JUDGMENT S. Ravindra Bhat, J.-The application seeks recall of the order dated 7th November, 2007, whereby, this Court had directed the writ petition to be treated as an appeal, under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (the Ace), and list it before the appropriate Bench. 2. The order of Court, of which recall is sought, reads as follows: " ORDER 7. 11.2007 Mr. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General, points out that the petition is not maintainable in view of the Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act; it provides for an appeal in such cases. In these circumstances, Mr. Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner states that the present petition may be converted into an appeal and considered on its merits. Accordingly, the prayer is granted. The Registry is directed to register the present petition as an appeal. The petitioner shall file an appropriate affidavit in this regard within two days. List before the appropriate Bench on 13.11.2007, subject to orders of Honble the Chief Justice." 3. The applicants state that no efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal exists, since the statute, that is, Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA for short) enables an aggrieved party to prefer an appeal to the High Court, only on a question of law. The justification or otherwise of the Appellate Tribunals order, declining relief, or not granting relief of waiver of pre-deposit, to the extent sought for, is not a question of law. Therefore, an appeal would not lie. In these circumstances, the party would be deprived of any forum to agitate its grievances, and would also forfeit its right of appeal. 4. It is alleged and contended on behalf of the applicants by Shri Rajiv Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel, that concession of Counsel, on a question of law, cannot bind the litigant, if the statement is contrary to terms of statute, or made under misconception. No estoppel can be pleaded, and the Court would have to consider the justice of the individual case, to decide whether to recall the order. In this case, denial of the relief in the application would result in substantial and irretrievable injustice. Reliance is placed on the decision in that regard, reported as Union of India v. Mohanlal Likumal Punjabi, I (2004) CCR 379 (SC)=II (2004) SLT 401= (2004) 3 SCC 628 . 5. Mr. In this case, denial of the relief in the application would result in substantial and irretrievable injustice. Reliance is placed on the decision in that regard, reported as Union of India v. Mohanlal Likumal Punjabi, I (2004) CCR 379 (SC)=II (2004) SLT 401= (2004) 3 SCC 628 . 5. Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General opposed the application and submitted that the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to resile from the statement of his Counsel, as a result of which the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was converted into an appeal. It was submitted that the remedy under Section 35 of the Act was the exclusive remedy available to the applicant, and the existence of an explicit provision rules out the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, from exercising its power of judicial review. Relying on a number of judicial precedents, he contended that Article 226 can be availed of only in the a absence of an alternative remedy. 6. The relevant part of Section 35 of the Act is extracted below: "35. Appeal to the High Court: Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication b of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order." 7. A plain reading of the above provision would indicate that the appeal is available to the aggrieved person only if it is on a question of law. The petitioner approached this Court seeking dispensation of the 50% pre- deposit of the amount of penalty as a pre-condition for hearing of the appeal, which the Tribunal had directed him to deposit. This is certainly not a question of law, and therefore not appealable under Section 35 of the Act. That being so, denial of the remedy under Article 226 would result in gross injustice, whereby the aggrieved would be denied a fora, for challenging a possibly irrational order. In State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, VIII (2000) SLT 815= (2001) 10 SCC 740 , the Supreme Court, speaking about the plenary nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226, stated as follows: "As we see it, the point in issue is no longer res integra. This Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. In State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, VIII (2000) SLT 815= (2001) 10 SCC 740 , the Supreme Court, speaking about the plenary nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226, stated as follows: "As we see it, the point in issue is no longer res integra. This Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad, IV (1999) SLT 204= 1999 (4) SCC 468 dealing with an analogous provision, where discretion to waive pre-deposit was limited only to the extent of 25 per cent of the tax, was upheld by this Court. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi. 1993 (1) SCC 22 . 4. For the reasons contained in the said decisions, we hold that the impugned provisions are valid. It is, of course, clear that if gross injustice is done and it can be shown that for good reason the Court should interfere, then notwithstanding the alternative remedy which may be available by way of an appeal under Section 20 or revision under Section 21, a writ Court can in an appropriate case exercise its jurisdiction to do substantive justice. Normally of course the provisions of the Act would have to be complied with, but the availability of the writ jurisdiction should dispel any doubt which a citizen has" 8. The power exercised under Article 226 by the High Court is Constitutionally endorsed and must be given the widest construction. This power of the High Court cannot be restricted by a constitutional amendment, let alone an ordinary legislation [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, III (1997) CLT 114 (SC)= 1997 (3) SCC 261 and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu, AIR 1993 SC 412 ]. Therefore, a construction that permits an ordinary legislation to restrict the power under Article 226 is untenable. It is true that while exercising its power of review under Article 226 the Courts have a wide discretion, and would ordinarily, where alternative remedies exist, desist from exercising their powers. But that cannot amount to a mechanical rejection of the power itself in the face of an alternative remedy. The assertion of power under Article 226 is a sine quo non for the progressive development of rights and respective remedies, and any construction to the contrary would be against the spirit of the Constitution. In Whirlpool Corpn. But that cannot amount to a mechanical rejection of the power itself in the face of an alternative remedy. The assertion of power under Article 226 is a sine quo non for the progressive development of rights and respective remedies, and any construction to the contrary would be against the spirit of the Constitution. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, VIII (1998) SLT 329=(1998) 8 SCC I, the Supreme Court held that: "16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Knirana laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words, unless there are good grounds therefor, which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances. 17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh as under- But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. 18. This proposition was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and was affirmed and followed in the following words- The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court. " 9. A number of decisions of the Supreme Court lend support to the propositions that wrong concessions made by the Counsel on a point of law do not bind the parties. The scope of a provision of law depends on its text and the construction placed on it by the Court, and not any random concession made by the Counsel. It would not be inappropriate to extract the following passage from Union of India v. Mohanlal Likumal Punjabi, II (2004) SLT 401=1 (2004) CCR 379 (SC)= (2004) 3 SCC 628 : "In Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan it was held that a case decided on the basis of wrong concession of a Counsel has no precedent value. That apart, the applicability of the statute or otherwise to a given situation or the question of statutory liability of a person/ institution under any provision of law would invariably depend upon the scope and meaning of the provisions concerned and has got to be adjudged not on any concession made. Any such concessions would have no acceptability or relevance while determining rights and liabilities incurred or acquired in view of the axiomatic principle, without exception, that there can be no estoppel against statute. " 10. The goal or objective of every legal system is to secure justice. The Supreme Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 (Supp 4) SCC 595, explained the rationale of review jurisdiction in the following terms: "Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice." 11. A plain reading of Section 35 would show that it does not confer any alternative remedy to the petitioner, to question the order of the Appellate Tribunal, declining the relief to the extent sought for. In such circumstances, the power of the Court to examine the correctness of the order under Article 226 is always preserved; it is another matter altogether that the Court may not chose to exercise the jurisdiction, or decline using it, after examining the merits. If the order of this Court is not reviewed, the petitioner would be remediless, resulting in the rejection of its appeal for non payment of the amounts directed. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the ends of justice require that the order dated 7.11.2007 is recalled. 12. In view of the above conclusions, the order dated 7.11.2007 is hereby recalled. The writ petition is restored to the original position on the file of the Court; it shall be listed for consideration before the appropriate bench, subject to orders of the Honble Chief Justice, on 18th January, 2008. Ordered accordingly.