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2008 DIGILAW 304 (CAL)

Soma Reddy v. Lt. Governor

2008-03-18

PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY

body2008
Judgment :- Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay, J. The petitioner herein has challenged, the validity and/or legality of the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Andaman & Nicobar Islands on August 3, 2007 on various grounds mentioned in this writ petition 2. The learnedadvocate representing the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition in view of the provision of Section 17(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. Mandal, learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the award published under Section 17(1) is final and cannot be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever in view of the provision of Section 17(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 3. It is true that the legislature has clearly expressed its intention to the effect that the award should be final and cannot be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. But, the aforesaid intention of the legislature cannot curtail the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the event such award of the Tribunal is vitiated by error of law and causing grave miscarriage of justice. 4. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine the validity of an award passed by the Tribunal if the same is challenged on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice or if it is alleged that the said award is perverse or arbitrary in the sense that the same has been passed without any evidence or extraneous, considerations have gone into the making of the award. 5. The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sitalukhiram v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal Cum' Labour Court, Wright Town, Jabalpur and Others AIR 1969 MP 200 specifically refused to hold that the award given by the Tribunal would be final and could not be called in question in any Court in any manner whatsoever. The relevant Paragraph of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is quoted hereunder: "8. It was next contended on behalf of the Colliery Management that the award given by the Tribunal was, as provided by Section 17(2) of the Act, final and could not be called, in question in any Court in any manner whatsoever. The relevant Paragraph of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is quoted hereunder: "8. It was next contended on behalf of the Colliery Management that the award given by the Tribunal was, as provided by Section 17(2) of the Act, final and could not be called, in question in any Court in any manner whatsoever. It is now well settled that such a provision does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to examine and determine whether the provisions of the statute have been complied with." 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of Parry and Co. Ltd., Dare House, Madras v. Commercial Employees Association, Madras and Another AIR 1952 SC 179 : 1952-I-LLJ-769 has specifically accepted the position that the superior Court is not absolutely deprived of the power to issue a writ inspite of imposition of restrictions by any statutory provision. It cannot be disputed that the jurisdiction of the Writ Court to interfere with the order and/or award of the Industrial Tribunal and to grant appropriate relief to the aggrieved party is very wide. Therefore, in the present case, I am unable to allow the aforesaid preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents and reject the same for the reasons discussed hereinbefore. 7. However, going through the award passed by the learned Labour Court, I find that the petitioner herein had tendered his resignation voluntarily on April 17, 1998 and the same was accepted by the competent authority. The learned Tribunal has also accepted the aforesaid factual position. The relevant portion from the award passed by the learned Tribunal is quoted hereunder: "Evidently he had tendered resignation on the ground of his family problems and that was accepted." The learned Tribunal has also held as hereunder: "Perused the resignation letter, which is abundantly clear what for and under what circumstances he did file such resignation. Nothing has transpired that there was any duress or coercion to file it. So the person who had tendered his resignation out of his own volition cannot now deviate from his own version because he did so very consciously." 8. Nothing has transpired that there was any duress or coercion to file it. So the person who had tendered his resignation out of his own volition cannot now deviate from his own version because he did so very consciously." 8. From the records I find that the petitioner herein by the letter dated October 4, 2001 requested the respondent No. 3 to allow him to join duty with immediate effect and for regularization of his absence on medical ground. Surprisingly, the said petitioner did not disclose in the aforesaid written representation that he had tendered resignation from service on April 17, 1998. Even in the event nothing was communicated to the petitioner about the acceptance of his resignation, then the said petitioner should have approached the concerned authority to know about the fate of his resignation instead of remaining silent for a long period subsequent to his resignation. In any event, concealment of fact of resignation in the subsequent written representation dated October 4, 2001 cannot be approved by this Court. Furthermore, the learned Tribunal upon considering the evidence on record specifically held that the petitioner herein had tendered resignation on the ground of family problems and the same was accepted. 9. The aforesaid findings of the learned Tribunal, on the basis of the materials on record, are final and cannot be questioned before this Court in its Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction. 10. For the reasons discussed hereinbefore, I hold that the award passed by the learned Labour Court is neither perverse nor any extraneous consideration has gone into the making of the said award. I am also satisfied that the aforesaid award has been passed by the learned Labour Court upon observing the principles of natural justice. 11. Inthe aforesaid circumstances, I am not inclined to interfere with the aforesaid award passed by the learned Labour Court. Therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs.