JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been directed against the judgment and order dated 4.5.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia, South Tripura in Sessions Trial No. 15 (ST/B)/2000 whereby and whereunder the accused respondent has been acquitted from the charges leveled against him under Sections 376 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. I have heard Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Additional P.P. appearing for the State appellant and Mr. D.C. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that on 1.10.1403 B.S., corresponding to 15.1.1997 A.D., Wednesday, at about 7/7.30 p.m., when the victim girl, (P.W. 1) was cooking in the kitchen in her house, the accused came to her house and entered into the said kitchen. He embraced her and by pushing on the ground, committed rape on her against her will, when she told the accused that she would inform the matter to her parents, the accused taking her hand on his head, promised her that he would marry her and requested her not to disclose the said incident to any one. With this assurance, thereafter, the accused used to visit the victim girl after every three-four days and committed sexual intercourse with her which continued about 2/3 months. During the period, the menstruation of the victim girl was stopped and she found herself conceived. She informed this development to the accused, who assured her that he would marry her on 3rd Jaistha by court marriage, but later he did not turn up to her on that day. Having no other alternative, she disclosed the said fact to her parents, who informed the matter to the Panchayat and the local Club, whereupon a panchayat meeting with order villagers and elders was held where the victim girl with her parents as well as the accused with his father were present. In the said meeting, the accused confessed that he did illicit cohabitation with the victim girl assuring to marry her and his father agreed to accept her as wife of his son. But ultimately, the accused as well as his father was not as good as their words, rather the accused fled away. Then victim girl informed the matter to the Panchayat and the father of the accused was asked by the Panchayat to see that she might not become helpless. But ultimately, the accused as well as his father was not as good as their words, rather the accused fled away. Then victim girl informed the matter to the Panchayat and the father of the accused was asked by the Panchayat to see that she might not become helpless. In the circumstances, the father of the accused gifted a paddy land measuring about one/one and half kani which she possessed for about one year, but she was dispossessed thereafter by the father of the accused. 4. Aggrieved to the said action, the victim girl then lodged complaint to the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia who forwarded the aforesaid complaint to the Belonia Police Station under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code for registration and investigation of the case whereupon Belonia P.S. Case No. 81 of 1997 was registered and after completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused as a prima facie case was established for committing offence under Section 376 IPC. 5. After taking cognizance of the offence, the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia committed the case to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia. In the course of trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia, South Tripura framed the charges against the accused respondent. 6. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 11 (eleven) witnesses, out of them, P.W. 6 was tendered by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defence. The prosecution also adduced some documents in evidence. On the other hand, the accused did not adduce any evidence and pleaded not guilty to the charges so framed and claimed to be tried. 7. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia acquitted the accused from both the charges levelled against him by the impugned judgment & order as noted earlier. Being aggrieved, the State has preferred this appeal against the order of acquittal dated 4.5.2001. 8. Mr. 7. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia acquitted the accused from both the charges levelled against him by the impugned judgment & order as noted earlier. Being aggrieved, the State has preferred this appeal against the order of acquittal dated 4.5.2001. 8. Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Additional P.P. in support of Memo of Appeal urges, inter alia, that the State appellant in its appeal have challenged the impugned judgment and order of acquittal of the accused on the grounds that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the evidence of prosecutrix in true perspective though the evidence of the prosecutrix had been fully corroborated by the extra judicial confessional statement of the accused, inter alia, that he had committed rape on the prosecutrix and thereafter by way of false assurance of marriage exploited her sexually, more so, which has been duly proved by the evidence of the witnesses before the Trial Court. He also contended that the learned Trial Court should not have disbelieved the deposition of the village elder, a Panchayat member, like P.W. 4 before whom the accused confessed that he had sexually intercoursed with the prosecutrix and he agreed to accept the prosecutrix as his wife and his father also agreed to, which the Trial Court discarded treating the whole story as partisan. Another ground of attack on the judgment and order of acquittal is that the Trial Court in no where in its judgment and order discussed regarding the offence committed under Section 417 IPC for which a specific charge was framed by the Trial Court though the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly stated that the prosecutrix was deceived by the accused, particularly, the evidence of P.W. 4 before whom in a Panchayat meeting the accused made extra-judicial confession in presence of his father regarding the said offence