Judgment Samarendra Pratap Singh, J. 1. Heard the parties. The instant revision application is directed against the order dated 25.5.2007 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamui in Case No. l9M/2004 whereby he directed petitioner to pay interim maintenance of Rs. 300/-per month to the minor son of O.P. No. 2 from the date of order, on her application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. 2. The opposite party No. 2, Zinnat Pravin, in her petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. stated that she was married with petitioner in May,2001 and her husband and in-laws kept her well for ten days but thereafter they began to torture her. She, however, remained in her Sasural for five months with a hope that torture would end. In the mean time she became pregnant. But as torture continued unabated she was forced to take shelter at her parents place. At her naihar she gave birth to a male child from her wed lock with petitioner. However, she admitted the factum of divorce. 3. The petitioner entered appearance and filed his written statement. In his written statement he claimed that he has already divorced petitioner on 4.5.2002 by post and on 15.7.2002 through registered deed of Talaknamahe asserted that he paid the amount of Dain Mahr and also maintenance for Iddat period. He however disclaimed the child born as his. He thus stated that as per Muslim Women(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred to as 1986 Act) he would not be liable to pay any further maintenance to his wife O.P. No. 2. He asserted that even assuming the son to be his own no application for payment of maintenance would be maintainable under Section 125 Cr. after enactment of 1986 Act. He claimed that even under 1986 Act maintenance could be paid only upto 2 years from date of birth of a child and not beyond. 4. The main issue in this case are: (i) whether a divorced Muslim woman can prefer an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. for maintenance of her minor child? (ii) Whether a child of divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance only for two years and that too under the provision of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for the brevity 1986 Act) and not under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.? 5. (ii) Whether a child of divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance only for two years and that too under the provision of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for the brevity 1986 Act) and not under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.? 5. As both the issues are inter linked, the same are taken up together for consideration. It would appear from the preamble to 1986 Act that the same has been enacted to protect the right of divorced Muslim woman from the husband. The 1986 Act was enacted as a sequel to the judgment in Mohd. Ahmed Khan V/s. Shah Bano Begum case, AIR 1985 SC 945 . The question of maintenance of children was not involved in the controversy therein. The Act was not enacted to regulate the obligations of a Muslim father to maintain his minor children unable to maintain themselves which continued to be governed by Section 125 of Cr.P.C. It would be useful to quote Section 3(1)(a)(b) of 1986 Act: 3.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to: (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband; (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children. Clause (b) of Section 3 (1) refers to grant of maintenance on the claim of divorced mother on her own behalf for maintaining the children for a period of two years from the date of the birth of the child living with her and presumably is aimed at providing some extra amount to the mother for her nourishment for nursing or taking care of the infant/infants upto a period of two years. Thus, Section 3(1) (b) of the Act, 1986 has nothing to do with the independent right of the child/children of divorced Muslim woman to claim maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. till they become major and as long they satisfy the terms of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. Section 3(1)(b) is in aid to Section 125 of Cr.P.C. 6. The Apex Court in case of Noor Saba Khatoon V/s. Mohd. The Apex Court in case of Noor Saba Khatoon V/s. Mohd. Quasim held that: Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are concerned there is nothing in Section 125 of Cr.P.C. which exempts a Muslim father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not affected by Clause (b) of Section 3 (1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of Section 125 Cr.P.C. to the children only on the ground that they are born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 of Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. 7. The issue in reference also came for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in case of Abdul Mannan V/s. Sairra Khatoon, 2000 2 PLJR 320 . This Court held that Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act does not restrict, control and affect entitlement of minor children even of a divorced Muslim woman. 8. Clause 3 (1) (b) only restricts and confines right of a Muslim woman to claim or receive maintenance for herself and for maintenance of children till the date of 2 years notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. It has nothing to do with the independent right or entitlement of minor children to be maintained by the Muslim father. Both Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and Section 3(1)(b) of 1986 Act operate in two different spheres and cover different situations. The beneficial provision under 1986 Act is in aid and addition to provision of maintenance of Muslim children under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. 9. The wife/or the children who are deprived of umbrella of love and affection of husband/father can never be fully or even adequately compensated in absolute realm. The obligation of a father to maintain his minor children who are living separately or with their divorced mother is being universally recognized by persons belonging to all religions as an aspect of basic human rights, gender and social justice. This beneficial consideration should transcends and obviate all religious faith or beliefs, national or sectarian attitude as well as racial or communal constraints. 10. This beneficial consideration should transcends and obviate all religious faith or beliefs, national or sectarian attitude as well as racial or communal constraints. 10. In view of the discussions made above, both the issues are answered as follows: (i) A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance of her minor children under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is satisfied. (ii) This right is independent of the right of the divorced Muslim woman to seek maintenance for her minor child/ children under Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act for a period of two years from the date of birth of the infant. Now having answered the issues as above, the claim of petitioner regarding the legitimacy of the child may be considered. 11 The petitioner had disputed the legitimacy and the child as not being his own. He submitted that she remained in her sasural only for three days. He submitted that he is a driver and remained mostly in Kolkata earning Rs. 3000/-. Thus, he submitted that minor child of opp. party No. 2 is not entitled to maintenance either under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or under the provisions of the 1986 Act. 12. There is no disagreement to the fact that O.P. No. 2 was married in the year2001.Even as per the petitioners case he gave divorce to O.P. No. 2 on 4.5.2002 and 15.7.2002 which decision he communicated vide post and registered deed of Talaqnama respectively. The trial court found that O.P. No. 2 gave a birth birth to a male child at her naihar much within 290 days of leaving her husband. 13. As per Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act if a child is born during the continuance of valid marriage and within 280 days after dissolution and the mother remaining unmarried, it shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that person. In case in hand no tangible material worth the name has been adduced by the petitioner to counter the claim of O.P. No. 2 regarding birth of child from her wedlock with him. A claim and counter claim regarding legitimacy or otherwise of the child is an issue which requires scrutiny of evidence which ordinarily can be best resolved in a court of civil jurisdiction. 14. A claim and counter claim regarding legitimacy or otherwise of the child is an issue which requires scrutiny of evidence which ordinarily can be best resolved in a court of civil jurisdiction. 14. Thus, finding of the learned Principal Judge that the child is a legitimate issue from the wedlock of the O.P. No. 2 with the petitioner will hold good till the same is upset by a finding in this regard by a competent civil court. I find no material on record of this case to interfere with the above finding regarding the legitimacy of the child. 15. Thus in view of discussion made above this Court holds that the minor child is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and I decline to accept the submission that a minor child of divorced Muslim wife is entitled to maintenance only under Section 3(1)(b) of 1986 Act. The petitioner is directed to pay interim maintenance of Rs. 300/- per month to child of O.P. No. 2 as ordered by Principal Judge. The arrears must be paid within four months. 16. Thus I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamui and, thus, the revision application fails and is dismissed.