JUDGMENT By the Court.—Since the pleadings are complete, as requested by learned Counsel for the parties, this writ petition has been heard and is being decided finally at the admission stage under the Rules of the Court. 2. Aggrieved by the order dated 1.3.2007 whereby the Registrar, Jagadguru Rambhadracharya Viklang Viswavidyalaya, Chitrakoot (hereinafter referred to as the “University”) has informed the petitioner that his services would come to an end on 31.3.2007, the petitioner, Dr. Sushil Kumar Tripathi has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the said order. He has also challenged the order dated 31.3.2007, whereby he was informed that since the post on which he was working has abolished, the petitioner’s services are no more required by the University. He has further sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay him regular salary and arrears with interest and other consequential benefits. 3. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition, as stated in the writ petition, are that the University has been established under U.P. Act No. 32 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) in private sector for providing education to handicapped persons. It imparts higher education namely B.A. and M.A. courses in various subjects like, Philosophy, Hindi, Sanskrit, English, History Culture and Archaeology, Sociology, Drawing and Painting, Music and Political Science. It is a residential University and regular classes are conducted in all the said subjects. An advertisement was published on 6.12.2002 and 3.7.2004 advertising post of Lecturer in Political Science under Faculty of Social Science besides other posts. The petitioner applied and was selected. Vide appointment letter dated 4.12.2004 he was appointed on the post of Assistant Professor, Political Science in the Faculty of Social Science in the pay scale of Rs. 8,000/- to 13,500/-. The letter of appointment is on record as Annexure-SA-2 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner. Pursuant to the said letter of appointment the petitioner joined his services and was continuously discharging his duties as Lecturer, (Political Science) in the Faculty of Social Science in the University. 8,000/- to 13,500/-. The letter of appointment is on record as Annexure-SA-2 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner. Pursuant to the said letter of appointment the petitioner joined his services and was continuously discharging his duties as Lecturer, (Political Science) in the Faculty of Social Science in the University. It is said that all of sudden the impugned order has been passed whereby he has been informed that the post on which he was working was sanctioned under Xth five year plan which is going to expire on 31.3.2007 and, therefore, his services would stand terminated on 31.3.2007. It is contended that the advertisement did not mention that the post was to continue only up to 31.3.2007 or was created under five year plan and, therefore, termination of services treating the said post under Xth five year plan is wholly arbitrary. It is further contended that after expiry of Xth five year plan, as required under Section 5(2) of the Act, the approved teaching staff liability was to be taken over by the State Government or the Executive Council of the University. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that the post would lapse on the expiry of Xth five year plan causing termination of the petitioner. It is also said that though the University is unaided but it receive financial assistance from University Grant Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “UGC”) and other bodies and authorities like State Government, private bodies etc. The Department of Political Science is still continuing hence it is inconceivable that only post which was being occupied by the petitioner is abolished justifying his termination, hence, it is evident that his termination is arbitrary. The order dated 31.3.2007 has been challenged on the ground that it is wholly dishonest, fraudulent and mala fide exercise of power on the part of the respondents. The petitioner has been singled out and the action of the University is illegal being hit by Articles 14, 19 (1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also said that in other departments the teachers are still working since students are there and, therefore, termination of petitioner individually is illegal and bad. 4. The respondent, University has filed its counter affidavit as well as supplementary counter affidavit. It is also said that in other departments the teachers are still working since students are there and, therefore, termination of petitioner individually is illegal and bad. 4. The respondent, University has filed its counter affidavit as well as supplementary counter affidavit. The case of respondents No. 3, 4 and 5 is that the University is a private body, therefore, writ petition under Article 12 of the Constitution is not maintainable. On merits, it is said that the University had taken a decision to abolish the post of Lecturers in the Department of Political Science and Philosophy and for the said purpose, letter dated 28.3.2007 has been issued by the Vice Chancellor communicating decision of Board of Governors to Registrar, Jagadguru Rambhadracharya Sansthan (hereinafter referred to as the “Society”) which is a Society registered under Societies Registration Act and is established the said University. The aforesaid decision of the Board of Governors of University has been approved by the Society, as evident from its letter dated 28.3.2007 (Annexure-CA-2 to the counter affidavit). The petitioner was appointed under the Scheme of UGC sanctioned under Xth five year plan and the said appointment was to continue till the life of the said plan i.e. 31.3.2007. The aforesaid fact was clearly mentioned in the appointment letter of the petitioner. It was also mentioned therein that the post may likely to continue depending upon the availability of the post and performance of the candidate. It is said that the appointment of the petitioner was more in the nature of contract depending upon certain terms and conditions specifically mentioned in the letter of appointment. He was never appointed on a permanent post nor he