when the said evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 were not shaken and as a result of such deception she had given birth of a child and the accused committed offence of cheating. The said aspect was totally overlooked by the Trial Court for which itself also, the order of acquittal of the accused is liable to be interfered with. The said aspect was totally overlooked by the Trial Court for which itself also, the order of acquittal of the accused is liable to be interfered with. While referring to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, he has contended that even if it is conceded that the prosecution failed to prove its case under Section376 of the IPC against the accused respondent, then also it can be safely said that the prosecution proved its case under Section 417 IPC against the accused respondent as he deceived the prosecutrix from the very inception of sexual intercourse with her. He finally submits that the learned Trial Court should not have accepted the medical report ignoring the statements of the prosecutrix only on the ground of omission and contradiction. According to him, the prosecution proved its ease against the accused respondent beyond any shadow of doubt. Consequent thereto, the judgment and order of the Trial Court is called for interference by this Court for conviction and sentence of the accused respondent. 9. In support of his aforesaid submissions, he relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Maran Ch. Paul v. State of Tripura reported in (1996) 2 GLR 75 and another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bipul Medhi v. State of Assam reported in 2006 (3) GLT 585 : (2007) 2 GLR 200 wherein their Lordship discussed the case of Maran Chandra Paul (supra). And finally, he referred to a decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Stat e of Karnataka v. Thimmappa Gowda reported in, particularly, drew the attention to Paras 23 and 24 of the judgment. 10. Per contra, Mr. D.C. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the accused respondent strenuously urges that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the case against the accused respondent under both the Sections 376 and 417 IPC and for such failure of the prosecution, the trial Court rightly acquitted the accused respondent from the charges levelled against him under those sections. 11. He again contended that neither the prosecutrix (P.W.1) herself stated in her deposition any of the ingredients required to prove the offence under Section 417 of the IPC against the accused respondent nor in the Memo of Appeal the State appellant has attacked regarding the failure of discussion of the Trial Court regarding the offence under Section 417 IPC. 11. He again contended that neither the prosecutrix (P.W.1) herself stated in her deposition any of the ingredients required to prove the offence under Section 417 of the IPC against the accused respondent nor in the Memo of Appeal the State appellant has attacked regarding the failure of discussion of the Trial Court regarding the offence under Section 417 IPC. Now it would not be proper for the appellate Court to rely on the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant when the said submissions are contrary to the evidence on record. From the evidence of P.W. 1 and 2, it is established that the witnesses produced by the prosecution except police officer and medical officer are the supporters of a particular political party and inimical to the accused and his family members as they belong to other political party and it cannot be brushed aside that in village politics, some times innocent rivals are implicated in criminal cases to achieve political gain, which had happened in the instant case with the accused respondent. He further submits that the alleged extra judicial confession by the accused before the so called independent witnesses, namely, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, is not at all acceptable as the same was not recorded in the vervetim and such record of Panchayat has been placed before the Trial Court as evidence. More so, there are so many contradiction and discrepancy in the evidence of the prosecution which would be evident from the Exbts. D-1, 2 and 3. 12. Mr. Roy has further contended that it appears from the statement of the accused under Section313 Cr.P.C. that at the time of recording such statements, his age was 20 years, meaning thereby at the time of alleged commission of offence on 15.1.97, the accused was juvenile for which also he is entitled to get the benefit of Section 360 of the Cr.P.C. or the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, and it would also not be proper for the appellate Court to convict the accused after 11 years of the alleged incident of rape and cheating as he has already suffered with mental tension and agony during the said period. 13. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel while countering the argument of the learned Additional P.P., referred to the evidence of P.W. 11, Dr. B.K. Sen, who exhibited the medical report issued by Dr. 13. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel while countering the argument of the learned Additional P.P., referred to the evidence of P.W. 11, Dr. B.K. Sen, who exhibited the medical report issued by Dr. Sucharita Das and specifically stated that the last date of menstruation (IMP) of the prosecutrix as recorded by Dr. (Smt.) Das at the time of examination of the prosecutrix was 1st Poush 1403 B.S. (corresponding to 16/17 Dec. 1996) and the alleged date of rape first took place on 15.1.97. Therefore, the allegation of the prosecutrix that she was pregnant by the accused respondent is not believable at all, rather the suggestion of the defence cannot be ruled out that the prosecutrix was pregnant by the cousin brother namely Sushanta Debnath. He further submits that the evidence of the prosecutrix clearly reveals that she even did not report to her parents about her alleged pregnancy during the initial stages though she was a full grown girl and there was no such evidence that even at the time of alleged