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2008 DIGILAW 306 (KAR)

O. K. Devaki v. Standard Chartered Bank

2008-06-19

B.SREENIVASE GOWDA, DEEPAK VERMA

body2008
ORDER Deepak Verma, J. Sri.S.P.Shankar, learned Senior Counsel with Sri.D.Vijayakumar appeared for the petitioners and Sri.Shohit H.Shetty, learned Counsel appeared for respondent No.1 and Sri.H.S.Lingaraj, learned Counsel appeared for respondent No.2. Arguments heard. Record perused. 2. The case has a long and chequered history, but to deal with the same, it is not required to give unnecessary details. However, short details of the case are mentioned herein below: “Husband of petitioner No.1 and father of minor girl, petitioner No.2, Sri.H.R.Basappa, was working as Manager in APCO Concrete Block Industries, Kanakapura Road, Bangalore. His salary was more than Rs.12,00,000/- per annum plus other fringed benefits. Respondent No.1 is M/s. Standard Chartered Bank (hereinafter shall be referred to as the “Bank”) carrying on its Banking operation through out India. In order to allure prospective customers, so as to enable them to have Banking operations with the Bank, it offered customers several incentive benefits. One of such benefit was that whosoever will hold Visa Gold Standard Credit Card (hereinafter shall be referred to as “Credit Card”) issued by the Bank, would automatically get insurance coverage to the extent of 5 lakhs to 15 lakhs looking to the nature of the accident. Application form issued by Bank for grant of credit card and submitted by Shri.H.R.Basappa is marked as Annexure - “A”. Some of the exclusive features of the said Credit Card have been mentioned on the reverse of the form. It mentions that all those customers, who have been issued the Credit Card would also be having accidental insurance coverage. For air accident Rs.15,00,000/-, for rail/road accident Rs.5,00,000/-. Since Shri.H.R.Basappa found it to be more beneficial, he opted for the said Credit Card of the bank. To indemnify the Bank, it had entered into an agreement with respondent No.2, M/s. Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., (hereinafter shall be referred to as Insurer) which in turn was to cover the aforesaid risk of all those card holders, who became members of Visa Gold Standard Credit Card issued by Bank. Bank had paid a total amount of Rs.3,99,16,929-00 to respondent No.2 as premium, for this facility. Annexure - “C” is the copy of Group Personal Accident Policy Schedule. Premium amount paid by Bank would show that insurer had charged almost a sum of four crores from the Bank to cover the risk of its members holding Visa Gold Standard Credit Card. Annexure - “C” is the copy of Group Personal Accident Policy Schedule. Premium amount paid by Bank would show that insurer had charged almost a sum of four crores from the Bank to cover the risk of its members holding Visa Gold Standard Credit Card. Late Shri.H.R.Basappa being financially sound, had also opted for similar type of card issued by State Bank of India, Bangalore Branch, in his favour. The card of State Bank of India had also offered similar incentives to him. Thus he was holding two credit cards at his disposal for use as and when required. Everything was going on well and smoothly for the petitioners and Late Shri.H.R.Basappa till 09.11.2002. On the said date an unfortunate incident took place, while he was coming out from his office and was a pedestrian on the road, situated within the factory premises, to get into his car during lunch break, at that time, he was stabbed several times by his co-worker. After seeing the injuries sustained by him, he was shifted to Hospital for treatment. However, he succumbed to the injuries sustained by him on the same day in the evening. After this accidental death as mentioned hereinabove, the petitioners were constrained to inform the Bank with regard to the factum of his death and reminded it of its sanctimonious obligation to pay to them a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- assured at the time of issuance of card, in case of accidental death; Bank after going through the contents of the letter issued by the petitioners made over the same to insurer which made certain enquiry with regard to cause of death. Thereafter it came to the conclusion that since death of the deceased did not occur either on account of rail, road or air accident, therefore neither the Bank nor the insurer was obliged to pay any sum assured to the deceased. In other words, they repudiated the claim made by petitioners. Since no relief was being granted to the petitioners, they were constrained to file a complaint before the Rural and I Additional District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Bangalore (hereinafter shall be referred to as the “District Forum”). District Forum examined the matter from all angles and thereafter passed an order, allowing the petitioners’ complaint. Relevant and operative part of the order is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “The complaint is allowed. District Forum examined the matter from all angles and thereafter passed an order, allowing the petitioners’ complaint. Relevant and operative part of the order is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “The complaint is allowed. The Opposite parties are directed to pay sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the Complainants towards the sum assured, together with interest at 6% p.a. from the date of complaint till the date of payment. Opposite party 2 being the insurer shall make payment of the above amount to the Complainants within one month from the date of communication of this order. The complainants are also entitled to cost of Rs.1,000/-. 8. Send a copy of this order to both parties free of costs immediately. 