has a right to continue on the post of Lecturer when the post itself stood abolished after 31.3.2007. The notice dated 1.3.2007 was served upon the petitioner in the similar manner as it was served upon other Lecturers appointed under the posts created under Xth five year plan and the petitioner has not been singled out for the said purpose. Once the termination of the services of the petitioner is in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment, he cannot raise any objection thereagainst and the writ petition challenging the order of termination, therefore, is clearly misconceived. Once the termination of the services of the petitioner is in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment, he cannot raise any objection thereagainst and the writ petition challenging the order of termination, therefore, is clearly misconceived. It is said that the University is neither a Central University nor Deemed University nor a State University but is a private University, though is established under the Act. It is said that with reference to para 5 (iii) of the guidelines framed by the UGC for providing financial assistance to various Universities the matter was considered by the UGC itself in view of the fact that various Universities were facing difficulty in obtaining assistance from the respective State Governments regarding taking over liability of the posts after the plan is over and vide letter dated 29.3.2004 (Annexure-CA-1), UGC gave three options to such Universities for filling up the post, approved during Xth five year plan, to safeguard the interest of the institution which are as under : “1. Assurance may be obtained from the State Government for taking over the liability of these posts after tenth plan period. OR 2. Assurance may be given by the University through a resolution of the Executive Council to bear the burden of these posts after tenth plan OR 3. Appointment shall be made on contractual basis.” It also provides that the University may opt for any of the above three options for filling up the post. In case of contractual appointments also UGC provided that the University shall follow the requisite qualifications etc. of the posts as provided under UGC regulations. It is said that vide letter dated 31.3.2007, the University has informed UGC also about abolition of post held by the petitioner. 5. The petitioner, in his rejoinder affidavit, has said that on the one hand the University has said that Xth five year plan is over but on the other hand it has applied for financial assistance from UGC in Xlth five year plan also. 5. The petitioner, in his rejoinder affidavit, has said that on the one hand the University has said that Xth five year plan is over but on the other hand it has applied for financial assistance from UGC in Xlth five year plan also. It is also said that the University is taking shifting stand and sometimes it says that the Department of Political Science has been abolished and sometimes it says that only post of Lecturer in Department of Political Science has been abolished showing that they themselves are not clear regarding the fact as to whether the department is continuing or the post of Lecturer is continuing and, therefore, no reliance has been placed on such defence. Since there was no mention in the advertisement pursuant whereto the petitioner was selected and appointed to the post of Lecturer that it is a post sanctioned in Xth five year plan, therefore, the petitioner cannot be treated to be appointed for limited period and cannot be terminated in the manner the impugned order has been passed. The appointment of the petitioner was on probation showing that it was substantive appointment and, therefore, he cannot be terminated. The letters filed by the respondents alongwith the counter affidavit with respect to abolition of post are manufactured documents and cannot be relied upon. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has sought to urge that he was appointed on probation after a regular selection on the post of Assistant Professor, and he has already completed the period of probation, therefore, his services could not have been terminated by means of the impugned order and the same is wholly arbitrary and discriminatory. He further contended that since in the advertisement, pursuant to which he had applied and was selected, there was no mention of the fact that the post in question was sanctioned in Xth five year plan and has limited life, the respondents cannot subsequently claim that the said post was a planned post and would come to an end on a particular date when the said plan would end. Referring to the fact that the students were still continuing education in the Department of Political Science and are pursuing their courses in the University, it is said that it is incorrect to suggest that there is no requirement of a teacher in the Department of Political Science till the existing students are pursuing their course and, therefore, termination of petitioner’s services on 31.3.2007 is illegal. 7. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 3, 4 and 5 has reiterated its stand taken in the counter affidavit/supplementary counter affidavit. 8. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record and the authorities cited at the Bar. 9. At the outset it would be appropriate to mention that since the University in question is governed by the Act and the statutes framed thereunder, during the course of final hearing, learned Counsel for the respondents has not stressed upon its preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition and, therefore, we are not required to record our opinion with respect to the aforesaid preliminary objection. Since arguments have been advanced on the merits of the issue, therefore, we are deciding this writ petition on merits. 