promise made by the accused at the time of alleged inducement, there was any fraudulent or dishonest intention in the mind of the accused at the time of making such alleged promise. Therefore, neither a case of 376 IPC nor a case of 417 IPC is made out against the accused respondent and it would not also be proper for the appellate Court to disturb the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court as the views of the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. More so, when from the evidence available on record two views are plausible, one is that the accused might commit offence for which charge (s) has been levelled against him, another is that the accused might not commit the said offence for which charge has been levelled against him and he is totally innocent and victim of situation and in that circumstances, it would be proper for the appellate Court to take the views which favours the accused particularly when the present appeal is against the order of acquittal. Supporting the order of acquittal, he relied on a decision in V. Venkata Subbarao v. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P. reported in, particularly he referred to Paras-29 and 30 of that judgment which are reproduced below: 29. Supporting the order of acquittal, he relied on a decision in V. Venkata Subbarao v. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P. reported in, particularly he referred to Paras-29 and 30 of that judgment which are reproduced below: 29. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, this Court held that when two views are possible, a judgment of acquittal is to be justified. 30. In Kalyan Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 13 SCC 303, this Court has held: The High Court while dealing with the matter, in our considered opinion, failed to apply the proper tests in deciding a case where a judgment of acquittal has been recorded. The views of the learned Trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. It is now well known that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court shall not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of acquittal. We do not, however, mean to lay down the law that the High Court, in a case where a judgment of acquittal is in question, would not go into the evidence brought on records by the prosecution or by the State but we would like to point out that even if the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, it is incumbent on the High Court to arrive at the conclusion that no two views are possible. 14. He also submits that if at all the alleged sexual relation between the prosecutrix and the accused respondent was developed, it was the outcome of consent given by the prosecutrix and the alleged pregnancy might have the result of the said sexual relation. Hence, considering the above, the learned Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused respondent from the alleged charges levelled against him. 15. In support of his contention on the ground of 'consent', he relied on the decision of Jintu Das v. State of Assam reported in (2002) 3 GLR 633, particularly to Paras-12 and 13 where it was held that: If a full grown woman consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact". It was further held that "in such a case prosecutrix consenting to act of sexual intercourse fully knowing nature and implication of such act, conviction of accused for offence of rape is not proper. 16. He also relied on a decision of the Apex Court in Uday v. State of Karnataka reported in 2003CriLJ1539 and referred to Paras-21, 23, 24, 25 and 27 of the said judgment and another decision in Mohd. Mahasin Sk. v. Sayeda Khatun Bibi reported in2005 Cri. LJ. 3162, particularly to Paras 10 and 11 and another decision in V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala reported in 2006 CriLJ 3634. 17. Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Samghaji Sariba Patil v. State of Karnataka reported in and a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Tripura v. Chanu Das @ Chan Mohan Das, he urges that once the Trial Court after appreciation of evidence on record passed an order of acquittal giving cogent and sufficient reason in support of order of acquittal, the High Court normally should not interfere with such order of acquittal unless the reasons given by the Trial Court are perverse or unreasonable. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to prove that the reasons given by the trial Court while acquitting the accused respondents were either perverse or unreasonable. Hence, interference by this Court does not call for. 18. Finally, Mr. Roy referring to the statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has further contended that at the time of recording of such statements, the age of the accused respondent was 20 years, meaning thereby at the time of alleged commission of offence on 15.1.1997, he was juvenile and therefore, the entire trial of the accused respondent was without jurisdiction and vitiated in view of the application of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 as well as Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000 and being the accused respondent was a juvenile at the time of alleged commission of offence, he is also entitled to get the benefit of Section 360 of the Cr.P.C. or the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act and it would also not be proper to convict the accused after about 11 years for the alleged incident of rape and cheating as he has already suffered mental tension and agony during the said period. In support of his submissions he also relied a decision of the Apex Court in Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in. 19. To appreciate the submissions of the learned Counsel of the parties, it would be proper for this Court to reproduce the salient portion of important evidences of the prosecution witnesses: P.W. 1 is the victim girl/prosecutrix and the only eye-witness in the case who disclosed the matter first to her mother (P.W.3). In her deposition, she stated that about 3/3½ years back, on 1st Magha, Wednesday, in the