9. Pronounced in open Court on this 18th day of August, 2005. Sd/Member Sd/ Member Sd/President Thus as mentioned hereinabove the District Forum was pleased to allow the complaint made by the petitioners herein. Insurer alone, feeling aggrieved by the said order, preferred an appeal before the Karnataka State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bangalore (hereinafter shall be referred to as the “State Commission”). Appeal came to be disposed of on 07.03.2006 and the State Commission was pleased to set aside the order passed by the District Forum and remitted the same to it to decide it afresh after due notice to all the parties. In the light of this appellate order passed by the State Commission, District Forum was obliged to hear the matter again. However after remand, it took contrary view and rejected the claim of the petitioners on 13.09.2006 holding therein that in the earlier order passed by it, there was no reference to the exclusion clause contained in the insurance policy. The omission was an inadvertent mistake by oversight. It further held that on considering the restrictive terms and conditions of the policy, it was of the opinion that opposite parties have rightly repudiated the claim of the complainants. On rejection of their complaint, now it was the turn of the petitioners to challenge the same before the State Commission. The State Commission considering the relevant provisions came to the conclusion that since admittedly deceased had not met with death on account of any bodily injury resulting solely and directly from rail/road/air accident caused by external, violent and visible means, thus such a case would not be covered, for payment of the sum assured to the claimants/petitioners. The State Commission considering the relevant provisions came to the conclusion that since admittedly deceased had not met with death on account of any bodily injury resulting solely and directly from rail/road/air accident caused by external, violent and visible means, thus such a case would not be covered, for payment of the sum assured to the claimants/petitioners. According to the State Commission, death should have been from either of the aforesaid three contingencies, then and only then the legal heirs of the deceased would be entitled to receive compensation, meaning thereby that death should have been caused, only on rail! road/air account, and no other contingency was covered under the terms of the policy. Thus the State Commission proceeded to dismiss the petitioners’ appeal on merits and confirmed the order passed by District Forum.” 3. The petitioners are therefore constrained to challenge the orders of the District Forum as well as the State Commission before us by filing this Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India on variety of grounds. 4. Bank alone has filed its detailed objections to the Writ Petition. The insurer has only adopted the objections, filed by the Bank. They have raised the following preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition apart from challenging the merits of the same: i) That against the order passed by State Commission admittedly the petitioners have a statutory remedy of filing a revision before the National Commission, as contemplated under Section 21-B of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the “Act”) .and not having done so the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative, efficacious and statutory remedy to them. 5. Then they have proceeded to contend that admittedly deceased Basappa had not died on account of air, road or rail accident, therefore the respondents were justified in repudiating the claim of the petitioners as what was assured to the card holder was that if death occurs on account of the aforesaid three contingencies, then only sum assured, thereunder would be paid to the legal heirs. Since death did not occur, on account of the aforesaid three contingencies no liability could be fastened on them. Since death did not occur, on account of the aforesaid three contingencies no liability could be fastened on them. No doubt, it was not a natural death, as it was caused on account of bodily injuries said to have been sustained by the deceased inflicted by a co-worker, which would amount to a homicidal death. In the light of this, they contended that nothing is payable to the petitioners. They have also contended that it was the sole discretion of the respondents to determine the nature of risk covered under the policy and since such type of contingency was not covered, obviously the petitioners are not entitled to receive any compensation. 6. On the strength of the rival contentions as having been submitted by them, we have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. Perused the records. 7. At the outset, before dealing with the merits of the matter, we must also confess that we made every endeavour on our part, with utmost sincerity to convince the parties to reach an amicable settlement, but unfortunately the insurer had taken a stub-born attitude and was not willing to compromise as it may have wide repercussions on many similarly situated cases. We even proceeded to assure that let there be an exgratia payment to the petitioners and whatever order would be passed, would not be treated as precedent for future cases, assuring them to safeguard their interest fully against any future litigation, but they did not come forward to help a widow and hapless minor child. Thus we are proceeding to decide the matter on merits. 