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2008 DIGILAW 29 (GAU)

Anonda Chandra Saikia v. Madhu Ram Saikia

2008-01-09

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2008
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. By this Second Appeal the appellant/plaintiff is assailing the concurrent finding of the facts by the learned Trial Court and First Appellate Court that the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant are the joint purchasers of the suit land under the Registered Sale Deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) from one Smti Smiya Donye Nara at a considerable amount of Rs. 4000/- (Four thousand) only and accordingly the appellant/plaintiff is not the sole owner of the suit land. 2. The substantial questions of law formulated for decision in the present Second Appeal are : (1) Whether the proof of oral agreement between the parties of one side of an instrument is barred under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act? (2) Whether the decree declaring right, title and interest of the defendant can be passed without a counter claim and on the basis of the revenue records? (3) Whether the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court is inconformity with the provision of order 41, Rule 31 of CPC as all the issues have not been discussed and decided? 3. Heard Mr. B.C. Das, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. M.K. Mishra for the appellant/plaintiff. None appears for the respondent/defendant. 4. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, of the appellant/plaintiff are that the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant are brothers and originally from village Rajbari Kachikata, Mouza - Bihpuria. The appellant/plaintiff has been serving as a Government servant since 1972. The respondent/defendant lives at North Lakhimpur and has been doing an ordinary job. The appellant/plaintiff periodically sent money to the respondent/defendant in order to purchase land and houses etc. and sometime, the appellant/plaintiff also personally gave money to the respondent/defendant. At one time the respondent/defendant had no means of earning and the appellant/plaintiff maintained him during that time. 5. On learning that the original owner of the suit land measuring 1K, 1 OLs covered by Dag No. 497 of P.P. No. 5, North Lakhimpur Town, Part-1, Mouza - Lakhimpur was willing to sell the same, the appellant/plaintiff withdrew money from Shillong Post Office on 26.3.75 and came to Lakhimpur to purchase the suit land. On 27.3.75 the appellant/plaintiff made payment of Rs. 8000/- (Eight thousand) only to the owner of the suit land, Smti Amiya Donye Nara, retired Government employee for purchasing the suit land in presence of the respondent/defendant and one 'Master'. On 27.3.75 the appellant/plaintiff made payment of Rs. 8000/- (Eight thousand) only to the owner of the suit land, Smti Amiya Donye Nara, retired Government employee for purchasing the suit land in presence of the respondent/defendant and one 'Master'. Since the owner of the Suit land was ill at that time, the appellant/plaintiff asked the respondent/defendant to get the deed signed by the owner of the suit land. For that purpose, the appellant/plaintiff also gave a sum of Rs. 1000/- (One thousand) and also for minor repairs of the house standing on the suit land to the respondent/defendant. After making such payment, the appellant/plaintiff returned to his place of work i.e. at Shillong as he has exhausted the learned leave in his credit and had come only on four days casual leave. The appellant/plaintiff had no reason to disbelieve the respondent/defendant as the respondent/defendant is his own brother. 6. Later on, the respondent/defendant informed the appellant/plaintiff that the deed for purchase of the suit land with the house standing thereon had been executed and as the appellant/plaintiff had full trust on the respondent/defendant, the appellant/plaintiff did not have any reason to ascertain about the execution of the said deed for purchase of the suit land with the house standing thereon from others. 7. In June, 1985, the respondent / defendant issued a registered notice to the appellant / plaintiff claiming his share on the suit land. On receipt of the said notice, the appellant / plaintiff came over to North Lakhimpur and confronted the respondent/defendant. On such confrontation the respondent / defendant informed the appellant/plaintiff that he had been incited by his wife to demand share of the suit land and promised that he would not demand his share in future. Taking the words of the respondent/defendant, the appellant/ plaintiff did not give any reply to the said notice. 8. Later on, the respondent/defendant filed a partition suit in respect of the suit land. Thereafter the appellant/plaintiff took the copy of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3). On perusal of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75(Ext. 3) and the Jamabandi of the suit land the appellant/plaintiff realized that the suit land had been purchased jointly by the appellant/plaintiff and respondent/defendant. It was also learnt that the mutation of the suit land was made jointly in the names of the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant. 9. On perusal of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75(Ext. 3) and the Jamabandi of the suit land the appellant/plaintiff realized that the suit land had been purchased jointly by the appellant/plaintiff and respondent/defendant. It was also learnt that the mutation of the suit land was made jointly in the names of the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant. 9. It is the further pleaded case of the appellant/plaintiff that the respondent/defendant has no right or title over the suit land as the same was purchased at the considerable amount of Rs. 8000/- (Eight thousand) by the appellant/plaintiff alone. Accordingly, the appellant/plaintiff filed the Title Suit No. 23/86 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur for the reliefs : 1. a decree for declaring that the respondent/defendant has/had no right, title and interest in the suit land and that the appellant/plaintiff alone has the title in respect of the suit land. 10. The respondent/defendant by filing written statement specifically denied the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the appellant/ plaintiff had alone purchased the suit land from the owner of the suit land, Smti Amiya Donye Nara at a considerable amount of Rs. 8000/- (Eight thousand). The respondent/defendant also pleaded in his written