Judgment :- This writ petition is directed, against the proceedings of the respondent in reference No R.Dis.55612/89 dated 18. 1989, whereby an Executive Officer was appointed to conduct the administration of Arulmigu Servai Vinayagar Thirukoil, Chennai. .2. The factual details as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition are as under:- .The property bearing Door No.27, Subramania Mudali Street, Chennai originally belonged to the ancestors of the petitioner and the said property, having one ground and a residential house was donated by the ancestors of the petitioner for the purpose of construction of a temple and accordingly the temple was constructed in the said property and the ancestors of the petitioner have been administering the temple as hereditary trustee-cum-Archaka for the last seven generations and the temple was administered till 21. 1994 by the father of the petitioner and after him, the petitioner became the hereditary trustee. Subsequently the petitioner filed O.A.No.10 of 1995 to declare him as a hereditary trustee and the Joint Commissioner after elaborate enquiry passed an order dated 12. 1998 declaring the status of the petitioner as a hereditary trustee. In pursuance of the said declaration, the Joint Commissioner passed the consequent order dated 7. 1998 directing the Executive Officer in-charge of the temple to hand over the entire charge to the petitioner. 3. Since the Executive Officer failed to hand over the administration to the petitioner as per the direction of the Joint Commissioner, the petitioner filed W.P.No.14095 of 1998 for a direction to the Executive Officer to hand over the charge to the petitioner and the said writ petition was allowed as per order dated 11. 1999. The said order was challenged in writ Appeal No.268 of 1999 and during the hearing of the said appeal it was brought to the notice of the Division Bench that the order dated 18. 1989 appointing the Executive Officer to the temple has not been cancelled and as such the petitioner was directed to take steps to set aside the order dated 18. 1989 within two weeks. Accordingly the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. .4. 1989 appointing the Executive Officer to the temple has not been cancelled and as such the petitioner was directed to take steps to set aside the order dated 18. 1989 within two weeks. Accordingly the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. .4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent it was their case that the temple in question was a non-listed temple assessed to the contribution of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment administration and the management was looked after till 1988 by Ganapathy Gurukkal, father of the petitioner by virtue of his appointment under the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act (hereinafter referred to as H.R. & C.E Act) as trustee. In March, 1998 the Executive Officer of Byragi Mandam Arulmigu Venkatesa Perumal Temple was appointed as Fit Person, pending constitution of the Trust Board and as such with effect from 13. 1988 the Fit Person has been managing the temple. In February, 1999 the said Fit Person requested the department to appoint an Executive Officer for the temple under Section 45 of the Act and it was only as per the said request that an Executive Officer was appointed as per the impugned proceedings dated 18. 1989. It was only as per the proceedings dated 12. 1998 that the petitioner was appointed as the trustee and neither the Fit Person nor the Executive Officer were parties to the said proceedings. Since the appointment of the Executive Officer was made prior to the order in O.A.No.10 of 1995, the respondent maintained that the petitioner was not entitled to notice before initiating action under Section 45 of H.R. & C.E. Act. In the said factual scenario, the respondent has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-contended that the declaration as made in O.A.No.10 of 1995 was in fact only a declaration of the existing status and nothing was conferred by the said order and as such it cannot be said that only as per the order dated 12. 1998 that the petitioner became a trustee of the temple and as such he was not entitled for a notice before appointment of the Executive Officer. 6. 1998 that the petitioner became a trustee of the temple and as such he was not entitled for a notice before appointment of the Executive Officer. 6. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that even prior to the appointment of the Executive Officer, a Fit Person was appointed for the temple and the administration of the temple was vested with the Fit Person and the petitioner was no where in the picture at that point of time and as such no notice was given to the petitioner. When there was no hereditary trustee administering the temple at the material point of time, there was no requirement to give notice prior to the appointment of the Executive Officer and the department was well within their powers to appoint the Executive Officer and as such no interference is called for in the impugned proceedings. .7. It is found from the proceedings of the Joint Commissioner dated 12. 1998 in O.A.No.10 of 1995 that the temple was in successive administration of the family members of the petitioner. Initially the ancestors of the petitioner were holding office as Gurukkal-cum-hereditary trustee of the institution. The founder trustee died in the year 1886 leaving behind his two sons to succeed the office of the trusteeship and finally it devolved on Meenakshi Ammal. Later one Mr. Vishwanatha Gurukkal became the trustee and he died on 21. 