JUDGMENT :- We have heard the counsel for the parties at length. We have also perused the order passed by the learned single Judge. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge is well reasoned and in accordance with the settled principles of law. It is not in dispute before us that three different and distinct companies belonging to the same group hold separate bank accounts with the appellant-Bank. It is also not disputed that the securities for loan accounts of the individual companies are not inter mixed and are independent of each other. At some stage, one of the companies made an application for return of the security documents as it wanted to open an account with another bank. This request was denied by the appellant-Bank on the ground that either the Group closes all its accounts or none. In other words, the appellant-Bank is willing to allow the writ petitioners to maintain all the three accounts but would not permit the continuance of only two accounts out of three. 2. The learned single Judge after taking into consideration the facts has come to the conclusion that the decision of the appellant-Bank was unjustified, unreasonable and contrary to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, a direction has been issued to the Central Bank of India to process the claim of the writ petitioner for return of the documents only after the entire liability being satisfied with regard to the account of the petitioner No. 1. This order was challenged by the appellant-Bank on the ground that the liability being purely contractual, the writ petition was not maintainable and the learned single Judge erred in law by entertaining the writ petition and issuing necessary directions. 3. In support of his submissions, Mr. Biswarup Gupta, Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant-Bank, has relied on two judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of National Highway Authorities of India v. Ganga Enterprises and Anr., reported in (2003) 7 SCC 410 : AIR 2003 SC 3823 and State of U.P. and Anr. v. Johri Mal, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 : AIR 2004 SC 3800 . 4. v. Johri Mal, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 : AIR 2004 SC 3800 . 4. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid two judgments do not lay down the proposition that there would be an absolute bar for entertaining writ petition in disputes arising out of a contract. In our opinion it is a settled proposition of law, that actions of government companies, corporations and other instrumentalities of the State, such as the appellant-Bank, which fall within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India are amenable to judicial review, even in matters of contract. We are of the considered opinion that the decision making process of the appellant-Bank must conform to standards and norms which are rational, fair and reasonable. In other words the decisions of the appellant-Bank must not suffer from illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety to satisfy the test of reasonableness, to comply with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. This view of ours will find support from the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of : 1) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . 2) Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1991 SC 537 . 3) ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 . We may note here the observations contained in paragraph 52 and 53 in ABL International Ltd. (supra) which are as follows :- "52. On the basis of the above conclusion of ours, the question still remains why should we grant the reliefs sought for by the appellants in a writ petition when a suitable efficacious alternate remedy is available by way of a suit. The answer to this question, in our opinion, lies squarely in the decision of this Court in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi wherein this Court held (SCC pp. 235-37, Paras 20-22 and 24). The requirement of Article 14 should extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity. The answer to this question, in our opinion, lies squarely in the decision of this Court in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi wherein this Court held (SCC pp. 235-37, Paras 20-22 and 24). The requirement of Article 14 should extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, the State cannot thereafter cast off its personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without anything more. The personality of the State, requiring regulations of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts, which cannot coexist. The Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the preamble. Therefore, total exclusion of Article 14 - non arbitrariness which is basic to rule of law - from State actions in contractual field is not justified. This is more so when the modern trend is to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power is unequal so that these are not negotiated contracts but standard form contracts between unequals. Unlike the private parties the State while exercising its powers and discharging its functions, acts, indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good and in public interest. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. It is really the nature of its personality as State which is significant and must characterize all its actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny permitted for examining the validity of its act. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. It is really the nature of its personality as State which is significant and must characterize all its actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny permitted for examining the validity of its act. The requirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates against the concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in contractual matters. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal requirements of public law obligations and impress with this character and contracts made by the State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. However, to the extent challenge is made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of its actions. 53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations; it really acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus if we apply the above principle of applicability of Article 14 to the facts of this case, then we notice that the first respondent being an instrumentality of the State and a monopoly body had to be approached by the appellants by compulsion to cover its export risk. Thus if we apply the above principle of applicability of Article 14 to the facts of this case, then we notice that the first respondent being an instrumentality of the State and a monopoly body had to be approached by the appellants by compulsion to cover its export risk. The policy of insurance covering the risk of the appellants was issued by the first respondent after seeking all required information and after receiving huge sums of money as premium exceeding Rs. 16 lakhs. On facts we have found that the terms of the policy do not give room to any ambiguity as to the risk covered by the first respondent. We are also of the considered opinion that the liability of the first respondent under the policy arose when the default of the exporter occurred and, thereafter, when the Kazakhstan Government failed to fulfil its guarantee. There is no allegation that the contracts in question were obtained either by fraud or by misrepresentation. In such factual situation, we are of the opinion, the facts of this case do not and should not inhibit the High Court or this Court from granting the relief sought for by the petitioner." 5. Considering the entire aspects of the matter, we are unable to accept the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant- Bank. The appeal has no merit. Accordingly, both the appeal and the application are dismissed. 6. Xerox certified copy of this order be made available to the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of usual formalities. Appeal dismissed.