statement that the original owner of the suit land, Smti Amiya Donye Nara used to love the respondent/defendant as her own son. During her old age the respondent/defendant helped her in all possible manners. The suit land was jointly purchased by the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant. As the appellant/ plaintiff had illegally tried to deprive the share of the respondent/defendant in respect of the suit land, the respondent/defendant served the pleader notice upon the appellant/plaintiff so that the petition of the suit land could be affected on mutual basis, but in spite of receiving such notice, the appellant/plaintiff preferred to keep mum. 11. The further case of the respondent/defendant is that since the sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) is a registered document which is required by law to be reduced in the form of a document, the appellant/plaintiff could not challenge the contents of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) by oral statement because of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and also that the appellant/plaintiff could only challenge the registered sale deed dated 3.4/75 (Ext. 3) on the ground of fraud, illegality etc and also that the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) cannot be acted upon as a document for transferring the suit land. It is also the further case of the respondent/defendant that as the appellant/plaintiff had taken the said registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) as a document for transferring the suit land, he cannot deny or contradict and/or vary the contents of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) by oral evidence/statement. 12. The learned trial court after full dress trial passed the judgment and decree dated 22.12.98 for dismissing the Title Suit No. 23/86 with the finding that since Ext. 3 registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 on its face discloses is that the suit land was purchased jointly by the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant and no ambiguity is found in the contents of the documents and also pursuant to the said sale transaction the names of both the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant had been mutated in respect of the suit land by the revenue authority, the appellant/plaintiff has miserably failed to lead any cogent evidence to show that he alone purchased the suit land and that the respondent/defendant had inducted his name as one of the purchasers of the suit land in the registered sale deed (Ext. 3) taking advantage of absence of the appellant/plaintiff. As such, the appellant/plaintiff has no sole right over the suit land and that both the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant have joint right, title and interest over the suit land as such the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled to get the decree of declaration that the respondent/defendant has no right, title and interest over the suit land as prayed for in the plaint. 13. Being aggrieved, by the said judgment and decree of the learned trial court dismissing the Title Suit No. 23/86, the appellant/ plaintiff preferred an appeal being No. T. A. 1/99 in the court of the learned District Judge, North Lakhimpur. The learned District Judge after conscious application of mind not only to the respective pleadings of the parties but also the oral evidence and documentary evidence of both the parties had passed the judgment and decree dated 22.12.98 dismissing the appeal being T.A. No. 1/99. 14. The learned District Judge after conscious application of mind not only to the respective pleadings of the parties but also the oral evidence and documentary evidence of both the parties had passed the judgment and decree dated 22.12.98 dismissing the appeal being T.A. No. 1/99. 14. The learned District Judge while dismissing the T.A. No 1/99 by impugned judgment and decree dated 22.12.98 also made a finding that since the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) is a document required to be reduced to the form of a document and duly registered, the appellant/plaintiff could not challenge the contents of the registered sale deed by oral statement/evidence because of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Further the learned District Judge also made a finding that the original owner Smti Amiya Donye Nara of the suit land to whom the appellant/plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs. 8000/-(Eight thousand) for purchasing the suit land ought to have been examined as his witness to substantiate his case. No sensible or prudent man can accept that the original owner Smti Amiya Donye Nara who is a literate and retired employee would execute the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) at the instance of the respondent/defendant blindly. 15. On perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, North Lakhimpur, it is clear that the first appellate court had shown the conscious application of mind and the record findings supported by reasons. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [2001] 251 ITR 84 (SC) held that the first appellate court being a final court of fact, pure findings of fact by the first appellate court shall immune from challenging before the High Court in Second Appeal. 16. The Apex Court in Surain Singh (dead) by LRs and Ors. v. Mehenga (dead) by LRs. [1996] 1 SCR 1152 held that interference by the High Court in a Second Appeal with the findings of fact would be when there is diverse findings of fact recorded by the learned trial court and the first appellate court. In the present case there is no diverse findings of fact by the learned trial court and the first appellate court. In the present case there is no diverse findings of fact by the learned trial court and the first appellate court. In other words, there is concurrent findings of fact by the learned trial court and the first appellate court that the suit land was jointly purchased by the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant under a registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) at a consideration amount of Rs. 4,000/- (Four thousand) only. 17. Interference with the concurrent finding of fact by this Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC i.e. in Second Appeal should be only in exceptional circumstance where the learned courts below failed to consider the vital evidence and the learned courts below also relied upon inadmissible evidence. 18. The Apex Court in Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lal AIR 1999 SC 3325 held that the concurrent finding of facts cannot be interfered with merely because there are lack of details in the pleading and the concurrent finding of facts can be interfered with when there is perversity in the finding of facts or in other words finding of facts are based on no evidence. 19. The Apex Court in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal AIR 2006 SC 2234 considered the circumstances under which the High Court in a Second Appeal interfered with the concurrent findings of facts. Paras 13, 19 and 24 (iii) of SCC in Hero Vinoth (Minor)(supra) reads as follows : Para 13. Though as rightly contended by learned Counsel for the appellant the scope for interference with concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is very limited, and reappreciation of evidence is not permissible (sic except) where the trial court and/or the first appellate court misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law or placed the onus on the wrong party certainly there is a scope for interference under Section 100 CPC after formulating a substantial question of law. Para 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. Para 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. Para 24(iii). The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts below have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the findings. 20. For deciding the substantial question of law formulated in the present Second Appeal, it would be apt to quote the Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 91. 20. For deciding the substantial question of law formulated in the present Second Appeal, it would be apt to quote the Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained. Exception 1--When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2--Wills (admitted to probate in (India) may be proved by the probate. Explanation 1--This Section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained in more documents than one. Explanation 2--Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.--The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact. Section 92. Explanation 2--Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.--The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact. Section 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement--When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms : Proviso (1)--Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or other relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, (want or failure) of consideration, or mistake in fact of law : Proviso (2)--The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the decree of formality of the document : Proviso (3)--The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved : Proviso (4)--The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents : Proviso (5)--Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved : Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract : Proviso (6)-Any act may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. 21. 21. On bare perusal of the plaint and the pleaded case of the appellant/plaintiff, it is clear that the pleaded case of the appellant/plaintiff is that the suit land was purchased at a considerable amount of Rs. 8000/- (Eight thousand). But on perusal of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) it is crystal clear that the suit land was purchased at a considerable amount of Rs. 4000/- (Four thousand). Therefore, there is variance between the pleadings of the case of the appellant/plaintiff and proof. Ordinary rule of law is that evidence should be only on plea properly raised and not in contradiction of the plea. The party cannot be allowed to adduce evidence for setting up a case inconsistent with one alleged in the pleading. Reference [1968] 3 SCR 111 Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand. A party is expected and is bound to prove the case as alleged by him and the party will not be allowed to succeed on a case nor set up by him. Ref. AIR 1972 SC 1274 Central Bank of India Limited v. Hari Prasad Man and AIR 1961 SC 1374 Saliq Ram v. Munshi Ram. Further a party cannot be allowed at the trial to change his case or set up a case inconsistent with what he as alleged in his pleading except by way of amendment of the pleading under Order 6, Rule 17. Only on this score, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the appellant/plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. Over and above, Smt. Amiya Donye Nara who would be the best person to support the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the appellant/plaintiff had alone purchased the suit land at the consideration amount of Rs. 8000/- (Eight thousand) was neither produced as witness (PW) neither prayed the Trial Court to issue notice to her for examining as witness. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that withholding ofbest or/relevant evidence shall have adverse inference. Ref. 2006 CriLJ 4598 State Inspector of Police, Visakhapatnam v. Surya Sankaram Karri and 2006 CriLJ 2931 Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. State of T.N. Therefore, there shall be adverse inference against the appellant/plaintiff for not producing the best witness i.e. Smt. Amiya Donye Nara for proving his case. 22. Mr. Ref. 2006 CriLJ 4598 State Inspector of Police, Visakhapatnam v. Surya Sankaram Karri and 2006 CriLJ 2931 Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. State of T.N. Therefore, there shall be adverse inference against the appellant/plaintiff for not producing the best witness i.e. Smt. Amiya Donye Nara for proving his case. 22. Mr. B.C. Das, learned Senior counsel strenuously submitted that what the Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act bar are that by leading oral evidence the terms and conditions recorded in the registered document between the parties cannot be contradicted or varied and as such there is no bar under the said sections to clarify the terms and conditions between one side of the party in the written document by leading oral evidence. In support of his case, the learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decisions of the Madras High Court (1) in Ramayya Chetti v. Mannaru Chetti AIR 1930 Mad 590 . (2) Decision of the Patna High Court in Lakshmana Sahu v. St. Simachala Patar AIR 1941 Pat 211 and Decision of the Madras High Court in Parattakath Mayan and Ors. v. Palakkotanteakatte AIR 1949 Mad 852. 