Judgment :- Petitioner seeks writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the orders of dismissal in No.2349/S6/TNSTC/2000 & 10039/S6/2001 dated 18.07.2002 passed by the Respondent and to direct the Respondent to reinstate the Petitioner with backwages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. 2. The Petitioner was appointed as conductor on 01.04.1986. Earlier there were other disciplinary proceedings initiated against him and various punishments have been awarded. On 211. 2000, while he was on duty in Bus No.Tn72 N 0694, Route No.127E proceeding from Tirunelveli to Surandai, during checking, it was noticed that 42 passengers travelled in the bus and tickets were issued without punching or marking to show whether, it pertained to up or down trip. The Petitioner had also collected luggage fare for 4 unaccompanied milk cans but did not issue luggage tickets. Based on the report of Checking Inspector, the Petitioner was suspended by order dated 211. 2000 and a charge memo was issued to him on 012. 2000. As the explanation of the Petitioner was not satisfactory, domestic enquiry was held, in which the Petitioner participated. By report dated 212. 2000, the enquiry officer held that the charges against the Petitioner had been proved. Second show cause notice was issued to him on 212. 2000. Though his explanation was not satisfactory based on the Petitioners mercy petition, the Corporation permitted the Petitioner to join duty without prejudice to entire disciplinary proceedings. 3. The Petitioner was also alleged to have used filthy language against the Checking Inspector by name R. Muthusamy, who conducted checking on 211. 2000. On the basis of the complaint given by the Checking Inspector, charge memo dated 16.01.2001, was sent to the Petitioner which was returned unserved. Charge memo was also exhibited on the Branch Notice Board. Since no reply was received to the charge memo domestic enquiry was conducted exparte and charges were found proved. Based on the enquiry report and taking into account past record of service, second show cause notice was issued to the Petitioner on 22.02.2001. The Petitioner sent a reply on 01.03.2001 and further enquiry was held wherein the Petitioner fully participated. Based on the enquiry report second show cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal was sent to him. As the explanation was not satisfactory Corporation passed the impugned order dismissing the Petitioner from service. 4. The Petitioner sent a reply on 01.03.2001 and further enquiry was held wherein the Petitioner fully participated. Based on the enquiry report second show cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal was sent to him. As the explanation was not satisfactory Corporation passed the impugned order dismissing the Petitioner from service. 4. The Petitioner challenges the impugned order mainly on the ground that in respect of charges framed against him are baseless and unfounded and that report of the enquiry officer is perverse and that there had been gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The Petitioner has filed the writ petition alleging that in respect of second charge no enquiry was held and therefore it has caused great injustice to the Petitioner and therefore he has invoked the extraordinary remedy of Article 226 to quash the impugned order seeking appropriate direction. 5. The Respondent/Management filed counter inter-alia raising objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition. According to the Respondent, Petitioner has effective alternative remedy before the Labour forums under the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. 6. The learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. K. Vasudevan, contended that when no enquiry was conducted it would vitiate the punishment and therefore the Petitioner is entitled to invoke the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 . Placing reliance upon (AIR 2004 ANDHRA PRADESH 198), Estate Officer & Manager (Recoveries), A.P.Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. and another, Vs. Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore and Others. Learned counsel submitted that once the writ petition has been admitted the same cannot be dismissed on ground of alternative remedy before the Labour forums. 7. The learned counsel for the Respondent Ms. Kala Ramesh, has submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of he settled position in law that alternative remedy under Industrial Disputes Act must be initially availed by approaching the Labour Court. The learned counsel would further submit that in view of the efficacious alternative remedy available the writ petition is not maintainable. 8. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretionary, courts have self imposed restrictions. 8. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretionary, courts have self imposed restrictions. Where alternative remedy is available the High Court would not normally interfere unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 9. Considering the scope of judicial review and interference under Article 226 in Labour matters, In ( 2005 (8) SCC 264 ), U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd Vs R.S. Pandey and another Honble Supreme Court has held:- ".... 11. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided, the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. 12. Constitution Benches of this court in K.S. Rashid and Son V. Income Tax Investigation Commission [ 1954 SCR 738 : AIR 1954 SC 207 ], Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah [ (1955) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1955 SC 425 ], Union of India v. T.R. Varma [ 1958 SCR 499 : AIR 1957 SC 882 ], State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [ 1958 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 ] and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (p) Ltd V. State of Madras [ (1966) 2 SCR 229 : AIR 1966 SC 1089 ] held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. Nooh [ 1958 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 ] and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (p) Ltd V. State of Madras [ (1966) 2 SCR 229 : AIR 1966 SC 1089 ] held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. 