evening, at about 7/7.30 p.m., she was cooking in her kitchen. At that time, in their house, there was none except her minor sister, aged about 4 years. Her parents were in their shop. The accused Laxman Debnath of their locality entered into their house. Then he entered into their kitchen and hugged her. The accused pushed her, for which she fell down on the ground and then the accused raped her against her will. When she told the accused that she would inform this to her parents, the accused after taking her hand on his head promised her that he would marry her and requested her not disclose the fact to anyone. Subsequently, the accused started coming to her in every three/four alternative days and used to sexual intercourse with her. After 2/3 months when her periodical menstruation stopped she informed it to the accused. The accused assured her that on 3rd Jaistha, he will marry her on coming to the court by court marriage. But on 3rd Jaistha, the accused did not come to her for such court marriage. She then informed the matter to her mother (P.W.3) who in turn informed her father (P.W.2). Her father informed the matter to the Panchayat and the local club. Thereafter, a meeting was held in the Panchayat wherein the accd. and his father, the prosecutrix and her parents, other villagers and elders were present. In the meeting, the father of the accused agreed to take her as the wife of his son if his son Laxman agreed to marry her. Accused Laxman also confessed that he did illicit cohabitation with her and agreed to take her as his wife. But the accused did not keep his word and ultimately fled away from the village. In the meeting, the father of the accused agreed to take her as the wife of his son if his son Laxman agreed to marry her. Accused Laxman also confessed that he did illicit cohabitation with her and agreed to take her as his wife. But the accused did not keep his word and ultimately fled away from the village. She also stated that after she lodged the complaint, police sent her to Belonia hospital where the doctor examined her. After one week, she was referred to Udaipur Hospital. There also doctor examined her. Due to stopping of menstruation, she became pregnant and ultimately within a year she gave birth of a female child at Belonia Hospital. That female child is still alive and she is aged about 3/3½ years. The accused was present before the court and identified. In her cross-examination, she has stated that she along with her father and mother consulted the Advocate for preparation of the complaint lodged before the Court. They had not narrated all the facts therein as stated by her today before the Court. She has further stated that she does not remember whether in the complaint petition, she stated that the accused would marry her by court marriage on 3rd Jaistha. No statement, however, was found in the complaint petition when it was confronted to her. She has stated further that before the accused entered into their kitchen for the first time, she had no talk with him, but she was seeing him since her birth and before the accused raped her for the first time, he never visited their house and she did not cry or raise alarm even on seeing the accused in their house as intruder. Her younger sister, who was only in the house, was sleeping when the accused raped her. She has also stated that she is illiterate and now she can writ her name, which she learnt through Illiteracy Eradication Training. After evening, when her brother and sisters left from the house for selling fire wood, the accused used to visit her and intercoursed with her in the evening. After three-four months of their cohabitation, her menstruation was stopped. Even after slopping of menstruation, the accused intercoursed with her frequently for about 1/1½ month. She told the doctor the month when her menstruation was stopped. After three-four months of their cohabitation, her menstruation was stopped. Even after slopping of menstruation, the accused intercoursed with her frequently for about 1/1½ month. She told the doctor the month when her menstruation was stopped. On 30th Jaistha she told her mother that her period was stopped. She remembers the date since she waited for the accused to marry her till the date. Her parents informed Kami Choudhury, (P.W. 4) their neighbour, who is also a Panchayat member of their locality. She also stated that she knows the house of the accused which is situated less than a distance of 1 k.m. from our house. 20. P.W. 2 is the father of the prosecutrix who in his deposition stated that about 4 years back, in the month of Jaistha, one day, his wife told him that the accused Laxman Debnath after entering into their house raped her daughter in the month of Magha in one evening time. The date may be 2nd or 4th Magha. His wife further told him that his daughter became pregnant and asked him to think over to get rid of this problem. Then he reported the matter to the Panchayat. A meeting was held in the Panchayat and in the meeting, the accused confessed that he cohabited with his daughter and agreed to marry her daughter in present of the Panchayat pradhan, members and other elderly people. The father of the accused told in the meeting that within 15 days they will fix a date of marriage in between complainant and the accused. But even after expiry of 15 days, no date of marriage was fixed and even the accused did not take his daughter to his house. On informing the matter again to the Panchayat, the father of the accused again assured that his daughter will be taken by his son shortly. But ultimately, neither the father of the accused nor the accused took his daughter to their house and as per advise of the Panchayat, then his daughter lodged the complaint. When his daughter lodged the complaint, she was pregnant for six months. His daughter was examined at Belonia Hospital and Udaipur Hospital and after about four months later of filing the case, his daughter gave birth to a female child. When his daughter lodged the complaint, she was pregnant for six months. His daughter was examined at Belonia Hospital and Udaipur Hospital and after about four months later of filing the case, his daughter gave birth to a female child. He also went on to state that he and his daughter narrated the whole matter to their Advocate Sri Dilip Dey before complaint petition was filed before the court. He stated to his Advocate Sri Dey at the time of drafting the complaint petition that there was a Panchayat meeting for the incident of his daughter. He has further stated that he had seen the accused Laxman at the time of entering into his house. 21. P.W. 3, Smt. Sanchirani Debnath, who is the mother of the prosecutrix, has stated that in the month of Magha, one day, she was informed by her daughter that her daughter was raped by the accused in the evening at about 6/7 p.m. when she and her husband were in their shop and other children went to Belonia to sell fire wood and their youngest daughter was sleeping in their house and due to such rape by the accused, her daughter became pregnant. She informed the matter to her husband who then informed the matter to the panchayat. In the Panchayat, though the accused told to marry her daughter, he did not keep his word, rather he absconded himself and left their village. 22. P.W. 4, Sri Kanu Choudhury is a co-villager and a Panchayat member. He stated in his deposition that about 4/4½ years back, probably in the month of Jaistha, in the morning, the parents of prosecutrix came his house and informed that probably 4/5 months back at about 7/7.30 p.m. the accused raped the victim girl finding her alone in the house. They further informed that the accused used to visit their house off and on and due to their cohabitation, their daughter became pregnant. When marriage proposal was given by her, the accused started avoiding her. The parents sought his advice to get rid of the problem. The parents also informed the matter to the Pradhan. A Panchayat meeting was held and the accused confessed that the prosecutrix was pregnant by him and his father told that since his son confessed his guilt for making her pregnant, he will arrange marriage for them. The parents sought his advice to get rid of the problem. The parents also informed the matter to the Pradhan. A Panchayat meeting was held and the accused confessed that the prosecutrix was pregnant by him and his father told that since his son confessed his guilt for making her pregnant, he will arrange marriage for them. He wanted 10/15 days time for their marriage, but he did not keep his promise and there was no arrangement of marriage between them. The accused fled away towards Bangladesh. 23. P.W. 5, Gopinath Shil, who was Pradhan of I.C. Nagar Gaon Panchayat in the year 1997, in his deposition stated about 4 years back, one day, the parents of the victim girl informed him that while their daughter was alone in the house, the accused entered their house and raped her and due to their cohabitation, their daughter became pregnant, and then the accused was avoiding her though he assured to marry her. Therefore, parents of the victim girl sought his advice. So a meeting was convened by him wherein the accused confessed that he used to visit victim girl and out of fear of his father he was avoiding her. In the meeting, the father of the accused agreed to take the victim girl as his son's wife. Later, the accused fled away and he advised the father of the victim girl to take shelter of law. In his cross-examination, he further stated that the meeting called by him for the victim girl and the accused was not a Panchayat meeting but was a social meeting to settle the issue. To call a meeting through Panchayat, they have a resolution book in the Panchayat and they call meeting by giving notice to the parties. He also stated that he did not know whether the accused fled away from the party office and took shelter in the house of Narayan Shil. He knew Narayan Shil. To call a meeting through Panchayat, they have a resolution book in the Panchayat and they call meeting by giving notice to the parties. He also stated that he did not know whether the accused fled away from the party office and took shelter in the house of Narayan Shil. He knew Narayan Shil. He also stated that while the parents of the victim girl came to his house to inform the incident, none was present and he did not enquire when the parents of the victim girl came to know about the incident of rape and pregnancy of their daughter, and he had also no personal knowledge about the facts of rape and the accused and his father except that incident were not involved in any other crime so far he knew. 24. P.W. 8, Sri Nani Gopal Biswas is the O.C. BLN P.S. On receipt of the petition on 2.8.97, he registered BLN P.S. Case No. 81/97 under 376 IPC. During investigation, he visited the place of occurrence and recorded the statements of the available witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He also arranged medical examination of the victim at BLN Hospital first on 2.8.97. On 5.8.97, the victim was sent to T.S. Hospital, Udaipur for her pregnancy test. 25. P.W. 9, Dr. Arup Bhattacharjee is the medical officer in the Pathology Deptt. at T.S. Dist. Hospital. Udaipur, who examined the victim girl, P.W. 10 Dr. Dilip Kr. Das is the Medical Officer at T.S. Dist. Hospital, Udaipur who conducted the Ultra Sonography examination of the victim girl. 26. After reproduction of the material part of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it would be better for the Court to properly notice the impugned judgment wherein the Trial Court had examined the medical report as well as the evidence of prosecutrix in paragraphs 19, 21, 22 and 23 of the judgment. Accordingly, this Court has gone through the same. After going through the aforesaid paragraph of the impugned judgment, for better appreciation, this Court feels it necessary to quote those paragraphs. Accordingly, the same are quoted hereunder: 19. On perusal of the medical report which is exhibited by the prosecution is marked as Exbt.-6, and it is found that the prosecutrix was examined at Belonia Hospital on 2.8.97 at 12.30 p.m. by Dr. Smt. Sucharita Das. Accordingly, the same are quoted hereunder: 19. On perusal of the medical report which is exhibited by the prosecution is marked as Exbt.