8. It has been contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners before us that admittedly deceased Basappa was holding two cards, one issued by State Bank of India and another issued by respondent No.1 - Bank. Terms and conditions of both the cards were almost similar and identical. For the former card also, he was insured for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-. After his death, the petitioners were required to approach the State Bank of India so as to remind them to pay to them a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as agreed to, at the time of issuance of card to him by State Bank of India. They had asked for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to be paid to them as against this card, issued by State Bank of India. They had asked for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to be paid to them as against this card, issued by State Bank of India. Since this request of Rs.5,00,000/- was not acceptable to State Bank of India and its Insurer, United India Insurance Company, the petitioners were compelled to approach the District Forum by filing complaint No.1 061/2004. The said complaint came to be decided by the District Forum on 12.12.2005 and the following order was passed: “The complaint is allowed. Opposite Party No.4 the Insurance Company is directed to make payment of Rs.6,00,000/- to the Complainants with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of complaint till realization. We direct that Opposite Party No.1 to 3 shall pay costs of Rs.l,000/- to the Complainants. Compliance of this Order shall be made within four weeks from the date of communication. 11. Send a copy of this order to both the parties free of cost immediately. 12. Pronounced in open Court on this 12th Day of December, 2005. Sd/Member Sd/Member Sd/President 9. This order was challenged by the Insurer alone before the State Commission. In appeal the present petitioners being respondents were pleased to file a memo mentioning therein that they would restrict the claim in complaint to Rs.3,00,000/- with interest. In view of the said memo filed by the petitioners, a modified order came to be passed by the State Commission. Relevant portion of the order of State Commission is also reproduced hereinbelow: Appellant/OP No.4 is directed to pay Rs.3,00,000/- to the complainant with interest at 6% p.a., from the date of the complaint till realization. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. The appellant/OP No.4 in this appeal has deposited a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-. If the respondent/complainants file a memo for payment, the office is directed to pay the same to the respondent/complainants. Sd/Member Sd/Member Sd/President This would go to show that on similar facts and circumstances, State Bank of India and the Insurer, United India Insurance Company Limited were pleased to honour their commitment given to the card holder, but on same factual scenario, the respondents herein proceeded to repudiate the claim of the petitioners. 10. We have been given to understand that terms and conditions of policies of both the Banks and the insurers were identical and similar. Thus different scales were adopted to deal with the case of the petitioners. 10. We have been given to understand that terms and conditions of policies of both the Banks and the insurers were identical and similar. Thus different scales were adopted to deal with the case of the petitioners. It has therefore been contended by Sri.S.P.Shankar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that it is a fit case for issuance ,of writ of certiorari so that justice be done to the petitioners. Learned Counsel for the respondents have opposed the prayer on the ground that unless all the terms and conditions of the policy of State Bank of India and Insurer, United India Insurance Company, are made available, it cannot be said that respondents have treated petitioners with a different yardstick. More so, to defeat the just and proper claim of the petitioners. 11. It was also contended before us that even though the petitioners have an alternative, efficacious and statutory remedy of preferring a revision before the National Commission, as contemplated under Section 21-B of the Act, but without exhausting the said remedy, they have approached this Court directly. Thus, this Writ Petition is not maintainable on this ground alone. 12. This argument of learned Counsel for the respondent No.2, Sri.H.S.Lingaraj and Sri.Shohit H.Shetty, learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, has been controverted by the petitioners on the ground that the wordings employed in Section 21-B of the Act would show that they are akin to the wordings of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled in law that scope of interference in revision is much narrower than either in the appeal or in a Writ Petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. To buttress this contention further, several judgments of High Courts and the Supreme Court have been put in service before us. Nodboubt, it is true that the petitioners have statutory remedy of preferring a revision before the National Commission under Section 21-B of the Act against the impugned orders, but on that ground alone, it would not be proper for this Court to throw the petitioners at the threshold, on the ground of availability of an alternative, efficacious and statutory remedy of revision available to them. Time and again, Supreme Court has reminded us with regard to the power conferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein the writ of certiorari can be issued and looking to the facts and features of the case, the reliefs claimed, are moulded so as to see that ends of justice are met. State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 . The Constution Bench in the aforesaid case in a terse language held as under: “If therefore, the existence of other adequate legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of a. writ of certiorari and if in a proper case it may be the duty of the superior , Court to issue a writ of certiorari to correct the errors of an inferior Court or Tribunal called upon to exercise judicial or quasi judicial functions and not to relegate the petitioner to other legal remedies available to him and if the superior Court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal, eg., by furnishing security required by the statute, it cannot then be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the superior Court must deny the writ when an inferior Court or Tribunal by discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior Court or Tribunal on appeal or revision”. 