1937, and the temple was administered by one kumarasamy Gurukkal in the line of succession and after the death of the subsequent trustee by name Ganapathi Gurukkal on 21. 1994, the petitioner being his son became the hereditary trustee and he has been managing and administering the office. It was also the finding of the Joint Commissioner that no outsiders of the family have ever functioned as trustee in the temple and the office of the trusteeship had always been vested in the family of the petitioner and his ancestors in the unbroken line of succession from father to son. There was also a factual finding in the report of the Joint Commissioner that there was no hundi in the temple, and the temple had no other property except the house and the house property enjoyed by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. There was also a factual finding in the report of the Joint Commissioner that there was no hundi in the temple, and the temple had no other property except the house and the house property enjoyed by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. It was under the said circumstances, the Joint Commissioner thought it fit to get a declaration of trusteeship under Section 63 (b) of the Act. 8. The report of the Joint Commissioner in the proceedings in O.A.No.10 of 1995 clearly shows that the petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest were in management of the temple functioning as hereditary trustee and what was conveyed by the order dated 12. 1998 was only a declaration of the existing status and as such it is clear that as on the date on which the Executive Officer was appointed as per the impugned proceedings dated 18. 1989, the petitioner was the trustee of the temple. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, they have contended that the appointment of Executive Officer no way affects the rights of the petitioner and continuance of Executive Officer does not have the effect of terminating the office of hereditary trustee. It was also indicated that the declaration of the status of the petitioner as hereditary trustee has nothing to do with the impugned order of appointment and the Executive Officer is not interfering in the functions of the petitioner. .9. It is true that Section 45(1) of the H.R. & C.E. Act permits the Commissioner to appoint an executive Officer for any religious institution other than a math or a specific endowment attached to the math. When there was a hereditary trustee functioning in respect of a particular temple, such trustee should be taken into confidence before such appointment. It is not as if such appointment should be made for a mere asking. It is found from the decided cases with respect to Section 45 of the Act that only in case the Commissioner is satisfied that the administration of the temple has not been conducted in a proper manner and there was misuse of the authority by the hereditary trustee, that such appointment could be made and that too after giving an opportunity of hearing to the hereditary trustee. However in the present case, no such notice has been given to the petitioner before such appointment. However in the present case, no such notice has been given to the petitioner before such appointment. The reason for such a course is explained by the learned Government Pleader to the effect that the declaration with respect to the status of the petitioner as hereditary trustee has not been made as on the date on which the Executive Officer was appointed. Even though technically such argument would be valid, but on a consideration of the order of the Joint Commissioner in the proceedings in O.A.No.10 of 1995, it is clear that the petitioner as well as his ancestors were functioning as hereditary trustee with respect to the temple. The order passed by the Joint Commissioner in O.A.No.10 of 1995 was only a declaration of the existing fact as well as the existing status of the petitioner as a trustee. There was no conferment of any new right on the petitioner by such appointment. 10. In Nagarajan V. Commissioner H.R & C.E. (1983 Law Weekly 753), the issue before a Division Bench of this court was in relation to appointment made by the Commissioner of H.R. & C.E. in respect of a temple without notice to the hereditary trustee and after considering Section 45(1) of the H.R. & C.E. Act, the Division Bench held thus:- " It may be seen that by appointing an Executive Officer with such powers the hereditary trustee is reduced to a non-entity as it were. The power under Section 45 to appoint an Executive Officer may no doubt be exercised by the Commissioner in proper cases. The discretion vested in him is to he exercised reasonably and fairly, because the power by its very nature is a drastic one, and appointment of an executive officer is more often than not, likely to virtually eliminate a hereditary trustee. It is now well settled that hereditary trusteeship is property and as such it is entitled to protection. It is in view of this that the procedure in Section 47 has been provided that where non-hereditary trustees are to be appointed along with the hereditary trustees, the appointment should be preceded by such enquiry as the Commissioner may deem adequate and he could make the appointment only if he considered there were reasons therefore which should be recorded. The reasons should suggest that the institutions concerned are not likely to be managed properly by the hereditary trustee. The reasons should suggest that the institutions concerned are not likely to be managed properly by the hereditary trustee. The inter position of an executive officer may in some respects be regarded as even more drastic than the appointment of a non-hereditary trustee, more especially as the executive