously held that the suit was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the appellants prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and for decreeing the suit as prayed for relating to the third item of the suit properties. 7. The points for consideration are as to:- 1. Whether the third item of the suit properties originally belonged to Mohammed Ibrahim. If not, how the third item was treated by Asiya Ammal and Sabiya Ammal? 2. Whether Ex.B5 was duly executed by Asiya Ammal in favour of Sabiya ammal? 3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation? 4. Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial court. 8. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. 9. 2. Whether Ex.B5 was duly executed by Asiya Ammal in favour of Sabiya ammal? 3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation? 4. Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial court. 8. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. 9. A bare perusal of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the learned counsel who appeared for the plaintiffs made a supine submission before the trial Court to the effect that success or failure of the plaintiffs cause was depending upon as to whether Ex.B5 was a genuine document or not. In para 6 of the lower court judgment, the learned Judge recorded so. Accordingly, the learned Judge proceeded to analyse the evidence and give a finding that Ex.B5 was duly executed by Asiya Ammal in favour of Sabiya Ammal in releasing the formers half share in the third item of the suit properties in favour of the latter on receipt of consideration of Rs.2000/-. The lower court also placing reliance on the deposition of DW2, the scribe and also one of the attesting witnesses of Ex.B5, held that Ex.B5 was duly executed by the executant Asiya Ammal in favour of Sabiya Ammal. 10. The deposition of DW2 would amply make the point clear that it was he who scribed Ex.B5 and also endorsed to the effect that Ex.B5 was written and attested by him. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the recent decision of the Honble Apex Court reported in 2006 (2) LW 658 (Pentakota Satyanarayana & others v. Pentakota Seetharatnam). An excerpt from it would run thus: "26. In the instant case, the propounders were called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated above. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the propounders themselves took a prominent part in the execution of the Will, which confer on them substantial benefits. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated above. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the propounders themselves took a prominent part in the execution of the Will, which confer on them substantial benefits. In the instant case, the propounders who were required to remove the said suspicion have let in clear and satisfactory evidence. In the instant case, there was unequivocal admission of the Will in the written statement filed by P. Srirammurthy. In his written statement, he has specifically averred that he had executed the Will and also described the appellants as his sons and Alla Kantamma as his wife as the admission was found in the pleadings. The case of the appellants cannot be thrown out. As already noticed, the first defendant has specifically pleaded that he had executed a Will in the year 1980 and such admissions cannot be easily brushed aside. However, the testator could not be examined as he was not alive at the time of trial. All the witnesses deposed that they had signed as identifying witnesses and that the testator was in sound disposition of mind. Thus, in our opinion, the appellants have discharged their burden and established that the Will in question was executed by Srirammurthy and Ex. B-9 was his last Will. It is true that registration of the Will does not dispense with the need of proving, execution and attestation of a document which is required by law to be proved in the manner as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The Registrar has made the following particulars on Ex. B-9 which was admitted to registration, namely, the date, hour and place of presentation of the document for registration, the signature of the person admitting the execution of the Will and the signatures of the identifying witnesses. The document also contains the signatures of the attesting witnesses and the scribe. Such particulars are required to be endorsed by the Registrar along with his signature and date of document. A presumption by a reference to Section 114 of the Evidence Act shall arise to the effect that particulars contained in the endorsement of registration were regularly and duly performed and are correctly recorded. Such particulars are required to be endorsed by the Registrar along with his signature and date of document. A presumption by a reference to Section 114 of the Evidence Act shall arise to the effect that particulars contained in the endorsement of registration were regularly and duly performed and are correctly recorded. In our opinion, the burden of proof to prove the Will has been duly and satisfactorily discharged by the appellants. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and execution of the Will in the manner contemplated by law. In such circumstances, the onus shifts to the contestant opposing the Will to bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus shifts back on the propounder to satisfy the court affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the Will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same." 11. The excerpt of the precedent cited supra would indicate that the propounder of the registered Will would have the additional benefit of pointing out that it is a registered Will and thereby canvass his plea that the Will is a genuine one. In the case of registered release deed, it is much more. The illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, would be in support of the genuineness of the Ex.B5. Despite the plaintiffs having put in knowledge of the execution of such release deed by Asiya Ammal in favour of Sabiya Ammal during the exchange of pre notices, they have not chosen to seek for cancellation of such deed. DW2, who had no axe to grind in the matter, would narrate to the effect that even though he did not accompany the executrix to the Sub Registrars Office for getting the Ex.B5 Will Registered nonetheless, he scribed it and decided it as one of the attesting witnesses. During trial, it appears the contention of the plaintiffs was that the thumb impression of Asiya Ammal was obtained by misrepresentation, but that was not the case in their plaint or in the pre suit exchange of notices also. It is also not their plea that doctrine of nonest factum was attracted as against Ex.B5 on the ground that the executrix was a pardha nation lady. It is also not their plea that doctrine of nonest factum was attracted as against Ex.B5 on the ground that the executrix was a pardha nation lady. It appears during trial, such a plea also was sought to be put forth on the side of the plaintiffs. These are all contentious pleas, which ought to have been pleaded. 