Judgment :- Heard Mr. S. Periyasami, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and G. Sankaran, learned Special Government Pleader taking notice for the respondents 1 to 3 and perused the records. 2. The impugned order dated 26. 2007 is an order placing the petitioner under suspension pending further framing of charge-sheet and enquiry. It is seen from the said impugned order that there was an inspection conducted in the Panchayat on 26. 2007 and 26. 2007. The Tahsildar, Pandalur, seized Cash Books and cheques and thereafter a report was sent by the Block Development Officer, Gudalur to the Collector. 3. It was the allegation against the petitioner that she, being the Panchayat Assistant, ignoring the directions, did not get the cheques signed by the President after preparing necessary bills and vouchers and got blank cheques signed. However, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that he is not against the charge being framed against the petitioner but the jurisdiction of the authority, viz., respondent, to place her under suspension. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, by G.O. Ms. No. 175 Rural Development and Panchayat Department dated 012. 2006, the part-time Panchayat Assistants have been brought under time scale of pay and in the Annexure to the said G.O., it is stated that such a Panchayat Assistant should function under the control of the executive authority of the Panchayat, viz., Panchayat President. Inasmuch the disciplinary power vests on the executive authority of the Panchayat in terms of Section 106 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 [for short, Act], any suspension by any other person is contrary to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the order should be quashed solely on the ground of jurisdiction. 4. A counter affidavit dated 28. 2007 has been filed by the third respondent and in paragraph 8, it is stated that since the respondent is the Inspector of Panchayat, he has jurisdiction to suspend any of his subordinate staff as and when it is warranted in public interest. 5. No doubt, it is true that in terms of the Act, it is the Panchayat President, who is the executive authority and who can take disciplinary action against the staff of the Panchayat. The question that arises for consideration is whether the higher officer, viz., District Collector (designated as Inspector of Panchayat) is also empowered to suspend. 6. 5. No doubt, it is true that in terms of the Act, it is the Panchayat President, who is the executive authority and who can take disciplinary action against the staff of the Panchayat. The question that arises for consideration is whether the higher officer, viz., District Collector (designated as Inspector of Panchayat) is also empowered to suspend. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 (2) SCC 474 [Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others]. In that case, the question that arose was whether the dismissal can be imposed by an appellate authority thereby denying the right of appeal to the charged officer. The relevant passages found in paragraphs 5 and 6 may be usefully extracted below: Para 5: ".... However, since the action against him was taken by the Deputy General Manager although the Divisional Manager and AGM (Personnel) were available for taking the action, the appellant was denied the right of an appeal and also the right of a review which lay only against the appellate order. The impugned order of dismissal passed by the Bank, therefore, suffers from an inherent defect." Para 6: ".... Although the argument looks attractive at first sight, its weakness lies in the fact that it tries to place the Rules/Regulations which provide no appeal on par with the Rules/Regulations where appeal is provided. It is true that when an authority higher than the disciplinary authority itself imposes the punishment, the order of punishment suffers from no illegality when no appeal is provided to such authority. However, when an appeal is provided to the higher authority concerned against the order of the disciplinary authority or of a lower authority and the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal which is a substantive right given to him by the Rules/Regulations. An employee cannot be deprived of his substantive right." 7. But, in the present case, we are not concerned with the order of punishment. It is only suspension pending enquiry. An employee cannot be deprived of his substantive right." 7. But, in the present case, we are not concerned with the order of punishment. It is only suspension pending enquiry. Therefore, the same logic cannot be made applicable and the Inspector of Panchayts cannot be a mute spectator when series of complaints were made on the basis of spot inspection and it is always open to him to order for suspending a Panchayat servant being the controlling authority of the Panchayat. 8. The learned counsel relied upon the Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1985 (1) SLJ 20 [Ram Narain Tewari v. Joint General Manager (Administration Personnel) and another]. There, the question that arose before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was whether there was any delegation of power in favour of a Joint General Manager of the State Road Transport Corporation and it was held that no delegation has been given in his favour for taking action. In the present case, this Court is not dealing with the case of delegation where the power of the Inspector of the Panchayat can be invoked in placing a Panchayat servant under suspension pending enquiry. 9. The learned counsel also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2007 (6) M.L.J. 36 [State of Tamil Nadu v. B. Jothi Naidu]. That case relates to the vires of Rule 2(e) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Building Rules 1997 and in that context, this Court held that the Panchayat President is the executive authority to sanction building plan and that power cannot be usurped by the Commissioner of the Panchayat Union in the light of Article 243-G of the Constitution of India. That was not a case of any disciplinary action taken by the employer. 10. In service jurisprudence, unless the suspension is made by an authority, who has totally no jurisdiction, the Court cannot interfere with the order of suspension. Further, it is not a case as if the suspension has been made mala fide or without any materials and a perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that the suspension was based upon an inspection and materials gathered. Even otherwise, it is not as if the petitioner has no remedy. He can always appeal to the District Collector to modify his order. Even otherwise, it is not as if the petitioner has no remedy. He can always appeal to the District Collector to modify his order. The Collector, being the Inspector of Panchayat, is empowered to exercise emergency powers under Section 203 of the Act. Further, under Section 204 of the Act, he has also been vested with the power to take action in default of a Village Panchayat or its President or its executive authority. 11. Under the above circumstances, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is misconceived and devoid of merits. Accordingly, the same will stand dismissed. No costs. Interim stay already granted by this Court will stand vacated and the Miscellaneous Petition is closed.