13. To contend further that revision cannot be said to be an efficacious, alternative remedy, we have been taken through the various Judgments of the’ Supreme Court reported in Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin and Others Vs. M/s. A.S. Bava, AIR 1968 SC 13 , wherein it has been held in Paras 3 and 4 as under: (3) The learned Counsel for the appellants has raised three points before us: (1) The petitions under Art. 226 were not maintainable as the petitioner did not avail himself of the remedy of revision provided by Section 36 of the Excise Act. (2) The petitioner having availed of the remedy under Section129 of the Customs Act was debarred from challenging the impugned notification dated May 4, 1963. (2) The petitioner having availed of the remedy under Section129 of the Customs Act was debarred from challenging the impugned notification dated May 4, 1963. (3) The impugned notification applying Section129 of the Customs Act was good. (4) There is no force in the first point. First, the point was not taken, in the High Court. Secondly, it is settled that the existence of a remedy by way of revision does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petition under Art. 226. Moreover, the petitioner had alleged that the Collector had no jurisdiction to demand the deposit or duty pending the appeals as the notification dated May 4,1963, was bad in so far as it applied Section129 of the Customs Act. In these circumstances it was not necessary for the petitioner to have filed revisions.” (ii) L. Hirday Narain Vs. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 . Para 12 relevant in this regard is reproduced hereinbelow: “12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date an which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33-A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved far an order correcting the order of the Income-tax Officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard an the merits. The High Court observed that under Sec. 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer is discretionary. If thereby it is intended that the Income-tax Officer has discretion to exercise ‘or not to’ exercise the power to’ rectify, that view is in our judgment erroneous. Section 35 enacts that the Commissioner or Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Income-tax Officer may rectify any mistake apparent from the record. If thereby it is intended that the Income-tax Officer has discretion to exercise ‘or not to’ exercise the power to’ rectify, that view is in our judgment erroneous. Section 35 enacts that the Commissioner or Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Income-tax Officer may rectify any mistake apparent from the record. If a statute invests a public Officer with authority to’ do’ an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative up an him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to’ the case when a party interested and having a right to’ apply moves in that behalf and circumstances far exercise of authority are shown to’ exist. Even if the words used in the statute are prima facie enabling, the Courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right - public or private - of a citizen.” (iii) Rohtas Industries Ltd. and Another Vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union and Others, AIR 1976 SC 425 , wherein it has been held as under: “The expansive and extraordinary power of the High Courts under Article 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person - even a private individual-and be available far any (other) purpose even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Art; 226 in 1963 inserting Art. 226 (1A) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the expressive reference to’ ‘the residence of such person’. The Supreme Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry far timely judicial interdict or mandate.’ The mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has, by and large, been the people’s sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. 14. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it was contended that even if alternative remedy of revision, existed, it would not create an absolute bar in approaching this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.” 15. 14. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it was contended that even if alternative remedy of revision, existed, it would not create an absolute bar in approaching this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.” 15. It was thereafter contended by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners that Article 226 as it stood after Constitution (Forty fourth Amendment) Act 1979, the provision as to alternative remedy has been deleted. Therefore it gives further impetus to the case of the petitioners to contend that this petition is not only maintainable, but it has to be decided on merits also. Chandra Sen Sharma (Dead) Vs. Supdt. Engineer, Hydel (Ganga) Circle, Aligarh and Others, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 622. 