Officer is vested with sweeping powers such as in the instance case, which deprive the hereditary trusteeship of its subsistence. In our opinion, such a power, drastic as it is, has to be exercised carefully and only where proper reasons existed showing that the temple or the math concerned has not been properly managed by the hereditary trustee. The power under Section 45(1) does not mean that the Commissioner., if he so wills, though there is no reason whatever justifying, can exercise the power and appoint an Executive Officer for a religious institution. We consider,-therefore, that before making the appointment, he must inform the hereditary trustee of the reasons which , according to him would, justify the appointment of an Executive Officer, ask for his explanation and after considering the same, if he still, thinks that an Executive Officer is necessary, he may properly exercise his power. It is true that Section 45 does not contemplate any notice or enquiry, but that does not mean that by exercising power under Section 45 at will the Commissioner can invade the hereditary trusteeship which is property as he has done in this case." 11. The judgment of this court in Nagarajan V. Commissioner H.R & C.E. (1983 Law Weekly 753) cited supra has been followed in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments V. K. Jothiramalingam (1999 LAW WEEKLY 601) and after analysing the provisions of Section 45(1) of the H.R. & C.E. Act, the Division Bench observed thus "….. The judgment of this court in Nagarajan V. Commissioner H.R & C.E. (1983 Law Weekly 753) cited supra has been followed in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments V. K. Jothiramalingam (1999 LAW WEEKLY 601) and after analysing the provisions of Section 45(1) of the H.R. & C.E. Act, the Division Bench observed thus "….. Ordinarily, in the case of the hereditary trustee in charge of an institution, he is clothed with plenary powers in the matter of the management as well as the administration of the temple in that he would be entitled to possession of all the properties and movables of the institution, to receive the income in cash and kind and in the shape of offerings, to make disbursements and incur expenditure, to draw up a budget, to exercise control over all office holders and servants and be in charge of the temple and responsible , for the maintenance of the records, accounts and registers, to see to the supply provisions and stores and check the same and to see to the performance of the poojas, festivals and other services according to the usage and dhittam, to bring actions on behalf of the institution and represent the institution in actions brought against it and to allot work to the office holders and servants, etc. But the appointment, of an Executive Officer under Section 45(1) of the Act coupled with the conferment on him of all or almost all the above powers, would be to relegate the hereditary trustee to the position of a non-entity. We ought not to be understood as saying that the Commissioner cannot exercise his powers under Section 45(1) of the Act, in a case, where the institution is under the administration and management of a hereditary trustee. No doubt, the power under Section 45 of the Act can be and has also to be exercised by the Commissioner appropriately in such case. The power vested in the Commissioner under Section 45 (1) of the Act being a very drastic one, it has to be exercised cautiously, reasonably and fairly as the exercise of such power may even result in the effective elimination of the hereditary trustee from management and administration of the institution. The power vested in the Commissioner under Section 45 (1) of the Act being a very drastic one, it has to be exercised cautiously, reasonably and fairly as the exercise of such power may even result in the effective elimination of the hereditary trustee from management and administration of the institution. Therefore it is, that natural justice and fair play require that the Commissioner should properly exercise the power under Section 45(1) of the Act, after being satisfied that the institution has not been properly managed and the then administration leaves much to be desired and requires to be toned up or improved and the appointment of an Executive Officer is justified to secure such better administration. This can be done only after communication to the hereditary trustee of the reasons, which according to the Commissioner justified the appointment of an Executive Officer and after calling for an explanation from him with reference to the irregularities and maladministration and after considering the same. If, after adhering to these requirements, the Commissioner still finds that the interests of the institution would be served better only by the appointment of an Executive Officer, he may properly exercise the power under Section 45(1) of the Act. Though Section 45(1) of the Act by its terms does not contemplate any notice or enquiry, it does not mean that the Commissioner, while exercising powers thereunder, can displace a hereditary trustee at his will and pleasure, throwing out even such hereditary trustees, who efficiently manage and administer the institution in their charge." 12. In a recent judgment in the case of Sivasubramanian.N V. The Government of Tamil Nadu By Secretary, Hr & Ce ( 2006(2) CTC 49 ), a Division Bench of this court interfered in the order of the Commissioner appointing the Executive Officer under Section 45(1) of H.R. & C.E. Act on the ground of non issue of notice to the hereditary trustee and observed thus:- "11. Section 45 of the Act, even though empowers the second respondent to pass an order appointing Executive Officer, that power has to be exercised in terms of the policy of the Act. The said power shall be exercised coupled with a duty. Therefore it is the duty of the second respondent, to see as to whether the Executive Officer has to be appointed for better and proper administration of the group of temples. 