12. It is a trite proposition that any amount of evidence without pleadings should be eschewed. Hence, in these circumstances, I could see no reason to disbelieve the document Ex.B5, which was executed by Asiya Ammal in favour of Sabiya Ammal. 13. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the suit property originally belonged to Mohammed Ibrahim, which they failed to prove by adducing any documentary evidence, much less any reliable evidence. On the other hand, the defendants placed reliance on Ex.B3, the patta, (Ex.B4 is the photocopy of it), which would demonstrate that the third item of the suit properties stood in the name of Sabiya Ammal as her own property even as early as in the year 1922, whereas the litigation started at the instance of Badruzmane during the year 1974 only. .14. It is therefore clear that Ex.B3 emerged at a time when this sort of dispute was not in contemplation. Even though the plaintiffs contended that Mohammed Ibrahim earned enormous income in Penang (Malaysia) and acquired properties from out of his income, nevertheless there is no exiguous or modicum of evidence that item No.3 was purchased by Mohammed Ibrahim. Had really Mohammed Ibrahim from out of his income purchased the third item of the suit property necessarily, there should be a registered sale deed. The very fact that patta is available in the name of Sabiya Ammal would speak volumes that by long enjoyment, she became owner of the third item of the suit properties. Once the case of the plaintiffs that the third item of the suit properties belonged to Mohammed Ibrahim, could not be proved, as a sequela the entire edifice of the case of the plaintiffs crumbles to the ground, for the reason that the defendants have on the contrary clearly proved that the property belonged to Asiya Ammal and she during her life time validly executed Ex.B5. If at all the plaintiffs could prove that the third item of the suit properties belonged to Mohammed Ibrahim and that he died intestate, the question of Badruzmane, the grand son and his descendants and legal representatives claiming right over it would arise. But, in this case, since the plaintiffs could not prove that the property belonged to Mohammed Ibrahim, their entire case of the plaintiffs fails. 15. I am fully aware of the legal position that the documents to which the plaintiffs are not parties could be ignored by them. But this is not a case of that nature. To the risk of repetition, without being tautologous, I would reiterate that had the plaintiffs succeeded in proving that the third item of the suit properties belonged to Mohammed Ibrahim, then they could ignore Ex.B5 without asking for a prayer to get it set aside and simply assert their legal heir ship right over the third item of the suit properties. But, in this case, inasmuch as the very owner of the third item of the suit properties herself had validly alienated her right and in the absence of any prayer to get such a deed set aside, the question of the plaintiffs claiming right over the third item of the suit properties has become a well-nigh impossibility. 16. The learned counsel for the defendants would draw the attention of this Court to para No.7 of Ex.B7, the plaint in the earlier suit, which would indicate that the third item of the suit properties herein, which was also the third item therein and argue appropriately and appositely that the possession of Sabiyammal over the third item of the suit properties, is unassailable and indubitable. A fortiori, the said evidence in fact would buttress and fortify the contention of the defendants that Ex.B5 was acted upon. Fait accompli, as it was that the third item of the suit properties was given in possession in favour of Sabiya Ammal. .17. Accordingly, these two points are decided in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiffs. .Point No.3: 18. This point is relating to limitation. In view of the decision rendered under the aforesaid points that the plaintiffs have not proved their right to suit property, this plea of limitation as raised by the defendants becomes insignificant. .17. Accordingly, these two points are decided in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiffs. .Point No.3: 18. This point is relating to limitation. In view of the decision rendered under the aforesaid points that the plaintiffs have not proved their right to suit property, this plea of limitation as raised by the defendants becomes insignificant. Even then, for the purpose of comprehensively deciding this appeal, I would like to advert to a few facts and the evidence available. No doubt as revealed by Ex.B7, the copy of the OP No.4 of 1974 filed in Sub Judges Court, Mayiladuthurai would reveal that the said Badruzmane during his life time attempted to file the suit Informa Pauperis against the said Sabiya Ammal and two others seeking partition. The evidence of record, to wit, the deposition of PW1, would exemplify that the petitioner therein did not pursue the matter further as the Court directed him to pay Court fees, which he did not do so. However, one crucial fact should be taken into consideration that here the said Baduruzmane is not a party as he died and as such his wife and children are the parties here. In fact, in stricto sensu, the plaintiffs herein ought to have been cited as parties in the earlier suit, if at all the said Baduruzmane was serious in prosecuting the said case. Be that as it may, technically speaking, the said dismissal of the earlier OP would not operate either as res judicata or would pave the way for the defendants herein to plead successfully the limitation as against the plaintiffs. My mind is redolent with the trite proposition of law that the plaintiffs have to stand or fall on their own pleadings. As per their own pleadings they claim to be in joint possession and that they sort for partition but, in this case they failed to prove their case. In such a case, the question of limitation plea would not arise. Accordingly, this point is decided. 19. The ratiocination adhered to in deciding the aforesaid points would make me to see no infirmity in the ultimate dismissal of the original suit by the trial Court, which au curante with facts and law passed the judgment and decree. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial Court are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. 19. The ratiocination adhered to in deciding the aforesaid points would make me to see no infirmity in the ultimate dismissal of the original suit by the trial Court, which au curante with facts and law passed the judgment and decree. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial Court are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.