16. It was also contended before us, with regard to the judicial perception of the constitutional review as contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To putforth the arguments further in this regard, reliance has been placed on Election Commission of India Vs. Union of India and Others, 1995 Sup (3) SCC 643, wherein it has been held as under: “There are no unreviewable discretions under the constitutional dispensation. The overall constitutional function to ensure that constitutional authorities function to ensure that constitutional authorities function with the sphere of their respective constitutional authority is that of the Courts. Whether the blanket suspension of the electoral process purported in the order dated 2-8-1993 is justiciable on that principle of judicial review is eminently arguable. But one thing seems clear - the jurisdiction of Courts would not extent to issuing directions to the Election Commission for the conduct of particular polls on particular dates independently of the perception by the Commission as to their feasibility and practicability consistent with what may be needed to ensure the purity of the electoral process. The fixing of the dates of polling is a matter for the informed judgment of the Election Commission consistent with its perception of the law and order situation and of the ensurement of the requisite precautionary and remedial measures.” 17. On the other hand, Sri.H.S.Lingaraj appearing for insurer has placed reliance on the judgment D.N. Banerji Vs. The fixing of the dates of polling is a matter for the informed judgment of the Election Commission consistent with its perception of the law and order situation and of the ensurement of the requisite precautionary and remedial measures.” 17. On the other hand, Sri.H.S.Lingaraj appearing for insurer has placed reliance on the judgment D.N. Banerji Vs. P.R. Mukherjee and Others, AIR 1953 SC 58 , to contend that dismissal whether wrongful is a question to be considered by the Tribunal and no case has been made out for interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. He also placed reliance on Miss. Manech Custodji Surjarji Vs. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirzaa, AIR 1976 SC 2446 , to contend that where other identical and comprehensive remedy by way of an appeal to High Court itself is available,. but has not been availed of, circumstances are not extraordinary for exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore on this ground, according to him petition would not be maintainable. 18. Further reliance has been placed on ajudgment Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2003 AIR SCW 930, wherein distinction between Articles 226 and 227 has been highlighted and it has been contended that only in those cases where remedy of revision has been expressly barred by State Enactment, only in such cases a writ petition would lie, under Article 227 of the Constitution where the Court has to exercise, supervisory jurisdiction. It is confined only to see whether inferior Court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In this regard, a judgment passed by learned Single Judge of Madras High Court K.PUDUR PRIMARY AGRICULTURE CO-OP BANK LIMITED. Vs. THE STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMR. & ORS, (2001) CPJ 37, has been relief upon to contend that against the order of State Commission, revision is the only remedy and generally it should not be interfered with under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. Vs. THE STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMR. & ORS, (2001) CPJ 37, has been relief upon to contend that against the order of State Commission, revision is the only remedy and generally it should not be interfered with under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. An order passed by the National Commission, has also been brought to our notice that against the order passed by the State Commission exercising appellate jurisdiction, revisions are maintainable’ and are also being entertained. 20. Considering the aforesaid judgments and facts of the case in hand, we have no doubt in our mind even though that the petitioners had a remedy of filing a statutory revision against the impugned order passed by the State Commission to the National Commission, but the moot question is with regard to competence and jurisdiction of interference. Needless to say, in a revision, jurisdiction becomes not only narrower, but limited also. Unless the case falls strictly within the parameter of the wordings used in Clause B of Section 21 of the Act, interference may not be possible, more so when there is finding of fact recorded by two authorities, whereas in a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the scope is not only wider but larger also, where many questions can be considered and decided so as to do complete justice between the parties. 21. In view of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation to hold that against the order of the State Commission, party if so desires, can avail of the remedy available under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. There is yet another angle to this petition. Order dated 08.02.2008 shows that on the first date of hearing, Writ Petition itself stood admitted and there is long catena of cases of various High Courts and Supreme Court holding therein that once the petition has been admitted, then it is neither proper nor judicial to throw it on the ground of availability of an alternative and efficacious remedy. Thus, on this additional ground, we are of the considered opinion that’ this Writ Petition is maintainable, and that is how we have proceeded to hear the learned Counsel for the parties on merits. 23. Thus, on this additional ground, we are of the considered opinion that’ this Writ Petition is maintainable, and that is how we have proceeded to hear the learned Counsel for the parties on merits. 