13. Another Constitution Bench of this court in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [ (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterate in N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G.Raja Nainar [1959 Supp (1) SCR 623: AIR 1959 SC 422 ], Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar [ (1965) 2 SCR 653 : AIR 1965 SC 1321 ], Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das [ (1984) 2 SCC 436 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 133: AIR 1984 SC 653 ], S.T. Muthusami v K.Natarajan [ (1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616 ], Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 :1995 SCC (L&s) 1207: (1995) 31 ATC 110 : AIR 1995 SC 1715 ], Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [ (2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573 ], A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [ (2000) 7 SCC 695 ], L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P. [ (2001) 6 SCC 634 ], Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami ( Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Digdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra [ (2001) 8 SCC 509 ], Pratap Singh v. State of Harayana [ (2002) 7 SCC 484 :2002 SCC (L&S) 1075] and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [ (2003) 1 SCC 72 ]. ....." 10. ....." 10. Observing that the High court should not entertain the writ petition unless there is something to show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ Petitioner. In the above cited decisions the honble Supreme Court further held as under:- "...... 20. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. Vs U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S.Karamchari Sangh [ (2004) 4 Scc 268 : 2004 SCC (L& S) 637] it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process a provided under the statute. To the same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. V Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [ (1976) 1 SCC 496 :1976 SCC (L& S) 70], Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 :1995 SCC (L&S) 1207: (1995) 31 ATC 110 : AIR 1995 SC 1715 ], Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam V municipal Corpn of Ahmedabad [ (2002) 2 SCC 542 :2002 SCC (l&S) 317] and in Scooters India v. vijai E.Y. Eldred [ (1998) 6 SCC 549 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1611]. 22. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant it was observe as follows:(SCC pp. 91-92, para 28) "[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act ar not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act ar not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them" 23. In Basant Kumar Sarkar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd [ (1964) 6 SCR 913 : AIR 1964 Sc 1260 ] the Constitution Bench of this Court observed as follows: (SCR p. 920) "It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would confirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or seek relief, if possible, under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act." The above position was recently highlighted in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd v. Employees Union [ (2005) 6 SCC 725 : (2005) 6 Scale 430]. 24. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. ......." 11. 24. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. ......." 11. In the above decision the Honble Supreme Court has referred to (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147 , Ram and Shyam Co v. State of Harayana and other decisions the Honble Supreme court has pointed out the circumstance as to how alternative remedy would be a mirage and would not be efficacious remedy which would make out an exceptional circumstance to knock the door of the High Court without availing the effective alternative remedy. 12. Retrenched workmen of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Another Vs. Jabar Singh and Others filed writ petitions challenging their retrenchment. In the said case management raised objection that the writ petitions were not maintainable in view of the effective alternative remedy under Industrial Disputes Act and the same must be initially availed before invoking Article 226. Referring to ( 2005 (8) SCC 264 ), U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd Vs R.S. Pandey and another and other decisions the Honble Supreme Court has held that the writ petitioner should have not invoked jurisdiction into the Industrial disputes which could be resolved before the appropriate forums and held that the writ petitions are not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 13. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 14. Placing reliance upon AIR 2004 ANDHRA PRADESH 198, Estate Officer & Manager (Recoveries), A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. and another, Vs. Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore and Others and 1999-II-LLJ pg 88 Mysore Paper Mills Ltd., Bangalore vs. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association, Bhadravathi & Another, the learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that when the order of complained is illegal and ultravires, in an appropriate case the High Court can entertain the writ petition and adjudicate the same on merits. The learned counsel would further submit that once the writ petition has been ordered to be admitted and the same cannot be dismissed after a period of about six years on the ground of its non-maintainability. The learned counsel would further submit that once the writ petition has been ordered to be admitted and the same cannot be dismissed after a period of about six years on the ground of its non-maintainability. The learned counsel would further contend that since no opportunity was given to the Petitioner in respect of second charge there was a gross violation of principles of the natural justice and therefore the writ petition is well maintainable. 15. The learned counsel for the Petitioner is not right in contending that there was no enquiry for the second charge. From the averments of counter affidavit and from the submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondent, it comes to be known that abusing the Checking Inspector on 211. 2000 in respect of the charge memo dated 16.01.2001 it was sent to the Petitioner and the same was returned with the endorsement "Left Without Instructions". Though initially domestic enquiry was conducted exparte after the Petitioner sent reply, it appears further enquiry was held wherein the Petitioner is said to have participated. In such circumstance it cannot be said that there was gross violation of principles of natural justice in respect of the second charge. The Petitioner is not made out any exceptional circumstance to entertain the writ petition. The learned counsel for the Petitioner is not right in contending that once the writ petition is admitted the court cannot dismiss the same on the ground of non-maintainability. 16. In view of the efficacious alternative remedy available to the Petitioner before the Labour courts the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. However it is open to the Petitioner to challenge the impugned order before the appropriate forum in a manner known to law, if he is so advised. No order as to costs.