12. The said power shall be exercised coupled with a duty. Therefore it is the duty of the second respondent, to see as to whether the Executive Officer has to be appointed for better and proper administration of the group of temples. 12. As pointed out above, no doubt the second respondent is empowered to appoint Executive Officer under section 45(1) of the Act. But to exercise the said power, there must be a maladministration by the trustees and to find out whether there is any maladministration or not, it is the duty of the second respondent to issue notice to the trustees, hear their objections and only after prima facie satisfaction of the maladministration, the second respondent is empowered to exercise the power under section 45(1) of the Act and appoint the Executive Officer. 13. Here in this case, based on the complaint/representation given by the 6th respondent, the impugned order is passed at the instance of the 6th respondent, appointing 5th respondent as Executive Officer, but without issuing notice to the petitioner or other trustees. A perusal of the impugned order amply establishes the fact that the second respondent has not issued any notice to any of the trustees including the petitioner. The administration of the temples, particularly the denominational temples, by the trustees is a valuable right and the same cannot be lightly divested under the guise of exercising power under section 45(1) of the HR&CE Act. The impugned order having civil consequences against the petitioner and other trustees, the second respondent is bound to give notice to the petitioner and other trustees and only after hearing their objections, if any, the Executive Officer can be appointed, if the explanation submitted by the trustees are not satisfied. " 13. In view of the reasons aforesaid and the binding judgment of the Division Bench referred to above, I am of the view that the respondent committed serious error in passing the impugned order appointing an Executive Officer for the temple in question without issuing notice to the petitioner. The property of the temple has been dedicated by the ancestors of the petitioner and the petitioners father and after his death the petitioner has been managing the affairs of the temple. No kind of malpractice or maladministration has been alleged against the petitioner. The property of the temple has been dedicated by the ancestors of the petitioner and the petitioners father and after his death the petitioner has been managing the affairs of the temple. No kind of malpractice or maladministration has been alleged against the petitioner. Even in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent as well as in the argument of the learned Special Government Pleader on behalf of the respondent, the only point advanced was in respect of the declaration of status of the petitioner subsequent to the impugned order and as such they have justified their action solely on the ground that there was no declaration of hereditary trustee or status prior to the impugned order and as such no notice was required to be issued to the petitioner. The said argument does not deserve consideration in as much as the order dated 12. 1998 in O.A.No.10 of 1995 clearly shows that the temple has been under the administration of the petitioner as a hereditary trustee. Naturally the petitioner has got sentimental attachment towards the temple and unless justifiable reasons are demonstrated, the respondent cannot make the appointment, of an Executive Officer. However the reasons or sufficiency of the reasons is not a matter for adjudication in the present case as there was no allegation of maladministration made against the petitioner for the purpose of passing the impugned order of appointment of Executive Officer. Therefore the impugned order has to be quashed solely on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. In a recent Judgment, in Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow V. Commissioner Of Income Tax reported in 2008(6) SCALE 733, the Apex Court observed that the phrase "natural justice is not capable of a precise definition and the said principle evolved under the common law is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State and its functionaries and held thus:- "11. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in, A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in, A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see: Income Tax Officer & Ors. Vs. M/s Madnani Engineering Works Ltd., Calcutta). ...................................................... 17. In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. explaining as to what is meant by expression civil consequence, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the majority said: " Civil Consequences undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personnel rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil Consequence. " (emphasis supplied)". 15. Therefore, I am of the view that the impugned order deserves to be quashed solely on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly the impugned order dated 18. 1989 is quashed. It is open to the respondent to issue fresh notice to the petitioner for the purpose of invoking Section 45(1) of H.R. & C.E. Act and to pass orders on merits and as per law. 16. The writ petition is allowed subject to the above observation. No costs.