23. The Apex Court in Bai Hira Devi and Ors. v. Official Assignee of Bombay [1958] 1 SCR 1384, held that Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid of Section 91. The two sections, however, differ in some material particulars, Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents, which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike. Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. Para No. 5 of AIR in Bai Hira Devi and Ors. (supra) read as follows : Para 5, Section 92 excludes the evidence of oral agreements and it applies to cases where the terms of contracts, grants or other dispositions of property have been approved by themselves under Section 91, in other words, it is after the document has been produced to prove its terms under Section 91 that the provisions of excluding of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. The application of this rule is limited to cases as between parties to the instrument or their representatives in interest. There are six provisions to this section with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. It would be noticed that Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid of Section 92 and Section 92 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 91. Since Section 92 excludes the admission of oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the document properly proved under Section 91, it may be said that it makes the proof of the document conclusive of its contents. Like Section 91, Section 92 also can be said to be based on the best evidence rule. The two sections, however, differ in some material particulars. Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike. Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. Section 91lays down the rule of universal application and is not confined to the executant or executants of the documents. Section 92, on the other hand, applies only between the parties to the instrument or their representatives in interest. There is no doubt that Section 92 does not apply to strangers who are not bound or affected by the terms of the document. Persons other than those who are parties to the document are not precluded from giving extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of the document. It is only where a question arises about the effect of the document as between the parties or their representatives in interest that the rule enunciated by Section 92 about the exclusion of oral agreement can be invoked. This position of Section 99 itself. Section 99 provides that persons who are not parties to a document or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document. This position of Section 99 itself. Section 99 provides that persons who are not parties to a document or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document. Though it is only variation which is specifically mentioned in Section 99, there can be no doubt that the third party's right to lead evidence which is recognized by Section 99 would include a right to lead evidence not only to vary the terms of the document, but to contradict the said terms or to add to or subtract from them. If that be the true position, before considering the effect of the provisions of Section 92 in regard to the appellants right to lead oral evidence, it would be necessary to examine whether Section 92 applies at all to the present proceedings between the official assignee who is the respondent and the donees from the insolvent who are the appellants before us. 24. What the Section 91 of Indian Evidence Act prohibit is the admission of oral evidence to vary the terms of a written document and/or oral agreement is a matter which is not covered by Section 91 at all, that is the subject matter of Section 92 and if Section 92 does not apply, there is no reason to exclude evidence about oral agreement solely on the ground that if believed the said evidence may vary the terms of transaction. It is clear that strangers to the documents are out side the scope of Section 92. 25. On conjoint reading of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is the forgone conclusion that Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act are applicable to the present case in hand and also that oral evidence to vary the terms of the document/ instrument i.e. registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 is excluded. Over and above Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only to the parties to the instrument and not to the stranger to the instrument and also that bar U/Section 92 is to oral evidence to disprove the terms of the written contract or/agreement. In the present case in hand as discussed above, the oral evidence on the part of the appellant/plaintiff is only to disprove the terms of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. In the present case in hand as discussed above, the oral evidence on the part of the appellant/plaintiff is only to disprove the terms of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) between the parties on one side of the parties in the sale deed dated 3.4.75 and not to disprove the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) itself. Ref: R. Janakiraman v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, SPE, Madras 2006 CriLJ 1232. As such, the case of the appellant/plaintiff shall confine to the terms and conditions between one side of the parties in the sale deed dated 3.4.75. 26. Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act do not bar the oral evidence to show that the written deeds are not the real transaction between the parties but it was something different. Ref: Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2299 . 27. Keeping in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court as well as the different High Courts in cases discussed above, and also the Proviso (2) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it appears that the oral evidence regarding the terms and conditions amongst the parties on one side of the written agreements/documents is not barred provided the written document is silent about the terms and conditions amongst the parties on one side and also not inconsistent with the terms and conditions between the parties in the said written document. 28. But in the instant case, the appellant/plaintiff had utterly failed to prove the alleged terms and conditions amongst the appellant/plaintiff and respondent/defendant who are on one side of the said registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext. 3) that the appellant/plaintiff alone purchased the suit land from the original owner at a consideration amount of Rs. 8,000/- (Eight thousand) only. 29. For the reasons discussed above, this appeal is devoid of merit and dismissed. Appeal dismissed.