10. In order to ascertain the right of the petitioner in the light of nature of his appointment and the conditions on which he was appointed, we find that though the advertisement did not mention extent of vacancy, the letter of appointment dated 4.12.2004 issued to the petitioner mention the following conditions of appointment besides others : “7. His appointment to the post is to be for X-Plan, but likely to be continued depending upon the performance of the candidate and availability of post. 8. He/She will be on probation at least for one year.” 11. The petitioner thus was well aware that the post is under Xth plan and is likely to be continued depending upon performance of the candidate and availability of post. It is not in dispute that Xth plan came to an end on 31.3.2007 as a result whereof the post in question held by the petitioner also ceased on the said date i.e. 31.3.2007. It is not in dispute that Xth plan came to an end on 31.3.2007 as a result whereof the post in question held by the petitioner also ceased on the said date i.e. 31.3.2007. In the Xlth plan the University initially, in its proposal recommended one post of Lecturer in the Department of Political Science vide letter dated March, 2007 but subsequently a revised proposal sent by the University vide letter dated 23.4.2007 wherein it was mentioned that the governing body of the University has decided to abolish the post of Lecturer/Assistant Professor in the Departments of Political Science and Philosophy and, therefore, the same was not incorporated in the proposal. 12. Two things, therefore, emerge from the aforesaid facts. Firstly, the petitioner’s appointment was tenure based, limited for Xth plan, and, secondly, it is the specific case of the University that the post in question has been abolished and the University has not recommended for sanction of financial assistance for the post of Lecturer in Political Science Department to UGC in Xlth plan, and thus could not have been contradicted by the petitioner by placing any material providing otherwise. 13. The logical inference is that the post of Lecturer in the Department of Political Science has been abolished after 31.3.2007. Now the question required to be considered, is, firstly, when the appointment of the petitioner was on specific conditions and time bound, whether he had a right to seek a writ of mandamus commanding University to allow him to continue in service on the post of Lecturer, and, secondly, whether the decision of University to abolish the post in any manner is vitiated in law, and thirdly, what is the scope of judicial review in respect to the right of the employer of abolition of post. 14. Considering the second and third questions first, in our view, the power of employer to abolish the post is inherent, and, is a policy decision in the interest of necessity of internal administration. Creation or abolition of post is a matter of policy decision based on exigencies of circumstances and administrative necessity. The scope of judicial review in the matter of abolition of post is limited only to the extent whether the decision for abolition of post has been taken in good faith or is arbitrary or mala fide or as a mask of some penal action. 15. The scope of judicial review in the matter of abolition of post is limited only to the extent whether the decision for abolition of post has been taken in good faith or is arbitrary or mala fide or as a mask of some penal action. 15. Considering the right of the Government, as employer, with respect to abolition of post and the consequential termination of service, the Apex Court in N. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1973 SC 2641 in para 36 of the judgment held : “36. The abolition of post may have the consequence of termination of service of a Government servant. Such termination is not dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penalty of dismissal or removal does not therefore arise in the case of abolition of post. The abolition of post is not a personal penalty against the Government servant. The abolition of post is an executive policy decision. Whether after abolition of the post the Government servant who was holding the post would or could be offered any employment under the State would therefore be a matter of policy decision of the Government because the abolition of post does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold the post.” 16. In State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar and another, 1976 (2) SCC 844 the Court said : “Whether a post should be retained or abolished is essentially a matter for the Government to decide. As long as such decision of the Government is taken in good faith, the same cannot be set aside by the Court. It is not open to the Court to go behind the wisdom of the decision and substitute its own opinion for that of the Government on the point as to whether a post should or should not be abolished.” 17. The aforesaid view was reiterated in K. Rajendran and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, AIR 1982 SC 1107 . The aforesaid view was reiterated in K. Rajendran and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, AIR 1982 SC 1107 . In S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 1745 considering the argument that abolition of post and resultant termination causes not only loss in earning livelihood but also cut short the tenure and, therefore, is punitive in nature, the Apex Court rejecting the submission observed that such loss is not unknown in a service career and is one of the exigencies of employment. The creation and abolition of post is the prerogative of the executive. The power to create the posts is unfettered and so also is the power to reduce or abolish them. Recently in Avas Vikas Sansthan and another v. Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Assn. and others, 2006 (4) SCC 132 in paras 50 and 59 of the judgment the Court held : “.....It is settled law that the power to abolish any civil post is inherent in every sovereign Government and such abolition will not entail any right on the person holding the abolished post the right to re-employment or to hold the same post.” (para-50) “It is well settled that the power to abolish a post which may result in the holder thereof ceasing to be a Government servant has got to be recognized. The measure of economy and the need for streamlining the administration to make it more efficient may induce any State Government to make alterations in the staffing pattern of the civil services necessitating either the increase or the decrease in the number of posts or abolish the post. In such an event, a Department which was abolished or abandoned wholly or partially for want of funds, the Court cannot, by a writ of mandamus, direct the employer to continue employing such employees as have been dislodged.” (para-59) 18. In such an event, a Department which was abolished or abandoned wholly or partially for want of funds, the Court cannot, by a writ of mandamus, direct the employer to continue employing such employees as have been dislodged.” (para-59) 18. In State of Haryana and others v. Navneet Verma (Appeal (Civil) No. 5064 of 2007) decided on 31.10.2007 the Apex Court after referring to N. Ramanatha Pillai (supra) and Avas Vikas Sansthan (supra) culled out certain principles with respect to power of Government for abolition of post and the role of the Court warranting interference as under : “We summarize the power of Government in abolishing a post and role of the Court for interference : (a) the power to create or abolish a post rests with the Government; (b) whether a particular post is necessary is a matter depending upon the exigencies of the situation and administrative necessity; (c) creation and abolition of posts is a matter of Government policy and every sovereign Government has this power in the interest and necessity of internal administration; (d) creation, continuance and abolition of posts are all decided by the Government in the interest of administration and general public; (e) the Court would be the least competent in the face of scanty material to decide whether the Government acted honestly in creating a post or refusing to create a post or its decision suffers from malafide, legal or factual; (f) as long as the decision to abolish the post is taken in good faith in the absence of material, interference by the Court is not warranted.” 19. The letter dated 31.3.2007 of University has been challenged on the ground that it is a dishonest and fraudulent exercise on the part of the respondents. The averments to this effect are contained in para 31 of the writ petition only and interestingly the said paragraph has been sworn on the basis of legal advise. The allegations are absolutely vague and not been substantiated by proper pleadings and material. Even the affidavit is defective and cannot be accepted. Moreover, the University has placed on record material showing that the decision has not been taken only with respect to the post of Lecturer in the Department of Political Science but also in respect to the Department of Philosophy. Even the affidavit is defective and cannot be accepted. Moreover, the University has placed on record material showing that the decision has not been taken only with respect to the post of Lecturer in the Department of Political Science but also in respect to the Department of Philosophy. Therefore, it is wrong to contend that the petitioner has been singled out for abolition of post of Lecturer and while other posts of Lecturer have been retained or the efforts are made to continue them, the post held by petitioner has only been abolished. In any case it is an inherent right of the employer. It is always open to the University to decide as to which course it intent to run in the University and no employee can insist upon the University to continue a post for the purpose of providing employment to him. 20. In the case in hand, however, looking deeper in the matter, we find that it is not a case as such of abolition of post by a positive decision of the University but in fact a post which was created for a fixed tenure has ceased to continue on expiry of the said tenure and thus it is a case of cessation of a post on expiry of the period for which it was created. After the expiry of the said period the post created for fixed term automatically came to an end and now it is a question of creation of a post for the subsequent period. Since the post has come to an end, the logical consequence is that the holder of the post would also go and cannot continue in service in the absence of the post. Whether the post should be created for the subsequent period is again a matter of executive policy and within the realm of administrative authorities. The Courts in this matter should not interfere since it involves several aspects of the matter and unless there is sufficient material to show that the authorities are acting with mala fide, in our view, no judicial interference is called for. 21. The petitioner, in effect, has required this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to respondents to create a post. We are afraid that such a mandamus cannot be issued to the University. 21. The petitioner, in effect, has required this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to respondents to create a post. We are afraid that such a mandamus cannot be issued to the University. In Union of India and others v. Tejram Parashramji Bombhate and others, AIR 1992 SC 570 , the Apex Court held that the Court or a Tribunal has no power to compel the Government to change its policy involving expenditure and to direct creation of any post. Following the aforesaid authority, in Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 1997 (11) SCC 670 the Court said : “.......What the petitioner, in effect wants this Court to do is to issue a writ directing the creation of post in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service. Such a direction cannot in our opinion be given.” 22. Therefore, in taking the view that for creation of post this Court cannot issue a direction we are fortified with the aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court and hence the relief as sought by the petitioner which is of the same effect, in our view, cannot be granted. 23. Now coming to the validity of the termination as we have already observed, the termination of an employee as a result of abolition of post is the normal consequence and cannot be said to be either a dismissal or removal. In N. Ramanatha Pillai (supra) the Apex Court also took the same view and held that such termination being normal consequence of abolition of post is not a dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court also held that the right to hold a post comes to an end on the abolition of post, which the Government servant holds and he cannot complain thereafter violation of Articles 19(1)(f), 14 and 31 of the Constitution unless it is shown that the decision has been taken mala fide or as a masked penal action. 24. In the present case the appointment letter of the petitioner specifically mention that his appointment is being made on the post under Xth plan. The continuance, however, depends upon the performance of the candidate as well as availability of post. It is not in dispute that Xth plan ended on 31.3.2007 and thus the post of Lecturer held by the petitioner also lapsed on the said date. The continuance, however, depends upon the performance of the candidate as well as availability of post. It is not in dispute that Xth plan ended on 31.3.2007 and thus the post of Lecturer held by the petitioner also lapsed on the said date. The appointment of the petitioner for the period subsequent thereto would depend upon the availability of post. It is evident that the University has taken a positive decision not to create the post of Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, besides others with which we are not concerned, and, therefore, has not taken any steps for creation of such post. In the absence of the post the petitioner has no right to claim continuance in service. 25. In this view of the matter, the order impugned in the writ petition which in effect only informs the petitioner about the consequences flowing from the aforesaid facts though has the effect of terminating his services but in the absence of any post available after 31.3.2007 the termination of the petitioner is fait acompli and being an exigency of the circumstances, he cannot seek any interference from the Court for continuance in service. 26. Some arguments have sought to be advanced in order to show that the action of the University is mala fide, but, besides other, the very first obstacle in considering the above submission is that no one has been impleaded eo nomine against whom mala fide is levelled. It is well settled that the plea of mala fide can neither be entertained nor shall be permitted to be raised in the absence of a person against whom such allegations are made. 27. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 in para 55 of the judgment, the Apex Court held : “It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded eo nomine as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegations would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. Admittedly, both R.K. Singh and G.N. Sharma were not impleaded. On this ground alone the High Court should have stopped enquiry into the allegation of mala fides or bias alleged against them.” 28. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. Admittedly, both R.K. Singh and G.N. Sharma were not impleaded. On this ground alone the High Court should have stopped enquiry into the allegation of mala fides or bias alleged against them.” 28. In J.N. Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 326 , in para 21 of the judgment, it has been held as under : “Further in the absence of impleadment of the.....the person who had allegedly passed mala fide order in order to favour such junior doctor, any contention of mala fide action in fact i.e. malice in fact should not be countenanced by the Court.” 29. In All India State Bank Officers Federation and others v. Union of India and others, JT 1996(8) SC 550, in para 23, the Hon’ble Apex Court has said where a person, who has passed the order and against whom the plea of mala fide has been taken has not been impleaded, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fide. The relevant observation of the Apex Court relevant are reproduced as under : “The person against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put before it. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fide, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.” 30. In Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344 , it has been held as under : “That allegations regarding mala fides cannot be vaguely made and it must be specified and clear. In this context, the concerned Minister who is stated to be involved in the formation of new Zone at Hazipur is not made a party who can meet the allegations.” 31. Secondly, even otherwise the allegations are very scatchy and vague. In this context, the concerned Minister who is stated to be involved in the formation of new Zone at Hazipur is not made a party who can meet the allegations.” 31. Secondly, even otherwise the allegations are very scatchy and vague. We do not find sufficient material supporting the contention of the petitioner that the action of the University is mala fide particularly when it has been taken by the governing body of the University which consists of a number of persons and it is not the case of the petitioner that all of them or most of them, in any manner are biased against the petitioner. Moreover, no reason for such alleged biased is pleaded or is available on record. 32. The appointment of the petitioner thus being coterminous with the post which was to continue up to Xth plan and the same having ended on 31.3.2007, it is evident that it was a temporary appointment made for a fixed period. In Union of India and others v. Dinesh Kumar Saxena and others, 1995 (3) SCC 401 in almost somewhat similar circumstances, it was held : “......The extra work being limited in duration, such posts are created for a fixed period and carry a fixed pay. Once the period specified is over, these posts are abolished and the temporary staff appointed against these temporary posts is disengaged......” 33. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, 2006(4) SCC 1 has taken the same view and held that an appointment made for limited period is liable to be terminated in terms of the conditions of appointment. 34. We, therefore, are clearly of the view that the nature of the appointment, the terms and conditions of appointment, and other material on record show that there is neither any illegality nor any infirmity in the orders impugned in the present writ petition and the petitioner’s services have rightly been ceased on 31.3.2007. Therefore, there is no occasion to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to function as Lecturer/Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science of University and to pay salary. 35. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. ————