23. We have already mentioned hereinabove that in identical facts and circumstances, State Bank of India and Insurer, United India Insurance Company Limited, proceeded to honour the commitment made by them to the card holder at the time when he was allured to take the card, but surprisingly enough even though similarly situated, yet the respondents have proceeded to repudiate the claim of the petitioners. This fact was very much within the knowledge of not only the State Commission, but also before the District Forum, but this aspect of the matter, has not been dealt with specifically, so as to examine whether the case of the petitioners could have been rejected on some hyper technical grounds. SKANDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD., Vs. KOKILABEN CHANDRA VADAN AND OTHERS, AIR 1987 SC 1184 . In this it has been held as under: “14. xxx xxx xxx xxx Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract.” 24. It is also pertinent to point out here that when the order of remand was passed by the State Commission to the District Forum vide order dated 07.03.2006, the order passed by the District Forum was set aside and directions was given to dispose of the matter afresh, after due notice to all parties. Even thereafter the Exclusion Clauses have not been considered in its proper perspective, taking a correct legal view of the matter by the District Forum. The provisions of the policy have not been read in consonance with the promise given to the card holder, with regard to.benefits to be accrued to the legal heirs, in case of death of the card holder. It is also to be noted that such benevolent and beneficial provisions should be so construed so as to benefit the card holder and not to defeat just and proper claim. 25. It is also to be noted that such benevolent and beneficial provisions should be so construed so as to benefit the card holder and not to defeat just and proper claim. 25. Much emphasis has been placed on the terms and conditions of the card members especially condition No.(h), which reads as thus: As an additional facility, Card Members are covered by a Group Insurance Policy issued by an Insurance Policy at the Bank’s request which affords Card Member’s personal insurance cover against death by accident and other risks as advised by the Bank periodically. 26. It is also brought to our notice that the insurance policy under the heading of benefits and sub-heading of active credit card holder deals with regard to the pedestrian accident covered under the policy. Thereafter in the same policy, pedestrian accident has been defined as also a public place to contend what would be construed as public place. A judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court LANKA SARMMA Vs. RAJENDRA SINGH AND OTHER, AIR 1984 AP 32 has been placed in this regard, wherein definition of public place contained in Section 2(24) of the Motor Vehicles Act has been considered. Under these circumstances, it has been attempted to impress before us that admittedly the deceased Basappa, had met with homicidal death in a public place while he was trying to reach his car from his office, even though the said road fell within the factory premises and thus he would be covered by the terms and conditions of policy. It was contended that all types of public is allowed to enter the factory premises of APCO Concrete Block Industries, Kanakapura Road, Bangalore, where the deceased was employed and it is open at all times, so that anyone connected with the business activities of APCO Factory could gain access to the same. In view of this, it was submitted that it being an accident caused to pedestrian, the terms and conditions would be applicable to the same. 27. However, this ground. has also been refuted by learned Counsel for the respondents on the ground that the pedestrian accident alone cannot be read separately unless it is read conjointly along with the terms and conditions, which deal with road accident, because it comes under the heading of road accident. It was therefore submitted that this argument cannot hold good. 28. has also been refuted by learned Counsel for the respondents on the ground that the pedestrian accident alone cannot be read separately unless it is read conjointly along with the terms and conditions, which deal with road accident, because it comes under the heading of road accident. It was therefore submitted that this argument cannot hold good. 28. However, we find from the impugned orders passed by both the authorities that the aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been considered by them. Infact, Exclusion Clauses have also not been considered as extensively as it should have been done, so as to see that justice is done between the parties. 29. Since all these aforesaid questions which should have been gone into in greater details by the District Forum and the State Commission have not been considered, we are left with no option but to remand the matter to the District Forum. If these findings would have been there before us, then we would have ourselves considered the matter on merits and in accordance with law. We were therefore greatly handicapped to consider the matter on merits, due to lack of evidence and findings recorded thereunder by both the authorities on the aforesaid contentions. 30. For all these reasons, we are of the considered opinion that it is a fit case which deserves to be remitted to the District Forum for fresh adjudication and for denovo trial after giving adequate and proper opportunities to both sides to contest the matter on merits, and in accordance with law. Thus, impugned orders passed by the State Commission and District Forum are hereby set aside and quashed. Matter stands remitted to the District Forum for fresh adjudication. However, we may clarify that either party would be at liberty to lead further oral evidence in support of their respective contentions. Since the matter is old, we hope and trust that parties would co-operate in disposal of the complaint, at an early date and the District forum would endeavour to decide it as expeditiously as may be possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. Since all parties are already before us, it is not necessary for the District Forum to issue fresh notices. They agree that they would appear before the District Forum on 30.06.2008. Since all parties are already before us, it is not necessary for the District Forum to issue fresh notices. They agree that they would appear before the District Forum on 30.06.2008. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Petition thus stands disposed of with the aforesaid directions.