-6, and it is found that the prosecutrix was examined at Belonia Hospital on 2.8.97 at 12.30 p.m. by Dr. Smt. Sucharita Das. After carefully going through the said medical report, it is found that at the time of her examination by the said Dr. Smt. Das, the prosecutrix stated to the Doctor that she was raped on 17th Magha 1403 B.S. (31st January, 1997 A.D.) duration of cycle 30 days, duration of bleeding 5 days, so, as per the statement of the prosecutrix recorded by the Medical Officer at the time of her examination, her next menstruation was to be started on the 1st day of Magha or on any day in the first week of Magha 1403 B.S. But from the complaint petition and also from the deposition of the prosecutrix, it is found that she was raped by the accused at first on 1st Magha 1403 B.S. Moreover, it is found that at the time of examination by the Doctor, the prosecutrix stated that she was raped by the accused on 17th Magha 1403 B.S. (corresponding to 31st January, 1997 A.D.), but in her deposition and complaint she has stated that she was raped by the accused on 1st Magha 1403 B.S., corresponding to 15th January, 1997. So, here I find that there is a vital contradiction regarding the date of rape (i.e. first intercourse by the accused with the prosecutrix). It is also found from the deposition and the medical report (Exbt. 6) that the last date of menstruation of the prosecutrix is first Poush 1403 B.S. and as per deposition of the prosecutrix, she was first raped by the accused on 1st Magha 1403 B.S. and as per medical report she was raped by the accused on 31st January, 1997. Even if her deposition regarding the date of rape is accepted in that case also it is found that she was pregnant before the alleged rape by the accused on 1st Magha 1403 B.S. The said medical report is exhibited by the P.W.-11 Dr. B.K. Sen who is a most experienced Doctor of Tripura Health Service and has been serving in Tripura Health Service since 1974." 21. B.K. Sen who is a most experienced Doctor of Tripura Health Service and has been serving in Tripura Health Service since 1974." 21. On careful perusal of the deposition of P.W.-1 (prosecutrix), it is found that she has not at all resisted the accused at the time of alleged rape and did not try to give alarm to save herself from the alleged rape and she has informed the matter to her mother only after becoming pregnant of about six months which is quite unnatural in case of any rape. 22. In view of the above omissions and contradictions between the deposition of the prosecutrix and the medical report (Exbt-6) and also between the complaint/F.I.R. which is drafted by senior member of Belonia Bar after knowing the entire fact from the mouth of prosecutrix and her father and the deposition of the complainant on material points as discussed above, I am of the opinion that the prosecutrix who is the sole eye-witness of the alleged incident of rape can not be relied upon at all and the alleged extra-judicial confession alleged to have been given by the accused in the meeting of Panchayat is also can not be accepted for want of any evidence of any independent witness, as the witnesses regarding the said extra-judicial confession of the accused person either interested or partition one. 23. In view of the above discussion, I find that prosecution has failed to prove the case against the present accused Laxman Debnath beyond reasonable doubt and for which he is entitled to be acquitted from the charges framed against him. 27. 23. In view of the above discussion, I find that prosecution has failed to prove the case against the present accused Laxman Debnath beyond reasonable doubt and for which he is entitled to be acquitted from the charges framed against him. 27. In the case of Bipul Medhi (supra), the Division Bench of this Court after referring to the case of Maran Chandra Paul (supra) as well as taking into consideration the case of Dilip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar AIR 2005 SC 203 , wherein the decision of Uday (supra) had been considered, came to the conclusion that when an accused dishonestly induced a woman to have sexual intercourse with her on the basis of false promise to marry her, the said dishonest inducement would come within the purview of simple cheating under Section 417 IPC and for coming to the said conclusion, their lordship also discussed the Section 90 of the IPC wherein it is stated "Consent known to be given under fear or misconception-A consent is not such a consent as is intended by section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person-If the consent is given by a person, who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of Child-Unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age." Their lordship also referred to the word 'consent' as has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, which are as follows: Consent-Agreement, approval, or permission as to some act, or purpose, esp. give voluntarily by a competent person. Consent is an affirmative defence to assault, battery, and related torts, as well as such torts on defamation, invasion of privacy, conversion, and trespass-consent. 28. give voluntarily by a competent person. Consent is an affirmative defence to assault, battery, and related torts, as well as such torts on defamation, invasion of privacy, conversion, and trespass-consent. 28. Their Lordship not only referred to the provisions of Section 415 as well as 417 of the IPC in the said judgment, for explaining the essential ingredients to attract the Section 415 of the IPC but also took the assistance from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla reported in 2004 CriLJ 1774 wherein the Apex Court held that: Section 415 defines 'cheating'. The said provision requires : (i) deception of any person, (ii) whereby fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property or (iii) intentional inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. Deception of any person is common to the second and third requirements of the provision. The said requirements are alternative to each other and this is made significantly clear by use of disjunctive conjunction 'or'. The definition of the offence of cheating embraces some cases in which no transfer of property is occasioned by the deception and some in which such a transfer occurs. Deception is the quintessence of the offence. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 are; (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver is property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable property; and (ii) the mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. 29. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 are; (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver is property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable property; and (ii) the mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. 29. Taking into consideration of the above decision of the Apex Court as well as the decision of the Moran Chandra Paul (supra) of this Court and Joleswar Kalita v. State of Assam 1993 (2) LLJ 100 Guj, the Division Bench approved the decision of Maran Chandra Paul (supra) and held that Joleswar Kalita (supra) not be a good law and ultimately upheld the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial Court stating that: Since the definition of offence cheating indicates as already pointed out above, that even when no parting of property is occasioned by deception, the deception may still amount to cheating if, as a result of the deception, a woman does anything or omits to do anything, which she would not have, but for such deception, done or omitted to do, it logically follows that when an accused, not intending to marry a woman induces the woman, so deceived, to have sexual intercourse with him or induces such a woman to omit from resisting the act of sexual intercourse by him with her, the act of the accused of having sexual intercourse with such a woman would amount to offence of cheating if the act of the woman in letting such a man have sexual intercourse with her or the act of the woman in omitting to resist the act of sexual intercourse by such a man with her causes or is likely to cause damage of harm to the person of such a woman, her mind or reputation. 30. In Moran Chandra Paul (supra), the age of the victim girl was between 14 to 16 as per the statement of the Radiologist of GB. Hospital, Agartala, P.W. 1 of that case, meaning thereby that the victim girl was a minor one and her consent has no value and the age of the victim girl in Bipul Medhi (supra) is not specifically mentioned. Hospital, Agartala, P.W. 1 of that case, meaning thereby that the victim girl was a minor one and her consent has no value and the age of the victim girl in Bipul Medhi (supra) is not specifically mentioned. This Court is not in a position to properly appreciate the fact of that case except the law laid down by their Lordship in a Division Bench. But in the case of Uday (supra) the age of the prosecutrix was about 19 years on the date of occurrence, as per her own statement and the appellant Uday was also a young man of about 20/21 years of age when the occurrence took place, though he claimed to be 25 years of age when he was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, there was no dispute that both the prosecutrix as well as the accused of that case was grown up girl and boy and a friendship was developed between them and the appellant Uday proposed to marry her and there was also no dispute that both of them fell in love with each other though belonged to different castes. Considering the aforesaid facts in the case of Uday (supra), the Apex Court in Paras-21 and 23 held that: 21. It, therefore, appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysts, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them. 23. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily, and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact. 31. In the instant case, though the fact of the case of Uday (supra) has no direct bearing, but only similarity is that both the prosecutrix and the accused in both the cases are full grown up young boy and girl and proceeded with sexual intercourse consciously and became pregnant. It is a settled position that if a full grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage, it shall not be considered as an act of inducement by misconception of fact and mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution of cheating unless the fraudulent or dishonest intention is done right at the beginning of the transaction i.e. time when the offence is said to have been committed. In the instant case, it appears from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that while the victim girl was cooking in the kitchen in her house, the accused respondent allegedly entered into the said kitchen and embraced her and also committed rape by pushing her on the ground against her will and when she told the accused that she would inform the matter to her parents, the accused taking her hand on his head promised her that he would marry her and requested not to disclose the incident to any one. With the said assurance, the accused used to visit the victim girl almost every 3/4 alternative days and committed sexual intercourse with her which continued about 2/3 months. But the victim girl no where stated in her deposition that she tried to resist the accused respondent from committing rape to her and she also did not state anywhere that when she was agreed to sexual intercourse with the accused respondent on account of promise of the marriage, the said promise by the accused respondent was false to the knowledge of the accused respondent at the time it was made for establishing a charge under Section 417 IPC. It also appears from the record that she did not disclose regarding the alleged fact of rape as well as subsequent sexual intercourse either to her parents or to the village Panchayat till she became pregnant although consequences of sexual intercourse were very much known to her as she understood the tone of marriage, meaning thereby she believed that the initial promise of the accused respondent was not with an ill intention to deceive her, but the accused turned out from his promise only after the alleged meeting of Panchayat. Hence the Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused respondent from the charge of 376 IPC and Section 417 IPC, though in the judgment of the learned Trial Court, there is no specific discussion on Section 417 IPC. Hence the Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused respondent from the charge of 376 IPC and Section 417 IPC, though in the judgment of the learned Trial Court, there is no specific discussion on Section 417 IPC. As this Court relying on the principle laid down in Uday (supra) has already stated that if a full grown girl consented to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage, it would be considered as an act of inducement by misconception of fact and it can be easily held that mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution of cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is right at the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have committed. Hence this Court has no hesitation to hold that no case is made out against the accused respondent for committing an offence of cheating which is punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. 32. According to this Court, when the Trial Court found contradiction between the deposition of the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) and the complaint/FIR as well as the medical report (Exbt.6), and between the statements of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, the Trial Court rightly disbelieved the statement of the prosecutrix and also P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 as both of them are interested and inimical. It can also not be ruled out that the accused and his family members being supporters of Congress party and the prosecutrix and other witnesses produced by the prosecution except the official witnesses being the supporters of the CPI (M) party, the accused was falsely implicated in the alleged offence due to political rivalry. 33. In a criminal case, degree of proof is the dictum than that what is required in a civil proceeding and if there is slightest doubt in the mind of the Court regarding involvement of the accused person, then the Court should not go for convicting the accused person with such a doubt, rather it would be proper for the Court to pass an order of acquittal in favour of the accused. When Trial Court after proper appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses passed an order of acquittal, it would not be proper for the appellate Court to disturb the said order unless the said order of acquittal is unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the appellate Court should not disturb the said order, rather, the Court should uphold the view favoured the accused. 34. Next question arises whether the present case should be remanded to the Juvenile Justice Board after setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. As the accused respondent was admittedly below the age of 18 at the time of commission of offence and as the accused respondent was not convicted by the Trial Court and this Court also held in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment that no case is made out against the accused respondent for conviction either under Section 376 or under Section 417 IPC, for providing the benefit of provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, it would not be proper for this Court to remit the case before the Juvenile Justice Board after lapse of a period of 11 years as that would be an injustice to the accused respondent. This Court is of further opinion that before proceeding with any criminal trial, in such a case, the Trial Court should ascertain the age of the accused person at the time of commission of offence and if it is found that the accused was below 18 years at the time of commission of offence, then he should not be tried by the normal Criminal Court, rather, the case ought to be sent to the Juvenile Justice Board so that the accused can get the benefit provided under the Juvenile Justice Act. When a juvenile delinquent is arrested, he or she has to be produced before the Juvenile Justice Board and if no Juvenile Justice Board is constituted for the area, amongst others, the Court of Session will have the powers of Juvenile Justice Board and such a juvenile delinquent ordinarily has to be released on bail irrespective of the nature of offence alleged to have been committed unless it is shown that there appears reasonable grounds for believing that release is likely to bring him under the influence of any criminal or expose him to moral danger or defeat ends of justice. And if there is Juvenile Justice Board, then he should be tried by the said Board, not by the Court of Sessions and before proceeding with the trial, the Trial Court should enquire about age of the accused person and if it is found that at the time of commission of offence, the accused respondent was a juvenile, then he should be sent to the Juvenile Justice Board for trial. In the instant case, plea of the accused respondent as a juvenile was not taken up before the trial Court, rather first time raised before this Court and it would not be proper for this Court to discard the said plea as in many cases, the question of age of the accused below 18 years on the date of occurrence was raised before the Apex Court for first time to get the benefit of either of the Children Act or the Juvenile Act and the Apex Court also considered the same and in some cases as referred to by the learned Counsel for the accused respondent upheld the conviction, but set aside the sentence without remanding the same though the trial was vitiated. 35. In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in mind the aforesaid principle, this Court is also of the opinion that it would not be proper to set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court and remand the same to the Juvenile Justice Board for fresh trial. Hence, the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.